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Babu Ram, v. Ramji Lal And Others,

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aug 6, 1963
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Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a reference under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal, recommending that the final order passed by Shri R.N. Puri, Magistrate First Class, Karnal, on 12th May, 1962, be set aside and the case remanded for fresh decision.

The petitioner, Babu Ram, originally filed an application under Section 145 CrPC on 24th October, 1961, alleging a dispute over 21 kanals of land in village Raisan with Ramji Lal and others and asserting a likelihood of breach of the peace. A preliminary order under sub‑section (1) of Section 145 CrPC was made the same day. On 25th November, 1961, the petitioner was absent and the Magistrate dismissed the application in default. Later that day the petitioner filed a fresh Section 145 application based on the same allegations and asked that the earlier order of dismissal be set aside and the original proceedings continued. The Magistrate did not restore the first proceedings but treated the second application as a fresh proceeding, made a new preliminary order dated 2nd January, 1962, and after hearings passed a final order on 12th May, 1962 declaring the respondents in possession as of the date of that preliminary order and directing that they not be ousted except in due course of law.

The petitioner sought revision in the Court of Sessions challenging the Magistrate's final order. The Additional Sessions Judge recommended setting aside the Magistrate's final order on the basis that the dismissal in default on 25th November, 1961, was illegal and that the final order should have been made with reference to the preliminary order dated 24th October, 1961 (the date of the first preliminary order) rather than 2nd January, 1962. The present opinion responds to that reference and disposes of the revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Magistrate may lawfully dismiss an application instituted under Section 145 CrPC for non‑appearance of the applicant (i.e., whether dismissal in default of the applicant is permissible in proceedings under Section 145).
  2. When a later final order is passed after a dismissal in default and a fresh application is filed on the same facts, whether the final order must be made with reference to the date of the original preliminary order or the date of the preliminary order in the fresh proceedings.
  3. Whether a Magistrate who has dismissed proceedings under Section 145 CrPC can itself set aside that order of dismissal or restore the original proceedings, or whether only a superior court may do so.
  4. The legal effect of an order of dismissal that is wrong but unchallenged: whether such an order continues to operate until set aside by a competent court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Magistrate's order dated 25th November, 1961 dismissing the petitioner's first Section 145 application in default was illegal because proceedings under Section 145 could not be dismissed for non‑appearance of the applicant; the Magistrate was bound to decide the matter in accordance with law despite the applicant's absence.
  • Because the dismissal of the first application was unsustainable, the original proceedings remained pending and the final order should have been with reference to the preliminary order dated 24th October, 1961, and not with reference to the preliminary order of 2nd January, 1962, passed on the second application.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in opposition to the reference)

  • Proceedings under Section 145 CrPC are quasi‑civil in nature (relying on Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin), and therefore the Magistrate was competent to dismiss the application under Section 145.
  • Even if the dismissal for default was illegal, it operated to terminate the proceedings, and the petitioner’s remedy was to file a fresh Section 145 application (which he did on 25th November, 1961).
  • The dismissal order became final because no revision was filed against it and it was not set aside by any competent court.
  • Once the first complaint dismissal was final, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to restore the original proceedings or ignore the dismissal.
  • The Magistrate properly refused to restore the original proceedings and treated the application dated 25th November, 1961 as a fresh proceeding, passing the preliminary order on 2nd January, 1962 under sub‑section (1) of Section 145 CrPC.
  • Therefore, the final order could be passed only with reference to the preliminary order dated 2nd January, 1962, and the Magistrate’s order dated 12th May, 1962 was valid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin, AIR 1959 All 141 (FB) Authority for the proposition that proceedings under Section 145 are quasi‑civil in nature and that a Magistrate may dismiss an application under Section 145. Relied on by the respondents to argue competence of the Magistrate to dismiss for default; the court recorded this contention but did not adopt this line as determinative of the case's outcome.
Bhavrao Ganpatrao v. Bhimrao Tukaramji, AIR 1958 Bom 450 Supports the view that the Court must proceed with Section 145 matters even if the party who instituted proceedings is absent; i.e., the Magistrate should act to prevent breach of the peace irrespective of applicant’s non‑appearance. The court expressly agreed with the observations in this case and relied on it to support the proposition that absence of the applicant does not relieve the Magistrate of duty to proceed under Section 145.
Sankatha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1208 Holds that a Sessions Judge (and, by analogy, criminal courts) is not competent to alter or review a judgment once signed except to correct clerical errors; indicates limits on a criminal court's power to review its own orders. Used to support the proposition that a Magistrate (a criminal court) has no inherent power to review or set aside its own dismissal order and that such a dismissal can be set aside only by a superior court under appropriate provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in these steps, following only the materials and legal points set out in the opinion:

  1. The court agreed with the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the Magistrate's order dated 25th November, 1961 dismissing the petitioner's first Section 145 application in default of appearance was not a valid order in substance because the duties of the Magistrate under Section 145 are directed to maintaining law and order and preventing breaches of the peace; those duties do not cease merely because the applicant is absent on a hearing. The court emphasized that the Magistrate must proceed under the provisions of Section 145 and ultimately pass a final order in terms of sub‑section (5) where appropriate.
  2. The court noted, however, that although such an order of dismissal may be wrong, it was nonetheless an order made by a court having jurisdiction. A court validly seised of a matter may decide wrongly as well as rightly; an erroneous decision still falls within the court's jurisdiction unless set aside by a competent tribunal.
  3. The court observed that a Magistrate (being a criminal court) lacks inherent power to review or alter its judgments and orders (except to correct clerical errors), and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure permitting such review by the trial Magistrate. Sankatha Singh was cited for this principle.
  4. As the dismissal order of 25th November, 1961 had not been challenged in a superior court nor set aside, it continued to operate; thus the proceedings initiated on 24th October, 1961 were, in law, terminated by that (albeit erroneous) order.
  5. When the petitioner presented a fresh Section 145 application later the same day, alleging the same dispute and likelihood of breach of peace, the Magistrate correctly treated that filing as a new and distinct proceeding. Consequently, the preliminary order made on 2nd January, 1962 related to that fresh proceeding and the question of possession for the purpose of the final order could only be determined with reference to the date (2nd January, 1962) of that preliminary order.
  6. The court examined the Magistrate's determination on the factual question of who was in possession on 2nd January, 1962 and found that the trial court's finding was supported by material on the record; sitting as a revisional court, there was no justification to interfere with the finding.
  7. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Magistrate's final order dated 12th May, 1962 was valid insofar as it related to the fresh proceeding and the possession determination as of 2nd January, 1962, and thus the reference of the Additional Sessions Judge should be declined.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge is declined. The revision petition is dismissed, and the Magistrate's final order dated 12th May, 1962 is upheld.

Immediate consequences and implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Magistrate's order declaring the respondents in possession as of 2nd January, 1962 and directing that they shall not be ousted except in due course of law remains in force.
  • The court clarified the legal posture that, while a dismissal for default in Section 145 proceedings may be legally objectionable because of the preventive and public‑order focus of Section 145, an erroneous dismissal by a court with jurisdiction remains operative unless and until set aside by a competent superior court; the Magistrate himself lacks power to review and set aside that dismissal (except for clerical corrections). This limited the petitioner’s remedy to apply to a superior court under the appropriate provision (Section 439 CrPC in the present context) or to file a fresh Section 145 application.
  • The opinion does not frame or announce any broader novel precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts: it affirms that (i) Magistrates must proceed under Section 145 to prevent breaches of the peace even if the applicant is absent, and (ii) criminal courts (other than superior courts) lack an inherent power to review or set aside their own orders once made, so an unchallenged dismissal continues to operate. The court specifically declined to interfere with the factual finding of possession made by the Magistrate on the fresh application.

Disposition: Petition for revision dismissed; reference by Additional Sessions Judge declined; Magistrate's order dated 12th May, 1962 stands.

Show all summary ...

Judgement

This is a reference under S. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal, recommending that the final order passed by Shri R.N. Puri; Magistrate First Class, Karnal, on 12th May, 1962, disposing of the petitioner Babu Rams application, dated 25th November, 1961, under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code be set aside and the case remanded for fresh decision in accordance with law. The detailed facts of the case are found in the order of reference, and briefly recapitulated are as follows :-

2. On 24th October, 1961, the petitioner Babu Ram put in an application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code stating that there was a dispute about 21 Kanals of land situate within the limits of village Raisan between him and Ramji Lal and others, members of the opposite party, who wanted to evict him forcibly, and this dispute was likely to cause breach of peace. That very day the learned Magistrate passed a preliminary order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. After several adjournments, when the case was taken up on 25th November, 1961, the petitioner was found to be absent, and, accordingly, the learned Magistrate dismissed his application in default.

3. Later in the day, Babu Ram petitioner came to the Court and put in a fresh application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code based upon the same allegations as were made by him in his earlier application. In a note appended to that application he stated that his earlier application had been dismissed in default and prayed that after setting aside that order of dismissal the proceedings be continued. Proceedings started on this second application, and on 2nd January, 1962, the learned Magistrate passed a fresh preliminary order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Appearing in response to the notices issued to them, the respondents contested the application, and after due proceedings and consideration of the material placed before him, the learned Magistrate declared by his order, dated 12th May, 1962, that the respondents were in possession of the land on the date of the preliminary order, and directed that they shall not be ousted, except in due course of law. Having failed to obtain any redress, the petitioner Babu Ram assailed this order of the Magistrate in the Court of Sessions by means of a revision petition.

It was contended on his behalf that the order passed by the Magistrate on 25th November, 1961, dismissing his first application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in default was illegal as the proceedings initiated under Section 145 could not be dismissed for non-appearance of the applicant, and irrespective of the default in appearance, the Magistrate was bound to decide the matter in accordance with law. It was further urged that since the order dismissing the first application in default of appearance was unsustainable, its result was that the original proceedings started by the petitioner under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code remained pending, and the final order had to be passed with reference to the date on which the first preliminary order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was made by the Court on 24th October, 1961, and not with reference to the preliminary order dated 2nd January, 1962, which the learned Magistrate unnecessarily passed on the second application made by the petitioner under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Being impressed by these arguments, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has recommended that the final order passed by the Magistrate on 12th May, 1962, be set aside. Giving the reasons for his opinion that the order under revision was not valid, the learned Additional Sessions Judge observed as follows :-

"As indicated above, the order of dismissal of the proceedings for default of the petitioner on 25th November, 1961, is illegal. In this view of the matter, the first preliminary order passed on 24th October, 1961, stands, and is in operation and effect. As such, the second preliminary order passed on 2nd January, 1962, cannot be said to be valid. Therefore, the impugned order which was passed on a consideration as to who, was in possession of the land on 2nd January, 1962, is not warranted by law and the same resulted into miscarriage of justice."

4. In opposing the recommendation, Shri Ram Rang, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has contended :-

(a) that since proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were of quasi-civil nature, as held in Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin, AIR 1959 All 141 (FB), the Magistrate was fully competent to dismiss the application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code,

(b) that even if the order of the Magistrate dismissing the application for default was illegal, it had operated to terminate the proceedings, and the only remedy of the petitioner was to put in a fresh application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code which he, in fact, did so on 25th November, 1961,

(c) that the order of dismissal in default of appearance passed by the Magistrate had become final as no revision against that order was filed nor was that order set aside by any competent Court,

(d) that the order of dismissal of the first complaint having become final, the learned Magistrate had neither any jurisdiction nor any authority to set aside or ignore the same and restore the original proceedings,

(e) that as a matter of fact the Magistrate, and quite properly so, did not accede to the petitioners request for restoration of the original proceedings and treating the application, dated 25th November, 1961, as a fresh proceedings passed the preliminary order on 2nd January, 1962, in terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and

(f) that the proceedings taken on the original application dated 24th November, 1961, having ended, the final order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code could only be passed with reference to the preliminary order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code passed on the second application on 2nd January, 1962, and, accordingly, the order of the Magistrate was valid.

5. After hearing the parties learned counsel I find myself in agreement with the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the order passed by the Magistrate on 25th November, 1961, dismissing the petitioners application, dated 24th October, 1961, in default of appearance was not a valid order. The proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not between two private individuals despite the fact that a dispute about property giving jurisdiction to the Magistrate would be of a private nature. Disputes of possession and title to the property as such are generally settled by Civil Courts and the object of the legislature in enacting Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was to act in the interest of law and order in cases where such disputes about, property are likely to lead to breach of peace. It this was the object of the legislature in authorizing criminal Courts to step in private disputes between the parties, it is obvious that once the Magistrate is informed that there is a likelihood of the breach of peace because of such a dispute, it is his duty to prevent breach of peace in the manner laid down by Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He is not relieved of that duty merely because the person at whose instance the proceedings were started fails to appear at one of the hearings or keeps away from the Court for some oblique motive. It is still the duty of the Magistrate to proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and pass a final order in terms of sub-sec. (5) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

It is true that where the applicant absents himself and thus fails to lay the necessary material before the Court, the Court may not be in a position to determine which of the contending parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order, and in that case it may have to act in accordance with the provisions of Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or the case of the applicant may fail. All the same, the Court has to proceed the case irrespective of the fact whether the party moving the Court is or is not present before it. There is a string of authority in support of this view, and I respectfully agree with the observations in Bhavrao Ganpatrao v. Bhimrao Tukaramji, AIR 1958 Bom 450, upon which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has relied.

6. After the passing of this order, two courses were open to the petitioner. He could either approach this Court for setting it aside, or, put in a fresh application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the dispute about that property still existed and the likelihood of breach of peace was continuing. If he disputed the correctness of the first order of dismissal and did not wish to put in a fresh application under S. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, then the order in dispute could be set aside only by this Court under S. 439 of the Cri. Procedure Code. The Magistrate who had once passed the order of dismissal had no jurisdiction to review that order or set it aside, and, accordingly, he was not competent to order that the proceedings once dismissed be restored. Unlike a Civil Court, a Criminal Court, other than a High Court, does not possess any inherent powers nor is there any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, which governs the proceedings instituted in criminal Courts, to review its judgment or orders, not even in cases where the order is patently wrong or contrary to the provisions of law. In Sankatha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1208 their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled that even when an appeal could not be dismissed for failure of the appellant or his counsel to appear at the hearing, the Sessions Judge was not competent to alter or review his judgment once signed, except for correcting a clerical error. This is also in consonance with the provisions of Section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which specifically prohibits a Criminal Court from altering or reviewing its judgment except correcting a clerical error.

7. Since in the case before us the original order of dismissal passed on 25th November, 1961, had not been challenged in a superior Court, nor was it set aside in a proper proceeding, that order continued to be valid. Merely because it was a wrong order it cannot be said to have been made without jurisdiction. As has been often observed, where the Court is validly seized of a matter and has jurisdiction to entertain it, it has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly, and if it arrives at an erroneous decision, it still acts within its jurisdiction.

8. Thus, when the second application under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code came up before the Magistrate, we find that he was faced with the situation that the order dismissing the first application remained unassailed, and the petitioner had put in a second application on the same facts alleging that the dispute about the property between the parties persisted and there was still likelihood of the breach of peace. On this fresh application he had to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and quite properly on 2nd January, 1962, he made a preliminary order in terms of Sub-Section (1) of that Section. Once it is held that it was a new proceeding with which the learned Magistrate was dealing, the only course open to him while passing the final order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was to determine the question of possession with reference to the date of the preliminary order passed in the fresh proceedings on 2nd January, 1962, and not at any earlier or subsequent point of time. This is what the learned Magistrate in fact did. On a consideration of the material placed before him by the parties, he came to the conclusion that on the date of the preliminary order, i.e., 2nd January, 1962, the property in dispute was in the possession of the respondents and not that of the petitioner, and, accordingly he declared the respondents in possession prohibiting the petitioner from interfering with the same.

9. So far as the decision on the question of possession is concerned, the finding of the trial Court is supported by material on the record, and sitting as a Court of revision I do not find any justification for interfering with that finding. In these circumstances, the order of the Magistrate cannot be interfered with and the reference made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is declined.

10. The petition for revision is dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code.