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Shrimati Shanti Devi v. Satya Pal And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 7, 1963
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant instituted a suit for separate possession by partition of her share in properties listed in the plaint schedule and for rendition of accounts. In the plaint the court-fee value was stated as Rs. 200 on two counts (Rs. 400 for jurisdiction), while the market value of the property was stated as Rs. 50,000 and the plaintiff's share of rental income as Rs. 2,000. The defendants objected in the written statement that the suit was not properly valued for court-fee and jurisdiction, but apparently no issue was settled on that objection during trial.

At decree stage the value for purposes of jurisdiction was recorded in the decree-sheet as Rs. 400. Relying on that entry, an appeal was filed in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge. During the hearing of that appeal the respondents objected that the appeal lay to the High Court because, based on the plaint, the value exceeded Rs. 5,000. The lower appellate court found the plaintiff's share to be at least Rs. 25,000, returned the memorandum of appeal, and the appeal was then presented in the High Court along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in presenting the appeal in the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay in presenting the appeal in the High Court should be condoned under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  2. Whether presenting the appeal initially in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge (in reliance on the decree-sheet valuation) constitutes sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 — including whether mistaken legal advice or reliance on the decree can excuse the delay.
  3. Whether omission or lapse on the part of the counsel (who had been connected with the trial) amounts to lack of good faith under the definition in Section 2(7) of the Limitation Act, thereby defeating a Section 5 application.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appeal should be admitted notwithstanding the expired limitation period because there is sufficient cause for the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • The appellant legitimately relied on the decree-sheet entry (showing Rs. 400 for jurisdiction) and in good faith filed the appeal in the Senior Subordinate Judge's Court; the appeal was prosecuted with due diligence there.
  • It is appropriate to take into account the principle underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act by analogy when considering extension under Section 5.
  • Authority was cited (e.g., Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rajeshwar Bali and other cases) to show that mistaken but honest advice by a legal practitioner or filing in the wrong forum can constitute sufficient cause.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The plaint itself disclosed a property valuation of Rs. 50,000 and the counsel who filed the appeal had been involved in the trial; therefore he must have been aware of the true valuation and the correct forum for appeal.
  • The omission or lapse in filing in the proper Court amounts to absence of good faith, i.e., lack of due care and attention, within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Limitation Act.
  • Authorities such as Sarmukh-Singh v. Chanan Singh and Dina Nath v. Munshi Ram were invoked to support the proposition that mistakes arising from negligence or want of reasonable skill do not qualify as bona fide mistakes warranting condonation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rajeshwar Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 Mistaken advice by a legal practitioner may amount to sufficient cause under Section 5; analogy of Section 14 (which applies to suits) has considerable weight. Referred to by appellant as supporting the proposition that honest but mistaken legal advice can excuse delay; considered as persuasive authority.
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, 104 Pun Re 1917 (AIR 1917 PC 156) Earlier decision approving the view that certain mistakes by advisers can constitute sufficient cause. Noted as one of the earlier decisions approved by the Judicial Committee in the Rajendra Bahadur Singh case; used to show historical support for the principle.
Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, ILR 43 Bom 376 (AIR 1918 PC 135) Earlier decision approved by the Judicial Committee on related issues of mistaken advice. Referred to as an antecedent authority considered in the same line of decisions; cited as supportive precedent.
Arura v. Karam Din, AIR 1947 Lah 76 On its facts, filing an appeal in the wrong forum constituted sufficient cause and relief under Section 5 was granted. Cited by appellant as an example where appeal to wrong forum justified condonation; treated as supportive authority.
Shanti Lal v. Firm Hiira Lal Sheo Narain, AIR 1941 Lah 402 Referenced among cases where Section 5 was applied in contexts of mistaken action. Listed by appellant's counsel among supporting authorities; no detailed treatment beyond citation in the opinion.
Abdul Ghani v. Maula Bakhsh, 161 Ind Cas 215 (AIR 1936 Lah 670) Application of Section 5 where appellant was misled by the Copying Department concerning computation of limitation days. Cited as an instance where courts applied Section 5 to excuse delay caused by misleading administrative action.
Kesharbhai v. Bai Lilavati, AIR 1965 Gujarat 119 Section 5 applied in a case of mistaken advice by a reputable lawyer; note that the Gujarat Single Judge dissented from some Punjab decisions. Referenced to show that courts have, in some instances, condoned delay for mistaken legal advice; the opinion notes conflicting views in some jurisdictions.
Sarmukh-Singh v. Chanan Singh, AIR 1960 Punj 512 (Division Bench) Authority cited by respondents for the proposition that mistakes attributable to negligence are not bona fide mistakes warranting condonation. Described as a binding Division Bench decision of the Court; relied upon by respondents to argue against condonation where negligence is involved.
Dina Nath v. Munshi Ram, AIR 1953 Punj 298 Bench observation that no bona fide mistake arises where appellants' legal advisers could have discovered correct position by consulting elementary sources; used to deny good faith where negligence exists. Cited by respondents; the opinion quotes the bench’s observation to support the proposition that negligence or failure to take elementary steps does not amount to good faith.
Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris, (1871) 3 PC 465 at p. 475 Principle that one of the first duties of courts is to ensure that the act of the court does no injury to suitors. Quoted by the Court to emphasize a duty to avoid causing injustice to litigants when discretion to condone delay is exercised.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the matter narrowly as a determination of the Section 5 application for condonation of delay in presenting the appeal in the High Court. The analysis proceeded by balancing two competing considerations explicitly set out in the opinion:

  • First, the finality interest of the victorious suitor: after the prescribed limitation period expires, the decree becomes binding and that right should not be lightly disturbed.
  • Second, the statutory discretion conferred by Section 5: if sufficient cause for the delay is shown, the Court may condone the delay and admit the appeal.

Applying these considerations to the facts, the Court noted the following facts and inferences relied upon in its reasoning:

  • During the trial stage, although defendants had raised an objection to the valuation in the plaint, they did not press the objection and the Court did not advert to it; consequently the valuation remained as entered in the plaint and the decree recorded the value for jurisdiction as Rs. 400.
  • It is customary and a reasonable prima facie practice for a suitor (or his counsel) to rely on the valuation as recorded in the judgment and decree when determining the appropriate forum for appeal.
  • Filing an appeal in accordance with the valuation disclosed in the decree cannot, without more, be characterized as bad faith or lack of due care.
  • The fact that the counsel who filed the appeal had appeared in the trial Court did not necessarily mean he would recall the precise valuation shown in the plaint; a busy practitioner may not remember such particulars.

The Court reviewed the authorities cited by both sides, acknowledging that some precedents deny relief where the mistake is attributable to negligence or lack of reasonable skill, while other precedents grant relief where the mistake or advice was honest and not grossly negligent. The Court considered the binding Division Bench decisions of the Punjab Court but concluded, on the facts before it, that the appellant had acted with due care in initially presenting the appeal in the Senior Subordinate Judge's Court relying on the decree-sheet entry.

For these reasons the Court concluded that the appellant had established "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and therefore the discretion to condone the delay should be exercised in the appellant's favour.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is allowed; the delay in presenting the appeal in this Court is condoned and the appeal is admitted for hearing.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's delayed appeal has been admitted to hearing in the High Court; the Section 5 application succeeds and the appeal is no longer dismissed on limitation grounds.
  • Scope and precedent: The opinion applies established principles concerning "sufficient cause" under Section 5 and references multiple authorities. The Court did not state that it was laying down any new legal principle; rather it applied existing authorities and exercised the Court's discretion on the particular facts (including reliance on the decree-sheet valuation and the defendants' failure to press their earlier objection). No broader novel precedent was announced in the opinion.
Show all summary ...

I.D Dua, J.:— The only point which arises at this stage for determination relates to the prayer under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in presenting the appeal in this Court.

2. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the appellant for separate possession by partition of her share in the properties mentioned in the Schedule attached to the plaint and also for rendition of accounts etc. In the plaint, value for purposes of court-fee was mentioned to be Rs. 200/- each on two counts and for purposes of jurisdiction Rs. 400/-. The market value of the property was, however, stated to be Rs. 50,000/- and the plaintiff's share from the rental income was stated to be Rs. 2,000/-. In the written statement, an objection was taken that the suit had not been properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. No issue, it appears, was settled on this objection and the matter was left at that, apparently, as this learned counsel for the respondents suggests, because the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class for entertaining suits was unlimited. It appears that after the termination of the suit, the value both for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was stated in the decree-sheet to be Rs. 400. In accordance with the entry in the decree-sheet, an appeal was preferred in Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, Ludhiana.

3. At the time of the hearing of the appeal the respondents in the lower appellate Court objected that the appeal lay in the High Court and not in the Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge because the for the purposes of jurisdiction was obviously more than Rs. 5,000/-. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the value of the plaintiff's share in the property in suit as stated in the plaint which was considered and indeed found by the Court below to be at least Rs. 25,000/-. On this finding, the memorandum of appeal was returned to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court and was duly presented in this Court along with an application made under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.

4. Since refusal to grant the prayer under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must entail dismissal of the appeal, the papers have been placed before this Bench for disposal.

5. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, it has been contended that it is a fit case in which this appeal should be admitted even though the period of limitation prescribed therefor has expired because there is sufficient cause for not preferring it in this Court within time. According to the counsel, it is legitimate to take Into account the principle underlying Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, while considering the question of extension of period under Section 5 and it has been emphasised that the appellant had initially preferred the appeal in good faith 3rd prosecuted it with due diligence in the Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, in that, he had been misled into it by the decree in which the value for purposes of jurisdiction was shown to be Rs. 400/-. We have been referred on behalf of the appellant-petitioner, inter alia, to Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rajeshwar Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276, in which it is laid down that mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances of a given case give rise to sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, though there can be no general doctrine which saves, parties from the results of wrong advice. In the reported case the advice was held to be honest though mistaken, the legal adviser honestly taking the view that the valuation of the suit for the purposes of appeal there was Rs. 1,000/- and, therefore, the appeal lay to the District Judge. The true value was, however, found to be in excess of Rs. 5,000/- and the appeal was refiled in that Chief Court. The Judicial Committee there concluded that the counsel could ‘not be deemed to have been negligent in valuing the appeal nor could his action be described as “gross negligence”. The Privy Council also expressed the opinion that in applying Section 5 to such a case the analogy of Section 14 which only applies to suits was an argument which had considerable weight. The Judicial Committee approvingly referred to its two earlier decisions in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, 104 Pun Re 1917 : (AIR 1917 PC 156) and Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, ILR 43 Bom 376 : (AIR 1918 PC 135). Reference by Shri Gandhi has next been made to Arura v. Karam Din, AIR 1947 Lah 76 where again an appeal to a wrong forum was on its own facts held to constitute sufficient cause and relief granted under Section 5. The other cases to which Shri Gandhi has made a reference are, inter alia, Shanti Lal v. Firm Hiira Lal Sheo Narain, AIR 1941 Lah 402; Abdul Ghani v. Maula Bakhsh, 161 Ind Cas 215 : (AIR 1936 Lah 670), where Tek Chand and Dalip Singh, JJ. applied Section 5 to a case of the appellant having been misled by the action of the Copying Department thinking (of course erroneously) that he would be entitled to exclude certain days in computing the period of limitation-for the appeal; and Kesharbhai v. Bai Lilavati, AIR 1965 Gujarat 119, where also Bhagwati, J. applied Section 5 in the case of mistaken advice by a lawyer of status and reputation. It may, however, be mentioned that in the Gujarat case the learned Single Judge appears to have dissented from two decisions of this Court in Sarmukh-Singh v. Chanan Singh, AIR 1960 Punj 512 and Dina Nath… v. Munshi Ram, Etc.…, AIR 1953 Punj 298 (both Division Bench decisions). It is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat Court because the two Bench decisions of this Court are clearly binding on us and as at present advised I am also inclined to think, with respect, that they represent the correct view of law.

6. As against this the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents has laid stress on the fact that in the plaint itself the value of the property was mentioned as Rs. 50,000/- and the counsel who filed the appeal had throughout bean connected with the: conduct of the suit in the Court of first instance, with the result that he must have been fully aware of the valuation as mentioned in the plaint. In any event, only if the counsel filing the appeal had taken the trouble of looking at the or if he had cared to recollect that in this case the value of the property was Rs. 50,000/- he would haw presented the appeal in this Court; omission or lapse Page: 291on his part to taker proper care must, according to the) respondents' learned counsel, be held to amount to absence of good faith; in other words, of duet care and attention. Emphasis has in this connection been laid on the definition of the term “good faith” in Section 2(7) of the Limitation Act. He has referred us to Sarmukh Singh's case, AIR 1960 Punj 512, for the authority that a mistake due to negligence or misconduct or want of reasonable skill can by no stretch be considered to fail within the definition of good faith as contained in Section 2(7). Dina Nath's case, AIR 1953 Punj 298, is next referred to. In this case a Bench of this Court (Falshaw, J. (as he then was) and, J.L Kapur, J.) made the following observations:

“No question of bona fide mistake arises nor does it show any good faith because if the legal advisers of the appellant had only taken the trouble of looking up any elementary book on Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, they would have discovered this.”

7. Relying on these observations, the respondents learned counsel has submitted that a look at the plaint would have disclosed the correct forum for the appeal. He has further stressed that the plaintiff should not be permitted to place reliance on the insertion in the decree which was primarily due to his own wrong valuation in the plaint.

8. After considering the respective contentions raised at the bar and the circumstances of the case, I think the prayer under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, deserves to be allowed. It is undoubtedly true that after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal, a right accrues in favour of the victorious suitor to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this right should not be light-heartedly disturbed, but on the other hand there is also be consideration which cannot be ignored, namely, that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. In this connection it must also be remembered that, to borrow with gratitude the words of Lord Cairns, used in Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris, (1871) 3 PC 465 at p. 475, “one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors”. Now, in the Court below an objection was raised on behalf of the defendants that the plaint did not correctly state the value for the purpose of jurisdiction and that, therefore, the relief claimed was undervalued but the defendants for reasons best known to them did not press this objection, nor did the Court itself advert to it, with the result that the valuation remained entered in the plaint as it was. Had the matter been pressed, the Court would have adjudicated upon it and come to some conclusion and if necessary would have called upon the plaintiff to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by it: on his failure to do so the plaint would have Been rejected but on the correction having been made the plaint would have been amended accordingly. On the conclusion of the trial, in the ordinary course, when the judgment was pronounced and the decree framed, both the judgment and decree disclosed Rs. 400/- as value for purpose of jurisdiction. Now it is a matter of common-knowledge that when a suitor goes to a counsel for filing an appeal, the entry in the decree is normally and as a matter of practice considered to be a proper prima facie guiding factor for determining the forum of appeal. If an appeal is filed in accordance with the valuation disclosed in the judgment and the decree, in my opinion, it cannot, without more, be said that the counsel has been guilty of bad faith or has failed to exercise due care and caution. The contention that in the case in hand the counsel filing the appeal was also a counsel in the trial Court does not necessarily mean that he recollected, or, must, reasonably speaking, have recollected that in the plaint the property in dispute had been valued at Rs. 50,000/-. A busy counsel is certainly not expected, according to the common course of human conduct, to remember these minor and apparently unimportant details about the various cases handled by him. It is, therefore, not possible for me, on the facts and circumstances of this case, to hold that the appellant had not acted with due care and caution in presenting his appeal in the first instance in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge.

9. In my view the appellant has clearly established sufficient cause within the contemplation of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, and this appeal should be admitted to hearing and the delay condoned.

10. Jindra Lal, J.:— I agree.

CH/AGT/R.G.D

11. Ordered accordingly.