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Dattatram N. Anvekar v. Shankar L. Parulekar, (F.B) .

Karnataka High Court
Sep 17, 1979
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Full Bench Opinion — Summary (Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961)

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arose from Small Cause Suit No. 101 of 1976 filed by the petitioner (landlord) in the Principal Civil Judge's Court, Belgaum, seeking possession of a house in the Angol Extension of the City of Belgaum, together with arrears of rent and future mesne profits. The respondent tenant resisted the suit, contending that the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act) was applicable and, implicitly, that rent-control remedies and restrictions barred the suit in its present form.

The petitioner argued that although "Belgaum Municipal Borough" appears in Schedule II to the Act, the Angol Extension was included within the Belgaum municipal area only later (by notification under municipal law) and that no separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Act had been issued to apply Parts IV & V of the Act to the newly added area; relying on the Division Bench decision in Balwant Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni, the petitioner contended the Act was not applicable to Angol and therefore the suit was maintainable.

The Civil Judge concluded he had no jurisdiction under the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964 to decide the question of jurisdiction under the Rent Control Act and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. The petitioner challenged that order by way of Civil Revision Petition No. 2859 of 1978.

A Division Bench referred the following question to the Full Bench for opinion: whether, when an area is newly added to any village, municipal area or notified area specified in Schedule II to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, by a notification under the law governing municipalities or village panchayats and local boards, a separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Rent Control Act is necessary to make the provisions of Parts IV & V of that Act applicable to the newly added area.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when an area is newly added to any village, municipal area or notified area specified in Schedule II to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, by a notification under the law governing municipalities or village panchayats and local boards, a separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is necessary to make Parts IV & V of that Act applicable to the newly added area.
  2. Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandlal v. Motilal (construing a notification under Section 2 of the C.P. Act as extending to municipalities constituted later) requires reconsideration of the Division Bench decision in Balwant (Balawant) Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni.
  3. Whether Section 4(3) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (providing that when a local area is included in a municipality, "this Act and all notifications, rules, ... and powers (including any tax levied) ... or any other law applicable to such municipality shall apply to the said area") has the effect of automatically extending the Rent Control Act (Parts IV & V) to areas newly included within a municipality identified in Schedule II.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord) Arguments

  • The suit property in Angol Extension was added to Belgaum Municipal Borough after Schedule II to the Rent Control Act came into force; no notification under Section 2(5) of the Act has been issued applying Parts IV & V to Angol.
  • Relying on the Division Bench decision in Balwant Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni, the petitioner argued that a separate notification under Section 2(5) is necessary to make Parts IV & V applicable to areas added subsequently.
  • Contended that Section 4(3) of the Municipalities Act does not operate to import the Rent Control Act into newly included areas because Schedule II uses descriptive labels (e.g., "Belgaum Municipal Borough") and those labels should not be equated mechanically with the statutory definition of "municipality".

Respondent's (Tenant) Arguments

  • Argued that the Division Bench decision in Balwant's case was no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Nandlal v. Motilal, which construed a notification under Section 2 of the C.P. Act to apply to municipalities constituted after the notification date when the notification extended to "all the Municipalities".
  • Relied on Section 4(3) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 to argue that, upon inclusion of Angol within Belgaum Municipality, all laws applicable to Belgaum Municipality (including Parts IV & V of the Rent Control Act, where Belgaum Municipal Borough is specified in Schedule II) automatically became applicable to Angol from the date of the municipal inclusion notification.
  • Submitted that the definition of "municipality" in Section 2(15) of the Municipalities Act supports the territorial/area-based operation of Section 4(3), so that laws applicable to the municipality apply to any area included therein.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balwant (Balawant) Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni (Division Bench of this Court) Held that where an area is added to a municipal area specified in Schedule II after Schedule II came into force, the Rent Control Act does not automatically become applicable to the extended area; a further notification under Section 2(5) is necessary to make Part V applicable to the extended area. The Full Bench majority affirmed that decision as correctly laying down the law and not requiring reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Nandlal. The majority relied on Balwant to answer the referred question in the affirmative (i.e., a separate notification is necessary).
Nandlal v. Motilal (Supreme Court) Construed a notification issued under Section 2 of the C.P. Act that declared Chapters II and IV extend to "all the Municipalities" — the Supreme Court held that the notification applied to municipalities constituted after issue of the notification (example: Tiroda), because the wording "all the Municipalities" was unambiguous. The Full Bench majority distinguished Nandlal: it held Nandlal was confined to construing the specific wording of the notification under the C.P. Act (which extended to "all the Municipalities") and did not lay down a general rule that any Act made applicable to a specified description of area automatically applies to areas later added under other laws. The minority (Rama Jois, J.) relied on Nandlal to support the view that Parts IV & V apply to areas included later in a municipality.
Nalanda Ceramic and Industries Ltd. v. N.S. Choudhury and Co. (P) Ltd. (Supreme Court) This decision was cited by the referring Division Bench in its order of reference, but the Full Bench observed that it had no bearing on the referred question (the Court indicated the Division Bench intended to refer to Nandlal instead). The Full Bench noted that this citation had no bearing and treated it as a miscitation; no substantive reliance upon its principle or reasoning was made in disposing of the referred question.
C. Kanyalal Daga v. C. Udaichand (Justice Kalagate, cited) Held that where a scheduled area description (e.g., a Sanitary Board area) included an area later reorganised (e.g., part converted into a Municipality), the relevant provisions of the Act would continue to apply to the area that was part of the originally scheduled area. The majority used this decision to support the proposition that schedules describe areas to which provisions are made applicable, and that subsequent changes of local status do not automatically remove or alter applicability unless the legislature so provides; it reinforced the view that schedules are descriptive and that automatic application to newly added areas is not compelled by Nandlal-type reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench considered the question referred by a Division Bench and produced opinions reflecting a majority (Malimath, J.) and a dissent (Rama Jois, J.). The reasoning of each is summarized below, based strictly on the text of the opinion.

Majority Reasoning (Malimath, J.)

  1. Framing the legal issue: the majority framed the issue as whether a separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 is necessary to apply Parts IV & V of the Rent Control Act to an area newly added to a locality named in Schedule II (e.g., Belgaum Municipal Borough).
  2. Distinguishing Nandlal: the majority analysed the Supreme Court decision in Nandlal v. Motilal and emphasized that Nandlal concerned the construction of a particular notification issued under Section 2 of the C.P. Act that expressly referred to "all the Municipalities". There, because the notification covered "all the Municipalities", when a municipal status was later conferred on a place (Tiroda), the notification applied from that date. The majority stressed that this was a construction of the specific wording of that notification and not a general proposition that laws applicable to a description of area automatically extend to subsequently added areas under different legal provisions.
  3. Textual distinction with Schedule II: Schedule II to the Karnataka Rent Control Act does not state that Parts IV & V are applicable to "all the Municipalities" of the State. Instead, Schedule II lists 61 specific items (a mixture of municipal boroughs, municipal districts, towns, villages, panchayat areas, sanitary board areas and other descriptions). The majority emphasized that not all municipal areas in the State are in Schedule II and thus the structure differs materially from the notification in Nandlal.
  4. Absurdity and inconsistency argument: the majority used examples to show potential absurd results from adopting a general Nandlal-type rule. It noted that parts of the State are distributed between Schedule II and Schedule III differently (for example, Dharwar appears in Schedule II but not Schedule III, whereas Hubli appears in both), and applying a rule that automatically extends Parts IV & V (or Part VI) to areas subsequently included could lead to the unintended application of Part VI to areas the legislature deliberately excluded (illustrated by the Hubli-Dharwar municipal corporation and the connecting strip example).
  5. Reliance on earlier decisions and legislative inaction: the majority observed that the Division Bench decision in Balwant's case had earlier examined the Act and reached the conclusion that schedule descriptions identify the specific areas intended by the legislature, and that a notification under Section 2(5) is required to extend application to subsequently added areas. The majority also relied on the decision in C. Kanyalal Daga as supportive of the interpretive approach that schedules are descriptive of areas to which the Act applies. The court noted that, although Balwant was decided in 1974/1975, the legislature had not amended the Act or issued notifications that would suggest Balwant was incorrect—an auxiliary circumstance supporting the correctness of that view.
  6. Interpretation of Section 4(3) of the Municipalities Act: the majority rejected the contention that Section 4(3) of the Municipalities Act automatically imported all laws applicable to a municipality into a subsequently included area. The majority concluded that the expression used in Schedule II (e.g., "Belgaum Municipal Borough") serves as a descriptive identification of the precise area intended by the legislature, and cannot be equated with the statutory definition of "municipality" in Section 2(15) of the Municipalities Act so as to make all municipal laws (including Parts IV & V) automatically applicable to any area later included. For the majority, therefore, Section 4(3) did not negate the necessity of a separate notification under Section 2(5) of the Rent Control Act.
  7. Conclusion: on the basis of the above textual analysis, distinctions from Nandlal, the examples of anomalous consequences, and supportive earlier authority, the majority answered the referred question in the affirmative: a separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 is necessary to make Parts IV & V of the Rent Control Act applicable to a newly added area.

Dissenting Reasoning (Rama Jois, J.)

  1. Initial position: Rama Jois, J. disagreed with the majority and concluded that no separate notification under Section 2(5) is necessary when an area is added to a municipal area specified in Schedule II by a notification under the Municipalities Act.
  2. Use of the Municipalities Act: he read Section 4(3) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 as meaning that when a local area is included in a municipality, "this Act and all notifications, rules, bye-laws, orders, ... and powers ... or any other law applicable to such municipality shall apply to the said area" from the date of publication of the inclusion notification. He relied on the statutory definition of "municipality" in Section 2(15) to show that "municipality" denotes the territorial area for which a municipality is constituted, and thus Section 4(3) imports laws applicable to the municipality to included areas.
  3. Reliance on Nandlal and textual reading of Section 2: Rama Jois, J. also relied on the Supreme Court's ratio in Nandlal to the effect that where a law or notification applies to "all the municipalities" it will apply to municipalities constituted later; he analogised that when a particular municipality is specified in Schedule II, and an area is included in that municipality, Parts IV & V (which applied to the municipality by virtue of Schedule II) apply to the included area by operation of the Municipalities Act and by the territorial notion of "municipality".
  4. Interpretation of sub-section (5): he read sub-section (5) of Section 2 (which permits the State Government to apply provisions to "such other areas") as dealing with areas other than those covered by Schedule II; hence a Section 2(5) notification would be needed only where the Government wanted to apply the Act to areas without including them within an already-specified municipality.
  5. Conclusion: on this basis, Rama Jois, J. concluded no separate notification under Section 2(5) was necessary to make Parts IV & V applicable to Angol once Angol became part of Belgaum Municipality under the Municipalities Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding (majority): The Full Bench, by majority (Malimath, J.), answered the referred question in the affirmative: a separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is necessary to make Parts IV and V of that Act applicable to an area newly added to any village, municipal area or notified area specified in Schedule II, when such area is added by a notification under the law governing municipalities or village panchayats and local boards.

Immediate implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The majority decision upholds the earlier Division Bench decision in Balwant Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni and treats it as correctly stating the law on the referred question.
  • Unless the Government issues a separate notification under Section 2(5) of the Rent Control Act, Parts IV & V will not automatically apply to areas that are added or extended into localities that are named in Schedule II; consequently, tenants or landlords operating in such newly added areas may not be subject to the eviction-control and rent-deposit regimes of Parts IV & V unless and until a Section 2(5) notification is issued.
  • The Court did not accept that the Supreme Court's decision in Nandlal establishes a general rule that would render Section 2(5) unnecessary in all cases; rather, the applicability depends on the wording and scheme in each statutory context (notifications that extend to "all the Municipalities" differ from a Schedule that enumerates specific areas).

Note: The opinion contains a reasoned dissent (Rama Jois, J.) disagreeing with the majority and concluding that no separate Section 2(5) notification is necessary where an area is included in a municipality specified in Schedule II by operation of the Municipalities Act. The summary above confines itself to the content and reasoning explicitly set out in the provided opinion text.

Show all summary ...

In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the question referred to the Full Bench is answered as follows:

If any area has been newly added to any village, municipal area or notified area specified in Schedule II to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, by means of an appropriate notification issued under the provisions of the Act governing municipalities or village panchayats and local Boards, a separate notification under sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is necessary to make the provisions of Parts IV & V of that Act applicable to the newly added area.

Civil Revision Petition No. 2859 of 1978

OPINION

Malimath, J.:— The Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Justice Bopanna has referred the following question for the opinion of the Full Bench.

“If any area has been newly added to any village, municipal area or notified area specified in Schedule II to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, by means of an appropriate notification issued under the provisions of the law governing municipalities or village panchayats and local boards, is a separate notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of that Act, necessary to make the provisions of that Act applicable to that newly added area?”

2. A Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, has answered this question in the affirmative in Balwant Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni(1). But the referring Bench felt that the said decision requires reconsideration in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. In the order of reference, the Division Bench has given the citation of the decision of the Supreme Court as Nalanda Ceramic and Industries Ltd. v. N.S Choudhury and Co. (P) Ltd.,(2). That decision has no bearing on the question. We are satisfied, that the Division Bench really intended to refer to the decision on the next page, i.e, Nandlal v. Motilal(3). Learned counsel appering for both the sides also concur with us.

3. The petitioner filed—Small Cause Suit No. 101 of 1976 in the Court of the Principal Civil Judge, Belgaum for possession of the suit house situate in Angol Extension of the City of Belgaum, for arrears of rent and for future mesne profits. The respondent tenant resisted the suit inter alia contending that as the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) are applicable, the suit is not maintainable. The petitioner, however, took the stand that though item-I of Schedule II of the Act is applicable to Belgaum Municipal Borough area, the Act is not applicable to the suit property, as it is situate to Angol Extension, which area came to be included within the Belgaum Municipal Borough, under the Bombay Municipal Borough Act, 1925, which was then in force, long after the II schedule to the Act came into force. He further submitted that as no notification by the State Government has been issued under sub-section (5) of Section 2 applying the provision of Part II of the Act to Anglo Extension, the Act is not applicable and that, therefore, the suit is maintainable. In support of his contention, the petitioner relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Balawant's case. But it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the decision of this Court in Balawant's case is no more good law in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Nandlal's case. In view of these rival contentions, the learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion that he has no jurisdiction to go into the question of jurisdiction under the provisions of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964. Consequently, the learned Civil Judge made an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. It is the said order that is challenged by the petitioner-landlord under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964.

4. Learned Counsel appearing on both the sides submitted that the Angol Extention, where the suit property is situate, was not within the Belgaum Municipal Borough on the date on which the Act and Schedule II came into force and further that the said area came to be included within the Belgaum Municipal Borough under the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, which was then inforce during the relevant time, after the II Schedule came into force. In Balawant's case, the Division Bench of this Court examining a similar question held that the expression “Belgaum Municipal Borough” used in item-1 of Schedule II of the Act is only a description of area to which Part V has been made applicable and that therefore, if any area is added to the Belgaum Municipal Borough under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 subsequent to the coming into force of the II Schedule, the Act will not became automatically applicable to the extended area. The Division Bench hag further held that a further notification under sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Act is necessary to make the provisions of Part V of the Act applicable to the extended area. The question for consideration is as to whether the view taken by the Division Bench requires re-consideration in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Nandlal's case.

5. Nandlal's case arose under the provisions of the C.P and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act (11 of 1946). Section 2 of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (hereinafter referrd to as the ‘C.P Act’) provides:

“2. Regulation of letting and sub-letting, etc.,—The Provincial Government may, by general or special order which shall extend to such areas as the Provincial Government may, by notification, direct, provide for regulating the letting and subletting of any accommodation or class of accommodation whether residential or non residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and wether with or without board and in particular.—

(a) for controlling the rents for such accommodation either generally or when let to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances.

(b) For preventing the eviction of tenants or sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances.

(c) for requiring such accommodation to be let either generally, or to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances, and

(d) for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating any of the aforesaid matters.”

In exercise of the power conferred by Section 2 of the C.P Act, the Provincial Government issued as order to the effect that the Chapters of the C.P Act specified in column 72 of the table below shall extend to the areas specified into the corresponding entries in column 3 of the said table. The order was issued by the state Government on the 26th of July 1949 directing inter alia, that Chapter I of the Rent Control Order shall extend to the whole of the Central provinces and Berar (and the States integrated with the Central Provinces and Berar), and Chapters II and IV shall extend to….

(a) All the Municipalities in the Central Provinces and Bexar and the States integrated with the Central Provinces and Berar. The area of Tiroda was declared to be a Municipality by a notification dated June 12, 1956 and was not a Municipality when the aforesaid notification was issued under Section 2 of that Act. It is in this context that the Supreme Court examined this question and held as follows:

“The validity of the notification which was issued on July 26, 1949, under Section 2 of the Act, has not been challenged before us, so that there can be no doubt that while Chapter I became applicable to the whole of the Central Provinces and Berar and the integrated States, Chapters II and IV became applicable to all Municipalities in that State with effect from that date. Tiroda was not a Municipality at that time and did not come within the purview of the notification. But it became a Municipality on June 12, 1956 and the notification became applicable to it from that date. We therefore see no justification for the argument that the notification was confined to these Municipalities which were in existence on July 26, 1949, and that a fresh notification was necessary to extend the benefit of the Rent Control order to a subsequently constituted Municipality. There is nothing in the wordings of the notification to justify any such argument. On the other hand, the wordings of the notification are quite unambiguous and there is no reason why they should not be given their simple and natural meaning. They clearly provide that Chapters II and IV of the Rent Control Order extend to “all the Municipalities” in the State. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June 12, 1956, the provisions of these chapters became applicable to it from that date…

One thing that becomes clear from a close reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court is that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not laid down a general preposition of law to the effect that if the Act is made applicable on a particular date to a specified area of a particular description that the Act will automatically become applicable to further areas that may be added to the originally specified area under some other provision of law. The decision of the Supreme Court is only on the construction of the relevant portion of the notification issued on the 26th of July 1949 under Section 2 of the C.P Act. The notification which the Supreme Court examined provided that Chapters II and IV of the Rent Control Order shall extend to all the municipalities in the Central Provinces and Berar and the integrated States with the Central Provinces in Berar. As Chapterg II and IV were made applicable to all the municipalities, the Supreme Court construed the said notification as having the effect of making Chapters II and IV applicable not only to the municipalities that were in existence on the date of the order but also to municipalities that came into existence after the issue of the order. The Supreme Court came to that conclusion because the notification provided that Chapters II and IV shall extend to all the municipalities in the State. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the wordings of the notification are quite unambiguous and there is no reason why they should not be given their simple and natural meaning to the expression “all the municipalities” in the State. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June, 12, 1956 the Supreme Court held that the provisions of these Chapters became applicable from that date. Schedule II to the Act with which we are concerned does not provide that Parts IV and V of the Act are applicable to all the municipalities in the State. Whereas, the notification issued under the C.P Act makes the provisions of Chapters II and IV of the Rent Centrol Order applicable to all the Municipalities, Scheudule II of the Act, with which we are concerned, makes it clear that Parts IV and V are not applicable to all the municipalities in the States. Schedule II enumerates 61 items of areas to which Parts IV and V of the Act are made applicable and reads as follows:

“SCHEDULE II

1. Belgaum Municipal Borough

2. Belgaum Cantonment

3. Nipani Municipal Borough

4. Athani Municipal District

5. Gokak Municipal District

6. Saundatti-Yellamma Municipal District

7. Bailhongal Municipal District

8. Bijapur Municipal Borough

9. Bagalkot Municipal District

10. Dharwad Municipal Borough

11. Hubli Municipal Borough

12. Gadag-Betgeri Municipal, Borough

13. Haveri Municipal District

14. Ranebennur Municipal District

15. Navalgund Municipal District

16. Nargund Municipal District

17. Byadgi Municipal District

18. Guddguddpur Municipal District

19. Kalaghatgi-Bendigere Village

20. Karajgi-Chikmagadur village

21. Hangal village.

22. Ron village

23. Mundargi village

24. The Revenue village of Bankapur

25. The Revenue village of Kod

26. Gajendragad village

27. Annigeri village

28. Hirekerur village

29. Shiggaon village

30. Karwar Municipal District

31. Kumta Municipal District

32. Gokarn Town Panchayat Area

33. Bhatkal Municipal District

34. Sirsi Municipal District

35. Ankola Panchayat Group

36. Siddapur Panchayat Group

37. Jamkhandi Municipal District

38. Rabkavi Banhatti Municipal District

39. Haiiyal Municipal District

40. Municipalities and Notified Areas in Kodagu District

41. Gulbarga Municipality

42. Raichur Municipality

43. Bidar Municipality

44. Aland, Gulbarga District

45. Shorapur, Gulbarga District

46. Sedam, Gulbarga District

47. Yadgir, Gulbarga District

48. Mangalore Municipality

49. Udupi Municipality

60. Kollegal Panchyat Area

51. Coondapur Panchayat Area

52. Karkal Panchayat Area

53. Puttur Panchayat Area

54. Non-Municipal Areas of Mulki & Buntwal

55. Mudbidri

56. Cities of Mysore, Davangere & Bellary

57. City of Bangalore and an area within a radius of two miles from the Municipal limits of the City.

58. The Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board Areas

59. The towns of Kolar, Tumkur, Chitradurga, Shimoga, Chickmagalur, Hassan, Mandya, Bangarpet, Chintamni, Chikballapur, Tiptur, Harihar, Sagar, Arsikere, Sakleshpur, Nanjangud, Hospet, Devanahalli, Doddiballapur, Nelamangala, Magadi, Channapatna, Ramanagaram, Kanakapura Anekal, Srinivasapur, Gauribidanur, Turuvekere, Kunigal, Hiriyar, Hunsur, Chamarajanagar, Srirangapatna, Nagamangala, Krishnarajapet, Malavalli, Maddur, Belur, Arkalgud, Holenarasipur, Channarayapatna, Kudur, Tarikere, Koppa, Narasimharajapura, Sringeri, Thirthahalli, Challakere Molakalmuru, Honnali, Shikaripur, Channagiri, Koratigere, Madhugiri and Gubbi.

60. Pandavapur.

61. Bhadravati Old Town and Bhadravathi, New Board Area excluding New Town and Paper Town.”

All the 61 items are not described with reference to the areas of the respective Municipalities. A bear reading of Schedule II clearly indicates that Parts IV and V are made applicable to only some of the municipal areas in the State. There are municipal areas in the State to which parts IV and V of the Act have not been made applicable. Schedule II shows that Parts IV and V of the Act have been made applicable to areas of different description such as Municipal areas, revenue villages, Panchayat areas, notified areas, Sanitary board areas, towns and cities and the City of Bangalore and an area within a radius of two miles from the municipal limits of the city. All the areas included in Schedule II are not municipal areas. It is, therefore, clear that the scheme of the II Schedule of the Act with which we are concerned is not similar to the scheme of the Rent Control Order dated 26-7-1949 issued under Section 2 of the CP. Act. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot, therefore, be applied for construing Schedule II to the Act, with which we are concerned.

6. Sub-Section (3) of section 2 provides that Parts IV and V of the Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule II and Sub-Section (4) of Section 2 provides that Part VI of the Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule III. If the principle laid down by the Supreme Court is applicable to Schedule II of the Act, it should be applicable to Schedule III of the Act also. Item 10 in Schedule II is Dharwar Municipal Borough and item 11 is Hubli Municipal Borough. But in Schedule III which consists only five items, Dharwar Municipal Borough is not included though Hubli Municipal Borough is included as item 4. Hubli and Dharwar are two cities in the District of Dharwar. Dharwar is not only the Taluka headquarter of Dharwar taluka but is also the headquarter of the District of Dharwar. Hubli city which is 12 miles from Dharwar is the taluka Headquarter of Hubli taluk. Under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925, separate Municipal Boroughs were constituted for each of these cities and were in existence for several decades. Subsequently a single Municipal Corporation came to be constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 by the name Hubli-Dharwar Municipal Corporation. It was constituted not only in respect of the areas of the Hubli Municipal Borough and Dharwar Municipal Borough, but also in respect of a strip of area connecting both the areas. The said strip was not part of either Municipal Boroughs. Now if the principle laid down in the Supreme Court decision is applied to Schedule II, Parts IV and V of the Act will be applicable to the areas of the Dharwar Municipal Borough and Hubbli Municipal Borough and also to the strip connecting the two areas. Now let us apply the same principle to Schedule III. In this schedule, Dharwar Municipal Borough is not included though it is included in Schedule II. Now if we apply the principle of item 4 of Schedule III, i.e, to Hubli Municipal Borough, it means that Part VI of the Act will become applicable to the former Dharwar Municipal Borough area and also to the connecting strip. This leads to an absurd result not contemplated by the legislature. When it was possible to include Dharwar Municipal Borough in Schedule III the legislature in its wisdom did not include it in Schedule III and thus expressed its intention not to apply Part VI to Dharwar Municipal Borough area. But if the decision of the Supreme Court is applied to Schedule III, it will result in applying Part VI of the Act to Dharwar Municipal Borough area, contrary to the intention of the legislature. Now let us also examine the situation when a particular area is excluded from the Municipal area or area of other description included in Schedule II. Can it be said that Part VI of the Act ceases to apply to such excluded area? Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board area is included in Schedules I and II of the Act. Subsequently Robertsonpet Town Municipality was constituted for a part of the K.G.F Sanitary Board area. But the Robertsonpet Municipality is not included in Schedules I and II and no notification has been issued under Sub-Section (5) of Section 2 of the Act making any of the provisions of the Act applicable to the newly constituted municipal area. Justice Kalagate held in C. Kanyalal Daga v. C. Udaichand(4) that the relevant part of the Act will continue to apply to that area which was part of the Sanitary Board area and came to be included in the newly constituted municipal area. The principle on which the said decision rests is that what is contained in the schedule is the description of the areas to which the relevant provisions of the Act are made applicable and that, therefore, if any area is subsequently execluded from that area under any other law, the provisions of the Act will not automatically cease to be applicable to the newly excluded area. If two constructions are possible then the one which reflects the intention of the legislature must be preferred. If the aforesaid decision did not reflect the intention of the legislature, appropriate remedial action would have been taken by the State by this time. The same can also be said about; the decision in Balawant's case. The decision rendered in the year 1974 was reported in the year 1975 in the Karnataka Law Journal. If the said decision did not reflect the intention of the legislature, the Act could have been amended or a suitable notification under Section 2(5) of the Act could have been issued. That no such action has been taken for all these years is another circumstance which supports the contention that the view taken in Balawant's case is correct.

7. It was lastly contended on the basis of Section 4(3) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 that provisions of Parts VI and V of the Act became automatically applicable to the area newly added under Section 4(1). Sub-section (1) provides for inclusion or exclusion from the Municipality any local area. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 on which reliance is placed reads as follows:

“(3) When a local area is included in any municipality, this Act and all notifications, rules, bye-laws, orders, resolutions, directions and powers (including any tax levied) issued, made or conferred under this Act, or any other law applicable to such municipality shell apply to the said area from the date of publication of the notification under pub-section (1)”.

This sub-section will apply only if any other law is applicable to, the, ‘Municipality’ Unless the context otherwise requires the word “Municipality” is defined in Section 2(15) to mean any local area which may be constituted or declared as a city or a town municipality under Section 3 and includes any local area which is deemed to be a City or a town Municipality under the provisions of the Act, if such Municipality has not ceased to be a City or a Town Municipality. Having regard to the context, there is no scope for applying the definition given in Section 2(15) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. The legislature has in our opinion used the expression “Belgaum Municipal Borough” in item No. 1 of Schedule II as a convenient mode of describing or identifying the precise area to which Part IV and V of the Act are made applicable. The expression “Belgaum Municipal Borough” cannot in the context be understood as meaning “Municipality” as defined in Section 2(15) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act. The refare, no reliance can be placed on Section 4(3) of the Municipalities Act for the contention that Parts IV and V of the Act become automatically applicable to the area extended under Section 3 of the Municipalities Act.

8. In Balwant's case this Court has, on a thorough examination of the provisions of the Act, come to the conclusion that the legislature has used the expression “Belgaum Municipal Borough” in item-1 of Schedule II to the Act to describe the area to which Parts IV and V of the Act have been made applicable and those words cannot be understood as meaning “municipality” as defined in Section 2(15). Consequently, it has held that if any area is added to the Belgaum Municipal Borough subsequent to the coming into force of Schedule II under Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964, the Act does not automatically become applicable to the newly added area and that the Act can be made applicable to the newly added area only by issue of an appropriate notification under Sub-Section (5) of Section 2 of the Act. In our opinion, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Balwant's case lays down the law correctly and does not require reconsideration consequent upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandlal's case.

For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 2859 OF 1978.

OPINION

Rama Jois, J.

I have read the opinion of my Lord Malimath, J. but with great respect to His Lordship, I do not agree that a separate notification under sub-Sec. (5) of Section 2 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is necessary to bring the provisions of the Act into force in any area on its inclusion in any Municipal area specified in II Schedule to the Act. Reasons for my conclusion are as follows:

2. Sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 2 of the Act and the relevant part of II Schedule read:

“2. APPLICATION OF THE ACT.—

(1) ****

(2) ****

(3) Parts IV and V of this Act shall be applicable to the areas specified in Schedule II.

(4) ****

(5) The State Government may, by notification, apply all or any of the provisions of Parts II, III, IV, V or VI to such other areas from such dates as may be specified in the notification.”

“SCHEDULE II

(See Section 2(3))

1. Belgaum Municipal Borough.

******”

Sub-section (3) of Section 2 provides that Parts IV and V of the Act applies to areas specified in II Schedule. Part IV deals with deposit of rent and Part V of the Act contains provisions, which control the eviction of tenants. Belgaum Municipal Borough, which was constituted as such under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Aet, 1925 was specified in II Schedule. Therefore, Part V came into force in the area covered by Belgaum Municicipal Borough on 31-12-1961 on which date the Act came into force. The Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) came into foroe on 1-4-1965. Under this Act, Belgaum Municipal Borough was renamed as Belgaum City Municipality (hereinafter referred to as ‘Belgaum Municipality’). Thereafter Angol area was included into the Belgaum Municipality. To this extent there is no controversy between the parties.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that though Angol area has become part of Belgaum Municipality, Parts IV and V of the Act has not come into force in that area as no notification has been issued under sub-sec. (5) of Section 2 of the Act. In support of this submission he relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Balawant Shamrao Deshpande v. Sadashiv Haripant Kulkarni. The said decision fully supports his submission.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent contended as follows:

(1) The view taken in Balwant's case on the interpretation of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act and Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act is not correct, and that on a correct interpretation of these provisions, it should be held that Part V of the Act, came into force in Angol area on its inclusion within Belgaum Municipality. In support of the submission that the interpretation of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act made in Balwant's case is not correct, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandlal v. Motilal.

5. Though the question referred for the opinion of the Full Bench covers village panchayats and local boards also, as the arguments before us were confined to the applicability of the Act to areas included in any municipality specified in II Schedule to the Act. I shall confine myself to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Municipalities Act.

6. I shall first consider as to whether by virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act, Part V of the Act came into force in Angol area on its inclusion in Belgaum Municipality. Sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act provides that Parts IV and V of the Act shall be applicable to areas specified in II Schedule. Belgaum Municipality (Belgaum Municipal Borough) is included in II Schedule. Therefore Parts VI and V applied to the area of Belgaum Municipality from 31-12-1961 on which date the Act came into force. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act empowers the State Government to include in any municipality any local area adjacent thereto. Sub-section (2) requires that the notification, issued under sub-section (1) should also define the limits of the local area, which is sought to be included into a municipality. It is common ground that this has been done and consequently Angol area has become part of Belgaum Municipality. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act reads:

“4. POWER TO INCLUDE OR EXCLUDE AREAS IN OR FROM MUNICIPALITIES AND THE EFFECT THEREON.—

(1) ****

(2) ****

(3) When a local area is included in any municipality this Act and all notifications, rules, bye-laws, orders, resolutions, directions and powers (including any tax levied, issued, made or conferred under this Act or any other law applicable to such municipality shall apply to the said area from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1).”

Sub-section (3) provides that on the inclusion of any local area, into a municipality, not only all the notifications, rules, bye-laws etc., issued under that Act, but also any other law which was applicable to the area covered by such municipality shall apply to the area so included from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1). Therefore, it follows that Part V of the Act being one of the law which was applicable to Belagaum Municipality, it came into force in Angol area with effect from the date it stood included in Belgaum Municipality.

7. The contention, however, urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is as follows: Sub-sec. (3) of section 4 of the Municipalities Act refers to laws which were applicable to ‘municipality’ as such and not to any area which was part of that municipality. Sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 2 of the Act refers to areas and not to ‘municipality’. Therefore on the inclusion of an area into a municipality, Part V of the Act does not automatically come into force in such an area. In support of this interpretation, he relied on the division Bench decision of this Court in Balwant's case. The view taken in the said decision, no doubt supports his submission.

8. I find it difficult to accept the submission that the word ‘municipality’ used in sub-section (3) of section (4) of the Municipalities Act does not refer to the territorial area which it covers. The word ‘municipality’ is defined in section 2(15) of the Municipalities Act. It reads thus:

“2. (15) ‘municipality’ means any local area which may be constituted or declared as a city or a town municipality under section 3 and includes any local area which is deemed to be a city or a town municipality under the provisions of this Act, if such municipality has not ceased to be a city or a town municipality;”

In view of this definition, the word ‘municipality’ used in Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act means the territorial area for which a municipality was constituted and includes the area, which is deemed to be a municipality under the Municipalities Act. Therefore for the purpose of the present case, Belgaum Municipality means territorial area for which Belgaum Municipality was constituted. Consequently when Angol area was included into Belgaum Municipal area by virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act, Part V of the Act being one of the law which was applicable to Belgaum Municipal area, began to apply to Angol area also on its inclusion into the said municipality. Therefore, I am unable to agree that a notification under sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Act was necessary to bring part V of the Act into force in Angol Area.

9. In my opinion, the above conclusion can also be reached even without the aid of Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Municipalities Act even on the language of sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act in the light of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandlal's case. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held that though the notification was issued under section 2 of the C.P and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946, applying the provisions of that Act to all the municipalities in the former State of C.P and Berar on 26.7.1949, and consequently that Act was not applicable to Tiroda town, as it was not a municipality than, C.P Act began to apply to Tiroda town with effect from 12-6-1958, on which date it was constituted into a municipality. The contention urged for the respondent therein that a fresh notification was necessary to bring that Act into force in Tiroda Municipality was repelled. Similarly, in the present case, it may be seen that sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Act, provides that a notification may be issued applying all or any of the provisions of the Act to such other areas which means areas other than those included in II Schedule. Therefore, when Belgaum Municipality finds a place in II Schedule and Angol ares has become part of that municipality, provisions of Parts IV and V applied to that area from the date of inclusion of that area in Belgaum Municipality by the force of sub-section (3) itself and a notification under sub-section (5) would be unnecessary. To put it differently, the use of the words ‘other areas’ in sub-section (5) indicates that a notification under sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Act would become necessary, if the Government intends to apply the provisions of the Act to areas other than municipal areas specified in II Schedule. Therefore, in my opinion a notification under sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Act would have become necessary, if only the Government wanted to apply the provisions of Part V of the Act to Angol area even without including the said area within the area of Belgaum Municipality and in the present case such a notification was unnecessary as Angol area had become part of Belgaum Municipality.

10. In the light of the above decision, with great respect, I disagree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Balawant's case. I accept the contention urged for the respondent.

11. In the result, my answer to the question referred for opinion is as follows:

If any area has been newly added to any municipal area specified in II Schedule to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, by virtue of a notification issued under the provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, no separate notification under sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act is necessary to make the provisions of Parts IV and V of the Karnataka Rent Control Act applicable to the newly added area