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S. Harcharan Singh And Others v. Shashpal Singh And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion by R.S. Narula, J. (with Inder Dev Dua, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners claimed to have purchased approximately 45 bighas of orchard land near Gumtala, Amritsar (admitted by respondents as about 170 kanals and 10 marlas). Fruit-bearing trees existed on the land, although respondents denied it was a fully developed orchard. The Amritsar Improvement Trust (represented by its Chairman, respondent No. 1) passed resolutions on 19 April 1962 (No. 70) and 1 May 1962 (No. 92) framing and enlarging a development-cum-housing accommodation scheme covering roughly 860 acres; the area included the petitioners' land (171 kanals and 4 marlas).
A public notice under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was issued on 4 May 1962 referring to Sections 24 and 25 read with Section 28(2). The scheme was submitted under Section 40 and sanctioned by the Punjab Government on 25 February 1964 under Section 41; the notification was issued pursuant to Section 42(1).
The petitioners filed objections (which, the Trust says, were heard and dismissed). The petitioners learned that the State Government had exempted the fully developed orchard land of another landowner (Raja Baldev Indra Singh) from acquisition and that a governmental letter (29 April 1964) directed that "really well developed orchards should be preserved" and listed several persons (including petitioners) for similar treatment. The petitioners applied on 27 August 1964 for their orchard land to be excluded but were not heard on that application. An award dated 29 March 1965 determined compensation for the petitioners' land and did not reflect any stay like that granted for Baldev Indra Singh.
The petitioners filed the present writ petition in July 1965 seeking to quash the development scheme; the petition was admitted to the Division Bench on 26 July 1965 and dispossession was stayed. The Chairman and the Trust filed a joint written statement supported by an affidavit (dated 20 August 1965). Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a further affidavit (a rejoinder) dated 1 November 1965 without obtaining leave required by rule 8 of Chapter 4-F(b), Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the Court; the Court treated this filing as unauthorised but, at the Trust's request, took into consideration the documents attached to that rejoinder whose authenticity was not disputed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sanctioned instrument is a valid "development scheme" under Section 24(1) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 when it (i) covers land beyond the municipal limits, and (ii) was sanctioned as a development scheme despite including land outside those municipal limits.
- Whether a composite scheme (purporting to be for both development and expansion/housing accommodation) could be treated as valid where the sanction and notices primarily refer to Section 24 (and not explicitly to Section 24(1) or to separate expansion/housing-accommodation provisions).
- Whether any part of the sanctioned scheme that is invalid (because outside municipal limits) is severable from the valid part or requires striking down the entire scheme.
- Whether governmental directions to preserve fully developed orchards (and prior exemptions granted to other landowners) required exclusion of the petitioners' land, and whether the Trust's post-sanction power (or the State's role) could affect the sanctioned scheme.
- Whether Section 42 of the Improvement Act (rendering the scheme notification conclusive) bars judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.
- Whether the filing and consideration of a further affidavit (rejoinder) without leave breached procedural rules and should be permitted.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in counsel Mr. Harbans Singh Gujral's submissions)
- The impugned scheme must be struck down because it covers a substantial area beyond the municipal limits of Amritsar, contrary to Section 24(1) of the Improvement Act; a "development scheme" is confined to municipal limits.
- The petitioners were entitled to be heard before their objections (including that their land constituted a well-developed orchard deserving exclusion) were dismissed; they were not heard on the application for exclusion dated 27 August 1964.
- Given governmental direction that well-developed orchards should be preserved (and exemptions granted in a like case), the petitioners' land should have been excluded from acquisition.
- The inclusion of the petitioners' land may be mala fide (allegation that inclusion served to benefit other landowners, including lands owned by the Chairman of the Trust), and the petitioners should have been afforded an opportunity to rebut any adverse factual finding that their land was not a full-fledged orchard.
- Under the Act (last part of Section 56) the Trust may be able to exclude portions of a sanctioned scheme on payment of compensation; this support was invoked to challenge the Trust's treatment of orchards.
Respondents' Arguments (as presented by the Trust / counsel Mr. B.R. Aggarwal)
- The Trust argued that the area in question was not a fully developed orchard and so need not be excluded.
- The Trust maintained that once the State Government sanctioned the scheme under Section 41(1), it became functus officio and could not thereafter affect the scheme by exempting any land covered by it.
- It was argued that after sanction under Section 41 the scheme and its notification under Section 42 are conclusive and thus not open to challenge on the grounds raised by the petitioners (i.e., that Section 42 precludes judicial review).
- The Trust sought to rely on the form and wording of the public notice and sanction (which referred to Sections 24 and 25 read with Section 28(2)) to treat the measure as a composite instrument encompassing development and expansion/housing elements.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the statutory scheme in Section 24 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and extracting the clear statutory distinction between a "development scheme" (restricted to localities within municipal limits) and an "expansion scheme" (for localities adjacent to and within the Trust's local area). The Court emphasised that the statutory phrases are not flexible; they carry definite meanings and impose specific conditions precedent before a Trust may frame a development scheme.
The Court distilled three conditions precedent for a development scheme: (i) the entire locality to be affected must be within the municipal limits, (ii) it must be within the Trust's local area, and (iii) the Trust must resolve to develop the area. While the second and third conditions were met, the first was not: a substantial portion of the petitioners' land covered by the scheme lay outside the municipal limits. This statutory violation was decisive.
The Trust's argument that the scheme should be treated as a composite development/expansion or housing-accommodation scheme (because the notices and resolutions referred to Sections 24 and 25 and Section 28(2)) was rejected. The Court explained that if the Trust intended to treat parts differently it could have framed two separate schemes (one confined to municipal limits as a development scheme and another under expansion/housing provisions for areas outside municipal limits), or expressly allocated parts of the area to different statutory heads within a composite scheme. That was not done.
The Court applied the principle that statutory provisions authorising deprivation of property are exceptions to fundamental rights and must be strictly construed. Given the statutory prohibition in Section 24(1) on development schemes affecting areas beyond municipal limits, and the absence of proper statutory framing separating development from expansion/housing acquisition, the Court found the impugned scheme ultra vires Section 24(1).
The Court further held that the invalid part of the scheme was not severable from the valid part in the circumstances, and therefore the entire scheme had to be struck down. The Court stated that it was not the role of the Court to reframe a workable statutory scheme for the Trust; that responsibility rested with the Trust itself.
On other points (which the Court said it did not need to decide in order to dispose of the petition), the Court observed: (a) the Trust's contention that the Government becomes functus officio after sanction and could not exempt land was not determinative here, (b) the policy expressed in the Government's letter to preserve well-developed orchards was consistent with socio-economic needs and could support excluding fully developed orchards, and (c) Section 42 could not oust the Court's power under Article 226 to strike down an invalid scheme — a conclusive-sounding statutory provision does not override constitutional judicial review.
Procedurally, the Court criticised the filing of an unauthorised further affidavit (rejoinder) without leave under rule 8 of Chapter 4-F(b) of the Rules and Orders; such filings should not be entertained except in exceptional circumstances, none of which were shown. Nevertheless, the Court (by leave) considered the documents attached to the rejoinder when their authenticity was not disputed, while cautioning against setting a precedent for admitting unauthorised affidavits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the writ petition, holding that the entire development scheme sanctioned on 25 February 1964 was ultra vires Section 24(1) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, and therefore illegal, void, and ineffective. The Court set aside and quashed the impugned scheme and all acquisition proceedings relating to the petitioners' land. The petition was allowed with costs. (Inder Dev Dua, J. agreed.)
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The scheme and the acquisition proceedings concerning the petitioners' orchard land were quashed; the petitioners obtained relief and were protected from dispossession by the stay and the subsequent decision.
- Statutory and procedural guidance: The opinion emphasises strict construction of statutory provisions that permit deprivation of property, the necessity of meeting statutory conditions precedent (particularly municipal-limit restrictions for development schemes), and the need for correct procedural framing (separate or clearly delineated schemes for areas falling under different statutory heads).
- Judicial review: The Court affirmed that a statutory provision purporting to make a scheme conclusive (Section 42) does not oust the constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 to examine whether a purported scheme is validly made.
- No broader precedent was announced beyond the application of these principles to the facts: the Court declared the specific scheme void and quashed related proceedings; it did not reframe the scheme for the Trust.
Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No external precedents or facts have been added.
R.S. Narula, J. - The petitioners claim to have purchased about 45 Bighas of orchard land situated in a locality known as Gumtala near Amritsar in 1965 for developing and further planting a well-developed garden. The respondents admit that the petitioners own an area of about 170 Kanals and 10 Marlas at the site in question. It is also admitted that fruit bearing trees were standing in that land, but it is denied that the entire piece of land had been developed into a full-fledged orchard as claimed by the petitioners. 2. By resolution No. 70 dated April 19, 1962 the Amritsar Improvement Trust, Amritsar (represented through its Chairman, respondent No. 1 in the instant case) decided to frame a development-cum-housing accommodation scheme in respect of a certain area. By resolution No. 92 dated May 1, 1962 the Trust refixed the boundaries of the proposed development scheme so as to enlarge the originally proposed area. The total area covered by the proposed development scheme admittedly includes the petitioner's garden land referred to above to the extent of 171 kanals and 4 marlas. In the resolution dated 1st May, 1962 reference is made only to the development scheme and the original reference to the housing accommodation scheme is omitted. On the basis of the above-said resolution a public notice under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 4 of 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Improvement Act) was issued on 4th of May, 1962. The relevant opening part of the public notice reads as follows :- "Notice is hereby given that in accordance with Resolution No. 70 dated 19th April, 1962 as amended by Resolution No. 92 dated 1st May, 1962, passed by the Amritsar Improvement Trust Amritsar, the Trust has framed a Development-cum-Housing accommodation scheme for an area measuring approximately 860 acres, bounded by ................, within the Local Area of the Amritsar Improvement Trust, under Sections 24 and 25 read with Section 28(2) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922". 3. It is then specified in the public notice that the area in question was intended to be developed as a commercial-cum-residential area and that it was also intended to provide an industrial colony therein. The notice ended with an invitation to the public to file any objections to the scheme in writing by the 7th of July, 1962. Ultimately the scheme was submitted by the Trust of the State Government under Section 40 of the Act and was sanctioned on February 25, 1964 under Section 41 of the Act. The notification of that date issued by the Punjab Government reads as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 1 of Section 41 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to sanction the Development Scheme (Acquisition of land only) framed by the Improvement Trust Amritsar under Sections 24 and 25 read with Section 28(2) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, for an area measuring approximately 860 acres, within the local area of the Trust and bounded by circular Road, Fatehgarh Churian Road and set forth in the sub-joined Schedule. The notification is issued in pursuance of Section 42(1) of the said Act. (Schedule)" 4. The petitioners stated that they had filed objections against the Scheme. According to the Trust the objections had been heard and dismissed. 5. In the meantime the petitioners came to know that the State Government had decided in connection with a representation of one Raja Baldev Indra Singh that some land under orchards should be excluded from acquisition for the Scheme relating to Ajnala Road and Byepass Road. The State Government is stated to have passed an order exempting the land of Baldev Indra Singh which was actually under a full-fledged garden from acquisition by the Trust. The petitioners have also referred to a letter dated April 29, 1964 from the Secretary to the Government, Punjab, Local Government Department to the Chairman, Improvement Trust, Amritsar, relating to the Scheme for development of a different area of which letter para 2 reads as follows : "2. Government desire that the really well developed orchards should be preserved in the process of town planning. This was the essence of the decision in the case of Shri Baldev Indra Singh of Amritsar. The Improvement Trust, Amritsar, should, therefore, accord similar treatment to the following applications : 1. Shri Narain Dass. 2. Shri Tarlochan Singh. 3. Shri Harbhagwan Singh. 4. Shri Jagtar Singh and 5. Shri Sham Dass". 6. When the petitioners came to know of fully developed orchards being exempted from acquisition by the Improvement Trust under orders of the State Government they also applied on August 27, 1964 for their orchard land being similarly excluded from acquisition by Trust. The petitioners were admittedly not heard in support of their prayer for exempting their land from acquisition. According to them the petitioners came to know only from the award dated March 29, 1965 (copy annexure A-1) that acquisition proceedings in relation to certain land of Raja Baldev Indra Singh had been stayed and postponed for the time being in pursuance of directions received by the Collector from the Trust but that no such stay had been granted in respect of the petitioners orchard land and compensation for the same had been determined by the said award. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners came to this Court in July, 1965 for setting aside and quashing the development scheme prepared by the Trust. The petition was admitted to D.B. by the Motion Bench on July 26, 1965 and dispossession of the petitioners from the land in question was stayed. 7. Shri Shashpal Singh, Chairman of the Trust has been impleaded as respondent No. 1 in this case in his personal capacity as well as representing the Trust itself in his official capacity. He has filed a joint written statement of behalf of himself as well as on behalf of the Trust and the Land Acquisition Collector. The written statement does not bear any date but it is supported by an affidavit of respondent No. 1 dated August 20, 1965. With the leave of the Court granted on September 9, 1965 in C.M. No. 3616 of 1965 the petitioners filed a replication in reply to the written statement of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Without obtaining any such leave as required by rule 8 of Chapter 4-F(b), Volume V of the Rules and Orders of this Court respondent Nos. 1 and 2 appear to have filed a further affidavit dated 1st November, 1965 in this Court as a rejoinder to the replication of the petitioners. The filling of this rejoinder is wholly unauthorised. Rule 8, ibid, reads as follows :- "8. No further affidavit of affidavits shall be filed by any party except with the leave of the Court". 8. It is not understood how the Registry of this Court had entertained this further affidavit after the filing of the return to the rule without leave of the Court being obtained in the face of the specific legal bar contained in the above-quoted rule. At the hearing of the writ petition before us an oral prayer was made by Shri B.R. Aggarwal, the learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 permit the rejoinder being taken into consideration. I do not think it proper to set a precedent for considering further affidavits filed in writ petitions without the leave of the Court on oral prayers being made during the hearing of the writ petitions except in very exceptional circumstances. No such exceptional circumstances has been made out in this case. At the request of the counsel for the Trust, however, we have taken into consideration the documents attached with the rejoinder, the genuineness and authenticity of which is not in dispute. 9. The first point made out by Shri Harbans Singh Gujral, the learned counsel for the petitioners at the hearing of the writ petition is that the impugned scheme is liable to be struck down as it admittedly covers certain area beyond the municipal limits of Amritsar. The scheme as sanctioned is only a "development scheme". No town expansion scheme has been sanctioned by the Government. No scheme can be executed till it is sanctioned under Section 41 of the Act. It is admitted by the learned counsel appearing for all the parties in this case that the entire land of the petitioners if within the local limits of the Amritsar Town Improvement Trust as extended by a notification dated 22nd September, 1961 under Section 3(1) of the Improvement Act. It is also admitted that a substantial part of the petitioner' land covered by the scheme is outside the municipal limits of Amritsar though within the local limits of the Trust. Section 24 of the Improvement Act reads as follows :- "24. (1) The trust may, for the purpose of development of any locality within the municipal limits contained in its local are, prepare "a development scheme", and (2) Such trust may, if it is of opinion that it is expedient and for the public advantage to promote and control the development of and to provide for the expansion of a municipality in any locality adjacent thereto, within the local area of such trust prepare "an expansion scheme". (3) "A development scheme" of "an expansion scheme" may provide for the lay-out of the locality to be developed, the purposes for which particular portions of such locality are to be utilised, the prescribed street alignment and the building line on each side of the streets proposed in such locality, the drainage of insanitary localities and such other details as may appear desirable". 10. A mere reading of the above-quoted section clearly shows that the expressions "development scheme" and "expansion scheme" are not loose or flexible phrases but have clear definite meaning for the purposes of the Improvement Act. A development scheme can be framed by a Trust under the Improvement Act only if and when three conditions precedent are satisfied. viz :- (i) the entire locality sought to be affected by the scheme must be within the municipal limits; (ii) the entire locality sought to be affected by the scheme should also be within the local area within which the Trust is authorised to carry out the provisions of the Act; and (iii) the Trust may resolve to develop that area or locality. 11. Though there is no dispute about the last two conditions having been fulfilled in the instant case it is equally undisputed that the first condition is not satisfied in respect of a substantial part of the land. That being so, even the learned counsel for the Trust has not been able to contend that the development scheme at least in respect of the area outside the municipal limits can in any case be held to be valid. His argument is that in the relevant notice and notification only Section 24 has been mentioned and not Section 24(1) and that, therefore, the scheme should be treated to be a composite one for development as well as for expansion. His second argument is that though the expression "housing accommodation scheme" has by error been omitted from the relevant notification of the State Government it should be presumed in the circumstances of the case in the context of the resolutions of the Trust and its earlier public notice under Section 36 that it is a composite scheme under Sections 24 and 25 of the Improvement Act. This, it is argued, is permissible under Section 28(2) of the Act which allows one composite scheme being prepared for all or any of the matters enumerated in that Sub-section. 12. There is no dispute that by operation of the relevant provisions of the Act the petitioners are sought to be deprived of their property. This can be done only strictly in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Once it is conceded, and it cannot possibly be denied, that the Trust intended to frame a development scheme and has in fact framed one and what has been sanctioned is also a development scheme and further that it covers area beyond the Municipal limits which is prohibited by Section 24(1) of the Act, it is impossible to sustain the impugned scheme as it does not specify which out of the area covered by the scheme is only for development purposes and which for the purpose of the alleged housing accommodation scheme. If this was the intention of the trust it could have framed two separate schemes, (i) a development scheme restricted to the Municipal area, and (ii) a housing accommodation scheme or an expansion scheme under Section 24(2) read with SEction 25 of the Act. This has not been done. The only other possible way of achieving what the learned counsel has canvassed before us was to say in the composite scheme that such and such area was sought to be acquired for a development scheme, the area being within Municipal limits, and the remaining area outside such limits was sought to be acquired for an expansion scheme or an housing accommodation scheme. The provisions of the Act are in the nature of an exception to the normal fundamental rights relating to property and have to be strictly construed. The petitioners have filed annexure "A" with the writ petition showing that 92 Kanals and 1 Marla of their orchard land is outside the Municipal limits of Amritsar and only 81 Kanals and 15 Marlas are within the Municipal limits. Mr. Gujral has contented that once it is found that a part of the scheme is not sustainable the whole has to be struck down because it is not open to this Court to reframe the scheme for the Trust and it may also not be safe to do so. It is ultimately for the Trust to see if a workable scheme can be prepared by merely excluding certain area or if the whole scheme had to be overhauled in that light. The invalid part of the scheme is in the circumstances of this case not severable from the valid part. I would, therefore, hold that the entire scheme in question prepared by the Improvement Trust as sanctioned by the State Government on February 25, 1964 in ultra virus Section 24(1) of the Improvement Act and is, therefore, illegal, void and ineffective. All proceedings taken under the said scheme relating to the petitioners are, therefore, set aside and quashed. 13. In the view I have taken of the first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners it is not necessary to dwell upon and decide other questions raised by him. In fairness to him, however, I will merely notice his other contentions. Mr. Gujral has argued that the State Government having directed that area of fully developed orchards should be exempted from schemes prepared by the Trust under the Improvement Act, the petitioners area in dispute should also have been excluded from acquisition. In reply to this contention it has been stated in the written statement of the Trust that the area in question is not a fully developed orchard. In the written statement it is further averred that the State Government after according its sanction under Section 41(1) of the Act becomes fnnctus officio and cannot thereafter affect the scheme by exempting any land covered by it. Mr. Gujral has argued that under the last part of Section 56 of the Act the Trust can on charging certain amount as compensation exclude any part of the area covered by the sanctioned scheme in certain circumstances. According to Mr. Gujral that much of the land of Raja Baldev Indra Singh which was found by the Trust to be covered by a full-fledged orchard has in fact been exempted and C.W. No. 2052 of 1965 filed by Raja Baldev Indra Singh in this Court relates to the remaining land which has not been so exempted. Be that as it may, contends Mr. Gujral, if the Trust wanted to give a finding of fact against the petitioners to the effect that the claim of the petitioners about the land in question not being a full-fledged orchard was incorrect, it was right of the petitioners to get an opportunity to prove their case before their objections could be dismissed on that ground. The last contention of Mr. Gujral was that the entire scheme and the acquisition proceedings are mala fide and that the land of the petitioners has been included therein merely to keep out certain land in Raja Sansi on the other side of the area in dispute which is stated to belong to the Chairman of the Trust so that its value may increase by the proposed development. Though the allegation of mala fides is denied by the Chairman, the fact of the lands in Raja Sansi being owned by the Chairman is specifically admitted in his written statement. Though in the view I am taking of the of the first question, I am not pronouncing in the allegation of mala fides. I am clearly of the opinion that the declared policy of the State Government to exclude from development and expansion schemes fully developed orchards is consistent with the socio economic needs of the country particularly in view of the current shortage of food. Fully developed orchards and gardens appear to be to be more necessary to be maintained rather than brick and mortar houses being built in their place, an object which can be fulfilled on other lands within the local area of the Trust. 14. The only other contention of Mr. B.R. Aggarwal, which has to be noticed, is about the stand taken on the basis of Section 42 of the Improvement Act. On behalf of the Trust it is vehemently argued that the scheme after it is sanctioned by the State Government under Section 41 has become conclusive the operation of Section 42 of the Act cannot, therefore, be called in question on any ground. There is no merit whatever in this argument. If it is found that there is no valid scheme it is certainly open to this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to strike down what merely purports to be a scheme under the Act. Section 42 of the Improvement Act cannot everride the constitutional safeguard contained in Article 226. I have, therefore, no hesitation in repelling this contention of Mr. Aggarwal. 15. I would, therefore, allow this writ petition with costs and quash and set aside the impugned scheme in question and the acquisition proceedings relating to the entire land of the petitioners-referred to above. Inder Dev Dua, J. - I agree. Petition allowed.
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