Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Damyanti Bisht And Etc. v. State Of Uttarakhand And Ors.

Uttarakhand High Court
Nov 20, 2008
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion consolidates the disposal of two matters: a Special Appeal and a Writ Petition. The Special Appeal No. 143 of 2008 challenged a transfer order dated 25th July, 2008, whereby the petitioner/appellant was transferred from Kotabagh to Mukteshwar on "administrative grounds." The transfer order was issued by the competent authority and the writ petition against this transfer was dismissed in limine by a learned Single Judge. Earlier, a Division Bench had taken a contrary view in Writ Petition No. 123 of 2008 by holding that transfers on administrative grounds were punitive and impermissible under service jurisprudence. The Division Bench referred the Special Appeal to the Full Bench for reconsideration of this issue. The government had also issued guidelines on transfers dated 5th June, 2008, specifying conditions under which transfers on administrative grounds can be effected.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a transfer order passed on "administrative grounds" is inherently punitive and therefore impermissible under service jurisprudence.
  2. Whether the competent authority must hold an inquiry or arrive at prima facie satisfaction regarding the truthfulness of allegations before effecting a transfer on administrative grounds.
  3. The extent of judicial scrutiny applicable to transfers on administrative grounds as opposed to punitive actions like dismissal or discharge.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner/Appellant's Arguments

  • The transfer order dated 25th July, 2008 was challenged on the ground that it was passed on "administrative grounds," which, following the Division Bench's interlocutory order dated 1st July, 2008, meant the transfer was punitive and based on allegations or accusations, and hence impermissible.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The learned Single Judge held that transfers on administrative grounds do not necessarily amount to punitive action and therefore should not be interfered with by courts.
  • Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents to support the view that transfers without adverse impact on service conditions or financial prospects do not require the same level of scrutiny as dismissal or discharge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath, (2004) 4 SCC 245, AIR 2004 SC 1632 - Transfers on administrative grounds are not punitive unless they adversely affect service conditions or financial prospects.
- Use of the term "undesirable" in transfer orders does not automatically cast stigma requiring inquiry.
- No departmental inquiry is required before effecting transfer on allegations of misbehaviour; however, prima facie satisfaction of the competent authority based on contemporaneous records is necessary.
The Court applied these principles to hold that transfers on administrative grounds are not per se bad in law and do not constitute punishment. It emphasized the necessity of the competent authority arriving at and recording prima facie satisfaction regarding the truthfulness of allegations before effecting such transfers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the conflicting views between the Division Bench and the Single Judge. It noted that the Division Bench had earlier held that transfers on administrative grounds are punitive and impermissible, but the Single Judge, relying on Supreme Court precedent, held the opposite. The Court examined the guidelines issued by the Government of Uttarakhand, which permit transfers on administrative grounds only if serious complaints, misbehaviour, or lack of interest in work are established, and emphasized that such transfers should not be based on motivated or casual complaints.

Relying heavily on the Supreme Court judgment in Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath, the Court clarified that transfers do not amount to punishment unless they adversely affect service conditions or impose penal consequences. The Court highlighted that while a departmental inquiry is not mandatory before a transfer, the competent authority must reach a prima facie satisfaction, based on contemporaneous records and reports, regarding the truthfulness of the grounds for transfer.

The Court overruled the Division Bench's interlocutory order to the extent it held transfers on administrative grounds as per se impermissible. It substituted its own view that the legality of such transfers depends on the prior verification and recording of satisfaction by the competent authority about the existence and truthfulness of the grounds justifying the transfer.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED both the Special Appeal and the writ petition, holding that a transfer order on administrative grounds is not inherently bad in law or punitive.

The Court established that such transfers are valid provided the competent authority, before issuing the transfer order, arrives at and records prima facie satisfaction regarding the existence and truthfulness of one or more of the stipulated grounds for transfer after due verification. Failure to do so renders the transfer order vitiated and against principles of natural justice.

This decision clarifies the legal standard for transfers on administrative grounds but does not set a new precedent beyond affirming the necessity of proper satisfaction and recording by the authority. The direct effect is to uphold the impugned transfer order and dismiss challenges based solely on the ground that the transfer was on administrative grounds.

Show all summary ...

V.K Gupta, C.J:— By this common judgment, both these matters, Special Appeal as well as the Writ Petition, are being disposed of together.

2. It was on 19th September, 2008 that Special Appeal No. 143 of 2008, to be heard in ordinary course by a Division Bench, was referred for hearing to the Full Bench because, in the opinion of the Division Bench referring the matter for hearing to the Full Bench, the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in its order dated 1st July, 2008 passed in Writ Petition No. 123 of 2008 (S/B) required reconsideration by a larger Bench. In the Special Appeal, the judgment dated 7th August, 2008 passed by a learned Single Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 807 of 2008 (S/S) is under challenge, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner against his transfer has been dismissed in limine. The petitioner/appellant, vide the impugned transfer order dated 25th July, 2008, was transferred from Kotabagh to Mukteshwar in district Nainital. The transfer order dated 25th July, 2008 was issued on “administrative grounds”. In an earlier case, being Writ Petition No. 123 of 2008 (S/B), a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with an identical issue and situation where a person was sought to be transferred on administrative grounds, had taken a view (while passing an interlocutory order) that if a person has been transferred on administrative grounds, it meant that his transfer was punitive in nature as well as it was based on considerations of some allegations/accusations having been levelled against him and this, in the opinion of the Division Bench, while passing an interlocutory order, was not permissible under service jurisprudence. The following observations in the aforesaid Division Bench order dated 1st July, 2008 (S/B) are apposite and we quote:

“The impugned transfer order shows that the petitioner has been transferred on “administrative grounds”. It therefore means that in his case the transfer is punitive in nature as well as it is based on considerations of some allegations/accusations against him. Transferring a person on this ground is not permissible under service jurisprudence.”

3. In Writ Petition No. 123 of 2008 (S/B), transfer order dated 14th June, 2008 was challenged by the petitioner on the ground that since it was passed on “administrative grounds”; it was bad in the eyes of law. As noticed hereinabove, interlocutory order dated 1st July, 2008 was passed in the said Writ Petition, relevant extract whereof has been quoted above. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment dated 7th August, 2008, even while in para 3 has made a reference to the aforesaid Division Bench order dated 1st July, 2008, in para 4, by referring to some Supreme Court Judgments, has taken the view that since the impugned transfer order, even though passed on administrative grounds, cannot be said to be punitive in nature, it should not be interfered with by the courts. The writ petition accordingly, challenging the said transfer order, was dismissed in limine by the learned Single Judge; hence the present Special Appeal.

4. Communication No. 545.SSIV (1)/2008-20/2008 dated 5th June, 2008 was issued by the Government to Uttarakhand addressed to Director, School Education, in which certain guidelines were issued relating to transfers. Para 4 of this communication dealt with and related to the transfers on administrative grounds, fn this para, it has been laid down that transfers on administrative grounds can be effected only in case of the following situations:

i. If there are serious complaints against the person sought to be transferred; or

ii. If the person sought to be transferred has misbehaved with superior officers; or

iii. If the person sought to be transferred has not been taking interest in the work.

5. Para 4, after laying down the aforesaid three stipulations being grounds for effecting transfers on administrative reasons, goes on to further stipulate and lay down that transfers on administrative grounds should not be effected on “motivated” complaints nor should these be ordered in a “casual” manner and the Competent Authority, seeking to effect the transfers on administrative grounds, is required to verify/confirm the existence as well as truthfulness of the aforesaid grounds (of transfer) and only after arriving at and recording its satisfaction about the existence and truthfulness of the grounds, should the transfer be effected.

6. In the case of Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath reported in (2004) 4 SCC 245 : AIR 2004 SC 1632 while dealing with the issue relating to the transfer of an employee on the ground of his being “undesirable”, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:

“12. That brings us to the other question as to whether the use of the expression “undesirable” warranted an enquiry before the transfer. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on a decision of this Court in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 449 (at p. 456, para 21) to contend that whenever there is a use of the word “undesirable” it casts a stigma and it cannot be done without holding a regular enquiry. The submission is clearly without substance. The said case relates to use of the expression “undesirable” in an order affecting the continuance in service by way of discharge. The decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. The manner, nature and extent of exercise to be undertaken by Courts/tribunals in a case to adjudge whether it casts a stigma or constitutes one by way of punishment would also very much depend upon the consequences flowing from the order and as to whether it adversely affected any service conditions-status, service prospects financially-and the same yardstick, norms or standards cannot be applied to all categories of cases. Transfers unless they involve any such adverse impact or visit the persons concerned with any penal consequences, are not required to be subjected to same type of scrutiny, approach and assessment as in the case of dismissal, discharge, reversion or termination and utmost latitude should be left with the department concerned to enforce discipline, decency and decorum in public service which are indisputably essential to maintain quality of public service and meet untoward administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the administration.”

7. Whether the use of the expression “undesirable”, as a means for transferring a person, warranted an inquiry before the transfer was actually effected was the issue before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Dealing with this aspect, in para 12 (supra), it has clearly been laid own that use of expression “undesirable” in an order effecting the continuance in service by way of discharge is different and is in contradistinction to the use of this expression in transferring an employee. The manner, nature and extent of exercise to be undertaken by courts/tribunal in a case to adjudge whether the use of such an expression casts stigma or constitutes a stigma by way of punishment also very much depends upon the consequences flowing from the order. In the realm of the “consequences”, also fell the aspect of the service conditions being adversely affected. Status and Page: 778service prospects financially were two important factors, which could amount to adversely affecting the service conditions. While summing up their Lordships held that he transfers, unless these involved any adverse impact or visited the transferred person with any penal consequences, are not required to be subjected to same type of scrutiny, approach and assessment as in the case of dismissal, discharge, reversion or termination of service. Utmost latitude should be left with the Competent Authority to enforce discipline, decency and decorum in public service, which are un-disputably essential to maintain quality of public service as well as to meet administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the administration.

8. In the same judgment, their Lordships also dealt with the issue of holding an inquiry with respect to the allegations of misbehaviour etc. Whether there was any misbehaviour on the part of the employee concerned, was a question which could be gone into in a departmental inquiry. However, for the purpose of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an inquiry to find out whether there was a misbehaviour or a conduct unbecoming of a Government servant was unnecessary. What was actually needed in such a situation was a prima facie satisfaction of the Competent Authority, on the basis of contemporaneous record as well as reports about the occurrence complained of before issuing an order of transfer, in other words, even though holding of a departmental inquiry before issuing an order of transfer, in other words, even though holding of a departmental inquiry before issuing a transfer order with respect to the allegations of misbehaviour or misconduct etc. was not required, it was essential that the prima facie satisfaction of the Competent Authority must be arrived at with respect to the existence or truthfulness of such an allegation. The following observations in this regard as contained in para 14 of the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath (supra), are aposite and we quote:

“14. The allegations made against the respondents are of serious nature, and the conduct attributed is certainly unbecoming. Whether there was any misbehaviour is a question which can be gone into in a departmental proceeding. For the purposes of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out whether there was misbehaviour or conduct unbecoming of an employee is unnecessary and what is needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned on the contemporary reports about the occurrence complained of and if the requirement, as submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, of holding an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted upon the very purpose of transferring an employee in public interest or exgencies of administration to enforce decorum and ensure probity would get frustrated. The question whether the respondents could be transferred to a different division is a matter for the employer to consider depending upon the administrative necessities and the extent of solution for the problems faced by the administration. It is not for this Court to direct one way or the other. The judgment of the High Court is clearly indefensible and is set aside. The writ petitions filed before the High Court deserve to be dismissed which we direct. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.”

9. Transfer on administrative ground does not amount to any punishment nor is it punitive in nature because by transferring a person from one place to another, no penalty as such is imposed which is either minor or major in character or extent. All that happens is that the person transferred is removed from one place and post to another place arid post. The status of the person transferred does not undergo any change nor his service prospects, in any manner, get financially adversely affected. The transfer does not visit the person transferred with any penal consequences.

10. One safeguard which is inbuilt in para 4 of the aforesaid communication dated 5th June, 2008 and which also finds support in para 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath (supra) is that the existence and truthfulness of any of the three allegations, finding a mention in para 4, is sine qua non to ordering the transfer of a person on administrative ground and the existence and truthfulness of such an allegation has to be prima facie established in the mind of the Authority competent to transfer based upon contemporaneous record as well as report. In other words, before effecting a transfer on administrative grounds, the Authority competent to transfer must prima facie arrive at and duly record its satisfaction about the existence and truthfulness, after due verification and confirmation, of the allegations against the person sought to be transferred. This is a condition precedent to the transfer of the person. If this does not happen and if the prima facie satisfaction, upon due verification and confirmation, is not arrived at and duly recorded, any and every order effecting a transfer on administrative ground is vitiated as well as it is against the principles of natural justice. On this ground alone, such an order deserves to be quashed and set aside. In the present appeal as well as in the writ petition, the only ground which was raised against the impugned transfer orders was that they were passed on administrative ground and therefore, per se were bad in a law. The learned Single Judge, in the judgment impugned in the Special Appeal, in our considered opinion, has taken the correct view that the transfer order on administrative ground per se is not bad in laws. We agree with him. We accordingly overrule the view adopted by the Division. Bench, in the interlocutory order dated 1st July, 2008 in the aforesaid Writ Petition. We, while upholding the aforesaid view, substitute our own opinion by laying down that even though transfer order on administrative ground per se is not bad in law, no person can be transferred on an administrative ground unless before issuing the transfer order, the Authority competent to transfer has arrived at and recorded his satisfaction, upon due verification and confirmation, about the existence and truthfulness of anyone of the three factors/grounds/considerations warranting the transfer of the person concerned. The Special Appeal as well as the writ petition have no merit. They are accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

11. Appeal dismissed.