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Parimal Chakraborty… v. State Of Meghalaya & Ors.…
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was originally appointed as a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Raid Laban College. He applied in response to an advertisement for the post of Principal at Tikrikilla College. The Governing Body approved his appointment by resolution dated 30.12.1989, and he was appointed Principal on a regular basis effective 31.12.1989 on a consolidated pay of Rs. 2,000 per month.
The Governing Body, alleging certain irregularities and deficiencies on his part, passed a resolution dated 25.6.1998 to degrade the petitioner to the post of Lecturer. Respondent No. 4, by an order dated 17.6.1998 forwarding that resolution, directed the petitioner to hand over charge of the office of Principal to respondent No. 5 and to continue as a Lecturer against a non‑sanctioned post. The petitioner handed over charge on 6.7.1998 and submitted a representation for reinstatement which was not considered. He therefore filed the present writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution seeking reinstatement to the principalship.
The Court heard counsel for the petitioner and for the respondents and framed the principal question for decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a teacher of a private college receiving grant‑in‑aid from the State is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for reinstatement to a post (here, Principal) from which he was reverted.
- Whether a private educational institution receiving grant‑in‑aid and affiliated to a university can be treated as performing a public duty such that writ remedies under Article 226 are available to its teachers when service rights or principles of natural justice are violated.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The college at issue (Tikrikilla College) is a purely private college receiving only adhoc grant from the State and therefore is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
- Reliance was placed on Dipak Kumar v. Director of Public Instruction, Meghalaya ((1987) 2 SCC 252 : AIR 1987 SC 1422) for the proposition that a college governed by university statutes and receiving aid is not a statutory body merely because it receives aid; its existence is not dependent on statute and therefore it is not a State instrumentality for writ purposes.
- The respondents further relied on Govt. of Assam v. Ajit Kr. Sarma (AIR 1965 SC 1196) to submit that rules for grant‑in‑aid are executive instructions which do not create enforceable rights enabling a teacher to seek a mandamus.
- Additional local and High Court decisions (including Governing Body of Women's College v. Alpana Syam and Silchar Collegiate School v. Devi Prasad Bhattacharjee) were cited in support of the respondents' stance.
Petitioner's Arguments
- The earlier decisions relied upon by the respondents no longer state the correct position because the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 has been widened and may be exercised against any person or authority discharging public duty.
- The college is governed by Government rules and regulations, receives grant‑in‑aid on stipulated terms, imparts education, and thus discharges an element of public duty; consequently teachers of private grant‑in‑aid colleges and affiliated institutions should be permitted to invoke Article 226 when their legal or natural justice rights are infringed.
- Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents such as Unni Krishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((1993) 1 SCC 645) (private bodies performing public duty are amenable to writs) and K. Krishnamacharylu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering ((1997) 3 SCC 571 : AIR 1998 SC 295) (teachers of private institutions can seek enforcement under Article 226, including parity claims), to support the contention that private educational institutions discharge public duties and their teachers may seek writ relief.
- Other authorities and a Full Bench decision (Miss Ravneet Kavr v. Christian Medical College, Ludhiana — AIR 1998 Punjab & Haryana 1) were relied on to show an evolving, more liberal approach to writ jurisdiction against private bodies performing public functions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in this Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Dipak Kumar v. Director of Public Instruction, Meghalaya ((1987) 2 SCC 252 : AIR 1987 SC 1422) | Held that Lady Keane Girls College, though governed by university statutes and receiving financial aid, was not a statutory body because it was not created by statute and its existence did not depend on statutory provisions. | Respondents relied on this case to argue that receipt of aid and regulation by statutes does not make an institution amenable to writ jurisdiction; the Court reviewed this authority as part of the prior line of decisions. |
| Vaish College v. Lakshmi Narain ((1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888) | Part of earlier jurisprudence considered on the nature of institutions and whether they are State instrumentalities. | Referenced (via Dipak Kumar) as forming part of the earlier test that receiving aid does not necessarily create a statutory body. |
| J. Tiwari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir ((1979) 4 SCC 160 : AIR 1981 SC 122) | Another precedent in the same vein regarding the characterisation of educational institutions vis‑à‑vis writ jurisdiction. | Quoted by the Supreme Court in Dipak Kumar and therefore considered by the Court when discussing the earlier approach. |
| Govt. of Assam v. Ajit Kr. Sarma (AIR 1965 SC 1196) | Observed that rules for grant‑in‑aid, being executive instructions, do not confer enforceable rights on teachers to seek mandamus. | Respondents relied on this proposition to contend that grant‑in‑aid rules do not create a right enforceable by writ; the Court noted this as part of the respondents' submissions. |
| Governing Body of Women's College v. Alpana Syam (1994 (1) GHC 273) | Decision of a Division Bench of the High Court relevant to the question of writ jurisdiction in the educational context. | Cited by respondents; used to support the argument that relief by writ may not be available in the circumstances contended by the petitioner. |
| Silchar Collegiate School v. Devi Prasad Bhattacharjee (1993 (2) GLJ 312) | Local High Court decision touching on related themes (service/administration of aided institutions). | Referred to by the respondents in support of their position. |
| Unni Krishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((1993) 1 SCC 645) | Affirms that a private body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226; writs can be issued to any person or authority for enforcement of fundamental rights or other purposes. | Relied on by the petitioner and cited by the Court as authority supporting extension of writ jurisdiction to private institutions performing public functions. |
| K. Krishnamacharylu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering ((1997) 3 SCC 571 : AIR 1998 SC 295) | Holds that when an element of public interest exists and a private institution caters to that, teachers may seek remedies under Article 226 (teacher entitled to seek enforcement of government orders; parity of pay under Article 39(d)). | Cited and relied upon by the Court to support the proposition that teachers of private aided institutions are entitled to writ remedies, especially where public interest or equal protection is engaged. |
| Miss Ravneet Kavr v. The Christian Medical College, Ludhiana (Full Bench, AIR 1998 Punjab & Haryana 1) | Full Bench held the view that the meaning of 'authority' under Article 226 should be given a liberal construction and private educational institutions supplement State efforts and perform public duties. | Quoted by the Court as part of the evolution toward a liberal understanding of writ jurisdiction against private bodies performing public functions. |
| Ajoy Hasis v. Khalid Mujib ((1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487) | Represents earlier tests on the scope of writ jurisdiction (mentioned as the older, more restrictive approach). | The Court noted the jurisprudential shift from the tests in Ajoy Hasis to a more liberal approach reflected in later decisions. |
| Chandigarh Administration v. Mrs. Rajni Vali (200 AIR SCW 153) | Observes that imparting primary and secondary education is a core duty of the State; State provides grant‑in‑aid and intervenes where discrimination against teaching staff is shown. | Relied upon to underline that private schools running with State regulation and aid discharge functions that attract constitutional protection and possible writ intervention. |
| H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (treatise cited) | Scholarly exposition on the doctrine of equal protection and permissible classifications (quoted on tests for intelligible differentia and rational relation). | Quoted by the Court to elucidate principles of permissible classification under Article 14 when considering whether teachers of private aided institutions can be denied the protection of Article 226. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the competing lines of authority and the factual matrix to determine whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 could be exercised in favour of the petitioner. The reasoning can be broken down into the following steps, reflecting the opinion's own analysis:
- The Court acknowledged an older line of decisions (e.g., Dipak Kumar and those preceding it) which held that mere receipt of financial aid or regulation by university statutes does not by itself convert a private college into a statutory body amenable to writ jurisdiction. That line had been relied upon by the respondents.
- The Court then examined more recent decisions (cited by the petitioner) in which the Supreme Court and High Courts had adopted a wider approach: where a private body performs a function of public character — in particular, discharging educational functions that are part of the State's constitutional responsibility — it may be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court specifically noted Unni Krishan, K. Krishnamacharylu and a Full Bench decision from Punjab & Haryana as indicative of this shift.
- The Court considered the policy and constitutional backdrop: the State has an obligation to ensure education and regulate institutions; private aided institutions supplement the State in meeting the constitutional mandate. When private institutions discharge such public duties, actions affecting service rights of their teachers may engage constitutional protections (Article 14 and related doctrines).
- The Court invoked the doctrine of permissible classification (quoting Seervai) and held that denying the writ remedy to teachers of private aided and affiliated institutions, while allowing it to teachers of State or statutory institutions, would amount to an impermissible classification unless an intelligible differentia with a rational relation to the object existed. The Court concluded no such justification existed to deny writ remedies where teachers discharge essentially the same public duty.
- Applying those principles to the facts, the Court found procedural unfairness: the petitioner was reverted from Principal to Lecturer without initiation of disciplinary proceedings and without being given a chance to represent his case. The Director of Higher and Technical Education had recommended reinstatement for a one‑year period (without claim to arrears), indicating administrative recognition of the problem.
- For these reasons — the evolving jurisprudential trend extending writ jurisdiction to private institutions performing public duties, the equality and classification analysis, and the facts showing lack of fair procedure — the Court concluded that interference by way of writ was warranted to remove the injustice done to the petitioner.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: WRIT PETITION ALLOWED; THE IMPUGNED RESOLUTION DATED 25.6.1998 AND THE CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER OF REVERSION DATED 17.6.1998 ARE SET ASIDE; THE PETITIONER IS DIRECTED TO BE REINSTATED AS PRINCIPAL.
Specific directions given by the Court (direct, operative consequences):
- The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner to the post of Principal and to allow him to continue in that post without disturbance except in due course of law.
- The respondents may initiate an inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner if they so desire, but any such inquiry and consequential orders must be completed after affording the petitioner reasonable opportunity to represent his case.
- Matters concerning payment of back salary were left to the authorities to decide after hearing the petitioner (i.e., no immediate award of arrears was made by the Court).
- No order as to costs was made.
Implications (as stated or reasonably deduced from the opinion's own reasoning):
- The decision reinforces the view expressed by more recent authorities that private educational institutions which receive aid and are affiliated to universities — and which discharge functions of public character — can be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when public law rights (including principles of natural justice and equal protection) are engaged.
- Direct effect is limited to the parties: reinstatement of the petitioner and permitting any disciplinary process to proceed only after giving him a fair opportunity to be heard. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel binding precedent beyond applying the evolving line of authorities to the facts before the Court.
- The Court explicitly applied established constitutional tests (permissible classification under Article 14) to reject any automatic denial of writ remedies to teachers of private aided institutions; however, the opinion does not state that it is announcing a new rule of law beyond what recent higher authorities have already endorsed.
This summary is confined to the material appearing in the provided opinion and does not add facts or holdings beyond the text of the judgment.
1. The question to be answered in this writ petition is whether the teacher of a private College receiving grant-in-aid from the State is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for reinstatement to the post of Principal held by him before reversion.
2. The petitioner was appointed as Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy in Raid Laban College, Shillong. He respondent to an advertisement and applied for the post of Principal in the Tikrikilla College, Tikrikilla. The Governing Body on completion of selection process Vide Resolution dated 30.12.1989 approved his appointment as Principal. Thereafter, the petitioner was appointed as principal on regular basis with effect from 31.12.1989 on a consolidated pay of Rs. 2,000 per month. Because of certain alleged irregularities and deficiencies on his part, the governing Body vide Resolution dated 25.6.1998 decided to degrade him to the post of Lecturer. The respondent No. 4 vide order dated 17.6.1998, while forwarding the copy of the Resolution of the Governing Body, directed him to hand over the charge of the office of the Principal to respondent No. 5 and continue to work as Lecturer of Philosophy against a non-sanctioned post. Accordingly, the petitioner handed over the charge of the office of the Principal on 6.7.1998 to the respondent No. 5 and submitted a representation for reinstatement to the post of Principal. The said representation was not considered and hence, the petitioner preferred this petition for relief's indicated above. I have heard Shri S. Dutta, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner and also Mr. B.P Maizal, Mr. M.K Deb and Mr. S.K Deb, the learned counsel for the respondents.
3. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the Trikrikilla College is purely a private-college receiving only adhoc grant from the State Government and, as such, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision in Dipak Kumar v. Director of Public Instruction, Meghalaya, (1987) 2 SCC 252 : AIR 1987 SC 1422. In this case before the Supreme Court, the status of Lady Keane Girls College, Shillong was under consideration. After consideration of the decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish College v. Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888 and J. Tiwari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir, (1979) 4 SCC 160 : AIR 1981 SC 122, the Supreme Court held as follows:—
“Para - 12.
12. The law enunciated in these decisions stand fully attracted to this case also. Even though the Lady Keane Girls College may be governed by the statutes of the University and the Education Code framed by the Government of Meghalaya and even though the college may be receiving financial aid from the Government it would not be a statutory body because it has not been created by any statute and its existence is not dependent upon any statutory provisions.”
4. On the conclusion as above, the Supreme Court refused to grant any relief to the appellant primarily on consideration of the fact that the said college was not a creation of any statute. However, the Supreme Court in exercise of powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution directed the college authorities to pay three years salary and allowances to the writ petitioner. The respondents also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Govt. of Assam v. Ajit Kr. Sarma, AIR 1965 SC 1196 and a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Governing Body of Women's College v. Alpana Syam, 1994 (1) GHC 273. In Ajit Kr. Sarma (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the Rules for the purpose of grant-in-aid being merely executive instructions do not confer any kind of right on the teacher to apply for a mandamus. The decision of this court rendered in Silchar Collegiate School v. Devi Prasad Bhattacharjee, 1993 (2) GLJ 312 has also been referred to.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the decisions relied upon by the respondents no longer hold the felid. The powers of the Court under Article 226 have been widened and it is available against any person or authority discharging or performing public duty. It is further submitted that the College in question is governed by the Rules and Regulations framed by the Government and is in receipt of grant-in-aid on stipulated terms. It is imparting education amongst the students and is catering to the need of the educational opportunities to the citizens which is the responsibility of the State. There being an element of public interest ingrained in the matter, the teachers of any private college receiving grant-in-aid and affiliated to the University are also entitled to avail the constitutional remedies provided under Article 226 against any wrong caused in violation of law or the principles of natural justice.
6. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on a number of decision of the Supreme Court in support of the above contention. In Unni Krishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a private body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that under Article 226 writ can be issued to any person or authority for enforcement any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. In para-79, the Supreme Court further observed that “if the emphasis is on the nature of duty, on the same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty.” This observation of the Supreme Court with regard to private institutions is indicative of the status the private institutions enjoy. In K. Krishnamacharylu, Appellants v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering, Respondents, (1997) 3 SCC 571 : AIR 1998 SC 295, while dealing the claim of the teachers of the private institutions for parity of pay, the Supreme Court held as follows:—
“Para — 4
We are of the view that the State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right to education. The private institutions cater to the needs of the educational opportunities. The teacher duly appointed to a post in the private institution also is entitled to seek enforcement of the order issued by the Government. The question is as to which forum one should approach. The High Court has held that the remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, the arm of the institution is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226; the jurisdiction part is very wide. It would be different position, if the remedy is a private law remedy. So, they cannot be denied the same benefit which is available to others. Accordingly we hold that the writ petition is maintainable. They are entitled to equal pay so as to be on par with Government employees under Article 39(d) of the Constitution.”
7. The above judgment makes it clear that the teachers who are arms of the institutions are entitled to enforce parity in pay by availing the remecy provided under Article 226. The parity was allowed on the basis of an executive order dehors any statutory provision. This otherwise means that in a just and proper case where injustice is palpable, the Court should not hesitate to exercise its powers under Article 226 to remove the same.
8. A full Bench of Pubjab and Haryana High Court dealt with the matter in details in the case of Miss. Ravneet Kavr, Petitioner v. The Christian Medical College, Ludhiana, Respondents, AIR 1998 pubjab and Haryana 1. In this case, the High Court after taking into consideration the relevant decisions on the subject held:
“37. It is, thus, clear that the old and conservative view regarding the maintainability of writs against the State or its instrumentalities is giving way to ‘a liberal meaning’. The power under Art. 226 is no longer confined to the issue of writs against statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. It covers ‘any other person or body performing public duty’. Medical Colleges are supplementing the effort of the State. These cannot survive or subsist without recognition and/or affiliation. The bodies which grant recognition are required to ensure that the institution complies with Art. 14 of the Constitution. These decision represent a Quantum jump - from ‘the tests’ in Ajoy Hasis v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487, to a liberal meaning to the term' authority' in Article 226.
38. A private educational institution receiving aid from State funds may not be a ‘State’ as defined in Art. 12. Yet, Article 29(2) confers a fundamental right on all citizens not to be discriminated against in the matter of admission to such an institution on ground only of religion caste, language or any of them. If a citizen is denied admission by such an institution on any of the grounds specified in Art. 29(2), can it be said that the aggrieved person cannot seek a writ for the enforcement of his rights either under Art. 32 or 226 on the ground that it happens to be a private educational institution? Certainly not.”
9. The question has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration v. Mrs. Rajni Vali, 200 AIR SCW 153. The relevant observation is as follows:
“6. The position has to be accepted as well settled that imparting primary and secondary education to students is the bounden duty of the State Administration. It is a constitutional mandate that the State shall ensure proper education to the students on whom the future of the society depends. In line with this principle, the State has enacted Statutes and framed Rules and Regulations to control/regulate establishment and running of private schools at different level. The State Government provides grant-in-aid to private schools with a view to ensure smooth running of the institution and to ensure that the standard of teaching does not suffer on account of paucity of funds. It needs no emphasis that appointment of qualified and efficient teachers is a sine qua non for maintaining high standard of teaching in any educational institution. Keeping in mind these and other relevant factors this Court in a number of cases has intervened for setting right any discriminatory treatment meted out to teaching and non-teaching staff of a particular institution or a class of institutions.”
10. It would, therefore, appear that a private educational institution imparting education to the students is discharging the functions of the State. It is a public duty and writ would lie against such institutions. In K. Krishnamacharylu (supra), teachers of the private educational institutions have been granted relief under Article 226 for parity in respect of pay. When the teachers of a public educational institutions are entitled to avail remedies under Article 226 for parity in pay, there cannot be any reason for debarring them or disqualifying them from getting ‘equal protection of laws’ in respect of other service conditions. If a teacher in a private institution receiving grant is met with unjust or unfair treatment or has been denied natural justice to the detriment of his service career, he will certainly be entitled to ‘the equal protection of the law’ as envisaged under Article 14.
11. The teachers of educational institutions established under statutory provisions or under the control of State are entitled to vindicate their grievances availing remedies under the Article 226; therefore, there must exist justifiable reasons for refusal of the same to the teachers of private institutions. Non-availability of any legislative shield cannot be criterian for such refusal. It is for this reason the Supreme Court in K. Krishnamacharyulu (Supra) while giving effect to an executive order held that the writ is maintainable. This decision of the Supreme Court has to be read in a larger amplitude.
12. Here it will be of great significance to quote a passage from the Constitutional Law of India by H.M Seervai (Para-9.8. Page-439):
“9.8 Since the new doctrine has been propounded by judges without asking and answering the question “What is meant by the equal protection of the law's ?” we must answer that question. If all men were created equal, and remained equal throughout their lives, then the same laws would apply to all men. But we know that men are unequal; consequently a right conferred on persons that they shall not be denied “the equal protection of the laws” cannot mean the protection of the same laws for all. It is here that the doctrine of classification, (the old doctrine) steps in, and gives content and significance to the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. According to that doctrine equal protection of the laws must mean the protection of equal laws for all persons similarly situated. To separate persons similarly situated from those who are not, we must discriminate, that is, “act on the basis of a difference between” persons, or “observe distinctions carefully” between persons who are, and persons who are not, similarly situated. But as the distinction is to be made for the purpose of making a law, how must the distinction be related to the law? This is answered by the central test for a permissible classification : “Permissible classification must satisfy two conditions, namely, (i) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question”, with the qualification that” the differentia and the object are different(so) that the object by itself cannot be the basis of the classification. A law based on a permissible classification fulfils the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws and is valid; a law based on an impermissible classification violates that guarantee and is void.”
13. To conclude, it may be stated that classification is permissible when two conditions are satisfied, that is - (i) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from other and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. In the instant case, the teachers of the private institution receiving grant from the State and affiliated to the University are discharging the same duties as that of the teachers of Govt. institutions or of the institutions which are created under the statute; and they all are discharging ‘public duty’ in aid of constitutional mandate. Merely because they are not employees of the State Govt. or of the institutions created under the statute, it would be an impermissible classification to place them as a different group to deny them the remedies under Article 226 for preservation and protection of their service rights. Any decision the way other is likely to have a deterrent effect on the objective sought to be achieved. The duty performed by two sets of teachers is in aid of constitutional mandate and, therefore, it would be unjust to classify the teachers of private institutions as a class distinct from the other.
14. In the instant case, the writ petitioner has been reverted to the post of Lecturer of Philosophy from the post of Principal without initiation of any disciplinary proceeding. The writ petitioner was not given any chance to represent his case. He was an important functionary of the college discharging public duty and as such, he should not been penalized in the manner as has been done. Even the Director of Higher and Technical Education, Meghalaya in his action taken report dated 15.11.1999 submitted to the Court recommended that the petitioner be re-instated with immediate effect ‘for a period of one year without claim of arrear of pay’ and further suggested that his performance should be watched during that period. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that this is a case which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 lot remove the injustice caused to the writ petitioner.
15. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned resolution dated 25.6.98 and the consequential order of reversion passed on 17.6.1998 are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner to the post of Principal and to allow him to continue as such without any disturbance except in due course of law. The respondents may like to initiate an enquiry against the petitioner, if they so desire, and pass appropriate orders on completion thereof after affording reasonable opportunity to him to represent his case. The matter with regard to the payment of back salary is left to the authorities for a decision only after hearing the petitioner. No order as to costs.
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