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United Club v. Nowgong Football Association Of Nowgong
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a football sub-under the Nowgong Football Association (opposite party No. 1), challenged a notice served by opposite party No. 2 (Honorary Secretary of opposite party No. 1) directing the petitioner to participate in the Second Division League matches instead of the First Division (Senior League) for the year 1963. The petitioner treated this as a wrongful demotion and filed a suit before the Munsiff seeking a declaration that the demotion was ultra vires and an injunction restraining the opposite parties from giving effect to the notice and holding the matches. Along with the plaint, the petitioner applied under Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC for an interim injunction to restrain the holding of the league matches. The Munsiff granted an ad interim injunction on the day the suit was filed (3rd May 1963). Opposite party No. 2 filed objections to the injunction, which were heard by the Munsiff on 7th May 1963, who postponed the decision on objections to allow evidence. Despite this, opposite party No. 2 appealed to the Subordinate Judge against the interim injunction and obtained a stay of the injunction's operation. The present petition under Section 115 of the CPC challenges the Subordinate Judge's stay order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lies against an interim order of injunction passed by the trial Court under Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC.
- Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to stay the operation of the interim injunction pending appeal.
- Whether the filing of objections to the interim injunction before the trial Court bars the opposite party from filing an appeal against the interim order.
- Whether the order passed by the Munsiff qualifies as an "order" under the Code of Civil Procedure, thus permitting an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1.
- Whether the conditions under Order 41, Rule 5 of the CPC were complied with before the appellate Court granted a stay of the interim injunction.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- No appeal lies against an interim injunction order passed by the trial Court under Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC; hence, the Subordinate Judge's stay order was without jurisdiction.
- Opposite party No. 2 should have awaited final disposal of objections filed before the Munsiff instead of filing an appeal prematurely.
- The order of the Munsiff granting interim injunction was not a formal order under Order 39 but an order under Section 151 and Section 94 of the CPC, thus not appealable.
- The Subordinate Judge erred in granting a stay without considering the mandatory conditions under Order 41, Rules 1, 2, and 3 of the CPC.
- The appellate order staying the injunction was interlocutory and not amenable to revision under Section 115 of the CPC.
Opposite Parties' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the opposite parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 | Validity of interim injunction orders under Section 151 of CPC and power of Courts to grant injunctions | Confirmed that Courts have ample jurisdiction to grant injunctions under Section 151 and that the Munsiff's order was properly passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, not merely Section 151. |
| L.D Meston School Society v. Kashi Nath Misra, AIR 1951 All 558 | Interpretation of Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 3 regarding notice and ex parte injunctions | Clarified that issuance of notice under Order 39, Rule 3 does not negate the order being under Rules 1 and 2; supports that appeal lies against such interim injunction orders. |
| Sarju Prashad Singh v. Gangaprosad Shah, AIR 1951 Cal 446 | Clarification on appealability of interim injunction orders and the definition of "order" under CPC | Supported the principle that appeal lies against interim injunction orders passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, reinforcing the appellate jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first examined whether the interim injunction order passed by the Munsiff was appealable. It held that the order was passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, as the application was made under these provisions and the Munsiff expressly granted the injunction as prayed for. The issuance of notice to the opposite party under Order 39, Rule 3 did not convert the order into one under Section 151 of the CPC, nor did it negate its appealability. The Court relied on established precedents to affirm that such orders qualify as "orders" under the CPC, thus permitting appeals under Order 43, Rule 1.
Regarding the objection that the opposite party should have awaited the final decision on the objections before appealing, the Court found no merit, clarifying that filing objections does not bar an appeal against the interim injunction if otherwise permissible.
On the issue of the Subordinate Judge's jurisdiction to stay the injunction, the Court acknowledged that while the appellate Court must consider conditions under Order 41, Rule 5 before granting a stay, the power to grant an interim stay pending disposal of the stay application itself is inherent. The Court held it would not interfere with such an interim stay order under Section 115 of the CPC.
The Court also addressed the contention that the appellate order was interlocutory and not subject to revision, rejecting it based on the nature of the stay order affecting the operation of the injunction.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the appeal against the interim injunction was maintainable, and the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to grant a stay pending appeal, and thus the revision petition was not maintainable.
Holding and Implications
The petition under Section 115 of the CPC is rejected.
The Court held that the appeal against the interim injunction order granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC was maintainable. The appellate Court possessed jurisdiction to stay the operation of the injunction pending appeal. The filing of objections before the trial Court did not bar the appeal. The revision petition challenging the appellate stay order was therefore dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. No new precedent was set; the decision affirms existing principles concerning appealability of interim injunctions and appellate jurisdiction under the CPC.
Mehrotra, C.J:— This is a petition under Section 115 of the CPC by the plaintiff. The facts necessary for the disposal of the case are that the petitioner is a football sub-under the Nowgong Football Association which has been impleaded as opposite party No. 1 to this petition. The opposite party No. 2 is Sri Nurul Amin who is the Honorary Secretary of the opposite party No. 1, and opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 are other affiliated clubs of the Nowgong Football Association. The case of the plaintiff is that the opposite party No. 1 conducts football leagues competition yearly amongst its affiliated clubs and for its convenience to carry on the league matches the opposite party No. 1 has divided its affiliated clubs into two divisions, namely the First Division (Senior League) and Second Division respectively. The league matches for both these divisions for the year 1963 were to commence from the 3rd May, 1963. According to the plaintiff petitioner the opposite party No. 1 is governed by certain rules and the opposite party No. 2 representing the opposite party No. 1 served a notice on the petitioner club that the petitioner should participate in the Second Division League matches under the opposite party No. 1.
2. When this notice was issued to the petitioner, the petitioner took it as if the petitioner has been demoted from the senior position to a junior position. That being so, when the league matches were going to start the petitioner filed a suit before the Munsiff for a declaration that the petitioner has been wrongly demoted to the second position and thus the notice was ultra vires. The suit in effect was for a declaration of the right of the petitioner to participate in the League matches of the Senior Division and for an injunction restraining the opposite parties not to give effect to that notice and not to hold the matches. After filing the suit the petitioner along with the plaint made an application purporting to be one under Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC for interim injunction restraining the opposite parties Page: 82from holding the League matches and restraining the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 from participating in those matches.
3. The suit was filed on the 3rd May, 1963. The Munsiff on that very day after hearing the counsel for the plaintiff passed the following order:
“Heard the learned lawyer for the plaintiff. Prayer for temporary injunction is allowed as prayed for. Issue ad interim injunction fixing the above date (37-5-63). Issue a notice to show cause as to why the ad interim injunction should not be made absolute till disposal of the suit.”
4. It appears that opposite party No. 2 took notice of this injunction and filed objection and prayed for vacating the interim injunction issued by the Munsiff on the 4th May, 1963. The objections filed by opposite party No. 2 were put up for hearing by the Munsiff on the 7th May, 1963. The Munsiff heard both the parties elaborately on the 7th May, 1963 and passed an order dealing with most of the points raised by the parties. But the Mnnsiff said that the defendant has raised the point that the plaintiff is not entitled to play in this year game as the plaintiff does not continue to be a member of the Association. This point required investigation and thus he gave opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on this prayer and postponed the hearing of the objections filed by opposite party No. 2 and final decision to a later date. The opposite party No. 2, however, without waiting for the final decision of the Munsiff on the objections filed by him, filed an appeal against the order of the Munsiff granting interim injunction on the 3rd May, 1963 before the Subordinate Judge. Along with the appeal the opposite party No. 2 also prayed for the stay of the operation of the order of interim injunction. The Subordinate Judge entertained the appeal and passed an order staying the operation of the order of interim injunction till the disposal of the appeal. It is against this order of the Subordinate Judge that the present petition in revision has been filed. Dr. Medhi who appears for the petitioner, has argued a number of points before us. His first contention is that no appeal lay against an interim order of injunction passed by the trial Court before the Subordinate Judge. His contention is that if the appeal itself was not maintainable, the order of interim stay was without jurisdiction and thus this Court should interfere with that order under Section 115 of the CPC. The next point urged by him is that in any case the opposite party had no right to come up in appeal against an interim order when he had already/filed objection to the interim order and the objections had not been finally disposed of by the Munsiff. He should have waited till final disposal by the Munsiff of his objections and then if at all necessary, should have filed an appeal against the order passed by the Munsiff under Order 39. Rule 4 of the CPC. That is the point so far as the merits of the case are concerned.
5. A preliminary objection was also raised to the maintainability of the revision on the ground that the order passed by the appellate Court was only an interlocutory order. It is not a case decided and thus no revision under Section 115 of the CPC was maintainable. Dr. Medhi's contention is that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge was a final order inasmuch as it stays the operation of the interim order till disposal of the appeal itself and not only till disposal of the application for stay made under Order 41, Rule 5 of the CPC. He has further attacked the order of the Subordinate Judge on the ground that if it is treated to be an order under O. 41, R. 5, then it is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the conditions for grant of such an order under Order 41, Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the CPC were not considered by the Subordinate Judge.
6. It will be necessary to examine first the: contention of Dr. Medhi. It will be convenient at this stage to quote Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 3. They read as follows:
“1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.— Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise:
(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated? by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or
(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors,
the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing, the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the Court thinks-fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.
2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach—
(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of or, any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.
(2) The Court may by order grant such in junction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit.
(3) In case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.
(4) No attachment under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award such Page: 83compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.
3. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party. The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party.”
7. Order 43 Rule 1(v) provides for an appeal against an order passed under Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 4. Dr. Medhi's contentions are twofold. He firstly contends that Order 43 which provides for an appeal against an order, presupposes the existence of an order as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure and if a particular order does not come within the definition of the order as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, no appeal under O. 43, R. 1(I) will lie. His second line of argument is that the order passed by the Munsiff is not an order under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. Sub-section (14) of Section 2 of the CPC says that — “‘order’ means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree”. The contention of Dr. Medhi is that unless the order embodies a formal decision of a civil Court, it cannot be called an order as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure and in the present case when the interim order was passed by the Munsiff, he did not apply his mind at all to the requisite conditions under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. In fact he did not decide any matter but only passed an interim order and thus it is not an order as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. Dr. Medhi contends that the order in effect was an order passed under Section 151 of the CPC and also an order under Section 94 of the CPC. It is not necessary to enter into the controversy whether apart from Order 39 or Section 94 of the CPC the Court has or has not got power to pass an interim injunction under Section 151 of the CPC.
8. The matter has been set at rest by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 and thus the Court below has ample jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 151 of the CPC granting injunction. The question, however, is whether the present order passed by the Munsiff was one under Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 3 or whether the order was passed under Section 151 of the CPC. Whether a particular order is one under Section 151 or under O. 39, Rules 1 and 2, will have to be determined from the circumstances of each case, that is, from the prayer made by the petitioner and the contents of the order passed by the Munsiff. The application filed by the plaintiff along with the plaint was one under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. The Munsiff in passing the order has expressly said that after hearing the counsel for the parties he ordered interim injunction as prayed for in the petition. When the order is read in the light of the prayer made in the application, it is apparently clear that the Munsiff purported to pass the order under O. 39, 1 Rules 1 and 2 and not under Section 151 of the CPC. If that is so, the appeals 1 maintainable. Even in the petition the petitioner has said that the order of injunction has been passed under Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC.
9. The next line of argument of Dr. Medhi is that the order is not one under Order 39, Rule 1, inasmuch as a notice was issued to the opposite party. Order 39, Rule 3 says that the Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. His contention is that in cases where the Court thinks that the granting of the injunction would be defeated by the delay, the Court need not issue notice to the opposite party and pass an interim order of injunction. But in the present case as the notice has been issued on the opposite party, it shows that the Court in the particular case did not propose to act under Order 39, Rule 3 and thus it was not an order of interim injunction passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 but under Section 151 of the CPC.
10. The matter has to be examined from another standpoint. As I have already pointed out, whether the order is one under Order 39, Rules and 2 or under Section 151, will have to be determined from the nature of the relief claimed and the order passed by the Court. But apart from it merely because a notice in this case has been issued, it does not necessarily follow that the order was not an order under O. 39, R. 1, read with O. 39, R. 3. Under O. 39, R. 4 it is open to a party to apply for vacating an interim order and obviously the notice may have been issued to enable the opposite party to appear before the Court and pray for the discharge of the interim order, and therefore it cannot be said that merely by issuing a notice to the opposite party the order was one under Section 151 of the CPC and not one under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. II the order was one under O. 39, R. 1 obviously an appeal lay under O. 43, R. 1(I) of the CPC. If the order was one under O. 30, R. 1, it comes within the definition of ‘order’ as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. The other contention of Dr. Medhi is that before a Court can decide a matter, the points have got to be proved and unless the matter is proved, it cannot be said that it finally decides the controversy between the parties, so as to bring it within the definition of the word ‘order’. The question whether there was proof or not is a question which will be examined by the Courts in appeal. Here the Munsiff as he passed the order, said that he has heard the parties and there was an affidavit in support of the plaintiff's contention and thus it cannot be said that the Munsiff did not examine the conditions necessary for the exercise of his powers under O. 39, Rules 1 and 2 and it cannot be said that so far as the plaintiff's case was concerned, there was no proof in support of plaintiff's case. In this connection there are two cases which may throw light on the points at controversy— (1) L.D Meston School Society…Defendant v. Kashi Nath Misra…Plaintiff . reported in AIR 1951 All 558 and (2) Sarju Prashad Singh v. Gangaprosad Shah, reported in AIR 1951 Cal 446. So far as the Page: 84Allahabad case is concerned Dr. Medhi's contention is that the facts were entirely different as in that case no notice has been issued under O. 39, R. 3. The following observation at p. 560 of the Allahabad case will show that the notice was issued to the opposite party
“If the Court finds that the object of granting an injunction will be defeated by the delay, it is authorised to pass an ex parte order of injunction. When it passes as ex parte order of injunction, no notice is provided for to be issued to the opposite party. But the opposite party is given an opportunity under R. 4 to move the Court for the discharge, variation or setting aside of the order of injunction issued ex parte. It follows, therefore, that when the Court passes an ex parte order after exercising the discretion vested in it under R. 3, it passes an order under R. 1 or R. 2; and as the Court does not contemplate that notice be issued to the opposite party of the application made under R. 1 or R. 2, when the Court decides to proceed ex parte, the application is for the time being finally disposed of, liberty being reserved to the other side to make an application under R. 4. Whenever, therefore, a Court passes an ex parte order of injunction, it is to be construed as an order passed under R. 1 or 2 and, as such, an appeal lies under O. 43, R. 1(I) of the CPC.”
12. The notice is really given with a view to afford an opportunity to the opposite party to make an application under Rule 4. But as I have already pointed out, the principles laid down in this case apply with full force to the facts of the present case and we are in complete agreement with the principle of the law laid down in these cases. To the same effect is the case reported in AIR 1951 Cal 446. The Calcutta case is sought to be distinguished on the ground that the definition of “order” was not pointed out to the learned Judges in that case. As we have already discussed this point, it is not necessary at this stage to consider it again. In our opinion, therefore, the appeal lay to the Court below against the order granting ex parte interim injunction.
13. The next contention of Dr. Medhi, in our opinion, has no force. The opposite party having known of the interim order of injunction filed objection and what was adjourned was the disposal of objections filed by the opposite party No. 2. But that does not deprive the opposite party of the right of appeal if he had otherwise any grievance against the order granting an ex parte interim injunction. After the objection has been disposed of the opposite party may have a fresh right cl appeal against the order passed under O. 39, R. 4. The fact of filing objections by opposite party I does not debar the opposite party from going up in appeal against the order if the appeal is otherwise permissible. The proceedings which were adjourned by the Munsiff arose out of the objections filed by the opposite party No. 2 and not out of the ex parte interim order passed by the Munsiff on the application made by the plaintiff himself.
14. Dr. Medhi has tried to read the order of the Munsiff in order to support his argument to this effect that the order is a considered order and all aspects of the matter has been considered by the Munsiff. As I have said already, the order which is an elaborate order is passed on the objections filed by the opposite party and not on the preliminary prayer made by the petitioner in his application under O. 39, R. 1. At that stage the Munsiff had not considered all these matters and he passed an ex parte order and prima facie on the consideration of the allegations made by the plaintiff in plaintiff's petition under O. 39, R. 1. The second ground thus does not debar the opposite party from going up in appeal if otherwise he has got a right of appeal under O. 43, R. 1(r) of the CPC.
15. The next point on the merits contended by Dr. Medhi is that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to pass an order of interim stay, unless the conditions laid down under O. 41 R. 5 of the CPC have been established. The Subordinate Judge has no right to pass an order staying the operation of an interim injunction till disposal of the appeal without applying his mind to the provisions of O. 41, R. 5. There are two answers to this contention. Firstly it cannot be denied that the appellate Court has got a right to pass an interim order under O. 41, R. 5 until the disposal of the application itself for stay and even if the argument of Dr. Medhi is accepted, it amounts to modification of the order of the Subordinate Judge so as to make it operative till disposal of the application for stay made by the opposite party, and the Subordinate Judge cars only be directed to hear the application made by the opposite party for interim stay of the operation of the order under O. 41, R. 5. But so far ts the interim order of stay is concerned, till disposal of that application, it cannot be set aside by this Court.
16. The second objection is that under O. 41, R. 5 there are two parts. Order 41, Rule 5(1) says that an appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed? by reason only, of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree. Order 41, R. 5(2) applies to the cases where an application is made for stay of execution, of an appealable decree before the Court which passed decree and not before an appellate Court-It is O. 41, R. 5(1) which is applicable in the case of an application for stay before the appellants Court and Order 41, Rule 5(3) says that no order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied — (a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made; (b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. The contention of Dr. Medhi is that even if the stay order is to be made under O. 41, R. 5, the conditions laid down under O. 41, R. 5(3) have got to be followed and unless those conditions exist, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order of stay. Order 41 Rule 5(1) deals with an appeal against a decree Page: 85as well as an appeal against an order. The later part of Order 41 Rule 5(1) says—
“nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.”
17. That portion of Order 41 Rule 5 to my mind, is attracted in the case of execution of the decree and not in the case of the operation of the order. Even though an appeal may lie and the stay of the operation of the order appealed against will be governed by the first part of the Order 41 Rule 5(1), if Order 41 Rule 5(3) is read that starts with the words ‘no order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied’, that obviously applies to the execution of a decree and not to the proceeding arising out of an order. The only requirement of the stay of the order is that there should be an order passed by the appellate Court. Merely filing of an appeal against an order will not amount to any stay. But the appellate Court has got full power to pass an order of stay of operation of an order appealed against in exercise of his discretion if he thinks that the circumstances of the case demand a stay order. Order 41, Rule 5(3) will not in express terms apply to the case of stay of execution of the decree. Apart from that, the power contained under Order 41 Rule 5 may not be exhaustive in itself. In any view of the matter we do not think that when the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, it had no jurisdiction to pass an interim order of stay and this Court under Section 115 of the CPC in these circumstances will not interfere with such an order. It cannot be said that the ex parte order passed by the Court below under Order 41 Rule 5 of the CPC is an order as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure and thus it is a case decided and revision lies against the order under Section 115 of the CPC.
18. It is not necessary for us at this stage to go into the merits of the suit. In the result, therefore, we reject this petition. But the parties will bear their own cost of this application.
19. The stay order passed by this Court stands discharged.
CH/SG/R.G.D
20. Petition rejected.
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