Ram Labhaya, J.:— This is an application under Art. 134(c) of the Constitution of India for a certificate to the effect that the case which was disposed of by a final order of this Court dated 21-8-1950 is a fib one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

2. In the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, criminal proceedings initiated on a complaint by the present petitioner in the Court of a Magistrate at Gauhati (in Assam) were quashed at the instance of one of the three accused (Hiralal Patni) in the case. We came to the conclusion that the dispute arose out of a contract. The parties were at issue on several complicated questions of fact and law, the decision of which involved a very elaborate and prolonged inquiry. It was found that the civil Court was the proper forum for the decision of these questions. The case was regarded as one of an exceptional nature and this in review (sic) was apparent from a bare recital of the two conflicting versions in the case. It was further found that the complaint did not disclose any criminal offence either under S. 417, Penal Code, or under Ss. 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act. An explicit statement that the three accused were personally liable for applying or getting applied false marks did not appear in the complaint or the statement that followed. There was no allegation that the contract was entered into personally by the three accused and they had any criminal intent to cheat or defraued at that time. Several factors pointing to the absence of good faith on the part of the complainant in instituting the plaint were also noticed and the proceedings pending in the Court of the Magistrate were quashed against all the three accused.

3. A certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court has been prayed for on several grounds contained, in the petition. At the hearing, the learned advocate crystallised these grounds into one contention. He urged that the order of this Court quashing the proceedings, which had hardly begun, was vitiated by an error of law. He argued Chat the complainant should have been permitted to adduce evidence in support of the allegations, made by him in the complaint and the quashing of the proceedings before such an opportunity was afforded to him was not in consonance with law. In support of this contention he relied on Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor, A.I.R (20) 1933 Sind 169 : (34 Cr. L.J 1049) and Amirbux v. Emperor, A.I.R (21) 1934 Sind 183 : (36 Cr. L.J 331). No other point was pressed in support of the prayer for a certificate. We have first to discover what may be described as an objective test or a standard for determining whether a particular case is a fit one for appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Art. 134(c) of the Constitution of India. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, and even before an aggrieved party in a criminal proceeding had no right of appeal to the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not a Court of appeal in criminal cases, but wherever there was substantial or grave injustice by reason of disregard of the principles of natural justice or by the infringement of the recognised forms of legal process, their Lordships of the Privy Council interfered in the exercise of the prerogative of His Majesty the King Emperor.

4. As early as 1887, Lord Watson in delivering: the judgment of the Privy Council in In re Abraham Mallory Dillet, (1887) 12 A.C 459 : (56 L.T 615) observed that

“Her Majesty will not review, or interfere with, the course of criminal proceedings unless it is shown that by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial or grave injustice has been done.”

5. The principle enunciated was adhered to in substance till 1946. It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases bearing on the point. It would be enough for the purposes of this case to refer to three important cases stating the rule of practice that their Lordships of the Privy Council always kept in view. In Taba Singh v. Emperor, AIR (12) 1925 P.C 59 : (26 Cr. L.J 391), the Board refused to accept or share the responsibility for the administration of criminal justice in India unless there was some violation of the principles of natural justice or some disregard of legal principles. In 1933, Lord Dunedin in delivering the judgment of their Lordships in Mohindar Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R (19) 1932 P.C 234 : (34 Cr. L.J 18) gave a very emphatic expression to the principle. He observed that “there must be something so irregular, or so outrageous as to shake the very basis of justice.” In 1946, Lord Porter, relying on the observations of Lord Watson in In re, Abraham Mallory Dillet, (1887) 12 A.C 459 : (56 L.T 615), observed in Malak Khan v. Emperor, A.I.R (33) 1946 P.C 16 : (47 Cr. L.J 489),

“that the Privy Council would not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings unless it was shown that by a disregard of forms of legal process or otherwise substantial or grave injustice had been done. When neither of these are present, the Privy Council will not interfere on the ground that the evidence was wrongly valued or was not sufficient to justify the conclusion reached.”

6. It is clear the exercise of His Majesty's prerogative was limited to cases where grave or substantial injustice had occurred by reason of a disregard of the recognised principles of natural justice or the forms of legal process. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not after the position. In Kapildeo Singh v. King, A.I.R (37) 1950 F.C 80 : (51 Cr. L.J 1057) Mahajan, J., in delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Federal Court in an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court at Patna affirming the convictions of the appellant under S. 147, Penal Code, found it necessary to remark that though the Federal Court was not bound by Privy Council practice and precedents, it did not depart from the principles which had been laid down by it defining the limits within which interference with the course of criminal justice dispensed in the subordinate Courts is warranted. This case was first of its kind admitted by the Federal Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction and it was disposed of on 24-1-1950. On 26-1-1950, the Constitution of India by which the Supreme Court was created came into force. Articles 131-136 deal with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Article 131 confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. Article 132 invests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction in certain cases. An appeal under this Article would be to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a Civil, criminal or other proceedings, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is open to the Supreme Court to grant special leave where the High Court has refused to give such a certificate. Article 133 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeal from High Courts in civil matters. Article 134 defines the limits of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in criminal matters. An appeal would be to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence. In a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India, (a) if the High Court has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death, or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death, or (c) the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, provided that an appeal under cl. (c) shall be subject to such provisions as may be made under cl. (1) of Art. 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require Parliament, has got the authority to enlarge the criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 134, cl. (2). It is apparent that the appellate-jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in criminal matters has been enlarged by cl. (a) and (b) of Art. 134 though to a very limited extent. In all other criminal matters, the right of appeal to the Supreme Court has not been conceded to the parties. In other words, the Supreme Court is not a Court of appeal in matters not covered by cls. (a) and (b) of Art. 134 or possibly Art. 132, Clause (c), therefore, would caver cases in which, the aggrieved party is not entitled to appeal as of right and in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and afterwards the Federal Court of India exercised criminal appellate jurisdiction. The situation so far as this clause is concerned would thus appear to be the same as it was before the Constitution came into force.

7. Under Art. 136, the Supreme Court may in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter pissed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. Article 136 is not limited to criminal proceedings. But Art. 134, which invests the High Court with power to certify a case as a fit one for appeal is limited in its application to judgment, final order or sentence in criminal proceedings. So far as criminal matters are concerned, the position is that a High Court may certify that a case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding. It follows, therefore, that the test or the standard which would guide the High Courts, in determining whether a certificate under Art. 134, cl. (c) should be granted or not ought to be the same which the Supreme Court may apply in exercising its discretion when asked to grant special leave. The standard in the two Courts cannot be different for the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which is to be exercised after a certificate from a High Court or after special leave under Art. 136, is the same. It would not be proper, therefore, for a High Court to refuse to certify a case in which the Supreme Court may consider it proper to allow special leave. Conversely, a High Court may not certify a case as a fit one for appeal Page: 384to the Supreme Court where special leave to appeal would be refused by the Supreme Court. The test under both the Articles must necessarily be the same. This line of reasoning finis support from the case reported in ‘Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Emperor’, A.I.R (22) 1935 Mad. 793 : (37 Cr. L.J 64 S.B) As stated above, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not a Court of criminal appeal. It, however, granted leave in certain cases. Some High Courts in India, including the Madras High Court had also the power to certify a criminal matter as fit for appeal to the Privy Council. In Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Emperor, A.I.R (22) 1935 Mad. 793 : (37 Cr. L.J 64 S.B), a special Bench of the Court laid it down that before granting a certificate under the Letters Patent, they had to satisfy themselves whether the case fell within the limits prescribed by the Privy Council for the entertainment of appeals in criminal nutters. The case is clearly analogous and justifies the view that the test for the High Courts under Art. 134(c) and for the Supreme Court under Art. 136 ought to be the sane.

8. The question as to what should be the standard of fitness for purposes of Art. 134, cl. (c), came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in Arjuna Misra…Accused — Applicant; v. The Indian Union…Opposite Party., A.I.R (37) 1950 Orissa 235 : (1952 Cri. L.J 120). The learned Chief Justice after considering the Privy Council cases enunciating the limits within which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council interfered with the course of criminal justice administered in India observes as follows:

“In my opinion, the scope of an appeal to the Supreme Court against a final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding has not at all been widened. That Court will have to interfere with convictions by local tribunals within the same bounds of limitations and restraints laid down by the Privy Council and the fitness has to be judged by the standard that tribunal laid before it in granting special leave to appeal. The only change that the Constitution has introduced is to endow the State High Courts with powers to certify or in other words, to grant leave to appeal.”

9. With great respect to the learned Chief Justice, it may be stated that the scope of appeal to the Supreme Court against a final order or sentence in criminal proceedings has been widened though to a very limited extent. The observation of the learned Judge would seem to relate to the scope of appeal under cl. (c) of Art. 134 and so far as this clause is concerned, the position remains the same and therefore the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Privy Council should still continue to form useful guides to the High Courts in the exercise of their powers under Art. 134 Cl. (c). These pronouncements have ceased to be binding. They have not, however, outlived their utility for that reason.

10. Articles dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts came to be considered in Pritam Singh v. State, A.I.R (37) 1950 S.C 169 : (51 Cr. L.J 1270). Fazl Ali, J. in delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“Generally speaking, Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal in criminal cases unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.”

11. It was further recognised that though the Supreme Court was not bound to follow

“too rightly the principles laid down by the Privy Council in granting special leave in criminal cases, yet some of those principles were useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of the Court in granting special leave.”

12. As the standard both for the High Court and the Supreme Court must be the same, the general rule laid down in this case would also be the test for determining whether a particular case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134, cl. (c). This test which covers not only criminal cases but all cases in which special leave may be applied for under Art. 136, is not less stringent than the one the Judicial Committee had before them for granting special leave in criminal cases. It is necessary, according to this test, that the case must have exceptional and special circumstances. There should be substantial and grave injustice and that it should have features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision. Judged by the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, this petition cannot succeed.

13. The only point that has been urged is that the decision is contrary to law inasmuch as it ignores or is in defiance of the rule of practice laid down in Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor, A.I.R (20) 1933 Sind 169 : (34 Cr. L.J 1049) and Amirbux v. Emperor, A.I.R (21) 1934 Sind 183 : (36 Cr. L.J 331).

14. In Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor, A.I.R (20) 1933 Sind 169 : (34 Cr. L.J 1049), it was held that the High Court, as a rule, will allow proceedings to go on and take their course in lower Courts and will not interfere with a pending proceeding even though irregularly conducted, unless there is exceptional ground for interference Generally speaking, a High Court would not investigate whether pending proceedings were of a criminal or a civil nature if the inquiry involved lengthy arguments. But a safe and practical test is whether a bare statement of the facts of the case without any elaborate argument would suffice to persuade the High Court that the case is a fit case for interference. The learned Judges in this case did not lay down any rule of law. The power of the High Court to interfere in Revision with the course of pending proceedings in criminal Court in suitable cases is undoubted, but according to the rule laid down in the Sind case a High Court may not embark on any elaborate Page: 385inquiry into the nature of pending proceedings in order to determine whether they are of a criminal or a civil nature. But where a bare statement of the facts is enough to come to a conclusion on the point, the High Court may determine the point. This rule was fully kept in view by us. Our conclusion was that a bare statement of the facts of the case or rather of the two rival versions showed clearly that the dispute was more appropriate for decision by a civil Court. The rule laid down in the Sind case was, in point of fact, applied to the facts of this case. It is, therefore, wrong to urge that the decision is contrary to law. The principle of the Sind case was not ignored or departed from. No rule of law militating against this decision was laid down. The statement of the law contained in Hariram Onkar v. Mt. Radha Jairam, A.I.R (30) 1943 Nag. 327 : (45 Cr. L.J 175), relied on by the learned counsel at the hearing of the revision petition was also accepted. According to the Nagpur case, the proceedings can only be quashed when no offence whatever is disclosed or when the prosecution is bound on the face of it, to fail or for some other cause equally powerful. We found that in the peculiar circumstances of the case our interference was justified. The findings arrived at in the case were (1) that the; dispute was of a civil nature and the decision of the complicated question arising out of it involved elaborate and prolonged inquiry and (2) that the complaint did not disclose any offence against the three accused personally. These findings would bring the case both within the purview of Hariram Onkar v. Mt. Radha Jairam, A.I.R (30) 1943 Nag. 327 : (45 Cr. L.J 175) as well as Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor, A.I.R (20) 1933 Sind 169 : (34 Cr. L.J 1049). The rule of practice enunciated in these cases was not deviated from though the conclusion that the Court arrived at was that the case was a fit one for interference and that the proceedings deserved to be quashed. What the learned counsel now therefore must be having at the back of his mind probably is that the rule of practice relied on by him has not been correctly applied to the facts of the case or that the view of this Court on facts is erroneous. He cannot say that any question of law has been wrongly decided or there has been any error of law. There was no question of law, much less a substantial question of law involved in the case. Any difficulty that may exist in the application of the law would not make the matter a question of law or a substantial question of law.

15. In Amirbux v. Emperor, A.I.R (21) 1934 Sind 183 : (36 Cr. L.J 331), the revision petition was directed against an order of the District Magistrate by which he directed further inquiry into the case of a person who in his view had been improperly discharged. The learned Judges declined to interfere at that stage of the case and observed that interference would be justified if on the face of the proceedings there was some clear injustice requiring immediate redress. The question whether the proceedings were of a civil or of a criminal nature did not arise in the case; nor was there any contention that the complaint did not disclose any offence. This case has got no bearing on the matter before us.

16. It is clear that the case does not fulfil any of the requirements of the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the appellant has not made any effort to show that these requirements exist. He has not urged that there are any exceptional or special circumstances. There is no basis for the view that substantial and grave injustice has been done, and no features of sufficient gravity to justify the grant of a certificate have been indicated to us. The petition must fail and is dismissed.

Thadani, C.J:— I agree. I am content to say that my interpretation of Cl. (c) of Art. 184 of the Constitution is this: The High Court will not ordinarily certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court unless it thinks the final order passed by it is unfit to remain or has doubts as to its fitness to remain, whether on facts or in law, without a certificate as prescribed by cl. (c) of Art. 134. I have no reason to think that our order in this particular case falls within such a category.

17. Petition dismissed.