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Behari Lal v. Dal Chand

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Jun 21, 1950
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Factual and Procedural Background

Ishar Singh, defendant 1, mortgaged two properties with possession: a house for Rs. 2400 on 17-8-1928 and a haveli for Rs. 3000 on 6-12-1933 to Bohru Mal Mahajan. Behari Lal, Ishar Singh's son and the plaintiff, filed a suit on 27-10-1945 seeking a declaration that these mortgages were not binding on him and requesting an injunction to restrain the mortgagee from interfering with his possession. The suit did not allege whether or when possession was taken. The trial court held the suit barred by limitation, a finding affirmed by the District Judge. The plaintiff appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff was under twenty-one years of age at the time of filing the suit, thereby affecting the limitation period.
  2. Whether Article 126 of the Limitation Act applies to the suit, considering the nature of possession and alienation involved.
  3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under the applicable articles of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was under twenty-one years of age when the suit was filed, which would affect the limitation period.
  • Article 126 of the Limitation Act applies because the suit seeks a declaration and injunction related to possession, and the second mortgage dated 6-12-1933 would be within time.
  • Relied on judgments from the Lahore High Court (Gokha Ram v. Sham Lal and Dev Raj v. Shiv Ram) to support the applicability of Article 126.
  • Challenged the evidentiary value of the birth entry in the school register relied upon by the District Judge.

Court's Observations on Arguments

  • The onus was on the plaintiff to prove he was under twenty-one at the time of filing, which was not discharged based on the evidence presented.
  • The cited Lahore High Court decisions do not assist in the present facts, as the question of possession under Article 126 was not fully addressed therein.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gokha Ram v. Sham Lal, 3 Lah. 426 (A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 268) Article 126 applies where alienee takes possession; suit for annulment covered, mere declaration not. Held not directly applicable as the possession question was not discussed and facts differ.
Dev Raj v. Shiv Ram, 25 I.C 463 (A.I.R. 1914 Lah. 408) "Set aside" in Article 126 implies immediate relief, not mere declaration. Did not assist in interpreting Article 126 for the present case.
Chintaman Balwant v. Bhagwan Ganpati, A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 383 (113 I.C 378) Article 126 limitation runs only from alienee's taking possession; if no possession, Article 126 does not apply. Supported the court's view that Article 126 does not apply here due to absence of possession.
Munia Goundan v. Ramasami Chetty, 41 Mad. 650 (A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 19) Limitation period under Article 126 runs from alienee's possession to avoid notice issues. Supported the interpretation of Article 126 requiring possession for limitation to run.
Luta Ram v. Shiv Ram, 114 I.C 59 (A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 14) Confirmed that limitation under Article 126 starts only when alienee takes possession. Reinforced the court's conclusion that Article 126 is inapplicable without possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether the plaintiff was under twenty-one years at suit filing, noting the plaintiff failed to prove this despite multiple witness statements and the plaintiff's own testimony. The District Judge's reliance on the school register birth entry was deemed appropriate given the lack of stronger evidence.

The court then analyzed the applicability of Article 126 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a 12-year limitation period for a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside a father's alienation of ancestral property, running from the date the alienee takes possession. The court emphasized that Article 126 applies only when the alienee has taken possession, citing authoritative texts and precedents. Since the possession was not alleged or proven to have been taken by the mortgagee, Article 126 did not apply.

Consequently, the court held that the residuary Article 120, prescribing six years limitation for suits not covered by specific articles like Article 126, applied. The plaintiff's suit was therefore barred by limitation. The court acknowledged the novelty of the Article 126 argument, which was not raised earlier, but allowed it due to its fundamental relevance.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, upholding the finding that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act.

The direct consequence is that the plaintiff's suit for declaration and injunction against the mortgagee fails on limitation grounds. No broader precedent was established beyond clarifying the non-applicability of Article 126 where possession by the alienee is not taken. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

1. Ishar Singh defendant 1 mortgaged with possession for a sum of Rs. 2400 the house in dispute to Bohru Mal Mahajan by means of a registered deed dated 17-8-1928, Ex. D-2, and he mortgaged on 6-12-1933, a haveli for Rs. 3000 by means of Ex. D-1. Behari Lal, who is the son of Ishar Singh, brought a suit on 27-10-1945 for declaration to the effect that these mortgages were not binding on him and that an injunction may be issued to defendant 2, the mortgagee restraining him from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the said property. It was nowhere alleged that the possession had been taken or if it had been taken when it had been taken. The defence inter alia was that the suit was barred by time. The trial Court held the suit to be barred by time and this finding was affirmed by the learned District Judge. The plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court.

2. The plaintiff submits that the finding of the learned District Judge is wrong because he was less than twenty-one years of age when he brought the suit. The evidence which was produced by the plaintiff was of five witnesses including himself. P.W 1, Nanak Chand prepared his horoscope but the horoscope was not produced in Court.

3. Plaintiff's witnesses Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are old men of the village and they have variously stated that the age of the plaintiff on the date they were giving evidence was 21 or 22 years or it was 20 or 21 years. The statement of the plaintiff himself was that he was 20 or 22 years of age on the date he was giving evidence which was in 1947. The learned District Judge relied on a birth entry mare in the school register, Ex. D.W 3/1, and Mr. Pandit has submitted that the evidentiary value of this register is very little and that the learned District Judge has not considered his evidence with regard to age. The onus of proving that the plaintiff was less than 21 years of age on the date he filed the suit was on him and, in my opinion, on the evidence that he has led it is not possible to hold that he has discharged the onus. In my opinion, therefore, the learned District Judge rightly held that the plaintiff has not proved that he was twenty-one years of age or less on the date when he filed, the suit.

4. The learned counsel then submitted that in any case the second alienation of 6-12-1933 would be within time on the date when he filed the suit. The article applicable according to the learned advocate is 126 of the Limitation Act which provides:

“126. By a Hindu governed by the law of Mitakshara to set aside his father's alienation of ancestral property. 12 years. When the alienee takes possession of the property.”

5. The submission comes to this that the suit is for a declaration with a prayer for injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and therefore he submits that Article 126 applies and he relies on two judgments of the Lahore High Court in Gokha Ram v. Sham Lal, 3 Lah. 426 : (A.I.R(10) 1923 Lah. 268) and Dev Raj v. Shiv Ram, 25 I.C 463 at p. 466 : (A.I.R(1) 1914 Lah. 408). In the former case where a mortgage with possession had been effected by the father in favour of Rosha, it was held that a suit for mere declaration that the alienation would not affect the plaintiff's rights is not covered by Article 126, Limitation Act but where the suit is for annulment of the sale and in fact the decree is also for the same, Article 126 applies and not Article 120. But whether this case is correctly decided or not it can have no application to the facts of the present case because the question has not been discussed as to whether this article applies in the case of alienation where no possession has been taken. In the second case all that the learned Judges said was that the phrase “set aside” in Article 126 implies a prayer for immediate relief, and not for a mere declaration. That again, in my opinion, does not assist us in interpreting Article 126 when applied to the present case.

6. In Col. 3 of Article 126 the words used are “when the alienee takes possession of the property”. In my opinion, this article applies to those suits where the alienee has taken possession and has no application to those where the possession has not been taken. In Rustomji's Limitation Act at p. 1092 it is said under this article:

“Time runs only when the alienee takes possession and therefore when possession is not taken under the alienation, the statute does not begin to run.”

7. In Chintaman Balwant v. Bhagwan Ganpati, A.I.R(15) 1928 Bom. 383 : (113 I.C 378) it was held that Article 126 contemplates the case of an alienation where the alienee has taken possession of the property, because limitation only runs from the date when the alienee so takes possession. In a case where the alienee never gets possession, no limitation can arise under Article 126; and in such cases the only right of the son will be to obtain a declaration that the deed is invalid and the limitation prescribed for such a suit is that of six years under Article 120. In Munia Goundan v. Ramasami Chetty, 41 Mad. 650 at p. 656 : (A.I.R(5) 1918 Mad. 19) Sadasiva Ayyar, J., interpreting Article 126 said:

“The Legislature has clearly fixed an overt and patent fact, namely, the taking of possession of the property by the alienee as the event from which the period has to be calculated so as to avoid as far as possible difficult questions as to notice.”

8. With this view I most respectfully agree. This view also finds support from the judgment of Addison, J., in Luta Ram v. Shiv Ram, 114 I.C 59 at p. 60 : (A.I.R(16) 1929 Lah. 14). In my opinion, therefore, Article 126 has no application to the facts of this case but the article which would apply would be the residuary Article 120. I may add here that the question of applicability of Article 126 was never raised at any time in the Courts below and it is the ingenuity and ability of Mr. Prem Chand Pandit which is responsible for this new question. But as it went to the root of the case, I allowed it to be raised.

9. I must, therefore, hold that the suit of the plaintiff was rightly held to be barred by limitation. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances of this case I would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

D.B.B

10. Appeal dismissed.