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Bhagu And Others , v. Ram Sarup And Another
Court Opinion Summary — I.S. Tiwtna, J. (17 April 1985)
Factual and Procedural Background
On 18 July 1978 Ram Sarup (plaintiff-respondent) instituted a suit alleging that of two plots (Nos. 208 and 212) in village Dhadoli, plot No. 208 was owned by him while plot No. 212 was a public street used by him and others as an approach to their houses for over 30 years. The defendant-appellants allegedly threatened dispossession of plot No. 208 and had erected a six-foot wall on plot No. 212, obstructing passage. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction restraining interference with his possession of plot No. 208 and a mandatory injunction directing demolition of the wall and restoration of the thoroughfare.
The defendants denied the allegations. The trial court framed issues covering ownership, long user of plot No. 212 as a street, whether defendants had blocked the street, maintainability, locus standi and relief. The trial court found for the plaintiff on ownership of plot No. 208, that plot No. 212 was a thoroughfare used by the plaintiff for over 30 years, and that the defendants had blocked it; the remedies prayed for were granted. The trial court also held the suit maintainable and that the plaintiff had locus standi. On appeal the District Judge, Jind, affirmed these findings. The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, contending that a decision on whether plot No. 212 vested in the Panchayat was barred from civil adjudication by Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, as amended by Haryana Act No. 2 of 1981. A Single Bench decision (Lehri v. Arjan Dass) was relied upon by the appellant. The matter was referred to a larger Bench and the appeal came before the court for disposal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit when the determination involved the question whether the land (plot No. 212) vested in the Panchayat under Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (as amended by Haryana Act No. 2 of 1981).
- Whether Section 13 (and its substituted form) ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the lis is between private parties rather than between the Gram Panchayat and a private person.
- Whether the bar of jurisdiction introduced by the Haryana Amending Act No. 2 of 1981 applied to appeals pending at the time of amendment (the parties were agreed that it did).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit because it involved determining whether plot No. 212 vested in the Panchayat, a matter barred by Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 as in force on the date of filing and as substituted by Haryana Act No. 2 of 1981.
- The appellant relied on a Single Bench judgment of this Court, Lehri and others v. Arjan Dass and others (1981 P.L.J. 52), which held on similar facts that the civil court could not adjudicate the matter.
Respondent/Plaintiff's Position (as pleaded)
- The plaintiff pleaded that plot No. 208 was owned by him and that plot No. 212 was a public street ("Gali sheh-re-aam") used by him and others for more than 30 years; he sought injunctions to prevent interference and to remove the obstruction.
- It is implicit in the pleading and findings that the plaintiff did not seek a declaration that the land be declared Shamilat Deh or to affect the Panchayat's title; the claim was factual — that the land was a public thoroughfare used by him for decades.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lehri and others v. Arjan Dass and others, 1981 P.L.J. 52 (Single Bench) | Held on similar facts that the civil court was incapable of adjudicating the matter (used by appellant to support ouster of jurisdiction). | The court considered this decision but explicitly stated difficulty in endorsing it and ultimately did not follow it; the court treated that Single Bench view as not accounting for the distinction between disputes involving the Panchayat and disputes between private parties, and therefore rejected/overruled that reasoning in the present case. |
| Samarth Transport Co. v. The Regional Transport Authority, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 93 | Interpreted the phrase "refuse to entertain" (in a statutory context) to mean refusing to dispose on merits and used to clarify the meaning of "entertain" in Section 13. | The court relied on this authority to explain that "entertain" in Section 13 means the Civil Court cannot dispose of the suit on merits where the section applies, i.e., it must reject as not maintainable when the dispute falls within the ouster clause. |
| A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1718 (case name not specified in text) | Principle that statutes ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts must be strictly construed; generally that ouster should not be readily inferred. | The court invoked this principle to stress that an ouster of civil jurisdiction must be strictly construed and to frame the approach to interpreting Section 13 of the Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in stages:
- Statutory and factual starting point: The pleadings described the disputed land as a "Gali sheh-re-aam" (public thoroughfare) and the Jamabandi for 1976-77 (Exhibit P.7) recorded the land as owned by the Nagar Panchayat. The court accepted that streets and lanes within Abadi Deh or Gora Deh fall within the definition of "Shamilat Deh" and vest in the Panchayat.
- Interpretive approach to Section 13: The court acknowledged that on first reading Section 13 appeared to support the appellant's contention that civil courts were barred from adjudicating whether land vested in a Panchayat. However, the court emphasized interpretive principles: under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure a litigant has a civil right to institute suit unless cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred; ouster provisions should not be readily inferred and must be strictly construed (citing A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1718).
- Purpose and context of the amendment: The court examined the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Haryana amendment, which disclosed a legislative objective to protect Panchayat/Shamilat lands from unlawful occupation and collusive decrees and to ensure effective implementation. The amendment aimed to remove civil forum remedies where appropriate to protect Panchayat lands.
- Reading Sections 13 and 13-A together: A combined reading led the court to conclude that the ouster in Section 13 is directed specifically to disputes where the contest is between the Gram Panchayat and a private person concerning the questions enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13. In that situation a civil court's jurisdiction to adjudicate or entertain the dispute is barred so that the matter is left to revenue courts, officers or authorities designated by the Act.
- Meaning of "adjudication" and "entertain": The court explained that "adjudication" implies a final determination creating binding rights and obligations between the parties; such adjudication affecting Panchayat rights cannot occur unless the Panchayat is a party. The court also adopted the Samarth Transport Co. interpretation that "entertain" in the statutory context means the civil court cannot dispose of the suit on merits but must reject it if it relates to matters within the ouster provision.
- Practical consequence of adopting appellant's broader argument: The court rejected an interpretation that would allow any defendant to oust civil jurisdiction by pleading that the property is or is not Shamilat Deh or Panchayat property. Such a construction would permit frivolous pleas to divest civil courts of jurisdiction over a broad range of disputes, contrary to legislative intent and accepted interpretive principles.
- Application to the present case: The plaintiff did not seek a declaration affecting the Panchayat's title or asking the court to determine that the land was Shamilat Deh. The plaintiff alleged as factual that the land was a public thoroughfare ("Gali-shah-re-aam") and sought relief for obstruction of access to his property. Any determination by the trial court on whether the land was a thoroughfare was ancillary to the private dispute and did not adjudicate or affect the Panchayat's rights. On these grounds the court held Section 13 was not operative to bar the suit in the circumstances of this case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The court found no merit in the appellant's contention that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (as amended), where the lis is between private parties and the relief sought does not seek to adjudicate the Panchayat's title. The dismissal was ordered with no costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The trial court's findings in favour of the plaintiff — that the plaintiff owned plot No. 208, that plot No. 212 was used as a thoroughfare for more than 30 years, and that the defendants had blocked it — were upheld by the appellate process and the appeal was dismissed, leaving the trial court's decree intact. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
- Scope of Section 13: The court clarified that Section 13's ouster of civil jurisdiction applies when the dispute is one between the Gram Panchayat and a private person concerning questions specified in the section (for example, whether land is Shamilat-deh or vests in the Panchayat). Section 13 does not, on its proper construction, bar civil adjudication in disputes that are between private parties where the outcome will not bind or affect the Panchayat's rights.
- Precedential note: The court expressly disapproved the Single Bench view in Lehri (and other Single Bench decisions cited) insofar as those decisions did not take into account the distinction between disputes that actually contest Panchayat rights and disputes between private individuals where adjudication is ancillary and will not affect the Panchayat's title. The court therefore did not follow those earlier Single Bench rulings in this respect.
R.M.S. — Appeal dismissed. (Order signed P.C. Jain, Acting Chief Justice.)
I.S Tiwtna, J. — (17th April, 1985) — The short but question of some complexity raised in his Second Appeal relates to the jurisdiction of the Court. It arises on the following facts.
Page: 1432. Plaintiff-respondent Ram Sarup filed the present suit on 18th July, 1978 with the allegations that out of the two plots Nos. 208 and 212 situated in village Dhadoli, Tehsil Safidon, district Jind, the first one is owned by him and the latter is a public street. He and the proforma defendants in the suit were utilising this street as an approach to their houses for the last more than 30 years. The defendant-appellant being head-strong people not only threatened to dispossess him from plot No. 208 but had actually constructed a 6′ high wall in the thoroughfare, i.e on plot No. 212 and, thus, caused obstruction in the free passage to his house and also to the house of other defendents. Thus, he sought a parmanent injunction restraining the appellants from raising any construction or interference in his possession over plot No. 208 and prayed for a mandatory injunction directing these appellants to demolish the wall and the other construction and to restore the thoroughfare to its original position. The appellants contested the suit denying the above-mentioned allegations. The parties were put to trial on the following issues:—
(1) Whether plaintiff is owner in possession of the disputed plot No. 208? OPP.
(2) Whether this plot No. 212 has been used by the plaintiff for the last more than 30 years as street? OPP.
(3) Whether defendants have blocked the street No. 212 prior to filing the suit dated 1st July 1978? OPD.
(4) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD.
(5) Whether plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the present suit? OPD.
(6) Relief.
Having come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of plot No. 208 and that plot No. 212 was a thoroughfare and was being used as a passage by the plaintiff for more than 30 years and the defendant-appellants had actually blocked the same by raising the construction in question, the rliefs prayed for were granted. Under issues Nos. 4 and 5 it was held that the suit was maintainable in the present form and the plaintiff had the locus-standi to file the same. In appeal, though the above-noted findings of the trial Court have been affirmed by the District Judge, Jind, yet one of the contentions raised before him and repeated before us is that the Civil Court had no jurisdition to try the suit as it involved the determination of the question whether the land forming part of plot No. 212 being a thoroughfare did vest or not in the Panchayat. This, according to their learned counsel, could not be done by the said Court in view of the provisions of section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short, the Act) as in force on the date of filing of the suit and as now substituted by Haryana Act No. 2 of 1981 with effect from February 12, 1981. The earlier section read as follows:—
“13. Bar of jurisdiction—No civil Court shall have jurisdiction—
(a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question as to whether any land or other immovable property or any right or interest in such land or other immovable property vests or does not vest in a Panchayat under this Act; or
Page: 144(b) in respect of any other matter which any officer is empowered by or under this Act to determine; or
(c) to question the legality of any action or any matter decided by any authority empowered to do so under this Act.”
This section along with sections 13-A and 13-B was later substituted by the present section during the pendency of this appeal. This, however, to our mind does not make any material difference to the fate of this case as the learned counsel, for the parties are agreed that the bar of jurisdiction brought in by the Haryana Amending Act No. 2 of 1981 applies to pending appeals even. The newly substituted section reads as follows:—
“13. Bar of jurisdiction.—No civil Court shall have jurisdiction—
(a) to antertain or adjudicate upon any question whether—
(i) any land or other immovable property is or is not Shamilat-deh,
(ii) any land or other immoveable property or any right, title or interest in such land or other immoveable property vests or does not vest in Panchayat under this Act,
(b) in respect of any matter which any revenue Court, officer or authority is empowered by or under this Act to determine, or
(c) to question the legality of any action taken or matter decided by any revenue Court, officer or authority empowered to do so under this Act.”
In support of his above noted stand, the learned counsel for the appellant placed firm reliance on a Single Bench judgment of this Court reported as Lehri and others v. Arjan Dass and others 1981 P.L.J 52 wherein almost on similar facts it has been held by the learned Judge that the matter is incapable of being adjudicated upon by the civil Court. Since I felt some difficulty in reconciling myself with the opinion expressed in this judgment, I referred the matter to a larger Bench. This is how the appeal is now before us for disposal.
3. Though in the pleadings of the parties, the land in question is not described as Shamilat deh and all that has been said and denied is that it is a “Gali sheh-re-aam”, yet this factual position is supported by the entries in the Jamabandi for the year 1976-1977 (Exhibit P. 7). As per this record of rights, the land is owned by the Nagar Panchayat. Undisputably streets and lanes within the Abadi Deh or Gora Deh of a village fall within the definition of “Shamilat Deh” as per the provisions of section 2(g) (4) of the Act and vest in the Panchayat.
4. The answer to the controversy raised is apparently dependant on knowing of the true content and scope of the present section 13 of the Act. In the first flush, the language of the section undoubtedly appears to support the stand of the counsel for the appellants, yet on a deeper consideration we find that the same is untenable.
5. In the light of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature undoubtedly has, independently of any statute a right to institute a suit in some Court or the other unless its cognizance it either expressly or impliedly barred. Though the proposition of law that in interpreting a statute barring the jurisdiction of the civil Court one should not necessarily make an attempt to abridge its operation or cut down Page: 145or modify its objectives with a view to give effect to the role of interpretation that the ousting of jurisdiction should not be readily inferred is well settled, yet equally well established is the principle that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil Court must be strictly construed (See A.I.R. 1966 S.C 1718) A.I.R 1966 T.C 1718. It is in the light of these principles that the scope and content of section 13 of the Act needs to be examined. The need for the substitution of the present section vide Haryana Amending Act No. 2 of 1981 is stated in the following words in the Statement of Object and Reasons:—
“In many places the Shamlat Deh has been occupied unlawfully by unscrupulous persons, acting some time in collusion with the representative of the Gram Panchayats. To combate this evil certain amendments were made to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act 1961, in 1974. However, when tested in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, certain of these provisions were struck down,—vide judgment of the Court. The present Bill seeks to remedy the infirmities found by the High Court. It also proposes to make some incidental changes to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, to make some of its provisions more explicit so as to ensure more effective implementation.”
This amendment was apparently brought about with a view to save and protect Panchayat lands from collusive decrees or to prevent usurpation of Shamilat lands, further in order to achieve this object rather quickly or in the shortest possible time, the Legislature thought it proper to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try questions stated in clauses (a) and (b) of this section. What sort of adjudication is evisaged by this section is also well-indicated by the next following section 13-A. It is clearly discernible from a combined reading of these two sections that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded from entertaining or adjudicating upon the questions stated in Section 13 when the lis is between a private person and the Panchayat. In other words, it is only when the contest is between the Panchayat and a private person for the determination or adjudication of the questions specfied in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13 that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. It is obvious that the right, title or claim of a private person to a particular land or immoveable property vis-a-vis the Gram Panchayat cannot factually and effectually be settled in the absence of the Panchayat being impleaded as a party to the litigation. Aay decree obtained by an individual in his favour, collusively or after a contest, about the properties vesting or deemed to have vested in the Panchayat can never bind the Gram Panchayat in the absence of its being a party to the litigation. The very implication of the word adjudication is to finally determine the rights of the two contestants vis-a-vis the subject-matter, of dispute judicially or in a judicial manner. One of the essential traits of “adjudication” is proprio vigore binding on and creates rights and obligations between the parties. This can never be done unless the dispute is between the Panchayat and a private individual qua the Shamilat Deh or any other land or immoveable property or any right, title or interest therein and unless the Panchayat is the real party to the litigation. Though the word “entertain” as occuring in the opening Page: 146part of clause (a) of this Section may generally mean “to receive on file or keep on file” yet in the context in which it occurs only means that the Civil Court cannot dispose of the suit or the claim on merits and has to reject it as not maintainable if it relates to any of the questions specified in the Section. This is so said by the Supreme Court in Samarth Transport Co. v. The Regional Transport Authority A.I.R 1961 S.C 93 in the context of Section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 wherein it is laid down that the Regional Transport Authority may by order “refuse to entertain” any application for the renewal of any other permit. So, in a nutshell the whole implication of Section 13 of the Act is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is taken away when the lis is between the Gram Panchayat and a private person and it relates to any of the questions specified in this Section. It appears clear that the Section would not be operative when the lis or the dispute is between two private individuals. In case the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is to be accepted and taken to its logical end, or Section 13 of the Act is to be subjected to the interpretation suggested by him, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be ousted in any and every suit relating to any property or interest therein by rising a wholly frivolous plea in the written statement that the subject-matter of the litigation is Shamilat Deh or Panchayat property. In the face of such a plea, according to the learned counsel, even if the subject-matter of dispute is an urban property or a property with which the Panchayat is not even romately concerned, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands ousted. In a nutshell, according to him, the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try any suit qua any property in which the defendant has pleaded on hawsoever frivolous or mischievous grounds that the property in dispute is or is not Shamilat Deh or Panchayat property. If this argument is to be accepted, then practically all Civil Courts stand divested of their jurisdiction on the basis of the above noted frivolous plea of the defendant. We do not think that ever was the intention of the Legislature in incorporating the present section or earlier section 13 in the statute. In the instant case, it is not the claim of the plaintiff that either the suit property (Plot No. 212) be declared as Shamilat Deh or included or excluded from Shamilat Deh. All that has been stated by him in the plaint is that the suit land is “Gali-Shah-re-aam” which is only a statement of fact. The denial of this fact by the defendant led to the settlement or determination of the question whether the land in dispute was a Galli-Shah-re-aam or a thoroughfare which was being used by the plaintiff as an approach to his house for the last about 30 years. This determination by the trial Court was only ancillary to the prayer or the relief sought by the plaintiff. Any finding either way is not to affect the interest or title of the Panchayat to the land in question. In light of this we find it difficult to endorse the view expressed in Lehri's case (supra) or some other Single Bench Judgments of this Court to which a reference was made by the learned counsel for the appellant as is none of those cases the above noted aspect of the matter was taken into account and thus overruled the same.
6. We thus find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same but with no order as to costs.
Sd/- P.C Jain, Act. C.J
R.M.S-Appeal dismissed.
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