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Atma Singh, v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner And Others,

Punjab & Haryana High Court

May 8, 1963

Judgment

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Judgment Summary — Division Bench (S. B. Capoor, J. & P. C. Pandit, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This civil writ petition, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, concerns eligibility for allotment under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and the rules framed thereunder. The subject property is house No. 697/13, Mohalla Sharifpura, Amritsar — an evacuee property acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Act.

Petitioner Atma Singh claimed to be a displaced person: the ground floor (larger portion) had been allotted to him and a room on the first floor allotted to Mohinder Singh. Neither Atma Singh nor Mohinder Singh had verified claims. Respondent No. 3, Ajit Singh, the contesting respondent, had a verified claim and was described in the record as either the father or step‑father of Mohinder Singh.

Procedural history (as presented in the opinion):

30 July 1959 — Assistant Settlement Officer, Amritsar, ordered transfer of the entire house to Ajit Singh against his compensation claim (C. A. No. P/ASR/11693).
30 October 1959 — Assistant Settlement Commissioner allowed Atma Singh's appeal and directed transfer to Atma Singh (Annexure‑B).
Ajit Singh filed a revision to the Chief Settlement Commissioner (respondent No. 1), who accepted the revision and, by order dated 2 February 1960 (Annexure‑C), directed transfer to Ajit Singh; the Chief Settlement Commissioner, in that order, found Ajit Singh had been residing with Mohinder Singh and was in lawful possession of part of the house.
18 August 1960 — Atma Singh applied under Section 33 to the Central Government (respondent No. 4), which declined to interfere (Annexure‑D).
The writ petition initially came before Dua, J., and by order dated 16 January 1963 was referred to a Division Bench. Respondents other than Ajit Singh did not file returns contesting the petitioner.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Ajit Singh was in occupation of a portion of the property such that the matter falls to be decided under Rule 30 (rather than Rule 31) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955.
Whether Ajit Singh's earlier application requesting compensation in cash (dated 27 February 1958) estops him from claiming transfer of the property.
Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner committed an error of jurisdiction in applying Rule 30 instead of Rule 31.
Whether, as a matter of law, Rule 30 can apply where only one of the occupants holds a verified claim while the others do not.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Atma Singh; advanced by Mr. N. S. Keer)

Ajit Singh is not the father of Mohinder Singh but only his step‑father and never lived in the disputed house either with Mohinder Singh or separately (argument aimed to undermine the finding of occupation).
Ajit Singh had, by application dated 27 February 1958, requested payment of compensation in cash and stated he had no concern with the house — this fact should prevent or estop Ajit Singh from claiming transfer of the house.
The Chief Settlement Commissioner erred in law in treating the case as one under Rule 30; the petitioner insisted that Rule 31 is the correct provision because, the petitioner contended, none of the occupants held a verified claim (or, as argued, the manner of occupancy meant Rule 31 should apply).
Legal‑authoritative support cited by petitioner: Dr. Khushi Ram v. Union of India (1962) 64 Pun LR 755 (relied upon by Mr. Keer, as stated in the opinion).

Contestant/Respondent Arguments (Ajit Singh; and other points raised by respondent's counsel Mr. B. S. Wasu)

The Chief Settlement Commissioner found as a fact that Ajit Singh was originally living with Mohinder Singh and was in lawful possession of a portion of the house (the finding relied upon by respondent and accepted in the impugned order).
It was argued on behalf of the contesting respondent that Ajit Singh was not a displaced person (objection raised in the return), but this objection had not been raised before the authorities under the Act and the earlier orders proceeded on the assumption both contesting claimants were displaced persons.
Mr. B. S. Wasu pointed out that Rule 31 uses permissive language ("the property may be transferred") and, relying on Sohdhi Harbaksh Singh v. Central Government (1962) 64 Pun LR 629, suggested that under Rule 31 transfer is discretionary and need not be made.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398	The limited scope of writ jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact by specialized authorities.	The Court relied on this principle to refuse interference with the Chief Settlement Commissioner's factual finding that Ajit Singh was in occupation of part of the property.
Ram Dass, J. Chugani v. Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property, (AIR 1961 Punj 366) reported also at 1961‑63 Pun LR 339	Authority confirming that appellate/writ courts should not lightly disturb findings of fact by settlement authorities.	The Court cited this Division Bench judgment alongside Nagendra Nath to support non‑interference with the impugned factual finding on occupation.
Sohdhi Harbaksh Singh v. Central Government, (1962) 64 Pun LR 629	Interpretation emphasizing that Rule 31's wording ("may be transferred") is discretionary.	The decision was mentioned by respondent's counsel to stress discretion under Rule 31; the Court noted the reference but stated it need not resolve that question because Rule 31 was not attracted on the facts.
Dr. Khushi Ram v. Union of India, (1962) 64 Pun LR 755	Authority relied upon by the petitioner (as supporting the petitioner's interpretation of the rules).	The Court noted the citation but observed that this case had been overruled by the Letters Patent Bench of the same Court in Kewal Krishan. The Court did not accept the view in Khushi Ram for this reason.
Kewal Krishan v. Government of India, (1963) 65 Pun LR 288 : AIR 1963 Punj 246	Letters Patent Bench decision which overruled Dr. Khushi Ram and took a contrary view on the point relied upon by the petitioner.	The Court followed the view of the Letters Patent Bench in Kewal Krishan and stated that it was not persuaded to depart from that decision; this undercut the petitioner's reliance on Dr. Khushi Ram.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench's reasoning proceeds in a series of connected steps tied closely to the facts and to textual interpretation of the rules:

On the question of parentage/relationship: The Court held that whether Ajit Singh was father or step‑father of Mohinder Singh was immaterial. The determinative factual issue was whether Ajit Singh was in occupation of the property.
As to occupation: The Chief Settlement Commissioner (with delegated powers) found, as a fact, that Ajit Singh had been residing with Mohinder Singh in the house and was in lawful possession of a portion of it; this finding was supported by reference to ration cards (Exhibits A‑1 and A‑2). The Court viewed this as a factual finding and — guided by authorities such as Nagendra Nath and Ram Dass — declined to interfere with that finding in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
Concerning the 27 February 1958 application by Ajit Singh asking for cash compensation: The Court adopted the Settlement Commissioner's equitable view that the mere prior request for cash compensation (which was not accepted) did not defeat Ajit Singh's right to have the property transferred to him when the property was available and the transfer was ordered against his compensation. The Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to treat that application as creating an estoppel.
On the choice between Rule 30 and Rule 31: The Court analysed the text of the rules. Rule 31, on its face, applies where none of the displaced persons in occupation holds a verified claim. Because the Chief Settlement Commissioner had found that Ajit Singh did hold a verified claim and occupied a portion of the property, Rule 31 did not apply.
With respect to Rule 30's applicability: The petitioner argued that Rule 30 required "more persons than one holding verified claims" in occupation to apply. The Court pointed to the Explanation appended to Rule 30 and applied Section 13 of the General Clauses Act (words in the singular include the plural, and vice versa) to read the rule sensibly so that it can govern cases where only one of the occupants holds a verified claim and the others do not. The Court considered it implausible that the rules left a gap for the specific factual situation before the Court.
On precedent and conflicting authority: The petitioner relied on Dr. Khushi Ram; the Court observed that Dr. Khushi Ram had been overruled by the Letters Patent Bench in Kewal Krishan, and the Court was not persuaded to reject the view taken by the Letters Patent Bench.
As to the objection that Ajit Singh was not a displaced person: The Court found this objection untenable because it was not raised before the authorities under the Act and the orders under challenge proceeded on the assumption that both competing claimants were displaced persons.

Holding and Implications

PETITION DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

The writ petition was dismissed and the impugned order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner (directing transfer to Ajit Singh) stands.
The Court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.
The decision rests on application of existing rules and precedent (including the Letters Patent Bench decision in Kewal Krishan). The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond its application of the rules and the cited authorities to the facts; no novel precedent was articulated in the judgment itself.

All statements in this summary are limited to and drawn from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond those expressly contained in that text have been added.

Show all summary ...

Judgement

S. B. CAPOOR, J. :- The dispute in this Civil Writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India relates to the eligibility for allotment under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation, and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (Act No. 44 of 1954) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), and the rules framed thereunder, of house No. 697/13 Mohalla Sharifpura, Amritsar, which was an evacuee property and was subsequently acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Act. Atma Singh, the petitioner in this writ petition, claims to be a displaced person and the ground floor consisting of the larger portion of the house was allotted to him, while the room on the first floor was allotted to Mohinder Singh, also a displaced person. Neither of these two has any verified claim. Ajit Singh, respondent No. 3 and the contesting respondent to this petition, had a verified claim and he is either the father or the step-father of Mohinder Singh. According to the findings by the Settlement Commissioner with delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner in his order, dated the 2nd of February 1960, which is the impugned order (copy Annexure-"C"), Ajit Singh was residing with Mohinder Singh in the portion of the property which was allotted to the latter. On the 30th of July 1959, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Amritsar, ordered the transfer of the entire house in favour of Ajit Singh against his compensation claim in C. A. No. P/ASR/11693. Atma Singh thereupon appealed and the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Amritsar, by his order, dated the 30th of October, 1959 (copy Annexure-B), allowed the appeal, directing that the property be transferred to the appellant, i.e., Atma Singh, the present petitioner. Against this order Ajit Singh went up in revision to the Chief Settlement Commissioner (respondent No. 1 to the petition), who accepted the revision petition and sent the case to the Regional Settlement Commissioner with the direction that the property in question be transferred to Ajit Singh, vide his order, dated the 2nd of February 1960 (Copy Annexure-C) Atma Singh then made an application under Section 33 of the Act to the Central Government (respondent No. 4 to the petition), which by the letter, dated the 18th of August 1960 (copy Annexure-D), declined to interfere. Hence this present writ petition, which originally came up before Dua, J., but by his order, dated the 16th of January 1963, was referred to a Division Bench. Respondents, other than Ajit Singh, have not put in any return contesting the petitioner.

2. The various contentions raised by the petitioner are as follows :

"(i) Ajit Singh is not the father of Mohinder Singh but merely his stepfather and he never lived in the house in dispute either along with Mohinder Singh or separately.

(ii) Ajit Singh gave an application, dated the 27th of February 1958 (copy Annexure-A to the petition) in which he prayed that compensation be given to him in cash and not by way of adjustment of the value of house No. 697/13, Mohalla Sharifpura, Amritsar, with which he had no concern.

(iii) The Chief Settlement Commissioner committed an error of jurisdiction in holding that Ajit Singh was entitled to transfer of the property in question under Rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, and actually it is R. 31 which is applicable to the case."

3. As regards the first point, it is not really material whether Ajit Singh is the father or the step-father of Mohinder Singh and the crucial question for determination, whether the case is to be treated as one under Rule 30 or Rule 31, is if Ajit Singh was in occupation of the property. While it is true that the allotment stood not in his name but in that of Mohinder Singh, yet the Settlement Commissioner with delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner vide his order, dated the 2nd of February 1960, has found as a matter of fact that Ajit Singh was originally living with Mohinder Singh in the house in dispute and as such was in lawful possession of a portion of it. In this connection reference was made by him to ration cards, Exhibits A-1 and A-2. This is a finding by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on a question of fact. Firstly, there is nothing cogent to show that it is erroneous, and secondly, even if the finding on this question of fact was wrong, this Court would not in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction interfere with this finding : See Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398, as well as a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Ram Dass, J. Chugani v. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, India, 1961-63 Pun LR 339 : (AIR 1961 Punj 366).

4. The second argument based on Ajit Singhs application, dated the 27th of February 1958, was advanced before the Settlement Commissioner with delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner also, who observed as follows :

"The mere fact that he (Ajit Singh) gave the application, dated the 27th of February, 1958 stating that he wanted to get the compensation in cash and was not anxious to obtain the property in question, does not in any way affect his rights to get the property transferred in his favour, as his request was not accepted and the property was available for transfer and was actually transferred to him against his compensation."

This appears to be the equitable view to take on the facts of the present case. Mr. N.S. Keer, learned counsel for the petitioner, wants the Court to treat this application as creating some sort of estoppel, but this is taking much too legalistic view of the matter. One has to keep in mind the real consideration when the application was made by Ajit Singh, which was to get in cash the amount of compensation due to him on the basis of his verified claim, possibly Mohinder Singh wanted to utilise that claim towards adjustment of the price of the house, but Ajit Singh preferred to get cash compensation and that is why he stated that he had no concern with that house. Since his application for payment of compensation in cash was turned down, it would obviously be not fair to rule out also his eligibility for transfer of the house. That is a consequence which could not be in his contemplation when he made the application.

5. There remains the last and the most important point, viz., the rule under which liability for transfer of the property is to be determined. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that rule 31 is applicable, which so far as relevant is as follows :

"31(1) Where an acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property is in occupation of more than one displaced person none of whom holds a verified claim, the property may be transferred to the displaced person who occupies the largest portion of the property or where two or more such displaced persons occupy a portion of the property which is equal in area, the property may be transferred to the displaced person who has been in occupation of such portion for a longer period."

This rule is attracted where none of the displaced persons in occupation of the property holds a verified claim. However, Ajit Singh, who is admittedly a displaced person, on the finding of fact as given in the impugned order, was one of the persons in occupation of the property and hence Rule 31 would not be applicable. One further objection in this connection made by Mr. B.S. Wasu on behalf of the contesting respondent was that, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the objections on merits in the return, Ajit Singh was not a displaced person. But this is not a tenable objection because it was not raised before any of the authorities under the Act and the orders (copies Annexures-B and C) proceed on the assumption that both the contesting claimants, i.e., Atam Singh and Ajit Singh, are displaced persons, Mr. B.S. Wasu further objected that in an order made under Rule 31 it was discretionary with the authorities under the Act whether to transfer the property to a displaced person or not and in this connection he pointed out that the words used are "the property may be transferred" and not "the property shall be transferred". Reference was in this connection made to Sohdhi Harbaksh Singh v. Central Government, (1962) 64 Pun LR 629. However, I need not go into this question, because, as already pointed out, R. 31 is not attracted to the facts of the case.

6. The only other rule which relates to the payment of the compensation where an acquired property, which is an allottable property, is in occupation of more than one person, is Rule 30, which as it now stands, omitting the proviso which is not material, is as follows :

"30. If more persons than one holding verified claims are in occupation of any acquired evacuee property, which is an allottable property, the property shall be offered to the person whose net compensation is nearest to the value of the property and other persons may be allotted such other acquired evacuee property, which is allottable, as may be available :

Provided ********

Explanation : The provisions of the rule shall also apply where some of the persons in occupation of any acquired evacuee property, which is an allottable property, hold verified claims and some do not hold such claims."

Mr. N.S. Keer contended that this rule is not in terms applicable because even if Ajit Singh was treated as being in occupation of a part of the property, he is the only one of the occupants who has got a verified claim, while the rule speaks of property in occupation of more persons than one holding verified claims. His interpretation of the rule is that if only one of the occupants has a verified claim, the question of his being in competition with any other of the occupants could not arise and in that event the provision of the rule, that "the property shall be offered to the person whose net compensation is nearest to the value of the property", would be inapt. There would have been some cogency in this argument if the Explanation was not appended to the rule. No doubt the Explanation speaks of "persons" in occupation who hold "verified claims", but according to Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act No. 10 of 1897), words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa, and I can see no real difficulty in reading this Explanation as also applying the provisions of the rule to a case in which only one person out of those in occupation of the property holds a verified claim, while the other occupant or occupants do not hold a verified claim. Even in such a case the occupant, who has a verified claim and is entitled to compensation, will have a better claim to the transfer of the property as against the other occupant or occupants whose compensation is nil on account of not having a verified claim. The argument put forward by Mr. Keer would in fact mean that the rules do not make any provision at all for the payment of compensation by means of transfer of the property in a case in which there are two occupants in it, one of whom holds a verified claim and the other does not hold such a claim. It is not easy to conceive that such a lacuna would be left in the rules.

7. The only authority cited by Mr. Keer in support of his contention was Dr. Khushi Ram v. Union of India, (1962) 64 Pun LR 755. This case has, however, been overruled by the Letters Patent Bench of this Court in Kewal Krishan v. Government of India, (1963) 65 Pun LR 288 : (AIR 1963 Punj 246), and the learned counsel for the petitioner has been unable to persuade us that the view taken by the learned Judges constituting the Letters Patent Bench is incorrect.

8. Accordingly none of the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner is correct and I would dismiss the petition, but in the circumstances of the case leave the parties to bear their own costs.

9. P. C. PANDIT, J. :- I agree.

Petition dismissed.