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Amrik Singh P.C.S. v. Surjit Kaur

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 7, 1975
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Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner-appellant, Amrik Singh (a P.C.S. officer who later became an I.A.S. officer), married Shrimati Surjit Kaur on 16 November 1958. On 10 November 1963 he filed a petition for judicial separation, alleging mental and physical cruelty by his wife arising from repeated instances of disrespectful, taunting and insulting conduct toward him and his family. The petition narrated multiple incidents over the years (including imputations of impotence, humiliating acts such as throwing his turban on his shoes, episodes of physical assault, a period of prolonged absence by the wife, alleged attempts to snatch the child in public, and other acts said to have caused mental distress).

The respondent denied the allegations, asserted that she had acted as a faithful wife, and explained periods of separation and particular incidents (including a stay at her parental home, hospitalization for a suspected abortion in October 1963, and her account of an episode involving the petitioner's younger brother). The pleadings resulted in five issues being framed by the trial (matrimonial) Court.

The matrimonial Court held that even if the alleged acts constituted cruelty, the petitioner had condoned them by cohabiting with the respondent at least until July 1963, and on that basis it dismissed the claim. The appellate court (presiding in this opinion) reviewed the evidence, the trial Court's approach to witnesses and issues of condonation, and ultimately set aside the trial Court's judgment, allowing the petition and granting a decree of judicial separation (with no order as to costs).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent is guilty of unjustifiable conduct amounting to cruelty or of mental cruelty as alleged in the petition (Issue No. 1).
  2. Whether the petitioner condoned the matrimonial offences alleged to have been committed by the respondent (Issue No. 2).
  3. Whether the petition has been filed after unnecessary and improper delay and, if so, with what effect (Issue No. 3).
  4. Whether the petition is false, frivolous and vexatious (Issue No. 4).
  5. Relief (Issue No. 5).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The respondent repeatedly and publicly insulted and taunted him and his family, including imputation that he was impotent, causing serious mental distress and adverse effects on his health.
  • Specific episodes of misconduct included: leaving marital home for a prolonged period without consent; throwing the petitioner's turban on his shoes and calling him names; creating public scenes; physically assaulting the petitioner; preventing the petitioner from studying; snatching the child at a public bus stand; locking him out of the house; and conduct while he was away that humiliated him in the community.
  • Evidence in support included documentary exhibits (notably a letter Exhibit A-5 from the respondent's father) and testimony of independent and official witnesses (P.C.S. officers, advocates, and medical witnesses) corroborating imputations of impotence, episodes of misconduct and the petitioner's deteriorating mental health.
  • Where the respondent's acts continued or were revived after any period of cohabitation, the petitioner asserted he was entitled to judicial separation.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent denied the allegations, described them as imaginations of the petitioner and pleaded that she acted as a faithful and loyal wife.
  • She explained periods of absence (May 1959–April 1960) as a stay at her parental house and cited customary reasons for childbirth-related residence at parents' home; she denied the imputations of impotency and offered alternative explanations for documents/letters relied on by petitioner.
  • The respondent and her witnesses attempted to explain specific incidents (for example, the episode involving the petitioner's younger brother was said to have been resolved with apologies and reprimands), and suggested other third persons had instigated the proceedings against her.
  • Before the trial Court, reliance was placed on condonation by cohabitation and a Supreme Court decision (Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Shri Avinash Prasad Srivastava) and the statutory bar in Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Atkins v. Atkins, 1942 (2) All E.R. 11 637 Illustration that gestures, taunts and constant nagging can amount to cruelty; cruelty includes mental cruelty not confined to physical violence. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that persistent taunts and nagging can amount to cruelty affecting health; used to frame the meaning and ambit of "cruelty".
Jamieson v. Jamieson, 1952 A.C. 575 Approach that incidents should not be treated in isolation and that cumulatively apparently minor acts may amount to serious cruelty when considered in context and effect on feelings/health. The court cited this to justify assessing incidents cumulatively rather than dismissing them as trivial one-by-one; it used the principle to evaluate the combined effect of respondent's conduct.
Perry v. Perry, 1952 (1) All E.R. 1076 Explanation of the content of condonation, including that forgiveness may need to be confirmed or made effective by reinstatement; was cited within later Supreme Court authority. Referenced indirectly (through Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava) on the nature of condonation; considered in the court's analysis of whether cohabitation amounted to condonation in the present facts.
Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Shri Avinash Prasad Srivastava, AIR 1967 SC 581 Supreme Court discussion relied on by respondent to argue that cohabitation may amount to condonation and bar relief under Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The trial Court relied on this authority to find condonation by cohabitation; the appellate court considered the reliance but distinguished the facts and held condonation had been revived by later acts of cruelty.
K.J. v. Smt. K. & another, AIR 1952 Nagpur 395 (Full Bench) Authority holding that an act once condoned can be revived by a fresh act of cruelty. The court invoked this Full Bench decision to support the proposition that condoned acts may be revived by subsequent misconduct, and applied it to conclude that later acts/ desertion revived past cruelty.
P.M. Issac John v. Mrs. Beatrice John & another, AIR 1964 Kerala 102 (FB) Support for the principle that revival of condoned acts is possible where fresh acts of cruelty occur. Relied upon alongside K.J. and Dina Dinshaw to show established jurisprudence that condonation does not permanently bar relief when cruelty recurs.
Dina Dinshaw Merchant v. Dinshaw Ardeshir Merchant, AIR 1970 Bombay 341 Another authority affirming that a previously condoned act can be revived by further acts of cruelty. Used by the court to reinforce the conclusion that resumed or renewed cruelty disentitles the doctrine of condonation from blocking relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court conducted a multi-step analysis grounded in statutory context, precedent and the evidence on record:

  1. Definition and scope of "cruelty": The court observed that "cruelty" under the Hindu Marriage Act is not defined by statute and is the product of judicial decisions. It emphasized that cruelty includes mental cruelty and that the test is whether the conduct makes continued association under the same roof unsafe for the complainant's mental or physical health. The court relied on authorities (Atkins; Jamieson) to stress that repeated gestures, taunts and nagging may cumulatively amount to cruelty.
  2. Errors in trial Court's approach to evidence: The court criticized the matrimonial Court for treating the respondent's position on condonation as dispositive and for not giving appropriate consideration to numerous petitioner witnesses and incidents. It found the trial Court made unwarranted assumptions about the credibility of witnesses (for example discounting witnesses because they shared the petitioner's religious sect or because the petitioner had been posted in places where those advocates practiced).
  3. Evaluation of specific evidence: Focusing on the most significant allegation—the repeated imputation of impotence—the appellate court found the allegation established by (a) the petitioner's unimpeached oral testimony, (b) letter Exhibit A-5 from the respondent's father, and (c) testimony of independent witnesses such as P.C.S. officers Balbir Singh Luthar and Sher Singh Sidhu. The court rejected the respondent's assertion that Exhibit A-5 referred to a trivial stomach ailment, reasoning that the tone and content of the letter showed concealment and shame inconsistent with a mere stomach complaint.
  4. Corroboration of other incidents: The court accepted testimony of other independent witnesses (advocates, P.C.S. officers, and medical witnesses) corroborating incidents such as the turban incident at Ropar, prolonged absence/desertion to parental home, the snatching of the child at Ludhiana, being locked out, and offensive conduct toward the petitioner's father and guests. The court found that some trial Court discounts of these witnesses (for example, suggesting they might perjure due to religious affinity) were unwarranted.
  5. Medical and behavioural impact: The court noted medical evidence (Dr. Harcharan Singh) that petitioner suffered functional disorder and that the petitioner himself related his condition to his wife's conduct. The court concluded the respondent's ongoing conduct caused substantial mental agony to the petitioner.
  6. Treatment of condonation: The respondent relied on Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act and a Supreme Court decision asserting that cohabitation may constitute condonation. The appellate court acknowledged the general principle but considered whether a previously condoned act can be revived. Relying on Full Bench and other decisions (K.J. v. Smt. K.; P.M. Issac John; Dina Dinshaw Merchant), the court held that condoned acts can indeed be revived by later fresh acts of cruelty. The court applied this reasoning to the facts: subsequent desertion, renewed imputations of impotence, and complaints by respondent's father after July 1963 showed revival/continuance of the cruelty, thus disentitling the respondent from relying on condonation.
  7. Conclusion from combined analysis: Considering the cumulative effect of conduct, corroborative documentary and oral evidence, the appellate court concluded that the petitioner had made out a case for judicial separation. The court therefore set aside the matrimonial Court's finding that condonation barred relief and granted the decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court set aside the judgment of the matrimonial Court and allowed the petition for judicial separation, granting a decree of judicial separation in favour of the petitioner. The court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner is granted judicial separation and the trial Court's dismissal on grounds of condonation is overturned.
  • The court applied established authorities to clarify that (i) repeated taunts, insults and nagging can amount to mental cruelty, and (ii) condonation by cohabitation can be revived or rendered ineffective by subsequent fresh acts of cruelty; the court relied on Full Bench and other authorities for this principle.
  • The opinion does not assert the creation of a new legal precedent beyond application of existing case law; its principal significance is factual—finding that the petitioner proved cruelty sufficient to warrant judicial separation and that condonation did not bar relief in view of revived misconduct.

Order pronounced: Petition allowed; decree of judicial separation granted; no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

D.S. Tewatia, J. - Appellant Amrik Singh, a P.C.S. Officer (now an I.A.S. Officer) on 10th November, 1963 sought judicial separation from his wife Shrimati Surjit Kaur, whom he had married on 16th November, 1958, on the ground of mental and physical cruelty resulting from her misconduct towards him and his family members. The central core of his grievance against respondent wife, which runs like a thread through the specific instances of her misbehaviour that have been quoted in the petition, is that she was of haughty temperament, highly disrespectful towards him and his entire family members, would pick up quarrel with him on trifling matters and continue on taunting and nagging him and his father and other family members in his presence and had been making such serious allegations against him as that of being impotent both in front of her own parents as also the friends of the petitioner, that her false accusations, taunts and nagging, ill-behaviour full of contempt and disrespect in presence of even outsiders constantly distressed him and very adversely affected his health; and when it becomes impossible to put up with such misbehaviour and conduct, and continued living with her any further involved the risk of totally wrecking his health, mental and physical, he took recourse to the present proceedings in order to save himself from further agony and the consequent danger therefrom to his mental and physical health. 2. Though the petitioner has dealt in great details the specific instances of respondent-wife's misbehaviour yet a brief summary of some of the salient allegations would suffice and these can be narrated thus :- (1) Immediately after the marriage when respondent-wife returned to her parents, she falsely told them that by marrying to the petitioner her life had been ruined as he was impotent; that on return from her parental house in Tundla, District Agra, she did not let pass any occasion or opportunity without insulting him and his family members. (2) That in Ropar where he was posted for a brief period as a Judicial Magistrate, she one evening threw petitioner's turban on his shoes and then started laughing at the incident; that the said incident though being greatly provocative and insulting and inflicted on him great mental torture, even then he tried to keep peace and left the matters after making a protest. (3) That in May, 1959, petitioner had to leave for 15 days' training at Police Training School, Phillaur, and therefore, left the respondent at his parental house in Chandigarh, where at one night she designedly created a scene by falsely alleging that petitioner's younger brother Tarlochan Singh aged 16-17 years had tried to touch her hand around mid-night; that the very next morning her grand-father arrived with whom she left for his village on the pretext of staying there only for a day or two, but instead of returning to Chandigarh she left for Tundla, where her father is posted, without taking the consent of the petitioner or his family members; and that she did not return to the petitioner from there till April, 1960 despite many efforts having been made by petitioner and his parents to bring her back therefrom. (4) That during the aforesaid period of her absence when the petitioner was posted at Delhi, her father and uncle paid frequent visits to his house and held out threats against him if he did not snap his relations with his family. (5) That he was living in Darya Ganj, Ansari Road in Delhi in the months of May/June, 1960; petitioner's father a Superintendent in the office of the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab, Chandigarh, came to live with him in order to get treatment for his ailment of asthma. She did not like his stay in the house and declined to prepare meals for him. She tauntingly remarked as to what for he (petitioner's father) had married petitioner's mother; and why she should not be called to prepare meals for him. She stopped the sweeper to clean his room and servant to serve him. She passed taunts against petitioner's father in his presence. (6) That one evening in the month of May or June, 1960 he was sitting in the verandah when she created a fuss. She even threw the child on him and physically assaulted him, thus attracting his colleague-officers who were residing in the neighbourhood and who reprimanded her for behaving in the said manner. That incident created utmost distress in the petitioner's mind and almost wrecked his health. (7) That the petitioner was preparing for his P.E.L. examination, but the respondent-wife would not allow him to study and taunted that he was not going to get first division; that on this occasion also the respondent grappled with the petitioner. (8) That in April, 1961 he shifted to S.A.C. Flats at Rajpur Road, Delhi where the respondent's parents frequently visited his house and performed siapa and tried to defame him amongst the Officers living in the neighbourhood. They encouraged the respondent-wife to abuse him and become more disrespectful, insulting and insolent towards him. (9) That in July, 1962, petitioner was posted at Jagraon as Sub-Divisional Magistrate. From there he had to go to Chandigarh to pay a visit to his parents. He wanted to carry his son with him as his parents had wanted to see him. The respondent though at first declined to send the child with him, but later on agred. The petitioner thus took the child with him, but he had hardly reached Ludhiana and was yet to board the bus for Chandigarh from there, that the respondent accompanied by Gian Chand, his peon, reached the bus stand and created a scene there by forcibly trying to snatch the child from him. Eventually, petitioner had to give pay and part with the child and thereafter go alone to Chandigarh completely shaken and insulted. (10) That again in the month of July, 1962, when petitioner reached home at 7.30 p.m., he found the outside door of his house locked. He first severely knocked at the door and finding no response from inside the house and after waiting for some time for respondent, made naxious enquiries about her from the neighbours. Search for her in the neighbourhood and at the houses of friends proved of no avail. After a few hours Chowkidar informed him that the respondent was inside the house. After having put the petitioner to so much agony, the respondent remarked that she was simply making a fun of him. (11) That in the month of December, 1962, petitioner had to go to Chandigarh for 15 days' Civil Defence Training. The respondent refused to accompany him and preferred to stay behind at Jagraon along with the younger child and the servant. In his absence, she stayed for a night at the house of Arjan Singh, Advocate and the next morning the child was seen moving around near the railway crossing. The people of Jagraon carried a story to the Deputy Commissioner that petitioner's wife had stayed in a hotel, had taken drinks and became unconscious and was thus unable to take care of the child. The Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana, conducted secret enquiries into the matter. The aforesaid conduct of the respondent greatly humiliated the petitioner and lowered him in the eyes of his colleague-friends and the public. (12) That in March, 1963, he was transferred from Jagraon to Ambala. There too, the respondent continued to create ugly scenes. She would not only openly insult the petitioner in front of his guests but would also insult his guests as she did with Gurdial Singh Fiji, P.C.S., a colleague of the petitioner, who had come to stay with him for a day or two. So was also the case with H.S. Raju, P.C.S., Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Faridkot, brother-in-law of the petitioner. She also misbehaved with petitioner's father in his presence and the latter left his house in great anguish. 3. The respondent-wife in her reply refused the allegations of cruelty and depicted them as figments of petitioner husband's imagination. She has pleaded that she acted all through as a faithful and loyal wife to him. Narrating the marital history she stated that she lived in the company of the petitioner-husband at first up to 25th May, 1959; that from that day till 10th April, 1960 she stayed at her parental house; that they resumed joint cohabitation from 10th April, 1960 and continued to reside together till October 1963, and that in September, 1963, he was posted to Dharamsala and left her in hospital in Chandigarh for treatment of her suspected abortion, where she was eventually aborted on 11th October, 1963. Regarding incident No. (3), she maintained that for a few days, she was residing at the petitioners husband's parental house, his younger brother Tarlochan Singh, then a young lad of 16/17 years one night tried to misbehave with her, for which the petitioner's pitcher rebuked him and the petitioner also apologised to her and matter was closed. As to the incident No. (11), she stated that Shri Arjan Singh Advocate at Jagraon was friendly towards the petitioner-husband, that his association with the petitioner led to a hostile incident in Jagraon town, and that Shri Arjan Singh, Advocate, like the petitioner-husband, is also Nirankari. She held out Shri K.S. Raju brother-in-law, of the petitioner-husband, to be the villain of the pence & person who had instigated the petitioner to file the petition, for he was annoyed with her when she complained to the petitioner-husband regarding his misbehaviour towards her. 4. The pleadings of the parties led to the framing of the following five issues : "1. Whether the respondent is guilty of unjustifiable conduct amounting to cruelty or of moral cruelty as alleged in Para 5 of the petition ? 2. Whether the petitioner condoned the matrimonial offences alleged to have been committed by the respondent ? 3. Whether the petition has been filed after unnecessary and improper delay & if so, with what effect ? OP (objected to). 4. Whether the petition is false, frivolous and vexatious ? 5. Relief ?" 5. The matrimonial Court considered the position of the respondent-wife under issue No. 2 to be so strong as to completely eclipse the petitioner-or-husband's case and render useless any discussion of the voluminous material adduced by him and the respondent under the material issue on merit i.e., issue No. 1. The matrimonial Court under issue No. 2 held that even if all the acts and omissions alleged against the respondent-wife were held to constitute mental cruelty, they stood condoned by the act of cohabitation of the petitioner-husband with the respondent-wife, which stood proved at least upto July, 1963. 6. Although the matrimonial Court, as already observed, deemed the position of the respondent-wife under issue No. 2 so impRegulation nt as to eliminate discussion of the material under other issues, yet, it, nevertheless proceeded to consider the material adduced by the petitioner-husband under other issues as well. When that is the background, then obviously the effort to consider the material under other issues would, at best, be haphazard and half-hearted. That it has been so appears to be fortified from the fact that the matrimonial Court did not advert to as many as ten witnesses of the petitioner-husband, as also some of the incidents, as would be presently pointed out. It made a short shift of most of the witnesses of the petitioner-husband, who happened to be respectable Advocates and gazetted officers, (judicial and executive) either on the ground that they professed the Nirankari faith as did the petitioner-husband or they were Advocates hailing from places where at one time or the other the petitioner husband had been posted as a judicial officer. The testimony of the petitioner-husband's relations like his father, brother-in-law Shri Raju, brother Tarlochan Singh etc. was not found to merit even a casual look and was laid aside by a crapticomment that these relation witnesses were bound to lend support to the case set up by the petitioner husband. 7. To decide as to whether the case against the respondent-wife for causing such cruelty to the petitioner as to entitle him for judicial separation is made out or not, one has to first inform oneself as to the meaning and ambit of the expression `cruelty'. The expression `cruelty' has not been defined in the Act and whatever it has come to mean, is as a result of judicial decisions handed down by the Courts. All authorities, however, are unanimous in asserting that the expression `cruelty' is not confined to physical violence but conceives of mental cruelty as well. But a cruelty has to be of such a kind as to make the complaining spouse's continued association under the same roof with the other spouse unsafe for his mental and physical health. 8. As to what constitutes cruelty, the Courts have gone to the extent of holding that even gestures, taunts and nagging amount to cruelty and the following observations in this regard of Henn Collins, J. in Atkins v. Atkins, 1942(2) All.E.R. 11 637, can be noticed with advantage :- "It is not necessary, as is quite obvious, in order to bring about that state of things that there should be violence. One knows that dropping water wears to stone. Constant nagging will become completely intolerable, and though in the course of married life you may be able to point to no single instance which could possibly be described as, in common parlance, "a row", yet nagging may be of such a kind, and so constant, that it endanvers the health of the spouse on whom it is inflicted. 9. Learned Lord Norman in Jamieson v. Jamieson, 1952 A.C. 575, in his characteristic style exponed, in the following observations the approach that a matrimonial Court must bring to bear upon a matter where cruelty is pleaded as a ground for either judicial separation or divorce : "My Lords, I think that it does not do justice to the averments to take up each alleged incident one by one and hold that it is trivial or that it is not hurtful or cruel and taken to say that cumulatively they do not amount to anything grave, weighty or serious. The relationship of marriage is not just the sum of number of incidents, and in this case it has been overlooked that all the incidents averred are to have been inspired by the respondent's intention to impose his will upon his wife without consideration of her feelings or health. Moreover, it is impossible in the bald averments of a condesendence to cony the effects of the conduct of one spouse on the feelings and through the feelings on the health of the other spouse. What on paper may seem little more than a series of pin pricks may present a very different aspect when it has been developed in evidence......" Now reverting to the assessment of the allegations in the present case and the evidence led to prove them, the first allegation both in point of time as also in importance is the imputation of impotency made by the respondent not only on the face of the petitioner but repeated before all and sundry including her own parents, petitioner's friends and relatives, behind his back as also in his presence. The respondent no doubt both in her written statement as also in her evidence has denied the aforesaid allegation but despite her denial, that allegation stands established not only from the unimpeachable oral evidence that the petitioner has adduced on the record but also from a letter Exhibit A-5, dated 16th June, 1959 admittedly written by respondent's father to the petitioner. The following extracts from that letter can be noted with advantage :- "Doosri Tarf Main Surjit Par Is liye ziada Khush Hun Jis Ne Babaji, Hamari Aur Tumhari Tamam Ke Izet Rakhi aur (.... torn...) Bimari par Parda Dal Diya, Warna Agar Ye Bigarh Jati To Namalum Tamam Ko Kaya Karna Parhta... .... Ham Ne Nirankar Sache Padshah Ke Aage Ardas Ki Ke `He Sache Padshah, Aap Jananhar Ho, Ham Ne Kisi Lalach Ke Liye (.... torn...) Nahin Ki. Agar Unhon Ne Hamare Sath Dhoka Kiya Hai To Hamari Aur Surjit Ke Gharibi, Sharafat, Sabar Aur Sadaqat Ka Khayal Karte Hue Amrik Singh Ko Sehat Bakhash Aur Yeh Phalen Phulen. Ham Badnami Nahin Chahte. Ham Is Bimar Ko Gale Lagana Chahte Hain...." (On the other hand I am pleased with Surjit because she preserved the honour of Baba Ji and all of us had concealed the ailment. Had she not acted wisely, it is not known as to what consequences we had to bear. Keeping in view her preservance we offered a prayer before Narankar Sache Padshah, you are omnisient. We did not (.... torn...) for any greed. If they have played fou with us, even then keeping in view our and Surjit's proverty, sincerity, patience and truthfulness (.... torn....) Amrik Singh may be blessed with health. We do not want to be disgraced. We want to accommodate this patient). The respondent and her father tried in their testimony to explain the disease of the petitioner referred to in letter Exhibit A-5 as some stomach ailment. However, their protestations that the ailment referred to in the aforesaid letter was stomach ailment is a tissue of lies. Surely, one does not have to conceal a stomach ailment nor one has to feel ashamed of it as has been sought to be conveyed in the aforesaid letter. Therefore, it irresistibly follows that ailment referred to in letter Exhibit A-5 releated to some such serious imputation as has been alleged by the petitioner. An independent witness like Balbir Singh Luthar, P.C.S. officer, who resided in the neighbourhood of the petitioner, has deposed on oath that respondent's parents who came to his house a few days after an unsavoury scuffle between petitioner and respondent (about which more a little later) had told him that the petitioner was impotent. When this officer tried to explain to them the gravity of their imputation in the light of the fact that their daughter, i.e. respondent, had already given birth to a son, they are alleged to have said that then he might have been potent, but he was no longer so. This officer belongs to a different caste as also different religion and obviously could have no truck with the petitioner. I cannot believe that such responsible officer would perjure for no rhyme or reason. There is also the evidence of another P.C.S. officer named Sher Singh Sidhu A.W. 4 who too was at the relevant time posted at Delhi. To him also respondent's father, in the presence of respondent, had denounced petitioner as impotent. It has been admitted by respondent and her father in their testamentary that they had met this officer twice, first time in the year 1960 and later on in the year 1963 in Delhi, both times to get the signatures of the respondent attested from him in order to enable her to draw some money from her post office account. When respondent and her father first met this officer, they had come from Agra and after meeting this officer went back to Agra. They did not visit or stay with the petitioner who was also posted at that time in Delhi. Why they did not visit him would be presently explained. This officer though belongs to the same caste from which both petitioner and respondent hail but does not belong to the Nirankari Sect to which the parties belong. If anything, this officer must be in some way sympathetic towards the respondent so that they could turn to him for help for getting the signatures of respondent attested to enable her to draw money, for unless one is sympathetic to a party one avoids even giving of an impression, much less giving actual help to a wife of a colleague, who is at loggers-head with her husband, for such an act could easily create misunderstanding between the two colleagues. I, therefore, do not have a moment's hesitation in accepting all that this officer has said in the witness-box to be true. 11. Besides the testimony of the aforesaid two P.C.S. officers, there is also the testimony of petitioner, his father Pritam Singh, two Advocates of Ropar, namely Sarmukh Singh and Banwari Lal and Dr. Iqbal Singh A.W. 16 whose testimony does not require to be commented upon in any greater length in regard to the allegations of impotency, for I am satisfied even from the testimony of Balbir Singh Lathar, Sher Singh Sidhu, the petitioner and the contents of letter Exhibit A-5 that the respondent had been imputing impotency to the petitioner from time to time in his presence as also in his absence, as also on his face in the presence of his friends. That the allegation of imputation of impotency was false and malicious is established from the evidence of Dr. Iqbal Singh A.W. 16 who has clearly stated that when such allegations were made against the petitioner by his wife, then he got examined himself from him and was found fit in all respects. 12. The petitioner's allegation that the respondent had prejudiced her parents by imputing impotency to him stands established to a certain extent at least by implication from letter Exhibit A-4 dated 16th June, 1960 admittedly written to the petitioner by Baltej Singh, father of the respondent. In that letter Baltej Singh clearly admitted that behaviour of his family was not as good as it should have been towards him. The following extract from the aforesaid letter can be noticed with advantage :- "Tumhare Sath Achha Salook Nahin Kiya, Ye Tum Ne Theek Likha Hai ......" (You have rightly written that you were not given a proper treatment...) 13. Then such was the estimation of petitioner in the eyes of respondent then the misbehaviour indulged in by the respondent at Ropar, as deposed to by Sarmukh Singh and Banwari Lal, Advocates, apart from the petitioner himself that in their presence when th petitioner asked her to put away his turban she threw it on his shoes and called him eunuch, cannot but be considered to be an over-expression of inner feelings of revulsion towards him. The evidence of the two Advocates, A.W. 2 and A.W. 3, was brushed aside by the matrimonial Court as unreliable on the ground that it was not difficult for the petitioner to put up in evidence two Advocates of a Court where at one time he had been posted as a Judicial Magistrate. The assumption made by the Court below, that the two respectable Advocates could come forward to perjure themselves at the behest of an officer who for a few months had been posted at the place where these Advocates are practising, to say the least, is rather wild and unwarranted. 14. That the respondent had left petitioner's home without their consent and deserted him is also amply borne out from the evidence on the record. The respondent left for her grandfather from Chandigarh from the house of petitioner's father in May, 1959 and returned to him on 10th April, 1960. The Court below explained this period of her absence from petitioner as something customary, for she was pRegulation nt when she left for her parental house and that normally it was customary to give birth to one's first child at one's parents' house. 15. The child, his son Inderpal Singh Ruby, was born to her on 25th November, 1959. The above fact would show that it was very unusual for a girl to have gone to her parents' house in order to give birth to her first child, so much in advance of the date of delivery. However, the assumption made by the Court to explain her abovesaid period of absence is not in consonance with the stand taken by the respondent and her father. Her case appears to be that she left Chandigarh on account of the misbehaviour of Tarlochan Singh, younger brother of the petitioner, on the night preceding the day on which she left Chandigarh, and that was also the cause for her not returning to her husband till April, 1960. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent, reiterated that stand before me and went to the extent of pleading that in fact, petitioner's family including petitioner's father fell in her estimation from that day onward as otherwise it was clear from the evidence of petitioner's father that prior to that day she used to have all the respect for him. I do not think that this Tarlochan Singh's incident could be the reason for her to leave Chandigarh for her parents' house. At the time when this incident occurred, her husband was away to Phillaur for some kind of training for a period of 15 days. Surely, she could wait till his arrival back. Secondly, according to her own testimony, her father-in-law as also other family members had reprimanded Tarlochan Singh, a young boy, for his alleged misbehaviour towards her and thus neither there remained any cause for her leaving petitioner's house nor for the lowering of respect in her eye for her father-in-law and other member of the family of her husband on that account. What is more, when the petitioner had not done any harm to her, then why on earth she was to take an attitude towards the petitioner which was, to say the least highly disrespectful and humiliating. 17. Further, she was not telling the truth when she denied that anybody from the side of the petitioner tried to bring her back. From the letter of petitioner written to her in the month of April, 1960, it is clear as to what extent he had gone to pacify her and to offer even an apology for anything on his part that might have in any manner disconcerted her or caused pain to her. Though neither she nor her father in their testimony has provided any clue for her being angry with the petitioner, yet angry she was with him and the extent of her anger and dislike for the petitioner and disinclination to come to him can be gauged from the fact that in the year 1960, she travelled all the way from Agra with her father to Delhi, approached Sher Singh A.W. 5, a P.C.S. Officer colleague of her husband, for getting her signatures attested with a view to draw some money from the post office lying in her name but neither contacted her husband then posted at Delhi nor stayed with him. Both she and her father had their lunch at this officer's house, and despite his persuation to go and stay with the petitioner, she declined to do so and went back to Agra without contacting him. This circumstance which is admitted by the respondent herself and her father should be enough to demonstrate that the reason for withholding her company from the petitioner was not the desire to live in her father's house to give birth to her first child as glibly assumed by the Court below. 18. That after her return to the petitioner, on 10th April 1960, in Delhi, the truce between them did not last long is made clear from the testimony of Balbir Singh Lathar, a P.C.S. officer residing in the neighbour-hood of the petitioner. He has stated that one day late at night he and his wife were called by the petitioner through his servant Raju to his house. When they arrived at his house, they found the respondent lying on the door steps of petitioner's house. He (petitioner) informed them that at that late hour past mid-night she was threatening to leave the house and that she had quarrelled with him. This incident relates to the alleged quarrel when she had physically grappled with the petitioner and had pulled his long hair. That thereafter respondent informed her father about it who thereafter threatened the petitioner and made a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner, is clear from the evidence of Balbir Singh Lathar, A.W. 4 who stated that a few days thereafter respondent's father came to his house and complained against the petitioner and also told him that petitioner was impotent. That the matter had reached the ears of the Deputy Commissioner is also clear from document Exhibit A 1. to which the reference had been made by the Court below in its judgment. 19. Testimony of the petitioner, his father Pritam Singh A.W. 21 and that of Dr. Iqbal Singh A.W. 16 has relied upon in support of the allegation that the respondent never took kindly to the presence of petitioner's father at Delhi where the latter happened to go to get himself treated for asthma. Having regard to the fact that the respondent looked upon the petitioner almost with contempt and also had no love lost for his family, it is conceivable that she must have threatened petitioner's father in the manner alleged, for such conduct on her part would be of a piece with her past behaviour towards, the petitioner and his family. Dr. Iqbal Singh obviously had no axe to grind, and a respectable person like him would not perjure for any rhyme or reason. He had clearly stated that one day he was a witness of such misconduct on her part with her father-in-law. 20. That the petitioner's posting from Delhi to Jagraon had also not brought any peace to him is clear from two/three incidents that happened when he was posted there and to which he had made reference in his petition. O.P. Gajri A.W. 10, Manager, State Bank of India, Jagraon stated that one day at about 8 p.m., petitioner came to his house and enquired about his (petitioner's) wife. He appeared to be mentally agitated and worried. After an hour and half when he happened to pass in front of the house of the petitioner, he came to know that his wife had arrived and he over-heard her saying to the petitioner angerly that none could object to her going outside and that she was the master of her own will. From the above fact he formed an impression that the relations between the petitioner and the respondent were not cordial. The incident of the petitioner being locked out by the respondent is admitted by the respondent in her testimony and it finds a mention in letter Exhibit A-4 dated 16th October, 1963, written by Baltej Singh (father of the respondent) to the Chief Secretary, Punjab. The hostility of the respondent towards the family of the petitioner can be gauged from yet another incident. This relates to the snatching of petitioner's son from him at Ludhiana. The Court below dismissed this incident as the figment of the imagination of the petitioner and the evidence adduced is support thereof as totally made up. What made the trial Court to say this was the testimony of Squadron Leader Gurdial Singh Sidhu, A.W. 6. He was produced to depose to the incident of snatching of the child from the petitioner at Ludhiana. He in his testimony instead of saying that it happened at Ludhiana made a mention of Jagraon bus-stand. From this fact the Court inferred that this witness although occupying such a status as that of Squadron Leader was nevertheless a got up witness as he was also a Nirankari like the petitioner. The trial Court found affirmation for its view from a piece of paper which the petitioner was holding in his hand at the time when witness i.e. Squadron Leader Sidhu was being examined. That piece of paper contained what, according to the Court would be the evidence of Squadron Leader Sidhu as also such questions as might be put to him in cross-examination. It is quite conceivable that the petitioner in his anxiety to refresh the memory of his witness might have tentatively written the contents of the statement that such a witness had to make. However, if from this circumstance alone one is to dub a respectable witness like Sidhu as a false witness or damn the entire case of the petitioner as a pure concoction, then it would be giving too wide a berth to judicial discretion. That such an incident occurred stands corroborated from testimony of an independent witness like Dr. Harpal Singh A.W. 20. The petitioner was taking his son to Chandigarh with him as his father had expressed his desire to see the child. He was to stay in Chandigarh only for a day or two. Even this gesture of the petitioner towards his parents was not to the liking of the respondent and she went to the extent of creating a scene at a public place. What the petitioner must have felt at that time and how much humiliated he must have felt in public can be better imagined than described. 21. Yet another incident lends further support to the allegation that the respondent was highly inimical towards the family of the petitioner. This concerns the visit of the petitioner to Chandigarh for 15 days for Civil Defence Training. His parents resided in Chandigarh where his father Pritam Singh is employed as Superintendent in the office of Director of Public Instruction, Punjab. Respondent preferred to stay back alone with the small child and her servant, when normally in a situation like this a young wife would be anxious to accompany her husband and join the members of his family for a change. It is clear from his testimony, as corroborated from letter Annexure R-12, that he had asked her to come to Chandigarh and had also arranged for somebody's car to fetch her, but even then she did not deem it necessary for her to comply with his request. It has been alleged by the petitioner that apart from the hostility and dislike for the members of the petitioner's family, yet another reason that must have prompted her to stay behind alone was to enjoy life in his absence. Evidence has been adduced of Arjan Singh and Brij Lal, Advocates and Gian Chand peon. The trial Court disbelieved the said insinuation, that the respondent had stayed at the house of Arjan Singh in the absence of the petitioner to Chandigarh, on the ground that if that had been a fact Arjan Singh could not have come forward to depose to that incident. The insinuation may have been relevant if Arjan Singh in his testimony had said that he had misbehaved with her. But he has completely discounted it by saying that he treated her like his own daughter. It is in the evidence, that Arjan Singh Advocate and the petitioner had social relations and their families used to visit each other. In the circumstances, it is not unthinkable that the respondent, who was alone might have decided to stay for the night in Arjan Singh's house though with the best of motives. However, she could not have been obvious of the fact that the people do not take kindly to such innocent gestures and that their tongues would start ragging. And that is precisely what appears to have happened. 22. From the above, one cannot conclude that what has been alleged by the petitioner in his petition is not correct, though the assumption that respondent had stayed at Arjan Singh's house with any ulterior motive is also not warranted. 23. That even at Jagraon she misbehaved with and showed disrespect to the father of the petitioner is clear from the testimony of Dr. Harpal Singh who is an independent witness and has clearly corroborated this part of the petitioner's case. 24. Ambala happened to be the last lap of their marital stay together. She is said to have continued with her old ways of treating the petitioner with contempt and disrespect and also of misbehaving with his guests, thus inflicting mental torture on him. A P.C.S. officer Mr. Fiji who is said to have come for a day or 6two to stay with the petitioner at Ambala has stated that one night when they came to the house after attending satsang respondent declined to cook dinner for them and that they had to go without dinner. 25. From Ambala petitioner was posted to Dharamsala in September, 1963. He left respondent at Chandigarh with his parents. She was pRegulation nt at that time and got herself admitted with the help of her uncle, into General Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh, where she was treated by Dr. Ajmer Kaur. Since an operation had to be carried out and consent of her husband was necessary, so in response to a telegram from her the petitioner reached on 7th October, 1963 where she had again complained to him against members of his family in the same known nagging fashion. That was the last of her that he saw as thereafter the respondent went to her parents. Her father followed his earlier letter, Exhibit A-3, written on 30th September, 1963 to Home Minister with a complaint, Exhibit A-4, dated 16th October, 1963 to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, which was full of such allegations against the petitioner as had even no connection with his married life and were such as to bring him on the wrong side of the Government and lead to departmental action against him. It was thereafter that the present matrimonial proceedings for judicial separation were launched on 19th November, 1968, by the petitioner. 26. The learned trial Court formed the impression that these proceedings had been started by the petitioner in order to save an enquiry being instituted against him. How wide of mark this assumption, on the part of the trial Court can be gauged from the fact that no departmental authority could possibly interfere in the personal marital affairs of the petitioner. 27. Neither in Exhibit A-3 or Exhibit A-4 nor in their testimony in the Court there has been any allegation that the petitioner was ever out to cause any harm to the respondent. On the contrary, the assertion is that the petitioner is almost a nincompoop and had brought the petitioner on the instigation of his brother-in-law K.S. Raju who had become angry with the respondent when the latter brought his misbehaviour towards her to the notice of the petitioner. 28. From the material on the record, I have come to a clear conclusion that the respondent appeared to be arrogant and temperamental lady and that her misbehaviour, which consisted of total disrespect towards the petitioner, the members of his family and unconcealed dislike for them all, besides constant nagging which, in my view, appears to have continued unabated till they finally separated, caused untold mental agony to him is clear from the testimony of Dr. Harcharan Singh A.W. 9, Professor Medical College, Amritsar, who had examined the petitioner from time to time between the period 1959 to 1964. This doctor stated that on examination he did not find anything organically wrong with the petitioner, as he appeared to him to be suffering merely from functional disorder. He further stated that on being asked as to his relations with his officers the petitioner told him that it was his wife who was causing him mental trouble. 29. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife at this stage urged that since the petitioner continued to condone the aforesaid acts of cruelty, no relief can be granted to him by the Court in view of the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, and in support of his contention placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision reported in Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Shri Avinash Prasad Srivastava and another, AIR 1967 SC 581. He drew pointed attention to paragraph 18 thereof which reads :- "Reliance in this connection is placed on Perry v. Perry, 1952(1) All.E.R. 1076, as to the content of condonation, which involves forgiveness confirmed or made effective by reinstatement. That was, however, a case of desertion. It is urged that in order that forgiveness may be condoned or made effective, something more than stray acts of cohabitation between husband and wife have to be proved. But whereas in this case, judicial separation is being claimed on the ground of Section 10(1)(f), the fact that the husband cohabited with the wife even after the knowledge that she had been guilty of cohabiting with another person would in our opinion be sufficient to constitute condonation, particularly, as in this case, the first respondent knew of the alleged adultery in May/June, 1958 and still continued to cohabit with the appellant thereafter upto October 1958. Further the statement of the first respondent to the effect that he kept his wife after May/June, 1958 at the instance of his friends is a clear indication of condonation even in the sense of forgiveness confirmed or made effective by reinstatement. We are, therefore, of opinion that the first respondent is not even entitled to a decree of judicial separation." There is no dispute with the proposition that if there has been condonation of the alleged act of cruelty, then the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act are a complete bar to the granting of relief prayed for. But the question arises, Can the act once condoned not be revived by a fresh act of cruelty ? That it can be, has been held by a Full Bench of Nagpur High Court reported in K.J. v. Smt. K. wife of K.J. and another, AIR 1952 Nagpur 395 and also in P.M. Issac John v. Mrs. Beatrice John and another, AIR 1964 Kerala 102 (FB) and Dina Dinshaw Merchant v. Dinshaw Ardeshir Merchant, AIR 1970 Bombay 341. That it could not have been otherwise is clear even from a common sense view. In the nature of things, neither it would be conducive for a married life nor it is thinkable that the moment a spouse commits an act which constitutes cruelty, the other spouse should rush to the Court for relief. a normal married couple would naturally make allowance for difference of temperament and allow time in order to stabilize the marital relations and would thus ignore the misbehaviour of the other spouse in the hope that things would improve with the passage of time. Where the mental cruelty is said to have been caused by constant nagging, taunts, gestures full of disrespect towards the other spouse and towards those whom he or she either out of final relationship or friendship greatly respects, it is only when the misconduct of the other spouse does not show any sign of improvement and a stage is reached where the last such taunt, nagging or gesture proves the proverbial `last straw' and the spouse throws up the spouse, gives up the hope that time would mend the matters and knocks at the doors of the Court. 30. The respondent was left by the petitioner in his parents' house in Chandigarh when he had to take up his assignment at Dharamsala. She left the house, got herself admitted in the hospital with the help of her uncle and on her discharge from there neither joined the petitioner nor returned to his parents' house and thus deserted the petitioner afresh thereby reviving her past misconduct of desertion. She also thereafter complained to Sher Singh A.W. 5 that petitioner was impotent when she met this officer for the second time after October, 1962 for getting her signatures attested in order to enable her to withdraw money from her post office account. The above two acts coupled with the allegations against the petitioner and the members of his family made by respondent's father in his complaint Exhibit A-4 dated 16th October, 1963 which could not have been mentioned by him unless the respondent had, as she used to in the past, informed him, would show that she continued even after July, 1963 to behave in the same old fashion and thus revived all her past acts of cruelty. 31. In view of the above, I hold that the petitioner has clearly made out a case for granting a decree for judicial separation from the respondent. I accordingly set aside the judgment of the trial Court, allow the petition and grant a decree of judicial separation of the petitioner against the respondent but make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.