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Ganesh v. State Of U.P

Allahabad High Court
May 31, 2012
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Concise and Structured Summary of the Opinion — State v. Dinesh (Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was preferred by two brothers, Ganesh and Dinesh, aggrieved by their conviction under Section 307/34 IPC and sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment recorded by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia, in S.T. No. 156 of 1980 (impugned judgment dated 29.8.1981).

The prosecution case, as per the FIR and witnesses at trial, arose from an incident on 27.6.1979 at about noon in village Hathauz. The injured (P.W.1 Pawan Kumar) was tilling his land with his father Rameshwar (P.W.3) and two labourers (Videshi and Banarasi, the latter P.W.2). The two appellants approached armed with a lathi and a spear (ballam) and forbade them from tilling. When P.W.1 refused, Dinesh reportedly caught hold of him from behind and Ganesh delivered a spear thrust to his chest. The incident was witnessed by the persons present and the injured and his father lodged an FIR the same day.

The injured was medically examined the same day (medical report Ext. Ka.8 noted an incised wound on the chest caused by a sharp pointed weapon and recorded the injury as fresh; patient was conscious). Investigation included seizure of blood-soaked attire, site inspection, and eventual arrest of accused Dinesh on 4.8.1979; the charge-sheet was filed thereafter and the case was committed to Sessions (S.T. No. 156 of 1980).

At trial the prosecution led five witnesses (including the injured, an independent eyewitness Banarasi, the informant father, the investigating officer, and the medical officer) and documentary exhibits (FIR, chik FIR, GD entry, medical report, site plan, and material exhibit). The trial court convicted both appellants under Section 307/34 IPC and sentenced them to 4 years RI. The present appeal challenged that conviction and sentence; when the appeal was called no counsel appeared for the appellants, so an amicus curiae was appointed to assist.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants possessed the specific intention or knowledge to commit murder, which is an essential ingredient of an offence under Section 307 IPC.
  2. If the requisite intention for Section 307 IPC is not established, whether the appellants' conduct is otherwise punishable under Section 324/34 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapon).
  3. What sentence is appropriate in the circumstances, considering the nature of the offence, evidence, and mitigating factors (including time elapsed and period of incarceration already undergone).

Arguments of the Parties

Amicus Curiae (for the appellants)

  • Contended that on the evidence (oral and documentary) the appellants' guilt does not go beyond Section 324 IPC and conviction under Section 307 IPC is unsustainable.
  • Pointed out that the injury was simple in nature (single incised wound), with no repetition of blows, no internal damage shown, and the doctor did not describe injuries as grievous or life‑threatening.
  • Argued the incident was sudden and unpremeditated (spur-of-the-moment) arising from a petty dispute over tilling land; therefore absence of the specific intention to kill.
  • Noted that if there had been intention to kill, more forceful or repeated blows would have been expected and the co‑accused would likely have used his lathi; those acts were not established.
  • Also raised a subsidiary contention of possible false implication due to enmity, but did not emphasize this point heavily.

Assistant Government Advocate (for the State)

  • Supported the trial court's conviction, submitting this was a daylight incident and the injury sustained was commensurate with the allegations; there was no motive for witnesses to falsely implicate the appellants.
  • However, on the precise question of which offence the evidence established, the AGA agreed with the amicus curiae that Section 324 may be the appropriate provision (i.e., he did not press insistence on sustaining Section 307 beyond challenge).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of M.P. v. Kashiram ((2009) 4 SCC 26 : AIR 2009 SC 1642) It is sufficient for Section 307 that an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof exists; the nature of injury (simple or grievous) is not determinative — the court must examine whether the act was done with the requisite intention or knowledge. The court cited this to underscore that intention, not the nature of injury, is the core criterion for Section 307; then applied that test to conclude intention to kill was not proved on these facts.
State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil ((1983) 2 SCC 28 : AIR 1983 SC 305) Reiterates that simple or minor injury does not preclude conviction under Section 307 if intention is proved; intention/knowledge is the determinative question. Used as part of the line of authorities establishing the legal principle that intention is the key; the court evaluated whether such intention existed here and found it lacking.
Girija Shanker v. State of U.P. ((2004) 3 SCC 793) Affirms the principle that intention/knowledge, not merely injury severity, determines applicability of Section 307. Included among authorities confirming how courts are to assess intention; informed the court's analysis on whether Section 307 was attracted.
R. Parkash v. State of Karnataka ((2004) 9 SCC 27 : AIR 2004 SC 1812) Further authority on Section 307: intention and overt act are required; injuries’ nature is not the sole test. Relied upon as supporting precedent for the legal test applied by the court in assessing whether intention to kill was present.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem alias Chamaru ((2005) 5 SCC 554 : AIR 2005 SC 3996) Authority reinforcing that intention/knowledge is the determinant for Section 307 and that injury nature alone cannot displace that requirement. Referenced to support the proposition that absence of proved intention undermines a conviction under Section 307; the court applied this proposition to the facts.
State of M.P. v. Imrat ((2008) 11 SCC 523 : AIR SC 2008 2967) Holds that conviction under Section 307 is justified where intent coupled with overt act is present; bodily injury capable of causing death need not be inflicted. Cited to emphasize that the court must determine intent from circumstances and not from injury severity alone; used in applying the test to the present incident.
Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar (AIR 2007 SC (Suppl) 488) Explains that (a) injury receipt is not a pre‑requisite for Section 307, and (b) the primary ingredient is intention or knowledge; illustrates by reference to an illustration in Section 307. Invoked to reiterate that absence of intention or knowledge precludes Section 307; guided the court's conclusion that intention to murder was not proved here.
Parsuram Pandey v. State of Bihar ((2004) 13 SCC 189 : AIR 2004 SC 5068) Summarizes that two ingredients for Section 307 are (a) intention/knowledge to commit murder and (b) doing of an act towards it; intention must be inferred from relevant circumstances (weapon, place of injury, nature of injury, surrounding facts). The court used this framework to examine the facts (single spontaneous blow, no prior enmity, absence of repeated blows) and inferred that the requisite intention was missing; thus Section 307 could not stand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two linked stages: (A) assessment of the prosecution's proof of presence and assault, and (B) examination of whether the essential ingredient of intention to kill (for Section 307 IPC) was established.

A. Credibility and proof of assault and presence:

  • The court found the presence of appellants at the scene and that an assault occurred was established by the prosecution evidence. The eyewitness Banarasi (P.W.2) was treated as an independent and credible witness whose testimony supported material aspects of the prosecution case and was not successfully discredited in cross‑examination.
  • The injured (P.W.1) and the informant (P.W.3), though related and thus interested, corroborated each other and the independent witness, lending credence to the prosecution narrative. Medical evidence (Ext. Ka.8) corroborated that a fresh incised wound caused by a sharp pointed weapon existed.
  • On these bases the court concluded that the prosecution had successfully proved the appellants' presence and assault — i.e., the actus reus of an assault causing hurt by a dangerous weapon was established.

B. Whether intention to cause death (mens rea for Section 307) was proved:

  • The court emphasized settled law (citing multiple Supreme Court decisions) that for Section 307 the primary test is the accused's intention or knowledge to cause death; the nature of injury alone is not determinative.
  • Applying the accepted legal framework, the court examined surrounding circumstances: incident was at midday in an open field; it arose on a petty dispute over tilling land; there was no prior significant enmity or litigation over the field; only a single, spur‑of‑the‑moment blow was inflicted; the assailant did not repeat the blow or otherwise manifest persistent effort to kill; the co‑accused who had a lathi did not themselves assault with it.
  • The doctor did not describe the injury as grievous or life‑threatening; the injured remained conscious. The court treated these facts as relevant indicia for inferring (or not inferring) intention and concluded that the requisite intention to kill was not proved to the hilt.
  • Thus, although actus reus was proved (an assault causing hurt by a dangerous weapon), mens rea for attempt to murder (Section 307) was missing; the court therefore held that the proved offence was Section 324/34 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapon) rather than Section 307/34 IPC.

The court explicitly relied on the line of precedents cited (e.g., Kashiram; Imrat; Parsuram Pandey; Prakash Chandra Yadav, among others) to support the proposition that intention is the determinative criterion for Section 307 and applied that principle to the specific facts to reach its conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Conviction under Section 307/34 IPC is set aside; appellants are convicted under Section 324/34 IPC instead.

Direct consequences and sentence:

  • The conviction and sentence imposed under Section 307/34 IPC were scored out and replaced with convictions under Section 324/34 IPC.
  • On sentence, the court noted mitigating circumstances: the incident occurred many years earlier (the judgment records a lapse of thirty‑one years), appellants were released on bail in 1981 after a few days of incarceration (near about five days in jail at that time), they have no other criminal record, are brothers, and have apparently settled in life over the intervening years. Taking these factors into account, the court ordered that the appellants be considered as having undergone the period of imprisonment already served.
  • Both appellants were directed to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000 each. From the total amount recovered as fine, Rs. 20,000 in aggregate is to be awarded as compensation to injured Pawan Kumar or his family members.
  • Appellants, being on bail, need not surrender, but their bail and surety bonds will be discharged only after deposit of the fine. They are given one month from notice by the trial judge to deposit the fine. Failure to deposit the fine will result in arrest and lodging in jail to undergo six months RI as default sentence. If the fine is deposited within the stipulated period, the trial judge shall summon the victim or his family and disburse the awarded compensation.
  • The court directed that a certified copy of the judgment be sent to the trial court for information.

Broader implication: The court did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law; rather, it applied established Supreme Court authority emphasizing that intention or knowledge to cause death is the crux for Section 307 IPC, and where that intention is not satisfactorily proved, the conviction must be limited to the offence actually established by evidence (here Section 324 IPC). The decision's primary effect is remedial and dispositive as regards the parties involved.

Disposition: Appeal partly allowed. Conviction under Section 307/34 IPC set aside and substituted with conviction under Section 324/34 IPC; sentence and fine/compensation directions as summarized above.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal has been preferred by two real sibling brothers Ganesh and Dinesh who are aggrieved by their conviction under Section 307/34, IPC and imposed sentence of 4 years R.I therefore, recorded by Ist Additional Session's Judge, Ballia, in S.T No. 156 of 1980, State v. Dinesh, relating to P.S Maniar, District Ballia, vide impugned judgment and order dated 29.8.81

2. Prosecution allegations against the appellants, as are perceptible from the F.I.R and testimonies of fact witnesses during the Session's trial, stated laconically, indicate that on 27.6.1979 at 12 noon, PW3 Rameshwar, his son Pawan Kumar, P.W 1, with two labours Videshi and Banarasi, PW2, who were brothers, were tilling their land, in their village Hathauz, when the two appellants, armed with lathi and spear (ballam), approached them and forbade them from such tilling. P.W 1 Pawan Kumar refused to abide by their threats by stating that the field belonged to them. On this, appellant Dinesh caught hold of P.W.I from behind and another appellant Ganesh thrusted a spear blow in his chest with an intention to annihilate him. This incident was witnessed by the persons present there namely, Bideshi, Banarsi, PW2, and informant father Rameshwar P.W 3.

3. After the incident, injured and informant P.W 1 & 3, went to the police station Maniar, and lodged written FIR, Ext. Ka-1 same day at 3.20 p.m Head Moharrir, Kalpa Nath Ram, registered the case by preparing chik FIR, Ext. Ka 6, and GD entry Ext. Ka 7. On an application dated 28.6.79, moved by the injured Pawan Kumar, crime was converted from 323/324 to 307, IPC by the orders of Chaman Lal, Superintendent of Police, Ballia vide Ext. Ka2. From the police station, injured was dispatched for his medical examination to Maniar Hospital.

4. Dr. K.N Dubey, M.O PHC, Maniar, PW5, had examined the injured on 27.6.1979 at 4 p.m and had prepared his medical examination report, Ext. Ka 8. Doctor had noted following external injuries on his body:—

1. Incised wound 2 cm × 1 cm × 1.2 cm, 10 cm medial from the right nipple.

Patient is conscious, responds to question.

Opinion-Injury kept under observation, caused by sharp and pointed weapon.

Duration-Fresh.

5. P.W 4 S.I Shyama Prasad Singh had investigated the case and on 3.7.1979, he had interrogated injured in the primary health centre and had seized and sealed, his blood soaked attire, gamcha, which is material Ext. 1, and seizure memo in that respect is Ext. Ka. 3. From the Primary Health Centre, I.O went to the incident scene in village Hathauz, where informant P.W 3 was present. I.O firstly interrogated him and recorded his statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C and thereafter conducting spot inspection prepared site plan map Ext. Ka. 4. Accused persons were searched by the I.O but they could not be apprehended. On 29.7.79, witness Banarsi, PW2, was interrogated by the I.O and subsequently, on 4.8.1979, accused Dinesh was arrested from the village. On 19.9.79 witness Bideshi was interrogated by the I.O, who concluding the investigation, charge-sheeted appellants accused, vide Ext. Ka. 5.

6. Charge-sheet against accused appellants resulted in registration of case against them before the Magistrate, who finding their crime triable by Session's Court, committed their case to Session's Court, u/S. 309, Cr.P.C, after observing due formalities u/S. 207, Cr.P.C, where it was registered as S.T No. 156 of 1980, State v. Dinesh.

7. Learned trial Judge charged the appellants with crime u/S. 307/34, I.P.C, which charge was denied by the appellants, who claimed to be tried and hence to bring home their guilt successfully, trial procedure commenced.

8. In it's effort to establish the charge against the appellants, prosecution relied upon oral testimonies of five witnesses out of whom injured Pawan Kumar, P.W.I, eye-witness Banarsi, P.W 2 and informant father Rameshwar Prasad, P.W 3, were the fact witnesses. P.W 4 I.O Shyama Prasad Singh, P.W 5 Dr. K.N Dubey were the two formal witnesses. Besides oral testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses, prosecution also relied upon various exhibits, written FIR Ext Ka. 1, chik FIR, GD entry, medical examination report of the injured, site plan map and material Ex-hibit-1.

9. Learned trial Judge after looking to the oral and documentary evidences produced before it, vide impugned judgment and order dated 29.8.81, concluded that the prosecution has successfully anointed guilt under section 307/34, I.P.C and therefore, convicted both the appellants for the said charge and imposed sentence of 4 years R.I for that crime, which conviction and sentence is under challenge in the instant appeal.

10. In the aforesaid background facts, when the appeal was called out for hearing, nobody appeared for the appellants and therefore, Sri Sriram Rawat, learned counsel was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court in disposal of the appeal, which was pending be fore this Court since last more than three de cades.

11. I have heard Sri Sriram Rawat, learned amicus curiae in support of the appeal and Sri Sangam Lal Kesherwani, learned AGA for the respondent State.

12. Learned amicus curiae castigated conviction of the appellants for the primary contention that taking the prosecution case and the evidences, both and oral and documentary, as it were tendered before trial Court, Page: 691guilt of the appellants will not travel beyond the scope of section 324, I.P.C and their recorded conviction under section 307, I.P.C is unsustainable. Learned counsel supplemented urged submission by pointing out that injury sustained by the injured was simple in nature, and no repetition of blow was given. No supplementary report was brought forth by the prosecution and incident had occurred at the spur of the moment without any premeditation at a petty issue of tilling the soil. It was further contended that the incised wound sustained by the injured on the right nipple, had not caused any internal damage nor there is any evidence to that effect. It was therefore, submitted that there was total absence of any intention to commit murder, which is sine qua non ingredient for making out an offence under section 307, I.P.C Elaborating the contention further it was submitted that if the appellant intended to cause death of injured PW1, they would have hurled a much forceful thrust and would have repeated the blow. Second accused would have also wielded his weapon, lathi carried by him. All of a sudden a single blow was given on the chest with mollified force by only one accused and therefore there was no evidence to convict the appellants u/S. 307, IPC, contended learned amicus curie. Injury report of the injured indicate that he was conscious at all point of time and even the doctor in his deposition had not stated that injuries sustained by the injured was grievous in nature and dangerous to life.

13. With tongue in cheek, another argument was also raised that there was an enmity between the appellants and the prosecution side and therefore, it is a case of false implication by fabricating a story but on this second urged contention, learned amicus curiae, did not harp much.

14. Conversely, learned AGA supported impugned judgment by submitting that it is a day light incident and injury sustained by the injured is commensurate with the prosecution allegations and there was no animus for the prosecution witnesses to implicate the appellants in a fabricated version. Consequently it suggested that prosecution has successfully anointed appellant's guilt. However, on the question as to what offence is established against the appellant, learned AGA expressed agreement with learned amicus curiae.

15. I have considered the arguments raised by both the sides and have vetted through the evidences, both oral and documentary, existing on the record. It is clear from the prosecution evidences that both the rival factions were co-villagers and incident had occurred midday in the month of June in an open field where the injured was tilling the soil along with his father P.W 3 with two other employed labourers Banarasi (P.W 2) and Videshi, who both were real brothers being sons of Jogi Dusadh. Banarasi (P.W 2) was an independent witness and had supported prosecution allegations on all it's material aspect. He had no animus against the appellants. He was subjected to searching cross-examinations but defence has not been able to dislodge him from main substantum of prosecution case. Injured and informant, albeit related and interested, have corroborated each other and PW2 convincingly, without any damaging statement diminishing creditworthiness of their depositions. Prior to the incident, there had been no such significant animus between them compelling prosecution witnesses to feign a story against them. Presence of all the fact witnesses at the incident scene is very natural and probable. No suggestion was made to them that they were not present at the spot and therefore I don't find any reason to disbelieve them and bracket them as an unreliable and untruthful witness. It is a case of single blow, which would not have lasted but for few seconds. Narration by the fact witnesses is natural and confidence inspiring. Medical report of the injured is another cementing factor, which lend credence to the prosecution story. Thus, so far as presence of appellants at the scene of the incident and assault made by them is concerned, prosecution has successfully proved these charges and resultantly, I am of the view that so far as conviction of the appellants is concerned, it is well merited and does not require any interference by this Court.

16. Turing to the harangued contention that crime committed by the appellants will not be one u/S. 307, IPC, I find that there is much force in that castigation. For establishing charge Page: 692of attempt to murder u/S. 307, IPC what has to be established, clear of all doubts, that accused necessarily possessed an intention to commit murder. This is sine qua non ingredient for that offence and absence of it will catapult accused case out of it. Voluminous judicial pronouncements, both by the Apex Court as well as by this Court has firmly laid down trite law that neither the injury nor it's nature is the guiding factor for making out of an offence u/S. 307, IPC, but the primary and sole criterion is intention to commit murder. Although weapon used, site of injury caused, nature of injury, circumstance under which it is caused, attending facts and circumstances, all are relevant factors to determine intention to commit murder but what cannot be eschewed from being proved to the hilt is the possessed intention to commit murder. In this respect, reliance can be placed on various Apex Court decisions, some of which are cited hereunder as exemplars:—

In State of M.P v. Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26 : AIR 2009 SC 1642 it has been held by the Apex Court as under:—

“10. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307, IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.

11. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil ((1983) 2 SCC 28): (AIR 1983 SC 305), Girija Shanker v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((2004) 3 SCC 793) : (2004 All LJ 683), R. Parkash v. State of Karnataka, 2004 (2) (JT SC 348) : ((2004) 9 SCC 27 : AIR 2004 SC 1812) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem alias Chamaru [(2005) 5 SCC 554] : (AIR 2005 SC 3996).

12. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307, IPC. The determinative question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not nature of the injury.”

17. In State of M.P v. Imrat, (2008) 11 SCC 523 : AIR SC 2008 2967 it has been laid down by the Apex Court as under:—

“11. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307, IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.”

18. In Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC (Suppl) 488 it has been held by the Apex Court as under:—

“12. From a bare perusal of the said provision, it is evident that first part thereof does not contemplate that receipt of any injury on the part of the victim is a pre-requisite for convicting an accused thereunder. In the event injuries are received, the second part of Section 307 would be attracted. The necessary ingredients for attracting the first part of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code is intention or knowledge. The legal position would be evident from the illustration (c) appended to the said provision which reads as under:

“(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.”

Mr. V. Shekhar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has drawn our attention to a decision of this Court in Page: 693Parsuram Pandey v. State of Bihar [(2004) 13 SCC 189] : (AIR 2004 SC 5068) wherein, inter alia, it was held: “To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present:

(a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and

(b) the doing of an act towards it.

For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence “of attempt to murder”. Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took place.”

19. Applying the reasonings laid down in by the Apex Court in the instant facts and circumstances, it is seen that a single blow was given to the injured at the spur of moment. Incident started because of tilling of soil. There was no previous enmity and none of the sides had any animus against each other. In respect of possession of field, there has been no litigation between both the sides. The doctor had nowhere stated that the injury sustained by the injured was grievous in nature or dangerous to life. If the appellants harbingered an intention to commit murder, Ganesh would have pierced the spear into the chest of the injured with such force as would have caused his death, which he did not do. He never attempted a second blow also. So far as Dinesh is concerned, he had caught hold of the injured by his back. He never made any attempt to assault him with lathi, though he had carried it along with him. In such a view, looking to the entire facts and circumstances and the background in which the incident had occurred, it does not seems that the appellants had an intention to commit murder and, therefore, their conviction under section 307, I.P.C is indefensible and has to be scored out. Proven guilt of the appellants does not cross boundary of section 324, I.P.C and it is only for that crime that the appellants can be convicted.

20. In the net result conviction of appellants u/S. 307/34, IPC is scored out and instead they are held guilty and convicted u/S. 324/34, IPC.

21. Turning towards the sentence, it is noted that the incident had occurred in 1981. Thirty one years have gone by. A single blow was given at the chest of the injured by one of the appellant Ganesh. Dinesh had not caused any injury to the injured although he had caught hold of him. Appellants were released on bail on 4.9.81 They had, therefore, remained in jail for near about five days. None of the two appellants had got any criminal proclivity nor they are involved in any other crime. They both are real sibling brothers. After a long gap of thirty one years, they must have attained quite an old age and must have settled down in their lives. Even during intervening period of thirty one years, they had not indulged into any crime. Both the sides were co-villagers and during crime, only simple hurt was caused and these are some of the mitigating and mollifying circumstances favourable to the appellants. In my humble view, the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellants with fine of Rs. 15,000/- on each of them with a compensation of Rs. 20,000/- to the victim or his family members will serve the ends of justice.

22. Appeal is allowed in part. Conviction of the appellants under section 307, I.P.C and imposed sentence thereon is hereby scored out and instead appellants are convicted under section 324/34, I.P.C and they are sentenced to the period of imprisonment already undergone by them with fine of Rs. 15,000/- on each of them, out of which total amount, Rs. 20,000/- as compensation is awarded to injured Pawan Kumar or his family members.

23. Appellants are on bail, they need not surrender but their bail bonds and surety bonds shall be discharged only after they have deposited the fine awarded Page: 694hereinabove. They are allowed one month time to deposit the amount of fine from the date of receipt of notice from learned trial Judge for the said purpose. If the appellants fails to deposit imposed fine, learned trial Judge will cause them to be arrested and will lodge them in jail to serve out six months rigorous imprisonment, as a default sentence. In case fine is deposited within the stipulated period of time allowed to them, learned trial Judge will summon the victim or his family members and shall disburse the compensation awarded to him hereinabove.

24. Let a copy of this judgment be certified to the trial Court for it's intimation.

25. Appeal partly allowed.