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State Of Punjab v. Pawan Kumar And Ors.

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 29, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — A.P. Chowdhri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a criminal trial in which Harmesh Chand (aged 23), his brother Pawan Kumar (21) and their father Ram Dhari (50) were tried for offences under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur. They were acquitted by judgment dated November 24, 1983. The State appealed seeking leave under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Separately, Ashok Kumar (brother of the deceased and the informant) filed Criminal Revision No. 269 of 1984 challenging the acquittal; that revision was also disposed of by this judgment.

The deceased, Saroj alias Neelam, married Harmesh Chand on April 16, 1982 and died of extensive ante-mortem burn injuries on July 8, 1982 at her husband’s/in-laws' house. The first information report (FIR) was lodged by her brother Ashok Kumar on the same day. The FIR alleged dowry-related dissatisfaction and alleged that the death was the result of a pre-planned killing by members of the husband’s family rather than suicide.

The prosecution relied primarily on (a) medical evidence (post-mortem by Dr. Amrish Mittal), (b) witness testimony regarding dowry taunts and earlier ill-treatment, and (c) testimony by Raj Kumar (PW-7) and Lakhi Ram (PW-9) about an extra-judicial confession said to have been made by Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar. The accused pleaded denial and false implication and led 16 defence witnesses.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar (as testified to by PW-7 and PW-9) was credible and could connect the accused to the offence.
  2. Whether the trial court’s acquittal of the accused should be interfered with on appeal under section 378 CrPC.
  3. Whether the prosecution could invoke the dowry-death provision (section 304-B IPC) or other presumptions (section 113-A Evidence Act) given the date of occurrence and the applicable amendments.
  4. Whether, in the alternative, the accused could properly be convicted under section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) based on the available evidence and applicable presumptions.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The main reliance was on the testimony of Raj Kumar (PW-7) and Lakhi Ram (PW-9) that Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar made an extra-judicial confession at Sunam on July 9, 1982 (the day after the occurrence).
  • The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence relating to dowry demands and taunts, the deceased’s complaints, medical evidence that death was due to ante-mortem burns, and the general facts surrounding the marriage and gifts.
  • When pressed, the State’s counsel suggested an alternative basis for conviction under section 306 IPC and invoked the presumption in section 113-A Evidence Act (as construed in Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab) to argue that certain presumptions of abetment/suicide could apply.

Defence and Complainant's Arguments

  • The accused pleaded denial and false implication and called 16 defence witnesses.
  • Documentary evidence (an anticipatory bail application and affidavit signed by Ram Nath) was produced to show that Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar had in fact been arrested on July 8, 1982 (the date of the occurrence), which, if true, meant they could not have made an extra-judicial confession on July 9, 1982.
  • Ram Nath (PW-4) and DW-16 (V. Ramswaroop, son of advocate A. Vishwanathan) were examined about the circumstances in which the anticipatory bail application and affidavit had been prepared and signed. The defence emphasized admissions in the application and affidavit that the accused were arrested on July 8.
  • Additional points relied on by the defence included absence of smell of kerosene on the dead body or clothes, the presence of many gold ornaments on the deceased, that she had eaten breakfast that morning, and the presence of an empty pressure stove at the scene, supporting a reasonable possibility of accidental death rather than suicide or homicide.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1991 (1) Recent CR 279 Construction that the presumption in section 113-A of the Evidence Act (as inserted by Act No. 46 of 1983) is a rule of procedure which can apply to occurrences that took place prior to the amendment. The Court observed that invoking section 113-A's presumption does not by itself warrant conviction. The Court held that even accepting the procedural applicability, a person cannot be convicted solely on that presumption; the prosecution must first prove that the deceased committed suicide. Since the trial court found it was not a suicide, the authority did not assist the prosecution to overturn the acquittal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused review of the evidence central to the prosecution's case and the grounds for appellate interference.

1. Extra-judicial confession: The Court identified the prosecution's main plank as the testimony of Raj Kumar (PW-7) and Lakhi Ram (PW-9) asserting that Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar made an extra-judicial confession on July 9, 1982. The Court carefully scrutinised documentary and oral evidence showing that an anticipatory bail application and an affidavit, signed by Ram Nath (PW-4), explicitly stated that Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar had been arrested on July 8, 1982 (the date of occurrence). The Vakalatnama in the record was signed in favour of both A. Vishwanathan and V. Ramswaroop, and the application and affidavit were typed, signed and sworn by Ram Nath who was a matriculate and thus capable of reading English.

The Court found the categorical admission in the application and affidavit — that the accused were arrested on July 8 — could not be realistically explained away by attempts to suggest drafting by others or confusion about which counsel acted. Because of this, the Court held the evidence of the alleged extra-judicial confession said to have occurred on July 9 could not be believed. That finding supported the trial court’s rejection of the confession evidence.

2. Applicability of dowry-death provision (section 304-B IPC): The Court noted as a matter of law that section 304-B was inserted by Amending Act No. 43 of 1986 with effect from November 19, 1986 — long after the occurrence on July 8, 1982. Consequently, the prosecution could not rely on section 304-B in this case.

3. Alternative reliance on section 306 IPC and section 113-A Evidence Act: Confronted with the collapse of the confession evidence, the State’s counsel urged conviction under section 306. The Court considered the invocation of the presumption in section 113-A (as discussed in Gurbachan Singh). The Court explained that even if section 113-A (a procedural presumption) could be applied to pre-amendment occurrences, such a presumption cannot by itself establish guilt. The prosecution must first prove that the deceased committed suicide. The trial court concluded it was not a suicide; indeed, the informant (the deceased's brother) asserted in the FIR that it was not suicide. The Court emphasized the primacy of that conclusion and the need for initial proof of suicide before any statutory presumption can operate.

4. Evaluation of circumstantial/medical facts: The Court reiterated several factual findings relied upon by the trial court: the post-mortem opinion that burns were ante-mortem and sufficient to cause death, lack of smell of kerosene on the body or clothes, the presence of numerous gold ornaments on the deceased (identified as Exhibits P-1 to P-19 and P-22, with payals P-20 and P-21), that the deceased had breakfast that morning, and that an empty pressure stove was found at the scene. Considering the totality of these facts, the Court concluded that a reasonable possibility of accidental death could not be ruled out.

5. Standard for appellate interference: The Court accepted the trial court's evaluation that the confession evidence was not credible and found no reason to interfere with the acquittal. The insufficiency of other incriminating evidence meant the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The appeal by the State under section 378 CrPC was dismissed for lack of merit. Criminal Revision No. 269 of 1984 filed by the informant was also dismissed.

Implications:

  • The acquittal granted by the trial court (dated November 24, 1983) is upheld; the accused remain acquitted of the charges under section 302/34 IPC.
  • The Court held that section 304-B IPC (dowry death) could not be applied because it was enacted after the occurrence; and that the presumption in section 113-A Evidence Act could not, by itself, sustain a conviction — the prosecution must first prove that the deceased committed suicide.
  • No new legal precedent altering these principles was created; the decision applies the existing legal standards to the facts of this case and results only in affirming the acquittal (direct effect on the parties). The Court did not convict under alternative provisions such as section 306 IPC.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added or inferred.

Show all summary ...

A.P Chowdhri, J.:— Harmesh Chand (23), his brother Pawan Kumar (21) and their father Rain Dhari (50) were tried for offences under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions, judge, Sangrur, and acquitted by judgment dated November 24, 1983, Aggrieved by the acquittal, the State has preferred this appeal for obtaining leave under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ashok Kumar, brother of the deceased, who lodged the first information report in this case, has filed Criminal Revision No. 269, of 1984 assailing the said acquittal and the said revision petition is also being disposed of by this judgment.

2. Saroj alias Neelam, deceased in this case, was married to Harmesh Chand accused on April 16, 1982. Within less than three months of the marriage, she died of extensive burn injuries at the house of her husband and in-laws on July 8, 1982, at 6/7 a.m The first information report was lodged by the deceased's brother Ashok Kumar PW-3 at 12.20/12.45 p.m the same day. Special report was received by the Judicial Magistrate, at Sangrur at 7.45 p.m According to the first information report, the parents of the girl had agreed to spend and did actually spend. Rs. one lakh on the marriage in accordance with the wishes of the husband and his father. They had given one scooter, refrigerator, gold ornaments weighing about 25 tollas apart from furniture, clothes, beds, utensils and cash. Thereafter from time to time they had been giving cash amounts to the husband and father-in-law in-accordance with the custom prevalent in their family. The husband and the father-in-law of the girl were, however, not happy with the dowry given by the parents of the deceased. The deceased complained to her brother and father that her in-laws and husband taunted her for bringing nothing in dowry. Her husband once gave her a beating. On July 7, 1982, Ashok Kumar visited his sister on the eve of the festival called Bhai-Bhinna and offered Rs. 21/- each to the father-in-law and mother-in-law of his sister. They refused to accept the above amounts. Ashok Kumar offered to take his sister along with him to his parents' Page: 29house, upon which the in-laws of Saroj told him that they would send Saroj to her parents' house once and for all times. Ashok Kumar returned without bringing Saroj to his house and narrated the entire incident to his parents. On the day of occurrence i.e July 8, 1982, Ram Nath son of Kaka Ram, also a resident of Dhuri, to which place parents of Saroj belonged, told him that he had received a telephonic message from Sunam, where Saroj was married, that Saroj had died. The deceased's brother and other relations went to Sunam and found Saroj lying dead. The first information report was concluded in the following words:—

“From the circumstances from the date of marriage till yesterday and the attitude of her in-laws towards my sister, it appears that she has not committed suicide but Ram Dhari, Harmesh Kumar, Shanti Devi, Pawan Kumar, Naresh Kumar and Surinder Kumar have killed my sister Saroj by making a pre-plan. I have made my statement with you at the spot. Justice may be done.”

3. Post-mortem examination was conducted on the dead body by Dr. Amrish Mittal (PW-2). At the time of post-mortem examination, Dr. Mittal noted that there were five gold bangles in the right arm besides three glass bangles. There was a golden ring in the right little finger. The left arm was wearing six gold bangles besides five glass bangles. There were two rings of gold. There was also earring in the left ear and payal on the ankles of each leg. There was also a nose pin. In his opinion, the cause of death was shock and burns which were; sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The burns were ante-mortem in nature. In cross-examination, Dr. Mittal identified the gold ornaments Exhibits P-1 to P-19 and nose pin Exhibit P-22, besides silver payals Exhibits P-20 and P-21 as having been removed from the dead body of Saroj. He also stated that there was no smell of kerosene oil coming from the dead body or the clothes of the deceased. In his opinion, the deceased must have died within five to seven minutes of burning.

4. The prosecution also examined Ashok Kumar, brother, and Bhim Sain, nephew of the deceased, with regard to the performance of the marriage, the giving of gifts, the dissatisfaction of the husband and in-laws over the dowry, their taunts to the deceased etc. Raj Kumar PW 7 and Lakhi Ram PW 9, who are respectively the husbands of the two other sisters of the deceased, also married at Sunam, deposed about the extra-judicial confession made by Harmesh Chand accused and his brother Pawan Kumar and SI Jhanda Singh (PW 10) and District Inspector Bakhshish Singh (PW-11) who partly investigated this case.

5. The plea of the accused persons was one of denial and false implication on the basis of suspicion. The accused examined 16 witnesses in defence.

6. The main reliance of the prosecution was on the testimony of Raj Kumar (PW-7) and Lakhi Ram (PW-9) to prove the entra-judicial confession made by Harmese Chand and his brother. Pawan Kumar before them at Sunam on April 9, 1932 i.e the day following the occurrence.

7. On an appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court did not accept the evidence relating to extra-judicial confession. There being no other evidence to connect the accused with the crime, the accused were acquitted. Hence this appeal and revision.

8. It may be stated at once that the offence of dowry death under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code was inserted by Amending Act No. 43 of 1986 with effect from November 19, 1986, i.e long after the present occurrence took place on July 8, 1982. It follows that even though the unfortunate death in the present case took place within less than three months of the marriage, the prosecution cannot take benefit of the newly Page: 30inserted provision of law. It may also be stated here that from the very beginning, the prosecution case was one of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence. The prosecution relies on the testimony of Raj Kumar (PW-7) and Lakhi Ram (PW-9) regarding extra-judicial confession said to have been made by Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar. We have very carefully scrutinised the record with the assistance of the learned counsel for both the parties as also the learned counsel for the complainant bearing on the question of the extra-judicial confession. According to the prosecution, the said extrajudicial confession was made by the said accused on July 9, 1982. The accused on the other hand, has placed on record evidence including documentary evidence to show that in fact Pawan Kumar and Harmesh Chand had been arrested by the police on July 8, 1982, the date of occurrence, and, therefore, the story of their having made the extra-judicial confession on the following day falls to the ground. Ram Nath (PW-4), who belongs to Dhuri, and who according to the prosecution received a telephonic call from his cousin Ashok Kumar (PW-5) from Sunam, with regard to the death of Saroj, engaged Shri A. Vishwanathan and his son Shri V. Ramswaroop, Advocates, for an anticipatory bail application in the High Court. Shri A. Vishwanathan having died his son Shri v. Ramswaroop, Advocate, appeared as DW-16 and deposed that he along with his father had been engaged by the said Ram Nath son of Kaka Ram (PW-4) for anticipatory bail. He had signed his power-of-attorney which was signed in token of acceptance both by his father and himself. The original application for anticipatory bail was signed by Ram Nath. The application was supported by an affidavit which was duly sworn by Ram Nath. In paragraph 5 of the application and the affidavit, it was categorically stated that Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar had been arrested by the police on July 8, 1982. In order to wriggle out of the aforesaid admission, we were taken (through relevant portions of the statement of Ram Nath (PW-4). Ram Nath tried to make out two points; one, that the counsel really engaged was Shri A. Vishwanathan and not his son, and two, that instruction on the basis of which application including, the aforesaid admission was drafted were given by one Kailash Chand who accompanied Ram Nath and not by him. It is not disputed that the Vakalatnama admittedly signed by Ram Nath was in favour of both Shri A. Vishwanathan as well as Shri v. Ramswaroop, Advocates. Both the said advocates had signed the Vakalatnama in token of acceptance. The instructions were given by Kailash Chand within the immediate presence and hearing of Ram Nath. When the matter had been typed out, he duly signed the application as well as the affidavit. Admittedly, he is a matriculate and can read English. We are satisfied that it is not possible to explain the categorical admission made in the application and the affidavit that Harmesh Chand and Pawan Kumar had been arrested by the police on July 8, 1982. If that is so, the evidence regarding extra-judicial confession said to have been made on July 9, 1982 cannot possibly be believed and the view taken by the learned trial Court on this aspect of the case does not warrant any interference.

9. Confronted with this situation, learned counsel appearing for the appellant made a last minute effort and suggested that there was ample evidence on record to warrant a conviction of the accused under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In this connection, reference was made to Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1991 (1) Recent CR 279 in which it was held that the presumption referred to in section 113-A of the Evidence Act, as inserted by Act No. 46 of 1983, being a rule of procedure applies to cases where the occurrence took place prior to the said amendment This contention does not advance the case of the prosecution because it Page: 31cannot be suggested that a person can be convicted only on the basis of the presumption contained in section 113-A of the Evidence Act. In order to find a person guilty, the prosecution has to necessarily prove in the first instance that the deceased committed suicide. The conclusion reached by the trial Court is that it was not a case of suicide. In fact, in the first information report the brother of the deceased categorically stated that this was not a case of suicide. There can be hardly any one better informed as to the true state of affairs than the real brother of the deceased who lodged the first information report within a few hours of the occurrence. His statement in the first information report, therefore, that it was not a case of suicide cannot be lightly ignored. The other circumstances relied on by the trial Court and canvassed by Shri H.L Sibal, learned counsel for the accused, before us were total absence of smell of kerosene, the fact that the deceased was wearing almost 22 gold ornaments on her person, that she had her break-fast that morning and that an empty pressure stove was found lying at the place of occurrence by the Investigating officer. In the totality of facts and circumstances, it is not possible to rule out reasonable possibility of death by accident. In any case, interference by this Court sitting in appeal against acquittal is not called for.

10. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. Criminal Revision No. 269 of 1984 is also dismissed.