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Ravinder Kumar And Brothers v. State Of Punjab .
Structured Summary of the Opinion — P.K. Jain, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
M/s Ravinder Kumar and Brothers, a partnership firm of four partners, filed a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of a criminal complaint (Annexure P-1) and the summoning order dated 28.1.1993 (Annexure P-2) issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar. The complaint alleged offences under Section 29 read with sections 3(k)(1), 17, 18 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 and Rule 10 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
On 25.6.1991, an Insecticides Inspector purchased a sample of the weedicide Butachlor 50% E.C. after serving the prescribed notice. The Senior Analyst at the Insecticide Testing Laboratory reported the sample to be misbranded, containing 40.80% E.C. instead of 50% E.C. A show cause notice dated 24.8.1991 (with the analyst's report) was served on the petitioners, who replied on 16.9.1991 disputing the analyst's report and requesting that the counterpart (second) sample be sent to the Central Government Laboratory for reanalysis under Section 24(4) of the Act.
Administrative action followed: the Chief Agriculture Officer cancelled the firm's licence by order dated 20.9.1991, which order was subsequently set aside and the licence restored by the Appellate Authority on 16.11.1992. Consent/sanction for prosecution was obtained (the record refers to sanction dated 6.11.1991). A complaint was filed on 17.12.1992 and cognizance was taken on 28.1.1993; the petitioners were summoned for 1.3.1993. By that summons date the shelf life (expiry) of the insecticide had expired (expiry indicated as March 1993).
The petitioners applied under Section 24(3)/(4) for sending the counterpart sample to the Director, Central Insecticides Laboratory. The Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected that application by order dated 8.7.1993. The petitioners therefore sought quashing of the complaint and summoning order under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that delay had deprived them of the statutory right to reanalysis.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complaint and the summoning order should be quashed because, by reason of the delay in prosecution, the petitioners were deprived of the statutory right under Section 24(3) and (4) of the Insecticides Act to have the counterpart sample reanalysed at the Central Insecticides Laboratory before the sample's shelf life expired.
- Whether the service of the show cause notice and information that reanalysis could be ordered only by a court absolved the prosecution of responsibility for delay that effectively denied the petitioners their right to reanalysis.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The sample was taken on 25.6.1991 and the analyst's report dated 12.8.1991 was communicated with the show cause notice dated 24.8.1991; the petitioners replied on 16.9.1991 disputing the report and specifically requesting reanalysis by a Central laboratory.
- The petitioners relied on Section 24(3) and (4) of the Act to assert a valuable right to have the counterpart sample reanalysed; that right was rendered illusory because the complaint was filed and prosecution proceeded only after a long delay and the petitioners were ultimately summoned after the sample's shelf life had expired.
- Because the prosecution delayed instituting and proceeding with the complaint despite knowledge of the petitioners' request, the complaint is liable to be quashed. The petitioners relied on this Court's earlier decisions (Mewa Singh and Raj Hans Chemicals) for support.
Respondent's Arguments
- The prosecution asserted that the petitioners were informed in time about the analyst's report and that reanalysis of the counterpart sample could be ordered only by a court, so the petitioners should have moved the court before expiry of shelf life to secure reanalysis.
- The prosecution contended that sanction for prosecution had been obtained as required by law and therefore there was no ground to quash the complaint.
- The respondent further argued that the petitioners cannot benefit from their own failure to apply to the court (i.e., they cannot claim prejudice caused by their inaction).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, AIR 1967 SC 970 | Delay in prosecution can deprive a vendor of the valuable statutory right to have a sample analysed by a central laboratory; such denial by inordinate delay may prejudice the accused so seriously that conviction ought not to be sustained on the analyst's report alone. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that the petitioners' statutory right to reanalysis was effectively taken away by inordinate delay and that this justified quashing the complaint. |
| Mewa Singh v. Prithipal Singh Insecticides…, 1994 (1) RCR 94 | Applied principle that complaints under the Insecticides Act may be quashed where delay has deprived the accused of the right to have a counterpart sample reanalysed. | The Court recorded that on identical facts this Court had quashed a complaint in Mewa Singh and relied on it as supporting the petitioner's case. |
| Raj Hans Chemicals v. State of Punjab…, 1994 (2) RCR 139 | Similar application of the principle that delay leading to expiry of the sample's shelf life can nullify the accused's right to reanalysis and justify quashing. | The Court cited this decision as another instance where a complaint under the Insecticides Act was quashed for the same reason. |
| Hindustan Pulverising Mills v. State of Haryana, 1992 (2) RCR 313 | Recognised that undue delay affecting statutory reanalysis rights may warrant relief to the accused. | The Court referred to this decision as reflecting similar views supporting quashing in appropriate circumstances. |
| National Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 1992 (1) RCR 157 | Addressed the effect of delay on the right to have samples reanalysed and the consequences for prosecution. | The Court noted that similar views had been taken in this case and relied on it in reaching its conclusion. |
| Jai Chemical v. State of Punjab, 1994 (3) RCR 610 | Affirmed the principle that where delay results in prejudice to an accused's statutory right to reanalysis, relief may be granted. | The Court cited this authority as part of a line of cases supporting the quashing of complaints on similar facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying and reproducing the relevant portions of Section 24(3) and (4) of the Insecticides Act. Section 24(3) makes an Insecticide Analyst's report conclusive evidence unless, within twenty-eight days of receipt of the copy, the person from whom the sample was taken notifies in writing that he intends to adduce evidence to controvert the report. Section 24(4) empowers the Court, where such notice has been given and the sample has not already been tested in the Central Insecticides Laboratory, to cause the counterpart sample produced before the Magistrate to be sent to the Central Laboratory for test or analysis; that laboratory's report is then conclusive.
Applying these provisions to the facts, the Court found:
- The petitioners did give timely written notice (their reply dated 16.9.1991) disputing the Senior Analyst's report and requesting that the counterpart sample be sent to a Central laboratory for reanalysis.
- Although Section 24(4) confers a further right (to court-directed reanalysis), the practical exercise of that right became impossible because the sample's shelf life expired by the date on which the petitioners were summoned in the prosecution; thus the petitioners could not secure reanalysis in practice.
- The Court emphasized that there is no provision under the Act allowing a dealer to get the sample retested before the launching of prosecution except via Section 24(3)'s challenge and Section 24(4)'s court-ordered reanalysis; consequently, the prosecution's delay between the petitioners' written request and actual summoning is critical.
- The Court rejected the prosecution's contention that merely informing the petitioners that reanalysis could be ordered only by a court absolved the prosecution of responsibility. The decisive factor was that due to the delay by the complainant in proceeding after receiving the petitioners' reply and after obtaining sanction for prosecution, the petitioners were deprived of their ability to obtain reanalysis within the sample's usable period.
- Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram and a line of earlier decisions of this Court (including Mewa Singh and Raj Hans Chemicals), the Court held that where a valuable statutory right (to central reanalysis) is rendered illusory by inordinate prosecutorial delay, the prosecution is guilty of conduct that prejudices the accused's defence and justifies quashing the complaint.
On these grounds the Court concluded that, on the facts of the present case, "on account of sheer negligence on the part of the complainant, the petitioners have been deprived of a valuable right to defend themselves."
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Court accepted the petition and quashed the complaint (Annexure P-1), the summoning order dated 28.1.1993 (Annexure P-2), and the consequent proceedings insofar as they concerned the petitioners in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The criminal proceedings arising from Annexure P-1 and the summoning order Annexure P-2 stand quashed as against the petitioners; they are relieved of the prosecution that had been initiated against them in the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court.
- Legal principle applied: The decision follows established precedent that inordinate delay by the prosecution that deprives an accused of a statutory right to have a sample reanalysed (thereby prejudicing the accused's defence) can warrant quashing of the complaint. The Court relied on Supreme Court authority (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram) and a line of similar decisions of this Court confirming that principle.
- No new legal precedent: The Court applied existing authorities and principles to the facts; the opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying that established line of authority to the present facts.
This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text have been included.
P.K Jain, J.:— M/s Ravinder Kumar and Brothers, a partnership firm consisting of four partners, has filed the present petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint (Annexure P-1) filed under Section 29 read with sections 3(k)(1), 17, 18 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Rule 10 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the summoning order dead 28.1.1993 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar.
2. On 25.6.1991, Insecticides Inspector Manjit Singh inspected the shop of the petitioner firm and purchased a sample of weedicide named Butachlor 50% E.C after serving a notice in the prescribed form and intimating the purpose for which the same was being purchased. The sample was sent to the Senior Analyst, Insecticide Testing laboratory, Department of Agriculture, Punjab and the same was found to be misbranded as it contained 40.80% E.C instead of 50% E.C of Butachlor.
3. A show cause notice dated 24.8.1991 was issued by the Chief Agriculture Officer-cum-Licensing Officer, Amritsar to the petitioner firm to which a reply dated 16.9.1991 was sent thereby intimating inter alia that the test report of the Senior Analyst was not acceptable to them and they wanted to adduce evidence to controvert the said report under section 24(4) of the Act and request was made to send the second sample for retesting to the Central Government Laboratory. However, the Chief Agriculture-cum-Licensing Officer by order dated 20.9.1991 cancelled the licence of the petitioner firm, which order was set aside and the licence was restored by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 16.11.1992 (Annexure P. 4). After obtaining consent/sanction for prosecution, Insecticides Inspector Anjala filed the complaint (Annexure P. 1) dated 17.12.1992 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar against the petitioner firm through its partners as well as manufacturer for the offences mentioned above. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar vide order dated 28.1.1993 took cognizance of the complaint and summoned the petitioner firm and its partners as well as the manufacturer for 1.3.1993
4. The petitioners moved an application (Annexure P. 7) under section 24(3) (4) of the Act for sending the counterpart of the sample to the Director Central Insecticides Laboratory for analysis. This application was opposed by the complainant on the grounds that the shelf life of the insecticide had already expired, although it was admitted that in response to the show cause notice issued to the petitioner firm they had expressed their intention to controvert the report of the Senior Analyst and had requested for sending counterpart of the sample for analysis by the Central Insecticides Laboratory. The Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected this application by order dated 8.7.1993 (Annexure P. 9). Hence the present petition.
5. Notice of motion was given to the respondent. In reply it has been stated that the petitioners have violated the provisions of sections 3(k)(1), 18 and 19 of the Act by selling and stocking for sale the misbranded weedicide Butachlor 50% E.C; that a show cause notice alongwith copy of the report of the Analyst was served upon the petitioners and they were told well in time that re-analysis of the counter sample could be allowed only by a court. It has been further stated that the prosecution has been launched after obtaining legal sanction as required by law and no ground is made out to quash the complaint.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
7. Shri Navkiran Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that the sample of the insecticide in question was taken on 25.6.1991 and expiry date was March 1993. It has been further pointed out by the learned counsel that the report of the Analyst is dated 12.8.1991 which was sent to the petitioners with the show cause notice dated 24.8.1991 to which a proper reply dated 16.9.1991 (Annexure P.(3) was sent and it was made clear that the report of the Senior Analyst was not acceptable to the petitioners and they wanted to adduce evidence to controvert the same and request was also made to send the second part of the sample for retesting to some other Central laboratory. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel that the complaint (Annexure P. 1) was filed on 17.12.1992, cognizance of the offence was taken on 28.1.1993 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the petitioners were summoned for 1.3.1993 by which time the shelf life of the insecticide had expired. While making a reference to the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that a valuable right to controvert the report of the Senior Analyst, thus, has been denied by the inaction and omission on the part of the complainant in filing the complaint after the lapse of long period of the receipt of the reply sent by the petitioners and even long after obtaining of he sanction on 6.11.1991 (Annexure P. 6). Thus, it has been argued that the complaint is liable to be quashed on this short ground. In support of this plea the learned counsel has placed reliance upon two judgments of this Court rendered in Mewa Singh… v. Prithipal Singh Insecticides…., 1994 (1) RCR 94 and Raj Hans Chemicals… v. State Of Punjab…., 1994 (2) RCR 139.
8. On the other hand Shri S.S Randhawa, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State of Punjab has argued that the petitioner firm was informed well in time regarding the report or the Analyst as well as the fact that reanalysis of the counter sample could only be made under the orders of the court and it was the duty of the petitioners to move the court for exercising their right under Section 24 of the Act before the expiry of the shelf life of the insecticide. Thus it has been contended that the petitioners cannot take the benefit of their own wrong.
9. I have carefully considered the respective arguments advanced at the Bar.
10. To appreciate the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the relevant portion of Section 24 of the Act may be noticed as under:—
“(3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by an Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken has within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of the report notified in writing the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in contravention of the report.
(4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory, where a person has under sub-section (3) notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversy of the Insecticide Analyst's report, the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, cause the sample of the Insecticide produced before the Magistrate under sub-section (6) of Section 22 to be sent for test or analysis to the said Laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by, or under the authority of, the Director of the Central Insecticides Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.”
11. It is thus obvious from the above provisions that the petitioners had a right to get the sample reanalysed since they were informed that the sample was found misbranded. Immediately on the receipt of the show cause notice, the petitioners intimated the respondent that they did not accept the report of the analysis to be correct and desired to controvert the same and it be sent for reanalysis by the Central Laboratory. A further right has been conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act which could not be exercised by the petitioners since shelf life had expired by the time the petitioners were summoned before the Court. The complaint was filed after a long period of the receipt of the reply from the petitioners and even after a long period of obtaining necessary sanction for prosecution. The petitioners were summoned in the complaint case for a date by which the shelf life of the insecticide in question had already expired. Thre is no provision under the Act that the dealer can get the sample retested before the launching of the prosecution against him except in sub-section (3) whereby he can challenge the report of the Insecticides Analyst only. The provision of this section simply provides that in case a written requisition is made by the dealer expressing its intention to controvert the report of the Analyst, the report shall not be conclusive evidence of the facts contained therein. Therefore, the service of the notice regarding the sample being misbranded or intimating the petitioners that the reanalysis can be ordered by a Court before the date of expiry of the shelf Me of the insecticide, is of no consequence.
12. In Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, AIR 1967 SC 970, due to inordinate delay in instituting the prosecution, a valuable right conferred by section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 on the vendor to have the sample given to him analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory was taken away. In these circumstances, the apex Court made the following observations:—
“It appears to us that when a valuable right is conferred by Section 13(2) of the Act on the vendor to have the sample given to him analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, it is to be expected that the prosecution will proceed in such a manner that the right will not be denied to him. The right is a valuable one because the certificate of the Director supersedes the report of the Public Analyst and is treated as conclusive evidence of its contents. Obviously the right has been given to the vendor in order that for his satisfaction and proper defence he should be able to have the sample kept in his charge analysed by a greater expert whose certificate is to be accepted by Court as conclusive evidence. In a case where there is denial of this right on account of the deliberate conduct of the prosecution, we think that the vendor, in his trial, is so seriously prejudiced that it would not be proper to uphold his conviction on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst, even though that report continues to be evidence in the case of the facts contained therein.”
13. While placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgment a complaint under the Insecticides Act, on identical facts and circumstances, was quashed by this Court in Mewa Singh's case (supra) and the case of Raj Hans Chemicals (supra). Similar views were expressed by this court in Hindustan Pulverising Mills v. State of Haryana, 1992 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 313, National Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1992 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 157 and Jai Chemical v. State of Punjab, 1994 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 610.
14. In view of the law discussed above and in the facts of the present case, it becomes clear that on account of sheer negligence on the part of the complainant, the petitioners have been deprived of a valuable right to defend themselves in the proceedings initiated on the complaint Annexure P-1.
15. Consequently, I accept this petition and hereby quash the complaint (Annexure P-1), the summoning order dated 28.1.1993 (Annexure P-2) and the consequent proceedings qua the petitioners herein pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar.
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