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Leetho v. Chamelo
Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion (Kamlesh Sharma, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents are defendants; respondent no.1 was the contesting defendant. A decree and judgment dated 30/6/1990 were passed by the Sub‑Judge, 1st Class, Dalhousie in favour of the plaintiff. Respondent no.1 appealed to the District Judge, Chamba Division, Chamba, which appeal was accepted by judgment and decree dated 31/7/1993. The District Judge set aside the Sub‑Judge's decree of 30/6/1990, dismissed the plaintiff's suit, declared the partition order dated 21/9/1983 and mutation entry no.467 dated 21/2/1986 illegal and void, and held those not binding on respondent no.1's rights. The Sub‑Judge had earlier restrained the defendants by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of khasra nos. 1632/406, 1636/407, 425 and 1646/472 (Kita 4, Khata/Khatauni no. 69/98 min, Mohal Gola, Pargana Bhatti Tikri). The present matter is a regular second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the first appellate court erred in holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's civil suit in the absence of any preliminary objection taken by defendant no.1 (Chamelo) in his written statement, in the issues framed, in the evidence adduced during trial or in the ground taken in the appeal?
- Whether the first appellate court misread and misinterpreted the pleadings and evidence (oral and documentary) to conclude that the land in dispute had already been partitioned as alleged by the plaintiff?
- Whether the first appellate court misread and misinterpreted the order dated 21/9/1983 (Ex. P.C.) to conclude that it was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff because the plaintiff had failed to appear in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (plaintiff) contended that the first appellate court should not have considered the question of civil court jurisdiction because no preliminary objection was taken by defendant no.1 in the written statement, issue was not framed on that point, no evidence was led on that contention at trial, and the ground was not raised in the appeal.
- The appellant challenged findings that the land had not been partitioned; the plaintiff relied on pleadings and oral evidence asserting a family settlement/partition in respect of the disputed khasra numbers.
- The appellant also argued (implicitly by contesting the ex parte finding) that the partition order dated 21/9/1983 was not rightly treated as ex parte against him.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, point‑by‑point account of any respondent's arguments; the court primarily addresses the appellant's submissions and the record.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (Constitution Bench) | Set out propositions on when civil court jurisdiction is ousted by special statutes — e.g., finality to orders of special tribunals excludes civil jurisdiction where adequate alternative remedy exists; where there is an express bar, examination of scheme is relevant though not decisive; where no express bar, scheme and remedies are decisive. | The court relied on these propositions as foundational guidance for determining whether the H.P. Land Revenue Act excluded civil court jurisdiction in the present case and to emphasise that exclusion is not absolute where title questions are raised or statutory procedure has not been complied with. |
| Katikara Chintamani Dora & Ors. v. Guatraddi Annamanaidu & Ors. | Held that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is subject to two limitations: (1) civil courts retain jurisdiction where statutory provisions are not complied with or tribunal fails to follow fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (2) the extent of exclusivity depends on purpose and scheme of statute. | The court invoked this authority to underscore that if partition proceedings or statutory procedure were not properly followed, civil courts may entertain suits; this supported the conclusion that civil jurisdiction could be invoked where title and procedural irregularities were alleged. |
| Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu & Ors. | Explained the role of Section 9, CPC in assessing exclusion of jurisdiction; directed consideration of adequacy of alternative remedies and discussed tribunal powers regarding collateral facts and jurisdictional facts. | The court used these guidelines to assess whether the land revenue/statutory machinery provided an adequate remedy and whether the partition/tribunal proceeding could preclude civil adjudication on title and procedural complaints. |
| Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. | Reiterated principles from Katikara regarding limits to exclusion of civil court jurisdiction. | The court noted this case as a reiteration of the same principles and as supportive authority for examining whether statutory procedures were followed and whether civil jurisdiction remained available. |
| Vankamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharamaratna Ranganayakamma | Summarised legal position about tribunal jurisdiction: courts decide whether tribunals of limited jurisdiction properly assumed jurisdiction; where statute gives finality to tribunal orders, civil courts excluded if adequate remedy exists; exceptions apply where statutory provisions are not complied with. | The court relied on this summary to frame the analysis that tribunals of limited jurisdiction cannot by a wrong decision give themselves jurisdiction and that finality clauses require sufficient alternative remedies to preclude civil suits. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (dead) through his LRs | Reiterated that disputed claims to title in immovable property are for the competent civil court unless the special enactment contains machinery to determine title disputes. | The court cited this authority to support the proposition that in absence of a statutory machinery to determine title between rival claimants, civil court jurisdiction is not ousted. |
| State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Deceased) by LRs. & Ors. | Reiterated the presumption in favour of civil courts' jurisdiction (Section 9 CPC), the test for exclusion (legislative intent, adequacy of alternative remedy) and reliance on Dhulabhai and allied authority. | The court relied on this authority as confirming the normal rule that civil courts have jurisdiction unless clearly excluded and as a framework for applying those tests to the facts of the case. |
| Kaka Ram alias Ram Lal v. Financial Commissioner, H.P. & Ors. (cited) | Referenced as an authority consistent with the proposition that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is not readily inferred and must be established by statute and scheme. | Cited in support of the general principle that civil jurisdiction should be presumed unless an exclusion is established by statute and scheme; used as corroborative authority. |
| Shri Lajpat Rai (Deceased) through his LRs. Smt. Maya Devi & Ors. v. Smt. Taro Devi & Ors. (cited) | Referenced alongside other cases as part of the jurisprudence that examines exclusion of civil court jurisdiction. | Used as supporting precedent in the chain of authorities confirming the approach to questions of civil court jurisdiction and exclusion under special enactments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured manner addressing each substantial question of law identified in the appeal.
-
Jurisdictional question (Substantial Question No. 1):
- The court treated the bar on civil court jurisdiction as a pure question of law that could be considered by the first appellate court even if no preliminary objection on jurisdiction was taken in pleadings, issues, evidence or grounds of appeal. The court rejected the plaintiff's submission that the appellate court could not consider jurisdiction in the absence of such preliminary pleadings or objections.
- The court interpreted Section 171(2)(xvii) of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1953 as not creating an absolute bar: while it restricts civil courts from entertaining claims of partition or questions connected with partition proceedings, it qualifies that if a question of title is involved the civil court retains jurisdiction.
- The court relied heavily on a series of Supreme Court authorities (including Dhulabhai and others, Katikara Chintamani Dora, Vatticherukuru, Vankamamidi, State of Rajasthan and Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao) which lay down principles for determining whether a special statute excludes civil court jurisdiction — particularly, the need to examine whether statutory provisions and procedures have been complied with, and whether adequate alternative remedies exist.
- Applying those principles to the facts, the court found that the plaintiff had raised a question of title by alleging an earlier partition that had allotted specified khasra numbers to him, and had also alleged procedural irregularity in the partition order (dated 21/9/1983) including ex parte passing without proper service and violation of principles of natural justice as well as the H.P. Land Revenue Act procedure. Given those allegations, the court concluded the civil court had jurisdiction. The first appellate court's finding that the civil court had no jurisdiction was set aside accordingly.
-
Misreading/misinterpretation of pleadings and evidence (Substantial Question No. 2):
- The court examined the plaint and the record. It observed that paragraph 7 of the plaint mentioned a family settlement without particulars; oral evidence related to partition but the documentary revenue record produced by the plaintiff did not support a conclusive partition.
- The court applied the legal standard that partition (whether by family settlement, arrangement, or revenue officer determination) must be of such a nature as to conclusively establish the respective shares of parties to preclude further dispute. Vague assertions about a party's share, unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to establish that a partition had taken place.
- The court further held that mere arrangements concerning cultivation do not amount to partition, although such arrangements may be relevant when final partition is being effected by revenue authorities to maintain possession arrangements. On this basis, the court found that the first appellate court had rightly set aside the trial court's finding that partition had occurred, and answered Substantial Question No. 2 in favour of the first appellate court.
-
Validity of the partition order dated 21/9/1983 (Substantial Question No. 3):
- The court closely read the partition order (Ex. P.C. dated 21/9/1983) and noted the order recorded that notices had been issued and that only the applicant (defendant no.1) appeared while the non‑applicants, including the plaintiff, did not appear; the order therefore recorded that proceedings were held ex parte against non‑applicants.
- The court treated this statement of fact in the quasi‑judicial order as correct on its face unless shown to be incorrect by evidence. The plaintiff's contention amounted only to a bald assertion to contradict that factual recital and nothing on record effectively controverted it.
- Accordingly, the court agreed with the first appellate court that the order of 21/9/1983 was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff. Substantial Question No. 3 was answered accordingly.
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- The court held that the civil court did have jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's suit because the plaintiff had raised substantial questions of title and had alleged procedural irregularities in the partition proceedings (including alleged ex parte order and lack of compliance with the H.P. Land Revenue Act). The first appellate court's finding that the civil court had no jurisdiction was set aside in respect of that question.
- On the merits concerning whether a partition had in fact taken place, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove a conclusive partition by admissible evidence and that the first appellate court was correct to set aside the trial court's finding that partition had occurred.
- The court upheld the first appellate court's conclusion that the partition order dated 21/9/1983 was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff, since the quasi‑judicial order recorded non‑appearance after service and the plaintiff produced no evidence to displace that factual recital.
Final Disposition and Immediate Consequences:
The opinion explicitly states: "There is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Appeal allowed." The text contains both the statement that the appeal is dismissed and the phrase "Appeal allowed." The operative language elsewhere in the judgment indicates the court concluded there was no merit in the appeal and that consequential relief was denied to the appellant. The judgment also:
- Set aside the first appellate court's finding that civil courts lacked jurisdiction (i.e., clarified that civil courts could adjudicate where title and procedural irregularities were alleged).
- Upheld the first appellate court's factual conclusions that (a) no conclusive partition was proved by the plaintiff and (b) the partition order dated 21/9/1983 had been correctly recorded as ex parte against the plaintiff.
- Recorded no order as to costs.
Broader Implications: The opinion applied established Supreme Court precedents on the limits of exclusion of civil court jurisdiction under special statutes and reiterated that where title questions are raised or statutory procedure is shown to be non‑compliant, civil courts may retain jurisdiction. The judgment does not purport to establish new law but applies settled authorities to the facts before the court.
Kamlesh Sharma, J.:-
(1) The appellant in this appeal is the plaintiff, whereas, respondents are the defendants but respondent no. 1 is the contesting defendant, who felt aggrieved by the decree and judgment dated 30/6/1990 passed by sub - judge 1st class, dalhousie and preferred an appeal against them before the district judge, chamba division chamba, who has accepted his appeal vide judgment and decree dated 31/7/1993 and set aside the decree and judgment dated 30/6/1990 of sub - judge 1st class with the result the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed, whereas it was decreed by sub - judge 1st class and the partition order dated 21. 9. 1983 and mutation entry no. 467 dated 21/2/1986 were declared illegal and void and not binding on his rights. Sub judge 1st class had also restrained the defendants by decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff in khasra nos. 1632/406, 1636/407, 425 and 1646/472, kita 4 khata khatauni no. 69/98 min, situate in mohal gola, pargana bhatti tikri. Hence the present regular second appeal under section 100, code of civil procedure.
(2) This court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
(3) The following substantial questions of law arise in the present appeal; 1. Whether the first appellate court has erred in holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit of the plaintiff in the absence of any such preliminary objection taken by defendant no. 1 chamelo in his written statement, issue framed, evidence adduced during trial and ground taken in the appeal? 2. Whether the first appellate court has misread and mis - interpreted the pleadings and evidence on record, oral as well as documentary to come to the conclusion that the land in dispute was not partitioned as alleged by the plaintiff? 3. Whether the first appellate court, has misread and misinterpreted the order dated 21. 9. 1983, ex. P. C. To come to the conclusion that it was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff as he had failed to put in appearance in the partition proceedings before assistant collector 1st grade?
(4) So far bar of civil court jurisdiction is concerned, it is purely a question of law which could be agitated before the first appellate court and there is no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that in the absence of pleadings, issue, evidence and even the ground of appeal the first appellate court could not consider it. Now, the question arises whether he has decided it erroneously? the answer is in positive. No doubt, section 171 (2) (xvii) of h. P. Land revenue act, 1953, puts a bar that civil court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any claim of partition of an estate, holding or tenancy, or any question connected with, or arising out of proceedings for partition, but qualifies that a question as to title should not be involved in any of the property of which partition is sought. From the provision, it is clear that there is no absolute bar and the moment the question of title is raised, the civil court gets the jurisdiction.
(5) In catena of judgments of the supreme court, guidelines have been laid down for deciding the question of civil court's jurisdiction. In dhulabhai etc. V. State of madhya pradesh and another, the basic judgment of the constitution bench, the learned judges after reviewing the case law on the question of maintainability of civil suit, have laid down seven propositions, out of which two relevant propositions are as under: -
" (1) where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to, be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not."
(6) In katikara chintamani dora and others v. Guatraddi annamanaidu and others, the learned judges have observed in para 33 that : -
". It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations. First the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors."
(7) In vatticherukuru village panchayat v. Nori venkatarama deekshithulu and others, the learned judges have further elaborated the guidelines in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment: -
"22. Section 9 of the civil procedure code, 1908 provides that whenever a question arises before the civil court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant, but cannot be decisive. Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication such consideration would be very important and in conceivable circumstances might become even decisive. 23. The jurisdiction of a tribunal created under statute may depend upon the fulfillment of some condition precedent or upon existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter, which the tribunal has to try, and the determination whether it existed or not is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question, which the tribunal has to consider. At the inception of an enquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact whether it would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunal, which by virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine finally, even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends; but subject to that, the tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with regard to collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise have had. Except such tribunals of limited jurisdiction, when the statute not only empowers to enquire into jurisdictional facts but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to enter on the enquiry and reach a decision rightly or wrongly. If it has jurisdiction to to do right, it has jurisdiction to do wrong. It may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected in appeal or revision subject to that the order would become final."
The learned judges have also quoted with approval the propositions laid down in dhulabhai etc. V. State of madhya pradesh and another (supra).
(8) The observations made in katikara chintamani dora and others v. Guatraddi annamanaidu and others (supra) were further reiterated in shiv kumar chadha v. Municipal corporation of delhi and others. In vankamamidi venkata subba rao v. Chatlapalli seetharamaratna ranganayakamma, the bar of civil court's jurisdiction is summed up as under: -
". It is settled legal position that if a tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction and decide for itself the dispute conclusively, in such a situation, it is the court that is required to decide whether the tribunal with limited jurisdiction had correctly assumed jurisdiction and decided the dispute within its limits. It is also equally settled that when jurisdiction is conferred on a tribunal, the courts examine whether the essential principles of jurisdiction have been followed and decided by the tribunals leaving the decision on merits to the tribunal. It is also an equally settled legal position that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunal, the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. When there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and provides procedure for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the tribunal so constituted and whether remedies are normally associated with the action in civil courts or prescribed by the statutes or not."
(9) In state of rajasthan v. Harphool singh (dead) through his lrs. The learned judges after referring to dhulabhai etc. V. State of madhya pradesh and another (supra) and other judgments have reiterated in para 11 that, "questions relating to disputed claims of parties for title to an immovable property could be decided only by the competent civil court and that in the absence of a machinery in the special enactment to determine disputes relating to title between two rival claimants, the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be said to have been ousted.
(10) In state of andhra pradesh v. Manjeti laxmi kantha rao (d) by l. Rs. And others, it is reiterated: -
"5. The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under section 9 of the code of civil procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislature intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In dhulabhai v. State of madhya pradesh, 1968 (3) scr 662, it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals jurisdiction of the civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Also see: kaka ram alias ram lal v. Financial commissioner, h. P. And others, and shri lajpat rai (deceased) through his l. Rs. Smt. Maya devi and others v. Smt. Taro devi and others."
(11) Therefore, in the light of settled legal position this court has no hesitation to hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the civil court had the jurisdiction, as question of title was raised by the plaintiff by making allegations that the land in dispute stood partitioned long back, as a result of which he was holding the land comprised of four khasra numbers (1632/406,1636/407. 425 and 1646/472) allotted to him, to the exclusion of other co - sharers. There was additional reason for invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court on the allegations that the impugned order dated 21. 9. 1983 partitioning the land in dispute was passed ex parte without proper service on the plaintiff; in violation of the principles of natural justice and without following the procedure laid down under h. P. Land revenue act. In this view of the matter, the findings of the first appellate court that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the plaintiff are set aside and substantial question of law no. 1 is answered accordingly.
(12) So far second substantial question of law is concerned, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has taken this court through the pleadings and evidence on record, oral as well as documentary, but has not been able to show that any part thereof has been misread and misinterpreted by the first appellate court to come to the conclusion that the land in dispute stood already partitioned. In para 7 of the plaint there is mention of family settlement without giving further particulars thereof, whereas, the oral evidence pertains to partition, which is not supported by the revenue record produced by the plaintiff. Partition, whether by way of family settlement or family arrangement or by the revenue officer by giving effect to the family partition or settlement by metes and bounds should be such which may conclusively establish the respective shares of the parties so as to stop further dispute in between them. Vague assertions in regard the share of one party and that too which is not proved from the evidence, cannot be said to be sufficient to hold that a partition had taken place. Further, mere arrangement in regard to cultivation of the land cannot be termed as partition though such arrangement at the time of final partition by the revenue officer should be given due consideration in order to maintain possession of the parties intact. Therefore, the first appellate court has rightly set aside the findings of the trial court to hold that the land in dispute was not partitioned as alleged by the plaintiff. The substantial question of law no. 2 is answered accordingly.
(13) After perusing the order dated 21. 9. 1983 ex. P. C. This court finds that the first appellate court has rightly held that in the partition proceedings the plaintiff did not appear despite service on him, hence ex parte order was passed against him. It is stated in this order that on receipt of report and proposal for mode of partition, the notices were issued to the parties in response whereof only the applicant defendant no. 1 was present and non - applicants including the plaintiff, were not present and ex parte proceedings were held against them. This statement of fact made in the quasi judicial order is liable to be accepted as correct on its face value unless it is proved to be incorrect. Except the bald statement of the plaintiff, there is nothing on record to controvert this statement of fact. Therefore, this court is in agreement with the finding of the first appellate court that order dated 21 - 9 - 1983 ex. Pc was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff. Substantial question of law no. 3 is decided accordingly.
(14) The result of above discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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