Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Governor General In Council, New Delhi v. Shrimati Indar Mani .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 25, 1949
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Opinion — Regular First Appeal No. 173 of 1947 (Harnam Singh, J.; S.R. Das, C.J., concurred)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Central Government requisitioned the premises known as the Grand Hotel, Delhi (including fixtures, fittings and furniture) initially by order dated 27 March 1943 under Rule 75(a) of the Defence of India Rules for the period 15 April 1943 to 14 April 1944, and again by order dated 3 April 1944 for a further year from 15 April 1944 to 14 April 1945 and thereafter until further orders.

The recorded owner was Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar (who died during the pendency of the requisition). No agreement as to compensation was reached between the Central Government and Shrimati Indarmani Jatia (widow of the owner). Under clause (b) sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, the Central Government appointed an arbitrator (Mr. S.B. Capoor, I.C.S., District and Sessions Judge, Delhi). Shrimati Indarmani Jatia filed a claim (dated 25 July 1946) alleging entitlement to a stated amount (the record reads "Rs. Page: 1096,000 per month" as recorded in the opinion). The Central Government, in its written statement, sought compensation calculated at rupees 14,443 per annum (equivalently rupees 1,313 per month after its pleaded deductions).

On the parties' pleadings, the arbitrator framed the issue: "What is the amount of compensation to which the respondent is entitled?" The arbitrator made an award (described in the opinion), which was the subject of the present Regular First Appeal and connected cross-objection. The court finally disposed of the appeal and cross-objection, confirming the arbitrator's award as set out below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the amount of compensation payable for the requisition of the Grand Hotel (i.e., how should compensation be assessed under section 19 of the Defence of India Act read with section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894)?
  2. Whether clause "fourthly" of section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (compensation for damage to other property or earnings) applies to this case.
  3. Whether the requisitioning authority becomes a "statutory tenant" such that fair rent (rather than market value) should be the basis of compensation.
  4. Whether the agreement (Exhibit P.1) between Qazi Fazle Azim and Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar constituted a lease (and therefore affected the basis for compensation).
  5. Whether the Rent Controller's order fixing a monthly rent (Rs. 1,313 per mensem) was binding or within jurisdiction, and whether that order should determine compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as reported)

  • Learned counsel Mr. Bishen Narain argued that the requisitioning authority, having taken possession from the owner, became effectively a statutory tenant; therefore compensation should be assessed on the basis of fair rent (citing Province of Bengal v. Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta).
  • He argued that if a statutory-tenant characterization applied, compensation for the period covered by the requisitions should be determined under relevant rent-control provisions (Article 8 of the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 for the first period and clause 7 of the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1914 for the second).
  • He relied on the Rent Controller's order fixing Rs. 1,313 per mensem as fair rent and contended the claimant should be limited to compensation on that basis.
  • He further contended that, if the agreements (Exhibits P.1, P.10 and P.11) were treated as leases, the rents actually realized (and rent-control law) would support a lower compensation than that awarded by the arbitrator.

Respondent's / Claimant's Arguments (as reported)

  • Learned counsel Mr. Shamair Chand maintained that the court, in determining compensation, should consider clause "fourthly" of section 23(1) (i.e., damages for injurious effects on other property or earnings) — effectively arguing for consideration of loss of earnings arising from the requisition.
  • He contended that the agreement Exhibit P.1 was not a lease (i.e., the arrangement should be treated as one where the owner retained effective control/possession), a point relied upon to justify market-value-based compensation rather than rent-based compensation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Shanmugaraya Mudaliar (Privy Council) Explained clause "fourthly" of section 23(1): compensation is payable only to persons interested in the land; if acquisition injuriously affects earnings of a person interested in the land, that person may obtain compensation beyond market value; persons not interested in the land cannot claim on that ground. The court relied on this principle to hold that clause fourthly did not apply in the present case (the court concluded the claimant was not entitled to separate damages under clause fourthly on the facts before it).
Province of Bengal v. Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 416 The decision, on its facts, treated the requisitioning authority "so to say" as a statutory tenant and on that basis assessed compensation by reference to fair rent. The court distinguished this decision: it did not accept a general rule that a requisitioning authority becomes a statutory tenant in all cases. The court noted factual differences (vacant land in that case versus a running hotel here) and refused to adopt fair-rent basis on that ground.
Clare v. Theatrical Properties Ltd. and Westby & Co. Ltd., 1930 A.E.R. 483 Explains that documents using lease-like language may nonetheless create only personal contracts/licences if the substance shows the grantor retains possession or control; words importing "lessee" do not automatically create an interest in land. The court applied the construction principles from this case to Exhibit P.1 and concluded that Exhibit P.1 (and related agreements) were not leases but arrangements where the owner retained effective control — supporting a market-value approach rather than a rent-based approach.
Nabakishore Mandal v. Upendra Kishore Mandal Authority illustrating the appellate burden: appellant must show some balance in his favour to upset the judgment below; appeals based on equal possibilities do not succeed. The court mentioned this precedent in relation to burden on appellant but observed it was unnecessary to invoke the doctrine because, on other grounds, the appellant failed.
Fakrunissa v. Izarus Sadik Similarly concerned with appellate burden and the requirement that an appellant show a sufficient basis to disturb the decision below. The court referenced this decision in the same context as Nabakishore Mandal, but did not treat it as necessary to dispose of the appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, grounded in the statutory framework and the facts as found by the arbitrator and the evidence:

  1. Statutory framework: The court held that compensation for requisition is governed by section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, read with section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (with adaptations appropriate to temporary acquisition). The arbitrator was appointed under section 19 where no agreement as to compensation had been reached.
  2. Basis of compensation: Section 23(1) requires regard to the "market value" as the primary basis. The court explained (consistent with authorities) that "market value" means the price a willing buyer would give to a willing seller; accordingly, the principal question was the market value of the requisitioned property as at 15 April 1943.
  3. Clause "fourthly" (damage to other property / earnings): The court considered the claimant's contention that clause fourthly should be applied. Relying on Secretary of State v. Shanmugaraya Mudaliar, the court held clause fourthly does not extend compensation to persons not interested in the land and that clause fourthly only permits additional compensation to the owner where the acquisition injuriously affects his earnings as a person interested in the land. On the facts, the court found the case did not come within clause fourthly.
  4. Whether the requisitioning authority was a "statutory tenant": The appellant relied on Province of Bengal (Calcutta) where, on the facts, the court had treated the requisitioning authority "so to say" as a statutory tenant and applied fair rent. The present court distinguished that decision: it did not lay down a general legal rule creating a statutory tenancy upon requisition; the facts differed (that case involved vacant land, whereas here the hotel was a running business). Importantly, the Defence of India Act and Rules contained no provision making the requisitioning authority a statutory tenant.
  5. Character of the agreement Exhibit P.1 (lease or licence): The court set out the legal test — substance over form — and applied it to Exhibit P.1 (which contained many operative clauses governing receipts, accounts, management, reservations of certain rooms and rights, and arrangements for payment to the owner). Applying the construction principles in Clare v. Theatrical Properties Ltd., the court concluded that Exhibit P.1 (and related Exhibits P.10 and P.11) did not create a lease because the owner retained effective control and many incidents of possession and enjoyment were not transferred exclusively to Qazi Fazle Azim. Thus the arrangement was not a transfer of possession in the sense required for a lease.
  6. Determination of market value on evidence: The court accepted evidence that the owner's income from the hotel for the year ending March 1943 aggregated to Rs. 3,600 per mensem (monthly), and that receipts under the agreement for a specified earlier period amounted to Rs. 49,205/6/6 (December 1941 to 8 November 1942) as shown in Exhibit P.4 (no rebuttal). The court considered the income in the year immediately preceding requisition as a criterion relevant to market-value assessment under section 23(1).
  7. Arbitrator's deductions and award: The arbitrator allowed Rs. 100 per mensem for house-tax and annual repairs and concluded that Rs. 3,500 per mensem was fair compensation. The court found no dispute that the allowance for house-tax and repairs was inappropriate or excessive and accepted the arbitrator's calculations.
  8. Rent Controller's order and jurisdiction: The appellant relied on an order of the Rent Controller (dated 19 April 1944) fixing Rs. 1,313 per mensem as fair rent. The court rejected the reliance: first, because the statutory characterization of the requisitioning authority as tenant was not legally sustainable; second, because the owner had appealed the Rent Controller's order to the Chief Commissioner, who allowed the appeal and observed that proceedings under section 19 of the Defence of India Act were the appropriate course. The court therefore held the Rent Controller's order to be without jurisdiction and of no legal effect for the purposes of determining compensation in this requisition case.
  9. Conclusion on compensation: On the statutory test, the examination of the documentary arrangements, the factual findings on income, and the arbitrator's permitted deductions, the court concluded that the arbitrator's award of Rs. 3,500 per mensem from 15 April 1943 was correct and should be confirmed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the appeal, confirmed the arbitrator's award, and ordered that compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,500 per mensem be paid to Shrimati Indarmani Jatia (the respondent) for the period the property remained under requisition. The court also disallowed the cross-objections preferred by the respondent and directed that the parties bear their own costs in the High Court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The arbitrator's compensation award (Rs. 3,500 per month from 15 April 1943 for the duration of requisition) stands and is payable to the claimant, Shrimati Indarmani Jatia.
  • On broader legal questions: The court declined to adopt a general rule that requisition gives rise to a statutory tenancy for the purpose of assessing compensation; it distinguished the Province of Bengal decision on its facts. The court also reaffirmed that compensation for requisition under section 19 (Defence of India Act) must be determined with regard to section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and market value principles. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general precedent beyond those conclusions drawn from the statutory scheme and applied authorities.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and language of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

Harnam Singh, J.:— This order disposes of Regular First Appeal No. 173 of 1947 and connected cross-objection.

2. By order No. Dy. 1414/43—Camp (B), of the Government of India, Department of Labour, dated 27th of March, 1943 under Rule 75(a) of the Defence of India Rules, the premises known as Grand Hotel, Delhi, together with all fixtures, fittings and furniture, therein were requisitioned for the use of the Central Government from the 15th of April, 1943 to the 14th of April, 1944. Again, by order No. Dy. 2431/44—Camp (B), dated the 3rd of April 1944, the Government of India, Department of Labour, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 75(a) of the Defence of India Rules, requisitioning the said premises together with all fixtures, fittings and furniture therein for a further period of one year from the 15th of April 1944 to the 14th of April 1945 and thereafter until further orders of the Central Government. The owner was Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar, resident of Khurja, who died during the pendency of the requisition. No agreement having been reached between the Central Government and Shrimati Indarmani Jatia, widow of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar, regarding the amount of compensation payable in respect of the requisitioned premises, the Central Government in pursuance of clause (b) sub-section (I) of section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, appointed Mr. S.B Capoor, I.C.S, District and Sessions Judge, Delhi to act as arbitrator in the case. Now, Shrimati Indarmani Jatia put in a claim on the 25th of July 1946 before the arbitrator alleging that she was entitled to recover Rs. Page: 1096,000 per month as compensation for the compulsory requisition of the premises known as the Grand Hotel. In the written statement put in by the Central Government it was, however, pleaded that after deducting rupees 1,313 on account of annual repairs and maintenance of the premises fair compensation for the premises was rupees 14,443 per annum. In other words the Central Government alleged in the written statement that rupees 1,313 per month was fair compensation for the requisitioned premises. On the pleadings of the parties the arbitrator framed the following issue:—

3. What is the amount of compensation to which the respondent is entitled?

4. Now, the law applicable in such cases is contained in section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, read with section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The relevant portion of section 19(1) provides:—

“19(1) Where by or under any rule made under this Act any action is taken of the nature described in sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, there shall be paid compensation, the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles, hereinafter set out, that is to Say—

(a) Where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement it shall be paid to accordance with such agreement.

(b) Where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government snail appoint as arbitrator a person qualified under sub-section (3) of section 220 of the above-mentioned Act for appointment as a Judge of a High Court.

(c) The arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to:

(i) the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as the same can be made applicable: and

(ii) whether the acquisition is of a permanent or temporary character.”

5. section 19, Defence of India Act, does not in terms speak of requisition. It, however, contemplates the case of “temporary acquisition”, see clause (e), sub-clause (ii) of section 10(1). In view of that provision in the Defence of India Act and of the provisions of section 299, sub-section (2) read with sub-section (5), Government of India Act, it is cleat that section 19, Defence of India Act, governs “requisitions” also and by reason of clause (e) thereof compensation has to be awarded to the owner of the premises requisitioned and that on the basis of section 23(1), Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with such adaptations as the nature of the case may require. Again, as sub-section (2) of section 23, Land Acquisition Act, has not been made applicable, the owner would not be entitled to the statutory compensation of fifteen per cent.

6. Now, leaving aside clauses secondly to sixthly of section 23(1) which are not material to the case before us, the position is that the compensation for the requisition of the Grand Hotel has to be paid to the claimant on the basis of the market value thereof on the 15th April, 1943.

7. The expression “Market value” contained in section 23, sub-section (1), clause first, has not been defined in the Act. But no material difficulty has arisen in the interpretation of the phrase “market value” as the decisions of several High Courts are at one in giving it the reasonable meaning of the Page: 110price of willing buyer would give to a willing seller, for the properly acquired. That being the situation, the sole, question for determination in the present case is the amount of compensation to be paid to Shrimati Indermani Jatia on the basis of the rule laid down in section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

8. Before proceeding further I may here notice the contention raised by Mr. Shamair Chand, learned counsel for the complainant-respondent, that the court in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the requisitioned property has also to take into consideration he provisions of clause fourthly of section 23(1) of the Act. Clause fourthly reads:—

“fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously effecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings”.

9. This clause came up for consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Shanmugaraya Mudaliar1. In that case. Lord Hobhouse said:—

“No compensation is tendered by the Collector or ordered by the Act, except to persons interested in the land. If the acquisition injuriously affects the earnings of the person interested, he is to obtain further compensation beyond the market-value of the land. But no compensation is given to persons not interested in the land, on the ground that their earnings may be effected by the change of ownership, or indeed on any ground.”

10. That being so, the owner is entitled to claim damages for loss of earnings if he carries on some business in the requisitioned premises and by virtue of the requisition he is deprived of his profits by reason of the fact that be cannot find any other place where he can carry on the business in which he was engaged can the requisitioned premises. But, to give the market value of the land and in addition, compensation for loss which, the claimant say's, has happened to him from being prevented from taking the corpus of the land would really be giving the value land twice over. In this view of the case, I find that present case does not come within clause fourthly of section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

11. Mr. Bishen Narain, learned counsel for the appellant contends that inasmuch as the requisitioning authority acts the possession from the owner and becomes, so to say, a statutory tenant the basis of compensation must, therefore, be fair rent. He bases himself on the observations in the Province of Bengal v. Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta A.I.R 1946 Cal. 416. In that case Miner and Akram, JJ. said:

“We have already held that the effect of a requisition under the Defence of India Rules is to deprive the owner of his possession. He must, therefore, get the value of his possession. Looking from another aspect the requisitioning authority gets the possession from the owner and becomes, so to say, a statutory tenant. The basis of compensation must therefore be fair rent and we hold accordingly.”

12. The final step in the argument is that if the requisitioning authority became a statutory tenant of Rai Bahadur Seta Ganga Sagar with effect from the date of the requisition, compensation for the period covered by the first requisition order would be on the basis of Article 8 of the New Delhi House Rent. Control, Order, 1939 and compensation for the period covered by the second requisition order would be on the basis of clause Page: 1117 of the Delhi Refit Control Ordinance, 1914. I fail to appreciate the force of the contention raised.

13. Now, Province of Bengal v. Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta A.I.R 1946 Cal. 416 does not lay down that the requisitioning authority is a statutory tenant of the owner whose property has been requisitioned. All that is said is that the requisitioning authority becomes, so to say, a statutory tenant. In other words for the purpose of determining the compensation under section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Court on the facts of that particular case regarded the requisitioning authority as if it were a tenant. Again the requisitioned property in Province of Bengal v. Board of Trustees far the Improvement of Calcutta A.I.R 1946 Cal. 416 comprised a vacant piece of land measuring more or less 412 bighas of standard measurement and it was held that on requisition the owner lost his possession only which was transferred to the requisitioning authority. That is not so in the present case, for at the time of the first requisition the requisitioned property was a running hotel under the agreement made between Qazi Fazle Azim on the one part and Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar on the other part, on the 17th of September 1941. Further although it is well-known that the relationship of landlord and tenant may be created by the operation of a statute, irrespective of the intention of the parties, that, relationship does not come into being if the statute does not make a provision in that behalf. In England, by section 39 and the provisions of Part VII of the First Schedule of the Law of Property Act, 1925, all land which immediately before the commencement of that Act was vested in a first or only mortgagee for an estate in fee simple in possession was made to vest in such mortgagee for a term of 3000 years and by section 85, sub-section 2, any purported conveyance of an estate in fee simple by way of mortgage made after the commencement of the Act operates in the case of a first mortgage as a dismiss of the land for a term of 3000 years. There is, however, no provision in the Defence of India Act, 1939 or the Rules made thereunder making the requisitioning authority a statutory tenant of the owner of the requisitioned property.

14. Be that as it may, I think the argument raised by Mr. Bishen Narain raises a limited point. That point is that the requisitioning authority became, a tenant under Article 2(4) of the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 or under Clause 2(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944. Clause 2(4) of the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 reads:—

“2(4). ‘tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a house and includes a person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour”.

15. Clause 2(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944 runs:—

“2(d). ‘tenant’ means a person who takes on rent any premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person dependent on him or in whom be is interested, but does not include a Collector of rents or any middle man who takes or has taken any premises on lease with a view to subletting them to another person.”

16. Clearly, the requisitioning authority does not come within any one of the two provisions set out above. In such cases there is no letting of the property to the requisitioning authority.

17. Mr. Bishen Narain next contends that on the date of the requisition the requisitioned property was on lease with Qazi Fazle Azim on the foot of the registered agreement Exhibit P. 1, made on the 17th of September Page: 1121941 and that being so, fair rent of the premises under the law then in force ought to be the basis of compensation. Mr. Shamair Chand on the other band, urges that the agreement, Exhibit P. 1, made on the 17th of September, 1941 is not a lease.

18. In deciding whether the agreement, P. 1, amounts to a lease, regard must be had to the substance of the agreement and if the effect of the agreement is to give the holder the exclusive right of occupation of the property, though subject to certain reservations, or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is a lease; but if the contract is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms, while it remains in the possession and control of the owner, it is a licence. In other words, the employment of words appropriate to a lease will not prevent the grant from being a licence merely, if from the whole document it appears that the possession of the property was to remain with the granter.

19. With these prefatory remarks I now pass on to the consideration of the substance of the grant covered by Exhibit P. 1. The opening words of Exhibit P. 1 are:—

“A building known as Grand Hotel, situate at 2, Under hill Road, Delhi comprising 35 rooms, viz., bed rooms, bathrooms, dressing rooms in addition to dinning room and drawing room, 19 moor garages and 28 servant quarters, fitted with electric, hot and cold and flush systems, with hotel furniture, one copy of the list whereof signed by the parties is with each of the parties owned and possessed by the second party has been taken on rent by me the first party from the owner, for a period of three years from the 1st August, 1941, for running a hotel, on the terms noted below…..”

20. Then follow 26 clauses of the agreement and the concluding clause 27 provides:—

“27. We both the patties without undue pressure accept all the above-mentioned terms. ??? the second party, will not be competent to increase the rent or eject the tenant till expiry of the above-mentioned term provided I receive the rent. The rent of Rs. 5,000 per annum and electric, water and house-taxes and repair charges, etc., come to Rs. 1000 per annum.

Hence these few words by way of a lease in the form of an agreement for a period of truce years, for Rs. 6,000 per annum have been written so that the same may serve as an authority and be of use in time of need”.

21. On first sight, there is a good deal to be said in favour of the contention raised, but on a close perusal of the agreement I am of the view that the use of the words “lease”, “tenant” end “rent” do, not bring the agreement within the definition of “lease”. The properties covered by the agreement, Exhibit P. 1 fall in two groups. The first group comprises 35 bed rooms, bath rooms, dressing rooms in addition to dinning room and drawing room while the second group comprises 19 motor garages and 28 servant quarters. With regard to the property coming within the first group, provision is made in clauses Nos. 1 to 3, 6 to 12 and 16 to 23 of the agreement, while provision is made with regard to property falling within the second group in clause 24 of the agreement. Clause 24 provides:—

“24. I, the first party will give on rent motor garages or servant quarters with the approval of the second party and pay eight annas per rupee on the amount of rent to him”.

22. Now, with regard to the property failing in the first group, the agreement provides that an employee of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar shall receive the entire amount of visitors' bills and other income and if any visitor makes payment of the bill by a cheque the employee of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar shall be entitled to receive payment under his own signatures without getting the cheque endorsed by Qazi Fazle Azim. Clause 11 of the agreement then provides Qazi Fazle Azim will send a daily report regarding the daily visits by the visitors, receipt of the dues and the rent settled with visitors at his own expense to Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar at Khurja, after getting the same signed by his employee. Again, Qazi Fazle Azim undertook not to let a room to any visitor for less than Rs. 4 per day or to a permanent customer for less than Rs. 100 per mensem and in case he did so he was liable for the deficiency under the agreement. In the case of visitors living on monthly or daily basis without board, Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar was to be paid eight annas per rupee instead of six annas per rupee out of the entire income. The agreement further provides that on account of any tea or dinner party in the hotel on the dinner bills of the persons other than the visitors Re. -/1/6 per rupee will be paid to Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar.

23. As stated above, an employee of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar was authorised to receive the entire amount of the visitors' bills and other income and clause to provided that out of the amounts received, the employee of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar was to deduct the entire amount due to the Rai Bahadur and pay the balance to Qazi Fazle Azim.

24. With respect to the management of the hotel, Qazi Fazle Azim agreed to run the hotel in every season and in case he closed it he was liable to pay rent for the remaining period at the rate of Rs. 500, per month. The electric and water connections in the hotel were to stand in the name of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar during the continuance of the arrangement under the agreement. Finally, clause 26 provided that in case Qazi Fazle Azim violated any of the terms or the agreement. Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar was competent to get electric and water connections disconnected and to cancel the agreement and further to recover the entire arrears with interest of Re. 1 per cent per mensem, as also the rent for the remaining period at the rate of Rs. 500 per month from Qazi Fazle Azim.

25. The question that arises for determination is whether regard being had to the substance of this agreement it can be said that the grant in question amounts so a lease.

26. A similar point came up for examination in Clare v. Theatrical Properties Ltd. and West by and Co. Ltd. 1930 A.E.R 483 In that case the opening words of the document were these:—

“The lessor doth hereby demise and grant unto the lessee the free and exclusive use of all the refreshment rooms, bars, cloak rooms and wine cellars of the theatre and all the other rooms and offices thereof now in use by and in the occupation of the lessee his contractors, servants or agents for the purpose only of the supply to and the accommodation of the visitors to the theatre and for no other purpose whatsoever including the sole and exclusive privilege of advertising and letting spaces for advertisements in and about the said bars and refreshment rooms and upon all the programmes sold within the theatre and also the exclusive right of selling in accordance with these presents in the theatre all such programmes of the entertainment then being given at the theatre and books of words and music Page: 114as may be required for the audience of the theatre and also the exclusive right to let or sell opera glasses and to sell in or about the said cloak rooms and the theatre photographs, scent and flowers and such other articles as may from time to time be usually sold at first class theatres in the West End of London. To hold the same unto the lessee for the term of 21 years from December 25, 1919. Yielding and paying therefor the sum of £ 25 per week…………only out of the profits to be made by the lessee.”

27. Then there were a number of covenants, ending with the definition clause stating that the terms lessor and lessee should include their executors, administrators and assigns. On these facts Lord Wright, M.R, said:—

“Words which include in the term ‘lessees, his executors, administrators and assigns, are not prima facie applicable when what is dealt with is a personal contract or a mere license, I cannot attach to there words any meaning which would import the sense that what was being transferred was an interest in land. I think, on the contrary, that this is not a document which creates an estate in land, but merely one which is a personal contract between the parties named therein and is only enforceable among parties between whom there is privity of contract”.

28. That case went to the House of Lords and the Earl of Halsbury, L.C, gave judgment to the same effect and pointed out at page 652, that:—

“Those who drew up the documents have used words inappropriate to the particular thing with which they were dealing. But they are not words of art and it is frankly and most properly conceded that we must, if we can, find out from the language of the instrument, having regard to the relations between the parties and the object which was on the face of the instrument apparent, what were the real intentions of the parties. And really but for the extremely confused and inaccurate use of technical words from time to time in the course of these instruments the object is clear enough. The lessee of a theatre is making a bargain with a refreshment contractor and he wants proper accommodation for those whom he invites to his theatre to be provided by some person who shall preside over and have the command and the profits of the refreshment department of the theatre. The mode in which the parties have contracted is that which really makes the difficulty. But when one looks at the whole thing there is not one word which necessarily, as a matter of art, decides the question.”

29. Looking at the whole instrument and seeing the relations between the parties Earl of Halsbury, L.C, came to the conclusion that the decision which was arrived at by the Courts below was correct and that there were nothing in the language of the instrument which prevented the Court from carrying out the real intention of the parties.

30. Applying the rules of construction laid down in Clore v. Theatrical Properties Ltd. and West by and Co. Ltd. 1930 A.E.R 483 to the facts of the present case, I find that the terms of the agreement, Exhibit P. 1, are inconsistent with the agreement being an agreement to lease. The effective control and possession of the motor garages and servant quarters remained with Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar and in the arrangement with respect to the running of the hotel Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar was given the dominant position. Clause 13 of the agreement provided that robin No. 25 completely fitted with electric fan and light with two motor-garages and one servant quarter was to remain with Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar or his relations and employees, while the manager of the hotel and Qazi Fazle Azim were Page: 115to be given one room each free of rent on the condition that Qazi Fazle Azim will not allow his son to visit the hotel.

31. Now, from the definition of “lease” in section 105, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 it is clear that the essential feature of a lease is that it is a transfer of a right to enjoy immoveable property for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised. Indeed, the fundamental conception of a lease is that it is the separation of the right of possession from ownership and though the section uses the word “enjoy” instead of the word “possession” there is no authority for holding that it contemplates the exclusion of possession when it refers to enjoyment. The word “enjoy” must, therefore, be taken to include possession. No doubt section 108(b) which deals with the lessor's duty to put the lessee in possession of the property, is subject to the opening words of the section under which the parties can exclude the operation of any particular clause by express contract. But this only means that the lessor's duty of putting the lessee in possession can be excluded by express contract. It does not mean that the parties can agree that the lessee is to have no right of possession. If they do so, then the transaction would not be a lease. That being so, I think that the transfer of a mere right to the usufruct of the property without the right of possession will not be a lease.

32. It is then said by the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent that in appeals the burden of showing that the judgment appealed from is wrong lies upon the appellant. If all he can show is nicely balanced calculation which lead to the equal possibility of the judgment on either the one side or the other being right, be has not succeeded. In other words, in every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellant to show some reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed, there must be some balance in his favour, when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. In this connection the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Nabakishore Mandal v. Upendra Kishore Mandal4 and Fakrunissa v. Izarus Sadik5, might be seen. It is, however, not necessary to invoke, that doctrine against the appellant in the present case because, for reasons that have already been stated, I think that the appellant has failed.

33. For all these reasons, I find that the agreement Exhibit P. 1, between Qazi Fazle Azim and Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar did not amount to a lease. For similar reasons, agreements, Exhibits P. 10 and P. 11 do not amount to leases. Indeed, the arrangement under Exhibit P. 1 proceeds on the basis of the provisions of the agreements Exhibits P. 10 and P. 11.

34. Giving the matter my anxious consideration, I find that on the 15th of April, 1943 when the Grand Hotel was requisitioned by the Central Government, the Grand Hotel was being run by Qazi Fazle Azim and Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar on the conditions set out in the agreement, Exhibit P. 1 and that the market value of the requisitioned property would be the price that Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar might reasonably expect from a willing transferee if he was willing and not obliged to part with the premises in favour of that transferee.

35. Now, there is evidence that during the year ending with March, 1943 the income of Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar from the Grand Hotel aggregated to Rs. 3600 per mensem and that from December, 1941 to the 8th of November, 1942 Rai Bahadur Ganga Sagar received from Qazi Fazle Page: 116Azim Rs. 49,205/6/6 under the various clauses of the agreement Exhibit P. 1. The details of income are set out in the statement of account, Exhibit P. 4, proved by Harpershad P.W 6. There is no rebuttal of that evidence. In my view, the income of the Rai Bahadur derived from the Grand Hotel during the year immediately preceding the date of requisition is a certain criterion for the fixation of compensation under section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. That income, as stated above, comes to Rs. 3600 per mensem approximately. From this income the arbitrator has found that deduction should be made for the liability of the owner to pay house-tax and annual repairs. The arbitrator has allowed Rs. 100 per mensem on these accounts and has come to the conclusion that Rs. 3500 per month is the fair compensation to be awarded to the claimant for the period of requisition. There is no dispute in the present proceedings' that the amount allowed for house-tax and annual repairs is not sufficient or that it is excessive.

36. Then if was pressed upon us by Mr. Bishen Narain that the Rent Controller had fixed on 1 he 19th of April, 1944 Rs. 1313 per mensem as the fair rent of the property and that being the case, the claimant could only be a warded compensation on that basis. I am not impressed with the argument raised for in the first place the argument proceeds upon the contention that the requisitioning authority became a tenant of Rai Bahadur Ganga Sagar with effect from the 5th of April, 1943. As shown above, that contention is not sustainable in law. In the second place, Rai Bahadur Seth Ganga Sagar preferred an appeal to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi from the decision of the Rent Controller and in that case the Chief Commissioner, Delhi while allowing the appeal observed:—

“I do not think it necessary to come to a conclusion whether the Controller's order under appeal was or was not without jurisdiction. In any case, even if the Controller has jurisdiction in the case, it seems to me that there was no need and no occasion for him in this case to take proceedings under clause 5 of the Order. What was needed was, clearly, for the appropriate authority to take proceedings under section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

37. On the finding reached by me that neither Qazi Fazle Azim nor the requisitioning authority was a tenant within Article 2(4) of the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 or within clause 2(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance 1944, I hold that the order passed by the Rent Controller was without jurisdiction and the appellant in the present proceedings can take no benefit of what the Rent Controller said on the 19th of April, 1944 in order No. RC/406/427. In any case, the Chief Commissioner having allowed the appeal from the order of the Rent Controller, the order passed by the Rent Controller on the 11th April, 1944 has no existence in the eye of law.

38. But it was said that even if the agreements Exhibits P. 10, P. 11 and P. 1 were leases the appeal must fail. In these documents the rent fixed varied in accordance with the conditions of business. Now, taking exhibit P. 1 to be a lease the monthly rent that Rai Bahadur Ganga Sagar in fact realized for the premises in question in the year 1942–1943 was rupees 3600 odd considering that Exhibits P. 10 and P. 11 provided for variations in rent in accordance with the conditions of business it is clear that rent at rupees 3600 per mensem for the premises in question was permissible in 1942–1943 under the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 and the Delhi Rent Page: 117Control Ordinance, 1944. Agreement Exhibit P. 10 was made on the 14th of June, 1936 and was to remain in force till the 30th of September, 1940 while agreement Exhibit P. 11 was made on the 20th of August, 1939 and was in force till the 17th of September, 1941 when agreement Exhibit P. 1 was made.

39. For the foregoing reasons, I confirm the order of the arbitrator fixing the compensation at Rs. 3500 per mensem from the 15th of April, 1943.

40. In the result, compensation at rupees 3500 per mensem will be paid to Shrimati Indarmani Jatia respondent for the period that the property remained under requisition.

41. Finding as I do, that the conclusion to which the arbitrator has come is the only proper conclusion to be drawn from the facts stated in the case, I disallow the cross-objections preferred by Shrimati Indarmani Jatia. Considering, however, the circumstances of the case and the fact that both the appeal and the cross-objections fail, I leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.

42. S.R Das, C.J:— I agree.

43. Appeal dismissed.