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Smt. Saroj Kumari v. State Of Haryana .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Dec 14, 2001
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Saroj Kumari (Anticipatory Bail under SC/ST Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Saroj Kumari, sought anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after being summoned to face trial under Sections 323, 379, 504, 506 IPC read with Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“the Act”), pursuant to a summoning order dated 29.5.2001 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hisar, in Criminal Complaint No. 143-1/2000 instituted by Chajju Ram.

The complaint alleged that the petitioner, a J.B.T. teacher, habitually came late to school, marked attendance improperly, used the epithet "Chamar" and threatened the complainant (a headmaster who described himself as “Harijan”), misappropriated two bags of rice meant for students and sold them, and on 27.9.2000 slapped the complainant 2/3 times and threatened to implicate him by committing suicide. Several persons subsequently came to the spot and the complainant lodged complaints with the Gram Panchayat, Deputy Commissioner and Police; preliminary evidence was recorded (complainant as C.W.1 and Chander as C.W.2) and the petitioner was summoned to face trial.

The petitioner had earlier sought anticipatory bail before the Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar, who rejected the prayer by order dated 5.9.2001 primarily on the ground that the Act contains no provision for anticipatory bail. The present petition was filed before the High Court challenging that rejection and pressing for anticipatory bail.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the bar contained in Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — which states that Section 438 Cr.P.C. shall not apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of an offence under the Act — precludes the petitioner from seeking anticipatory bail in respect of allegations framed under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
  2. Whether the allegations in the complaint, taken at their face value, satisfy the requirements of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act — in particular (a) whether the complainant has been shown to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as defined by the Constitution and relevant statutory orders, and (b) whether the alleged insult or intimidation occurred "in any place within public view."

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The complaint arises from animosity by the complainant following the petitioner's objection to the complainant's alleged collection of student funds without depositing them in government accounts; the petitioner had made complaints and an inquiry resulted in the complainant's transfer.
  • The complaint is a concocted and false story motivated by the complainant's grievance against the petitioner.
  • Even if allegations in the complaint are accepted at face value, they do not constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act because the alleged offensive words were not uttered "within public view" as required by that provision.
  • The complainant merely described himself as "Harijan" and did not specify he was a member of a Scheduled Caste as defined by the Constitution and the statutory Schedule; therefore, the case does not prima facie fall within Section 3 of the Act and the bar of Section 18 cannot be invoked to deny anticipatory bail.

Respondent / State's Arguments (Assistant Advocate General)

  • The accusations against the petitioner relate to an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
  • Section 18 of the Act expressly bars the applicability of Section 438 Cr.P.C.; therefore, anticipatory bail under Section 438 is not available to a person accused of committing an offence under the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State Of Maharashtra, 2000 (2) RCR (Crl.) 116 (SC) : 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 722 Held that to attract provisions of the relevant clause of Section 3 of the Act the victim must be shown to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and the offence must be committed against him because he belongs to such caste or tribe; mere unquestioned assertion of caste is insufficient without establishing membership as per constitutional/statutory listings. The court relied on this precedent to emphasize that the victim must be shown to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe as defined under Article 366 and the relevant constitutional orders; because the complainant in the present case described himself as "Harijan" but did not establish membership in the Schedule applicable to Haryana, the court concluded Section 3(1)(x) was not prima facie attracted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the substantive requirements of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and the effect of Section 18 of the Act which excludes the applicability of Section 438 Cr.P.C. for offences under the Act.

First, the court noted the textual requirement of Section 3(1)(x): it applies to "whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view." Thus, two distinct factual predicates must be established on the face of the complaint: (i) the accused must be a non-member and (ii) the victim must be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

The court examined how membership in a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is to be determined: by reference to Section 2(1)(c) of the Act (which adopts the meanings assigned under clauses (24) and (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution) and by reference to Articles 341 and 342, the presidential notifications and subsequent statutory orders (in particular, the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the amendments effected by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976). The court emphasized that the Schedule for a particular State (here, Part-V of the First Schedule for Haryana inserted by the 1976 Act) determines which castes are deemed Scheduled Castes in that State.

Applying these principles, the court observed that the complainant had only stated that he is "Harijan" by caste and had not averred that he belonged to a caste specified in the Schedule for Haryana. The court noted that "Harijan" is not included in Part-V of the First Schedule to the Act of 1976 for Haryana. On that basis, and relying on the precedent cited (Masumsha), the court held that the case was not prima facie made out under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

The court also addressed the "public view" element of Section 3(1)(x). The complaint alleged that the petitioner called the complainant "Chamar" and slapped him; however, the complaint did not expressly state that the offending words were uttered in the presence of the public. The complaint mentioned that several persons subsequently came to the spot and saved the complainant, but that fact did not amount to an allegation that the insult was made in public view. Because the presence of others at or before the time of the alleged insult — necessary to constitute "public view" — was not clearly pleaded, the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) were not satisfied on the face of the complaint.

Given these conclusions — that the complaint did not sufficiently show the complainant to be a Scheduled Caste member as per the statutory Schedule and that the "public view" element was not established on the face of the complaint — the court found that the prosecution could not, at the prima facie stage, successfully invoke Section 18 to bar anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C.

For these reasons the court accepted the petition for anticipatory bail and directed that if the petitioner is arrested pursuant to the summoning order she should be released on bail on furnishing specified bonds and a surety according to Section 438(2) Cr.P.C.

Holding and Implications

PETITION ALLOWED — Anticipatory bail granted.

Holding: The High Court accepted the petition and directed that in the event of the petitioner's arrest on the allegations contained in the complaint (Annexure P-1) pursuant to the summoning order dated 29.5.2001, she shall be released on bail on furnishing her own bond and that of a surety to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/Court with an undertaking to abide by the conditions under Section 438(2) Cr.P.C. The opinion concludes with the formal statement: "Petition allowed."

Immediate consequences for the parties: If arrested on the basis of the summoned complaint, the petitioner is to be released on anticipatory bail subject to the required bonds and conditions. The court's decision operates at the interim/constitutional remedy level and determines availability of anticipatory bail based on the face of the complaint and statutory definitions.

Broader implications: The court's reasoning is confined to the prima facie sufficiency of the complaint in this case — specifically the absence of an averment that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste as specified in the applicable Schedule and the absence of a clear allegation of insult "in any place within public view." The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying existing constitutional definitions, statutory schedules and the cited precedent; no wider change to the law was asserted in the judgment.

Petition allowed.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the facts, arguments, legal citations and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added.

Show all summary ...

R.C Kathuria, J.:— Petitioner Saroj Kumari has filed this petition under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafer referred to as ‘the Code’) praying for grant of anticipatory bail as she has been summoned to face trial under Sections 323/379/504/506, Indian Penal Code read with Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) as per order dated 29.5.2001 passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Hisar, in Criminal Complaint No. 143-1/2000 instituted by complainant Chajju Ram against the petitioner.

2. Essential facts to focus the controversy involved in this petition need be noticed:

3. Chajju Ram (complainant) is employed as a Head Master in Government Primary School, Agroha, District Hisar. He claims to be ‘Harijan’ by caste. Saroj Kumari (petitioner-accused) is working as a J.B.T Teacher in the same school. As per allegations made in the complaint, she did not come to the school in time and used to mark herself present in the attendance register. Whenever the complainant objected to the same, she remarked that where ‘Chamer’ was Head Teacher, there was no use of coming to school in time. While addressing the complainant as a ‘Chamar’, she had also threatened the complainant that in case he asked her to come to school in time, he and his family would face dire consequences. The petitioner was entrusted the work of distributing ration to the students of the school and she allegedly misappropriated two bags of rice and sold the same. Objection was raised by the complainant in this regard and a complaint was also filed by him against her to the Gram Panchayat, Agroha. The Gram Panchayat imposed a fine of one bag of rice upon the petitioner and she assured to deliver the same within two days, but this undertaking was not honoured by her. On 27.9.2000, the petitioner came late to the school. The complainant objected to it and asked her to fill the time of her arrival in the attendance register. This infuriated her. While addressing the complainant as ‘Chamar’ and saying that she would teach him a lesson, she gave 2/3 slaps to the complainant. Balraj son of Chhaju Ram, Chandra widow of Darya Singh, Manju Bala and Mahesh Kumari, teacher of the school, came to the spot and saved the complainant from the hands of the petitioner. She also threatened the complainant in the presence of the above-mentioned witnesses that she would implicate him in some false case by the committing suicide. The complainant informed about this incident to the Gram Panchayat, Agroha and complaints were also made by him to the Deputy Commissioner, Hisar, and Police Station, Agroha, but no action was taken by the police. Under these circumstances, the complaint was filed against the petitioner in the Court.

4. In support of the allegations made in the complaint, Chajju Ram (complainant) himself appeared as C.W 1 and examined Chander as C.W 2. After taking into consideration the preliminary evidence led by the complainant, the petitioner was summoned to face trial, as stated above.

5. The petitioner had initially sought anticipatory bail in the Court of Sessions at Hisar. The Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar as per order dated 5.9.2001 rejected the prayer of the petitioner primarily for the reason that there is no provision in the Act for granting anticipatory bail.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while pressing for her bail, has strenuously urged before me that the present complaint has been filed on account of animosity of the complainant against the petitioner. The complainant used to collect funds from the students, but never deposited the same in the government account. The petitioner objected to it and made a written complaint to the authorities in September, 2000. Block Education Officer, Hisar, had enquired into her the matter. Similar complaint was also made by Dev Raj Taneja against the complainant and after an enquiry into the allegations, the complainant was transferred from Agroha to Madhopur. With this grievance, the present complaint was filed. Additionally, it was submitted that a false and concocted story has been put up against the petitioner. The allegations made in the complaint, even taken at their face value, do not constitute any offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act because the alleged offensive words where not uttered to the complainant by the petitioner within public view.

7. Opposing the submission made, learned Assistant Advocate General has contended that accusations against the petitioner relate to an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, remedy of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code has been expressly barred to the person committing an offence under the Act.

8. Before evaluating the facts of the case, the requirements of the provisions of Sections 3 and 18 of the Act have to be noticed in detail in order to appreciate the stands taken by the parties before me. The relevant provisions of Section 3(1)(x) read as under:—

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities—(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Schedules Caste or a Schedules Tribe,—

(i) to (ix) xx xx xx xx xx;

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

(xi) to (xv) xx xx xx xx xx;

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine.”

9. Section 18 of the Act provides as follows:—

“18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act.”

10. Section 3 of the Act being a substantive penal clause creates various offences of the atrocities and then prescribes different punishments for each of them. The word “whoever”, mentioned in Section 3(1) has been qualified by the phrase “not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe”. Consequently, the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of the Section 3 would not apply to a person who himself/herself is a member of such caste or tribe. The net result would be, to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, the offence punishable must be committed by - (i) a non-member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (ii) in respect of a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

11. In Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State Of Maharashtra, 2000 (2) RCR (Crl.) 116 (SC) : 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 722, it was laid-down as under:—

“To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In this case the trial Court erred in convicting the accused-appellant for the offence arising under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act only on the basis that there was no controversy that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste.”

12. Coming to the facts of the present case, Chajju Ram (complainant) in the complaint (copy Annexure ‘P-1’) has only stated that he is a ‘Harijan’ by caste but has not specified that he is a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. For determining whether a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the definition as contained in Section 2(1)(c) of the Act has to be noticed. It provides that “Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes” shall have the meanings assigned to them respectively under clause (24) and clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution. Clauses (24) and (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution provide:

“366. Definitions.— In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say—

(1) to (23) xx xx xx xx xx.

(24) ‘Scheduled Castes’ means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution;

(25) ‘Scheduled Tribes’ means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this Constitution;”

13. The other relevant provisions having bearing are contained in Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, which read:

“341. Schedules Castes.— (1) The President may with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is a State……… after consultation with the Governor……. thereof by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union Territory, as the case may be.

(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.”

“342. Scheduled Tribes.—(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is a State…………… after consultation with the Governor………thereof by public notification, specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union Territory, as the case maybe.

(2) Parliament may be law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification issued under clauses (1) any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community, but save as aforesaid notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.”

14. In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (1) of the Article 341 of the Constitution, the President of India issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Order of 1950. It has been stated in para 2 of the said Order that “subject to the provisions of this Order, the castes, races or tribes or parts of, or groups within, castes or tribes specified in [Parts I to (XXII)] of the Schedule to this Order (substituted by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order, 1956) shall, in relation to the States to which those parts respectively relate, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes so far as regards members thereof residents in the localities specified in relation to them in those Parts of that Schedule.”

15. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976 (No. 108 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1976’) came into force with effect from 18.9.1976 The Scheduled Castes orders were amended in the manner and to the extent specified in the First Schedule and the Scheduled Tribes Orders were amended in the manner and to the extent specified in the Second Schedule to the Act of 1976. Consequently, Part-V of the First Schedule to the Act of 1976, relating to the Castes and Tribes who were to be deemed Scheduled Castes in the State of Haryana, came to be incorporated, for the first time, by the process of amendment as per the Act of 1976. As there are no Scheduled Tribes in the State of Haryana, there is no mention of the same in the Second Schedule to the Act of 1976.

16. The requirements of Section 3 of the Act are very explicit and clear. The person alleging commission of the offence under this Section should not only be a member of the Scheduled Castes, but he/she has to be from amongst the Castes or Tribes, who have been deemed to be Scheduled Castes as per specifications given in Part-IV of the First Schedule of the Act of 1976.

17. In the present case, as already noticed, complainant Chhaju Ram has deliberately not mentioned his caste and sought to file the complaint alleging himself to be ‘Harijan by caste’. Harijan as such has not been included in Part-V of the First Schedule to the Act of 1976. Therefore, there is a force in the stand taken from the side of the petitioner that since the case of the petitioner is not prima facie brought within the purview of Section 3 of the Act, the bar of Section 18 of the Act debarring the petitioner from claiming anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code cannot be pressed into service from the side of the prosecution.

18. Taking the allegations against the petitioner, as contained in para No. 7, of the complaint (copy Annexure ‘P-1’) at their face value, it cannot be said that these satisfy the essential requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act with clearly provides that whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribue in any place within public view, shall be liable for punishment. As stated above, on 27.9.2000, when the petitioner came late to the school, the complainant objected to it and asked her to fill the right time of her arrival in the attendance register, upon which she got infuriated and called him ‘Chamar’. Further allegation in the complaint is that the petitioner gave 2/3 slaps to the complainant. It has not been stated in the complaint that at the time of this incident, any other person was present there. What has been mentioned in the complaint is that “Balraj son of Chhaju Ram, Chandra widow of Darya Singh member Panchayat Manju Bala, Mahesh Kumari teacher of the School came at the spot and they saved the complainant from the clutches of the accused”.

19. Keeping in view the above-quoted facts and position of law, this petition deserves to be accepted. I, therefore, accept this petition and direct that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner on the allegations made in the complaint (copy Annexure ‘P-1’) in pursuance of the summoning order dated 29.5.2001 passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Hisar, she shall be released on bail on her furnishing her own bond and that of a surety to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/Court concerned undertaking therein to abide by the conditions laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code.

Petition allowed.