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Smt. Pritam Kaur And Others v. Chanan Singh And Others
Case Summary — Judgment by B.S. Yadav, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit land (193 Kanals 10 Marlas) in village Aulakh, Tehsil Batala, was owned by Ujjagar Singh who died on 23 May 1967. He left behind his widow Pritam Kaur (plaintiff No. 1), two daughters Chhiboo and Chhindo (plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3) and three sons Charan Singh, Atma Singh and Phuman Singh (defendant Nos. 1 to 3).
A mutation (Exhibit D-2) in respect of the inheritance was entered by the Patwari on 26 July 1967 in favour of the three sons and the Revenue Officer sanctioned it on 10 December 1970 on the basis of a will.
The plaintiffs filed a suit on 3 September 1974 seeking possession of a half share of the land, claiming they were entitled as heirs and alleging that the will propounded by the defendants was forged. Only defendant Nos. 1 and 2 contested the suit (they admitted relationship but relied on a will executed in favour of defendant No. 3). Defendant No. 3 (Phuman Singh) filed a written statement admitting the allegations of the plaint as correct.
The trial court held that the will was not executed by Ujjagar Singh (or was surrounded by suspicious circumstances) and decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 appealed; the Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur, reversed the trial court, accepted the appeal, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The plaintiffs then filed the present second appeal in this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the will (Exhibit D-1, dated 6 May 1963) was validly executed by Ujjagar Singh and whether it genuinely expressed his testamentary intention.
- Whether the will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances such that the onus lay on the propounders to remove those suspicions.
- Whether entries in the mutation proceedings (Exhibit D-2) sanctioned by the Revenue Officer are admissible and can be relied upon as corroborative evidence of the will's genuineness.
- Whether the plaintiffs (heirs) were entitled to a decree for possession of half share of the suit land despite the propounded will.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Defendant Nos. 1 & 2) — Arguments as recorded in the opinion
- The presence of Charan Singh (a beneficiary) at the time of execution of the will showed he took part in its execution and thus gave rise to suspicion.
- Charan Singh admitted having given Rs. 21 to Ujjagar Singh towards expenses of executing the will, which suggested complicity in procuring the will.
- One of the attesting witnesses was Ganga Singh, who was father-in-law of Charan Singh, and this relationship raised suspicion about the will's genuineness.
- The will was not registered despite the testator surviving for several years after executing it; non-registration was argued to be a suspicious circumstance.
- The will effected an unnatural or inofficious disposition by effectively disinheriting the widow and two daughters.
- A provision for the widow's maintenance was allegedly inserted after the body of the will had been scribed, suggesting later interpolation.
- P.W.3 (Phuman Singh), though a beneficiary, later disowned the will and supported the plaintiffs; that disowning was urged as significant.
Plaintiffs — Contentions as recorded in the opinion
- The plaintiffs alleged the will propounded by the defendants was forged, fictitious and bogus and sought possession of a half share as heirs of Ujjagar Singh.
- The plaintiffs (later) stated they did not appear before the Revenue Officer when the mutation was sanctioned (a point the Court noted in assessing credibility).
- One of the daughters (P.W.5 Chhibbo) admitted that the suit was filed late and explained that it was due to strained relations with her brothers.
Defendant No. 3 (Phuman Singh) — Position as recorded
- Defendant No. 3 filed a written statement admitting the allegations of the plaint as correct (the opinion records this fact).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H. Ventatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 | One of a group of Supreme Court authorities laying down principles for adjudging the validity of a will (concerned with proving wills and suspicious circumstances). | The Court relied on this and the other cited SC authorities to state the general principles: wills are proved like other documents except for attestation (s.63 Succession Act); onus on propounder to dispel suspicious circumstances; courts must be vigilant when beneficiaries are involved in execution. |
| Ramchandra Rambux v. Champobai, AIR 1965 SC 354 | Same group of SC authorities referred to for principles governing validity and proof of wills. | Used as part of the doctrinal foundation to assess whether suspicious circumstances existed and the appropriate onus on propounders. |
| Gorantia Thataiah v. Thotakura Vankata Subbaiah, AIR 1968 SC 1332 | Again part of the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions laying down principles for adjudging validity of wills. | Formed part of the Court's statement of applicable principles guiding its scrutiny of the will and surrounding circumstances. |
| Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Smt. Kamta Devi, AIR 1954 SC 280 | Law that there is no requirement for registration of a will; non-registration is not a valid ground to draw an inference against genuineness. | The Court relied on this authority to reject the appellants' argument that non-registration of Exhibit D-1 (the will) rendered it suspicious. |
| Nizam Ud Din v. Fateh Din (1939) 41 PLR 308; AIR 1940 Lahore 118 | Mutation entries carry a presumption of truth; official acts in mutation proceedings are presumed regular and admissible even without producing the official who made the entries. | The Court cited this to support the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the mutation (Exhibit D-2) sanctioned by the Revenue Officer, as corroboration of the will. |
| Nizam Din v. Godar, AIR 1934 PC 40 | Authority referenced in connection with the admissibility/weight of mutation entries recorded by revenue officials. | Referred to support the point that mutation proceedings can be evidence even if the revenue official is not produced. |
| Bhagwan Dess v. Mangal Sain, AIR 1929 Lah 93 | Direct authority that entries recorded by revenue officials in mutation proceedings and jamabandis carry a presumption of correctness and are admissible without producing the revenue official. | The Court relied on this to treat the sanctioned mutation (Exhibit D-2) as admissible and bearing evidentiary weight regarding acceptance/propounding of the will. |
| Arti v. Rodbol, (1936) 38 P.L.P. 225 | Authority stating that mutation proceedings should be taken into consideration even if the revenue official who sanctioned them is not produced. | Used to reinforce the view that the mutation (sanctioned by the Revenue Officer) could be considered as evidence without production of the sanctioning revenue official. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court followed the Supreme Court authorities cited and articulated the governing principles: proving a will is similar to proving other documents save for attestation requirements under section 63 of the Succession Act; if execution circumstances are suspicious the onus lies on the propounder to dispel those suspicions; courts must be vigilant when beneficiaries play a prominent role in execution.
Applying those principles to the facts, the Court examined the evidence for Exhibit D-1 (the will dated 6 May 1963). The execution was supported by testimony: D.W.2 (Rattan Lal), the scribe, and attesting witnesses D.W.1 (Thakur Singh) and D.W.3 (Ganga Singh). Another attesting witness, Moola Singh (Lambardar), was not examined because he had left India. The plaint contained no allegation that the testator lacked testamentary capacity and P.W.3 (Phuman Singh) admitted the testator did not fall ill prior to death.
The Court addressed each suspicious circumstance argued by the appellants:
- Presence of a beneficiary (Charan Singh) at execution: the Court observed mere presence did not prove active participation in procuring the will.
- Payment of Rs. 21 by Charan Singh towards expenses: judged insufficient by itself to infer procurement or forgery.
- Attestation by a relative of a legatee (Ganga Singh being father-in-law of Charan Singh): the Court found that, given there were other independent witnesses (including the village Lambardar), genuineness could not be impugned solely on that basis.
- Non-registration of the will: the Court relied on Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi to hold that non-registration is not a legal ground to doubt genuineness.
- Alleged inofficious disposition disinheriting widow and daughters: the Court placed the will in its social and temporal context (date of execution 1963), noting the relevance of local practices and the then recent impact of the Hindu Succession Act — concluding the disposition was not unnatural given the circumstances and that provision was made for the widow (income from 3 killas).
- Alleged later insertion of addenda for widow's maintenance: the addenda bore the testator's thumb impression and was scribed above witnesses' signatures/impressions, so the Court rejected the contention it was inserted after death.
- P.W.3's later disavowal of the will: the Court discounted the significance because P.W.3 had not previously challenged the will and had not acted against it until much later.
The Court further found positive corroboration: the mutation (Exhibit D-2) was entered and later sanctioned on the basis of the will; the plaintiffs had, at the time of sanction (10 December 1970), appeared and stated that the mutation be sanctioned in accordance with the will. The defendants had not produced the mutation at trial but it was later admitted by the lower appellate court. Relying on authorities on the probative value of mutation proceedings, the Court held that entries in the mutation carried presumption of regularity and truth and thus supported the genuineness of the will.
The Court also treated the plaintiffs' later denials (that they did not appear before the Revenue Officer) as not credible in the light of the surrounding conduct: the mutation had been pending for about three years; plaintiffs did not pursue alternate remedies such as appeal against the sanction; and P.W.5 admitted delay due to strained relations with brothers, suggesting earlier acquiescence.
On this combination of positive evidence (scribe and witnesses, mutation proceedings, lack of prior challenge) and the rejection of the pointed suspicious circumstances urged by appellants, the Court concluded that the will was duly executed and not vitiated by suspicious circumstances.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Court upheld the decision of the lower appellate court that the will (Exhibit D-1) was genuine and not surrounded by suspicious circumstances, and thus the plaintiffs' suit failed. The appeal by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (as the appellants in the second appeal) was dismissed and parties were directed to bear their own costs.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applies existing Supreme Court authorities on the proof of wills and the evidentiary weight of mutation proceedings but does not purport to lay down any new legal principle or to overrule prior authorities. No new precedent is stated to have been created by this decision.
Decision signed H.L.S. — "Appeal dismissed."
B.S Yadav, J.:— The facts giving rise to this appeal are that Ujjagar Singh was owner of that suit land measuring Page: 492193 Kanals 10 Marlas situated in village Aulakh, Tehsll Batala. He died on 23rd May, 1967 leaving behind his widow Pritam Kaur (plaintiff No. 1), two daughters named Chhiboo and Chhindo (plaintiff No. 2 and 3 respectively) and 3 sons namely Charan Singh, Atma Singh and Phuman Singh (defendant Nos. 1 to 3 respectively). After his death mutation Exhibit D-2 in respect of his inheritance was entered on 26th July, 1967 by the Patwari in favour of his 3 sons and eventually the Revenue Officer sanctioned it on 10th December, 1970 on the basis of a will. The plaintiff's filed the present suit on 3rd September, 1974 for possession of half share in the above land on the ground that they were entitled to that share in the ineritence of Ujagar Singh being his heirs. They further alleged that the will propounded by the defendant was a forged, fictitious and bogus document.
2. Only defendant Nos. 1 and 2 contested the suit. They admitted the relationship of the plaintiffs with Ujjgar Singh decested but pleaded that the deceased had executed a valid will in favour of the defendants Phuman Singh (defendant No. 3) filed a written statement admitting the allegations of the plaint as correct.
3. The learned trial Court held that Ujjagar Singh deceased did not execute the will and in any case it was surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Accordingly, he decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. Feeling aggrieved defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed an appeal which was heard by learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur. He upset the findings of the learned trial Court about the will and consequently accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have now come to this Court in second appeal.
4. Before I proceed further I may take up H. Ventatachala Iyengar v. B.N Thimmajamma AIR 1959 SC 443, Ramchandra Rambux v. Champobai AIR 1965 SC 354 and Gorantia Thataiah v. Thotakura Vankata Subbaiah AIR 1968 SC 1332, in which certain principles have been laid down for adjudging the validity of a will. The sum total of the principles is as follows:—
The mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to special requirements of attestation, prescribed in the case of a will by section 63 of the Succession Act. In a case in which a will is prepared under circumstances which raise the suspicion of the Court that it does not express the mind of the testator, the onus is upon the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the will as genuine. In such a case the Court naturally expects that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator If, however, the propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer a substantial benefit, on them that itself is a suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the will and in appreciating evidence in such a case, the courts should proceed in a vigilant and’ cautious manner.
5. The arguments of the learned counsel for the parties will be considered in the light of above principles laid down by their Lordships Page: 493of the Supreme Court.
6. Exhibit D. 1 is the will executed by Ujjagar Singh on 6th May, 1963. The execution of the will has been duly proved by D.W 2 Rattan Lal, deed writer, who is its scribe and D.W 1, Thakur Singh of parties' village and D.W 3 Ganga Singh, who are the attesting witnesses One Moola Singh, Lambardar, of the parties' village was also an attesting witness of this will. He was not examined as he is said to have left India. It is to be noted that in the plaint there is no allegation to the effect that Ujjagar Singh was not of sound disposing mind at the time of the will purports to have been executed by him. In fact, P.W-3 Phuman Singh (defendant No. 3) has admitted that Ujjagar Singh did not fall ill prior to his death.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that Chanan Singh (defendant No. 1) who is beneficiary under the will, has denied his presence at the time of the execution of the will but his presence on that occasion has been established by D.W 3 Ganga Singh. I am of the opinion that merely because Chanan Singh happened to be present at the time of the execution of the will, it cannot be said that he took any part in its execution. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that Chanan Singh had admitted that he had given Rt. 21/- to Ujagar Singh towards his share of the expenses incurred in the execution of the will. On that account alone it cannot be said that Chanan Singh was intrumental in getting the will executed by Ujjagar Singh. Chanan Singh alone is not the only beneficiary under the will. The ether two beneficiary are his brothers and all have got the testator's property under the will in equal share.
8. Ganga Singh (D. W-3) is, of course, father-in-law of Chanan Singh but other two attesting witnesses were of parties' village and one of them was the village Lambardar. Therefore, the genuineness of the will cannot be doubted merely on the ground that one relation of one of the legatees attested the will.
9. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that Ujjagar Singh is said to have died after about 4 years of the execution of the will but surprisingly enough it was not got registered by the executant. Thus according to him, this is a suspicious circumstance surrounding the will. This argument hag no force. Reference can be made to Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Smt. Kamta Devi AIR 1954 SC 280, wherein it was remarked:—
“The High Court has relied on the fact that the will was not registered or deposited with the District Registrar. There is nothing in law which requires the registration of a will and wills are in majority of cases not registered at all. To drew any inference against the genuineness of the will on the ground of its non-registration appears to us to be wholly unwarranted.”
10. Therefore merely because the will Exhibit D. 1 is unregistered its genuineness can not be doubted on that account alone.
11. The learned counsel for the appellants next argued that there is unnatural disposition under the will. According to him, the testator disinherited his widow and two daughters. In my view there is nothing unnatural or inofficious about the will, if the circumstances of the case are taken into account. The will was executed in May, Page: 4941963. By that time the agricultural tribes had not totally reconciled themselves with the Hindu Succession Act. Instead of allowing the ancestral property to go into the hands of strangers, a land-ower preferred to give the property to the male members of the family. One of the daughters of Ujjagar Singh had been married prior to the execution of the will Only one daughter had remained unmarried. Ujjagar Singh could well expect that her brothers would perform her marriage according to the standard of the family. As far as his widow Pritam Kaur was concerned, Ujjagar Singh made a provision in the will to the effect that she would be entited to the income of 3 killas of land for her maintenance.
12. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the provision about the maintenance of Pritam Kaur was inserted after the remaining body of the will had been scribed. His argument was that if Ujjagar Singh was conscious about maintenance to his wife he could have executed a fresh will. This argument has no force. The addanda made in the will purports to bear the thumb-impression of Ujjagar Singh and it has been scribed above the signatures or thumb impressions of the witnesses. Thus it can not be said that addanda was introduced sometime after the death of Ujjagar Singh just to show that the will contains a natural disposition Ujjagar Singh might not have considered it economical to get a new will executed because he had to pay the charges of deed-writer. Therefore, the above argument of the learned counsel for the appellants has to be rejected.
13. The learned counsel for the appellants next argued that P.W 3 Phuman Singh, who is one of the beneficiaries under the will, has disowned the will and has supported the plaintiffs and his statement should be given due weight as he is deposing against his own interest. No reliance can be placed upon the statement of Phuman Singh As noticed earlier, the suit was filed in 1973 and till then Phuman Singh did not raise a single finger against the validity of the will.
14. In fact, there are circumstances to show that the will is a genuine document. The mutation Exhibit D-2 was entered on the basis of the will Exhibit D-1 soon after the death of Ujjagar Singh. The contesting defendants failed to tender in evidence this mutation before the learned trial Court, though it had been placed on the record. On their application the learned lower Appellate Court admitted the mutation in evidence and gave an apportunity to the plaintiffs to lead evidence in rebuttal. Chhibbo (plaintiff No. 2) end Chhindo (Plaintiff No. 3) appeared in that court as P.W 5 and P.W 6 respectively. Both of them have stated that after the death of their father, their brothers had started saying that he (i.e father) had made a will in their favour. Thus it is clear that at the earliest possible opportunity the will was propounded by them.
15. The mutation proceeding shows that on 10th December, 1970 on which date the Revenue Officer sanctioned the mutation, the plaintiffs had appeared and stated that the mutation be sanctioned in accordance with the will. It is not disputed that mutation proceedings are admisible in evidence. Reference can be made to Nizam Ud Din v. Fateh Din, Defendant (1939) 41 PLR 308 , AIR 1940 Lahore 118, wherein it was remarked:—
Page: 495“Mr. Shamair Chand for the defendant-respondent on the other hand contends that what is stated in a mutation carried with the presumption of truth and that as all official acts are to be presumed to have been regularly performed it was not necessary to produce every official who made an entry in the mutation proceedings, and that all entries in the mutation proceedings were admissible perse without the necessity of producing the official or officials who made them”.
16. In this connection he relied on Nizam Din v. Godar AIR 1934 PC 40, but a more direct authority in, his favour is Bhagwan Dess v. Mangal Sain AIR 1929 Lah 93, where Bhide J. observed as follows:—
‘The plaintiff produced certain copies of mutations and the entries in the mutation had been incorporated in the jamabandis also. There was a presumption of correctness of the latter entries under S. 44, Punjab Land Revenue Act…….. The mutation show that in one case the defendant himself and in the other his son were present and admitted transfers at the time of mutations were sanctioned. The learned District Judge apparently thinks that the Revenue Officer who sanctioned the mutations or the Girdawar should have been produced as witness to prove the mutations, but no authority in support of this view has been cited…………”.
17. It appears thus in that case what was recorded by revenue officials in mutation proceedings was accepted as evidence without those officials being produced. In Arti v. Rodbol (1936) 38 P.L.P 225 again Bhide J. laid down that mutation proceedings should have been taken into consideration even when the revenue official who sanctioned them was not produced as a witness
18. Though the plaintiffs have now stated that they did not appear before the Revenue Officer at the time the mutation was sanctioned but their denial can be hardly believed. The mutation had remained pending for about 3 years but none of the plaintiffs approached the Revenue Officer to get the mutation entered or sanctioned in accordance with natural succession. Of course, when the mutation was taken up for sanction on 28th January, 1970 Pritam Kaur had appeared and raised objection to the will. As noticed earlier, later on all the plaintiffs appeared before the Revenue Officer and admitted the will as correct. If the plaintiffs had not appeared before the Revenue Officer, they would have filed appeal against the order sanctioning the mutation. Surprisingly enough, they kept quiet and the present suit was filed long after the death of Ujjagar Singh These circumstances clearly show that the plaintiffs had first accepted the will as correct but now perhaps their relations with the contesting defendants have not remained cordial and, therefore, they have filed the suit P.W 5 Chhibbo plaintiff was frank enough to state that she had filed the suit late as her relations with her brothers became strained and earlier the relations were cordial.
19. For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that the learned lower appellate Court was right in holding that Ujjagar Singh executed the will Exhibit D. 1 and that it was not surrounded by suspicious circumstances.
20. For the foregoing reasons I do not find any force in the present appeal and dismiss the same. In the circumstances of the case, parties are left to bear their own costs.
H.L.S
Appeal dismissed.
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