Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Ratneswar Goswami Applt. v. Mongoli Chutiani Resp.

Gauhati High Court
Jan 25, 1950
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Thadani, C.J.; with concurring remarks by Ram Labhaya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff brought a suit (instituted in 1946) seeking rectification of a sale-deed dated 17-7-1935 and a declaration of title and confirmation of possession in respect of two portions of land described as "rupit" and "busti" land. The sale-deed was said to have been executed by the defendant (a widow of Sonaram alias Someswar) purportedly conveying the property for Rs. 100 to discharge a loan owed to the Kubiarbaria Gaolia Bank, for which the plaintiff had stood as surety. The sale-deed was not registered, but the plaintiff alleged delivery of possession and subsequent entry in the mutation register. The defendant allegedly continued to occupy the busti portion as a monthly tenant, while the plaintiff retained possession of the rupit portion.

Procedurally, the trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit (with no order as to costs). The lower appellate court reversed the trial court and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to rectification of the 1935 sale-deed. The present opinion is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. Subordinate Judge dated 24-9-1948, which had set aside the trial court's decree. The High Court (bench of Thadani, C.J., with Ram Labhaya, J. concurring) reviewed the matter and reached the conclusions summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale-deed of 17-7-1935 could be rectified under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act on the ground of fraud or mutual mistake.
  2. Whether the defendant had contracted to sell the land and made over possession to the plaintiff (issues of contract and delivery of possession).
  3. Whether the defendant was a monthly tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the busti portion of the land, and if so whether the plaintiff was entitled to possessory relief (khas possession) as against her.
  4. Whether confirmation of the plaintiff's possession of the rupit land should be decreed.
  5. Ancillary procedural issues framed at trial (maintainability, cause of action, limitation, multifariousness, entitlement to compensation under section 35(a) CPC, and reliefs to which the parties are entitled) as set out in the trial court's issues.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — Main contentions

  • The plaintiff sought rectification of the sale-deed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act on the ground of mutual mistake (he expressly disclaimed reliance on fraud).
  • The alleged mutual mistake was that the scribe/writer drafted the instrument to show the defendant acting as guardian selling the minors' interest, whereas the parties intended a sale by the defendant in her own right (or otherwise that the deed did not truly express the parties' intention).
  • The plaintiff also sought declaration of title and confirmation of possession, relying on alleged delivery of possession and continued occupation of the rupit land by him.

Respondent (Defendant) — Main contentions

  • The defendant denied there was any contract to sell the land as alleged by the plaintiff.
  • She denied delivery of possession to the plaintiff and contended that she occupied the busti portion in her own right (or claimed not to be the plaintiff's tenant).
  • She advanced technical defences in her written statement (not detailed in full in the opinion) and later argued that a notice had not been served on her — though the opinion records that the evidence on service of notice was not before the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in two main strands: (A) whether the sale-deed could be rectified under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, and (B) rights to possession of the busti portion of the land.

A. Rectification under Section 31

  1. The Court accepted that Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act governs rectification where an instrument does not truly express the parties' intention due to fraud or mutual mistake.
  2. At the hearing the plaintiff disavowed fraud and relied solely upon a mutual mistake — specifically that the scribe had mistakenly framed the deed as a sale by the defendant in her capacity as guardian of minor daughters (i.e., conveying the minors' interest) when that did not reflect the parties' true intention.
  3. The Court declined to find a mutual mistake established on the material before it. It emphasized that the evidence of the scribe (the person alleged to have made the mistake) was not placed on the record (not in the paper-book), and the Court was not prepared to rely solely on the plaintiff's evidence as to a manual/scribal mistake.
  4. The Court further held that even if the transfer exceeded the transferor's legal rights (for example, if the defendant could convey only a limited interest), that fact alone does not necessarily show that the instrument failed to express the parties' real intention within Section 31. The Court observed that it was open that the defendant might have intended to relinquish her limited ownership in favour of the minors or otherwise intended the consequences recorded in the deed.
  5. The plaintiff relied on illustration (b) to Section 31; the Court found that illustration inapplicable on the material before it and was unable to hold that the defendant intended to convey only her limited interest.
  6. Because the minors were not made parties to the suit, any question as to whether the deed affected their reversionary rights would have to be determined if and when the minors themselves challenged the transfer.
  7. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower appellate court's refusal to rectify the sale-deed: the plaintiff had not clearly proved the mutual mistake required by Section 31 on the available evidence.

B. Possession of the busti land and landlord-tenant relationship

  1. The Court observed that the trial court had found (issue 6) that the defendant was a monthly tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the busti portion. That finding was not reversed by the lower appellate court and therefore stood.
  2. The trial court had also found that the plaintiff was in possession of the rupit portion; the High Court noted it did not need to decide in the appeal whether confirmation of the plaintiff's possession of the rupit land should be decreed, since the question of title was left open by the Court's judgment.
  3. Because the sale-deed was not rectified, but the facts indicated that pursuant to the deed the plaintiff was in possession of the rupit land and the defendant occupied the busti land as a tenant, the Court concluded the plaintiff was clearly entitled to a decree for possession of the busti land by reason of the landlord-tenant relationship created after the deed's execution.
  4. The Court addressed the defendant's contention concerning service of notice (on notice to quit), noting that the evidence on that point was not in the paper-book and thus the Court had no material to support the defendant's argument that she was not served. Moreover, the Court observed that because the defendant had denied the plaintiff's title in her written statement, she would not be entitled to a notice to quit in any event.
  5. Accordingly the High Court modified the lower appellate court's decree: while it affirmed the refusal to rectify the instrument, it granted the plaintiff a possessory decree for the busti land and ordered the eviction of the defendant from that portion.

Concurring reasoning (Ram Labhaya, J.)

  • Ram Labhaya, J. agreed with the Chief Justice's conclusion and added that the facts found below (payment of the debt, delivery of possession of the rupit land to the plaintiff, and the defendant's continued occupation of the busti land as a tenant) supported the view that the parties intended to sell present rights in the land to discharge the debt rather than merely a reversionary right.
  • He observed that the defence that only a reversion was sold was inconsistent with the fact of delivery of possession. He also noted that the defence that the sale was not intended to convey present rights was a contention different from the written statement and without factual basis on the record.
  • Even if the case did not fully fall within Section 31, the defendant could not be permitted to repudiate what she had deliberately done where she was held to occupy as a tenant; therefore the decree for possession of the busti land should be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The High Court affirmed the lower appellate court's refusal to rectify the 17-7-1935 sale-deed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, but modified the lower appellate court's decree by granting the plaintiff a decree for possession of the busti portion of the land and ordering the eviction of the defendant from that portion. The appeal was allowed with this modification, and no order as to costs was made because the appellant had only partially succeeded.

Implications and practical consequences:

  • The sale-deed itself was not rectified; the question of title generally (including any reversionary rights of the minors) is left open and may be litigated by interested parties (notably the minors) if they challenge the transfer.
  • As a direct practical effect of this judgment, the plaintiff obtains an enforceable decree for possession of the busti land and the defendant is to be evicted from that portion pursuant to the decree.
  • The plaintiff's claim to rectification failed for lack of clear proof of mutual mistake (and absence of evidence from the scribe), so no broader declaratory remedy altering the written sale-deed was granted by the Court.
  • No costs were awarded to either side because the appellant only partially succeeded on appeal.

This summary is limited to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Thadani, C.J:— This is a second appeal from the judgment & decree of the learned Addl. Subordinate J., A.V.D dated 24-9-1948, by which be set aside the judgment & decree of the trial Ct. which had decreed the pltf.'s suit with no order as to costs.

2. The pltf. brought a suit foe the rectification of a sale-dead dated 17-7-1935, executed in his favour by the deft a widow of one Sonaram alias Someswar, purporting to convey the property to ??? of the value of less than Rs. 100, & for declaration of his title to & confirmation of possession of the rupit land & khas possession of the busti land. The pltf.'s case was that during his lifetime Soniram, the husband of the deft. resp. had incurred a loan from the Kubiarbaria Gaolia Bank, for which the applt. had stood surety with the bank; some time before 1935, Sonaram died leaving his widow, the resp. & two minor daughters; is due course the bank demanded payment of the loan which then amounted to Rs. 100, & the deft.-resp. agreed to sail the land in suit to the plft. for Rs. 100 in order to discharge the loan; the sale-deed was not registered, but delivery of possession was made to him & in due course he had his name entered in the mutation register; the deft, however; was permitted to occupy the busti portion of the land in suit as a monthly tenant, the rupit land remained in his possession, 10 years later in 1945, one Bhaluka, a cousin of the resp. interfered with his possession by cutting & removing standing crops, whereupon in 1945 he brought a suit for ejectment & recovery of the suit land, but later withdrew it with permission to bring a fresh suit, he brought the present suit in 1946.

3. In this suit, in addition to the prayer for a declaration of his title A possession, the pltf. sought to rectify the sale-deed of 1935. The prayer for rectification was based upon the allegation that the deft, was the sole heir of her deceased husband, Sonaram, & that she alone was, therefore, competent to execute the sale-deed in her own right, but that the writer of the sale-deed wrote out the deed by which the deft, as guardian of her minor daughters purported to sell their interest only by mistake; on discovering the mistake the plft. served the deft, with a notice, & on the deft.'s failure to comply with his demand, the pltf. brought the present suit.

4. The defence to the suit was that there was no contract to sell the land as alleged by the pltf. that possession of the lands in suit was not made over to the pltf. that she was nos 5 tenant of the pltf. in respect of the busti portion of the land. Other technical defences were taken by the deft, to which it is not necessary to refer.

5. On the pleadings, the trial Ct. framed the following issues:

1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?

2. Whether there is any cause of action?

3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

4. Whether the suit is had for multifarious-ness?

5. Whether daft, contracted to sell the land & agreed to execute a deed of sale on her own behalf as alleged is the plaint?

6. Whether the deft;, made over possession of the suit land & entered into occupation of the basti land as pltf's. tenant?

7. Wether the pltff. has been in occupation of the rupit portion of the suit land?

8. Whether the pltf. is entitled to hive a sale dead executed in place of the one filed in the suit?

9. Whether pltf. is entitled to declaration of title & confirmation of possession of the ‘rupit’ land & recovery of possession of the busti land?

10. Whether deft, is entitled to compensation under Section 35(a) of the CPC; if so, how much?

11. What relief, if any, are the parties entitled to? As a result of its findings, the trial Ct. decreed the pltf's. suit.

6. The lower appellate Ct. reversed the judgment & decree of the trial Ct. & held that the pltf. was not entitled to a decree for the rectification of the sale-deed of 1935.

7. It is not disputed by the applt's advocates that the relief for the rectification of the instrument will be governed by the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which is in these terms:

“31. When instrument may be rectified.—When through fraud or mutual mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing does not truly express their intention, either party, or his representative in interest, may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; and it the Court finds it clearly proved that there hits been fraud or mistake in framing the instrument and ascertain the real intention of the parties in exerting the same, the Ct. may in its discretion rectify the instrument so as to express tun intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.”

8. At the hearing the learned advocate for the applt. stated that be did not rely upon any fraud, but only upon a mutual mistake of the parties, a mistake which did not truly express their intention. The mutual mistake alleged in the plaint is that the writer made a mistake by asking the parties to have the document drawn up in such a way that it purported to be a sale of the minors' property by the deft. in her capacity as their guardian.

9. We do not think the alleged mistake amounts to a mutual mistake within the meaning of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. The evidence of the scribe has not been brought on the paper-book, & we are not prepared to rely up Page: 72on the evidence of the applt. alone on the question of the alleged manual mistake.

10. It is contended on behalf of the applt. that as a limited owner of the estate of her deceased husband the deft, resp. was competent to convey only her own interest, & not the interest of her minor daughters. That may be the legal position but we do not think that a transfer in excess if the legal rights of a transferor entitled a transferee to have the instrument of transfer rectified under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. The fact that in law the minors in this case did not have a present interest in the property, does not necessarily mean that the instrument did not truly express the intention of the parties. It may well be that the deft, in this case had relinquished her limited ownership in the property in favour of her minor daughters & as there was a debt outstanding, she deliberately executed the sale deed intending to convey what she did in fact convey by the instrument.

11. Mr. Barua has relied upon illus. (b) of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. We do not think the illustration has any application to the facts of the present case. We are unable to hold on the material before us that the deft, intended to convey only her limited interest. The minors have not been made parties to the suit. Their rights will not, therefore, be affected by any judgment given in this case. Whether the sale-deed affects the reversionary rights of the minors is a question which must be decided if & when the minors challenge the transfer made by their mother. In this view, we think the lower appellate Ct. was right in refusing to rectify the sale-deed.

12. The lower appellate Ct. has, however, lost sight of an important aspect of the case which is that so far as the busti portion of the land in suit is concerned, it was the pltf.'s case that the deft, was his monthly tenant. The trial Ct. held on issue 6 that the deft, was the tenant of the pltf. That finding has not been reversed by the lower appellate Ct. It is true that the deft, had stated in her written statement that she was not the tenant of the pltf. but she did not elect to go into the witness-box to support her written statement. We think the trial Ct. was justified in coming to the conclusion that the deft, was a tenant of the pltf. in regard to the busti portion of the land. As regards the rupit land, the pltf.'s case was that he was in possession of it all the time & he merely sought confirmation of its possession. Whether the trial Ct. was justified in decreeing confirmation of the pltf.'s possession of the rupit land in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, as against the deft. is not a matter which need be decided in this appeal, in view of the fact that by this judgment we leave the question of title an open question.

13. The position then is this that in pursuance of the sale-deed, which we decline to rectify, the pltf. was in possession of the rupit land & by virtue of a contract of tenancy, the deft. came to be a monthly tenant of the pltf. in respect of the busti land. It is unnecessary to decide in this case whether in pursuance of the sale-deed, title to the property has passed to the pltf. The pltf. is clearly entitled to a decree for possession of the busti land in virtue of the relationship of landlord & tenant created between the pltf. & the deft, after the deft, executed the sale-deed.

14. The resp.'s advocate has argued that the notice in this case was not served upon the deft, but the evidence led on this issue has not been made a part of the paper-book, & we have no material to enable us to say that the deft, was not served with a notice or that the notice was not proper. In any case, in view of the written statement of the deft, denying the landlord's title, the deft, would not be entitled to a notice to quit.

15. Accordingly, while affirming the judgment of the lower appellate Ct. refusing to rectify the instrument, we modify the judgment & decree of the lower appellate Ct. by decreeing the pltf.'s suit for possession of the busti land by evicting the deft. With this modification, the appeal is allowed, but as the applt. has only partially succeeded, we make no order as to costs.

Ram Labhaya, J.:— I agree in the conclusion reached by my Lord the Chief Justice, but I wish to add-a few words to it.

16. Plaintiff sought for a rectification of the document on the ground of mutual mistake. He also prayed for khas possession of the property in suit which is the busti part of the land sold to him by the sale deed dated 17-7-1935. The sale deed purports to have been executed by deft, on behalf of her minor daughters. The sale became necessary for repayment of a debt which deft's husband had incurred. It has been concurrently found by the Cts. below that pltf. paid the debt & under the sale deed got possession of the rupit land. The busti land remained in possession of the deft. So far as this part of the land is concerned, the finding of the trial Ct. not reversed in appeal, was that deft, occupied it as a tenant of the pltf.

17. The plea raised in defence was that the deft, never sold the property to the pltf. in any capacity. She claimed that she was entitled to remain in possession of the property in her own right.

18. Her plea had been negatived & her learned counsel has not tried to resist; the pltf's claim on that ground. He has argued that deft, sold the reversion which vested in the daughters. She never intended & did not sell her rights, which vested in her at that time as a widow. This contention is entirely new. It is different from the position taken up in the written statement. Even this contention cannot hold water. The facts found are that the possession of the rupit land was given to the pltf. who has been in possession of it for about 10 years. So far as the busti land is concerned, deft, was held to have occupied it merely as a tenant on plt's. behalf. If reversion alone was intended to be sold, no question of delivery of possession would have arisen. It is obvious from this circumstance that the land or the present rights in the land were intended to be sold. A mere spes successionis or the right of reversion cannot be the subject matter of the sale either. There is absolutely no basis for this plea. Defendant now claims that the property in suit vested in her at the time of sale & not in the minor daughters. They had no right in the property at that time. The question, however, is whether she can resist the claim on that basis.

19. There is no doubt that deft, had to pay the debt due from her husband. She agreed to sell the property for the repayment of the debt. The debt was paid in consequence & pltf. was placed in possession of the property. It is clear that sale of the property was intended for the repayment of the loan. If there had been no misapprehension in the mind of the parties as to who could convey the property, the pltf. at any rate would not have agreed to a sale deed which purported to convey the property on behalf of the minors who had no interest in the property at that time. The defence that the document was obtained from the deft, by fraud has also been ruled out. Her claim that it was a sale of reversion alone is not entertainable. Plaintiff or anybody else on his behalf would not be interested in getting a document in a way that no title could be conveyed. Mutual mistake as to the legal position appears to be the basis on which the form that the document took could be explained. The intention was to convey the property & as alleged by the pltf. it seems probable that it was the ignorance of the petn. writer that has created the difficulty which pltf. now stands confronted with.

20. In these circumstances the deft., could not be permitted to go back upon what she had deliberately done merely because she & the pltf. allowed the document to be executed as though the property vested in the minor daughters which was admittedly not the case. Even if therefore the case may not be regarded as fully covered by the language of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, so as to admit of rectification of the deed of sale, deft, cannot be allowed to resist the claim for possession of a part of the property sold, in regard to which the finding also is that she holds it as a tenant. I, therefore, agree that the decree of the lower appellate Ct. be modified & pltf's. suit for possession of the bustee land decreed.

21. Decree modified.