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Saudagar Singh , v. Harnam Kaur .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Feb 23, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.V. Sehgal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (appellants) instituted a suit on 6.7.1971 for a decree of declaration that they are owners in possession to the extent of a 1/2 share of a specified land and that the defendant, Harnam Kaur, had no right, title or interest in that share. The plaintiffs alleged that the disputed property was originally owned equally by Ganda Singh and Santa (Santa) Singh, that Ganda Singh died in 1924 leaving Harnam Kaur as his widow, and that Harnam Kaur later contracted a karewa marriage with Hazura Singh many years earlier and thereby forfeited her rights. The plaintiffs claimed possession and sought only a declaration (no consequential relief).

Harnam Kaur denied the karewa marriage and asserted she remained owner in possession of a half share. She also raised objections that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiffs lacked locus standi.

At trial, several issues were framed and the trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Harnam Kaur appealed and the Additional District Judge (First Appellate Court) allowed her appeal by judgment and decree dated 27.7.1977, holding among other things that the suit was barred by limitation, that Harnam Kaur was in possession of half the land so a mere declaration without consequential relief was not maintainable, and that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the alleged karewa marriage.

The plaintiffs (now appellants before the revisional/second appellate court) challenged the First Appellate Court's decision. During the pendency of the appeal before the Additional District Judge, Harnam Kaur died (4.6.1977). The appellants contended that the appeal abated because her legal representatives had not been brought on record and that the decree in her favour was a nullity. The revisional court (D.V. Sehgal, J.) heard arguments and delivered the present opinion dismissing the second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal in favour of the defendant (Harnam Kaur) abated upon her death during the pendency of the appeal and whether the decree passed by the First Appellate Court on 27.7.1977 is a nullity for that reason.
  2. Whether the suit for declaration simpliciter (without consequential relief) filed by the plaintiffs was maintainable when the defendant was found to be in possession of the disputed land.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs' suit filed on 6.7.1971 was barred by limitation (i.e., when did the cause of action first accrue under Article 58 of the Limitation Act).
  4. Whether the plaintiffs proved that Harnam Kaur contracted a karewa marriage with Hazura Singh and thereby forfeited her rights in the property of Ganda Singh (i.e., whether the affidavit and other evidence established re-marriage leading to forfeiture of rights).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appeal in favour of Harnam Kaur abated upon her death on 4.6.1977 because her legal representatives were not brought on the record within the prescribed time; therefore, the decree dated 27.7.1977 is a nullity and should be set aside, with remand to the First Appellate Court to consider abatement and the bringing on record of legal representatives.
  • The plaintiffs claimed ownership and possession of a 1/2 share of the suit land and alleged that Harnam Kaur forfeited her rights by entering into a karewa marriage with Hazura Singh (claimed to be about 45 years before the suit). They relied on an affidavit dated 30.10.1967 (Exhibit P.W.5/2) as an admission by Harnam Kaur of that marriage.
  • The plaintiffs argued the suit was within limitation, alleging a fresh cause of action arose about a week before institution of the suit when Harnam Kaur allegedly refused to accept that she had forfeited her rights.
  • The appellants challenged the trial court and First Appellate Court's findings on evidence (e.g., challenged the assessment of handwriting and witness credibility) mainly in relation to Exhibit P.W.5/2 and supporting testimony (P.W.5, P.W.7, P.W.9).

Defendant's (Harnam Kaur's) Arguments

  • Harnam Kaur denied having contracted any karewa marriage with Hazura Singh and asserted continuous ownership in possession of a half share of the suit land.
  • She contended the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable as a mere declaration since she was (and had been) in possession of the disputed half share.
  • She raised the legal objections that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiffs lacked locus standi to bring the suit.
  • The defence relied on entries in the revenue records (Jamabandi and mutation entries), witness testimony corroborating possession, and her application to correct a wrong entry in the Khasra Girdawari (resulting in Collector's order dated 6.12.1972) to support her continuing ownership and possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amarsangji Indrasangji v. Desai Unel, A.I.R. 1925 Bombay 290 Authorities cited by appellants to support the proposition that an appeal abates on the death of a sole surviving appellant if legal representatives are not brought on record within the prescribed period. The court distinguished this precedent: those cases involved abatement after the lapse of the period for bringing legal representatives. In the present case the appeal was heard and decided before the 90-day abatement period expired, so the precedent did not apply.
Ram Saran Ahir & others v. Prithvi Nath Singh & another, A.I.R. 1952 Patna 267 Authority relied upon by appellants concerning abatement and non-joinder of legal representatives after death of a party. Distinguished on the basis that in those authorities the appeals or suits had already abated on expiry of the limitation period; in the present matter the appeal was decided prior to expiry of the 90-day period, so the precedent was not controlling.
State of Gujarat v. Chandramani Shanker Jadhavlal Sanghvi & others, A.I.R. 1963 Gujarat 243 Authority cited on consequences of death of a party during proceedings and the need to bring legal representatives on record. Distinguished for the same reason: the cited authorities dealt with matters in which the appeals/suits had abated; by contrast, in the present case the appeal was decided before abatement could occur.
Jiviban Lavji Raganath v. Jadavji Devshanker & others, A.I.R. 1978 Gujarat 32 Another authority relied on by appellants related to abatement and representation of deceased parties in appeals/suits. Distinguished: the court treated these precedents as inapplicable because the appeal here was disposed of within the 90-day period and did not stand abated when decided.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The analysis below follows the sequence and legal reasoning provided in the opinion without adding external material.

  1. Abatement and effect of death of appellant/respondent during appeal:

    The court reviewed Order 22 Rule 3 read with Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. These provisions require that when a sole surviving appellant dies and the right to sue survives, the court shall, on application, cause legal representatives to be made a party and proceed with the appeal; if no application is made within 90 days, the appeal shall abate.

    Applying this to the facts: Harnam Kaur died on 4.6.1977. Abatement would occur only after the expiry of 90 days from that date if no application were made. However, the Additional District Judge heard and decided the appeal on 27.7.1977 — well within the 90-day period. The court therefore held the precedents relied on by the appellants (which involved cases where abatement already occurred) to be distinguishable. The court also noted an earlier order (by J.M. Tandon, J.) which observed that the appeal decided on 27.7.1977 could not be taken as having abated and that later the respondents were allowed to be brought on record as legal representatives. On that basis, the contention that the First Appellate Court's decree was a nullity for want of joinder was rejected.

  2. Maintainability of a declaration suit when defendant is in possession:

    The court examined the record of rights (mutations and Jamabandi entries) and oral testimony. The revenue records showed continuing entries recognizing Harnam Kaur as owner in possession of 1/2 share over successive Jamabandis (including 1941-42, 1945-46, 1961-62, 1964-65 and 1969-70). The Khasra Girdawari entry for 1970-71 initially omitted her name, but she successfully applied to the Collector and the wrong entry was corrected by order dated 6.12.1972.

    Several defence witnesses (D.W.3, D.W.4, D.W.6, D.W.7, and D.W.9 (Harnam Kaur)) testified that she had been owner in possession; these depositions were not effectively shaken in cross-examination. The court accepted the Additional District Judge's rejection of the plaintiffs' bare statements of exclusive possession.

    The court applied the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which bars a suit for declaration simpliciter where the person against whom the declaration is sought is in possession — a consequential relief (e.g., for possession or ejectment) is required. On that basis the court affirmed the First Appellate Court's finding (Issue No. 3) that the declaration-only suit was not maintainable.

  3. Limitation — when the cause of action first accrued (Article 58):

    Article 58 (to obtain any other declaration — three years from when the right to sue first accrues) was considered. The court identified specific points in time reflected in the revenue record when the predecessors of the appellants could and did have notice of Harnam Kaur's continuing rights:

    • Mutation regarding inheritance of Smt. Saddi sanctioned on 14.4.1942 (Exhibit D.W.9/A) recorded Harnam Kaur and Santa Singh as inheritors — a date when the predecessor's right to sue first accrued.
    • Jamabandi for 1945-46 (Exhibit D.W.8/F) again recorded Harnam Kaur as owner of 1/2 share — another occasion when suit could have been filed.
    • Jamabandi for 1961-62 (Exhibit D.W.8/G) continued the same position, after inheritance by appellants of Kishno’s share.

    The court rejected the appellants' argument that successive threats or a refusal by Harnam Kaur a week before suit created fresh causes of action for limitation purposes. The court emphasized Article 58’s clear rule that time begins to run from when the cause of action first accrues (not from every subsequent denial). The court explained that the earlier conflict under the Limitation Act, 1908 about successive denials was resolved by the express language of Article 58 of the 1963 Act. Accordingly, the suit (instituted in 1971) was held to be barred by limitation and the First Appellate Court's finding on Issue No. 1 was affirmed.

  4. Evidence of karewa marriage and the affidavit (Exhibit P.W.5/2):

    The court examined the trial and appellate courts' assessments of evidence regarding the affidavit dated 30.10.1967 and related proof attempts (witnesses P.W.5 Karnail Singh, P.W.9 Saudagar Singh, and handwriting/thumb impression evidence P.W.7).

    The court agreed with the First Appellate Court that the affidavit was rightly rejected for cogent reasons: Karnail Singh (P.W.5) showed inconsistent statements and appeared to be a witness friendly to the appellants; his testimony about presence at execution was inconsistent and at one stage denied Saudagar’s presence. Saudagar Singh (P.W.9) admitted presence, creating conflicting testimony. The fingerprint/thumb impression expert (P.W.7) could not satisfactorily compare the thumb impressions (they were superimposed and not suitable for comparison).

    The two sale deeds dated 15-3-1965 were held by the First Appellate Court to be of no assistance even if proved because they did not mention the date or fact of any karewa marriage. Moreover, if the alleged remarriage occurred in 1965, by that time the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had already come into force and Harnam Kaur (as absolute owner of her share) would not have forfeited her rights by subsequent remarriage. The court also noted inconsistency by the appellants in pleading when the alleged karewa marriage occurred (variously pleaded at different times as 45 years earlier and 4/5 years earlier). For these reasons the court affirmed the First Appellate Court's finding (Issue No. 4) that the appellants failed to prove the karewa marriage and consequent forfeiture.

  5. Overall conclusion reached by the court:

    The court found no force in the appellants' contention regarding abatement; affirmed that a declaration-only suit was not maintainable where the defendant was shown to be in possession (Section 34 proviso); held the plaintiffs' suit barred by limitation under Article 58; and affirmed the First Appellate Court's rejection of the evidence of karewa marriage. On these bases, the court dismissed the second appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs. (C.M. No. 3831-C of 1987 is dismissed as infructuous.)

Implications

  • Direct effect: The First Appellate Court's judgment and decree dated 27.7.1977 in favour of Harnam Kaur (and the subsequent proceedings recognizing her legal representatives) stand; the plaintiffs' suit for a mere declaration is not allowed to succeed and remains dismissed on limitation and maintainability grounds.
  • On limitation and maintainability principles: The court applied Article 58 of the Limitation Act to hold that the period for a declaration suit begins when the right to sue first accrues (earlier dates in the revenue records), rejecting the notion that each subsequent denial creates a fresh cause of action for limitation purposes. The court also applied the proviso to Section 34, Specific Relief Act, 1963 to hold a declaration-only suit is not maintainable where the defendant is in possession.
  • Precedent setting: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying existing statutory provisions and distinguishing earlier authorities relied on by the appellants. The decision applies established procedural rules (Order 22 R.3 CPC; Limitation Act Article 58) and Section 34 proviso; it does not announce a new precedent beyond its application to the facts.
Show all summary ...

D.V Sehgal, J. — This appeal by the plaintiff appellant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27.7.1977 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faridkot (Camp at Bhatinda whereby he allowed the appeal of Harnam Kaur defendant against the judgment and decree dated 26.2.1974 of the learned Sub Judge IIIrd Class (A) Bhatinda decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-appellants for declaration.

2. The appellants had filed a suit on 6.7.1971 praying for grant of a decree of declaration to the effect that they are owners in possession to the extent of 1/2 share of the land measuring 425 Kanals 16 Marlas situated in village Chak Fateh Singhwala as decribed therein and that Harnam Kaur had no right, title or interest in the same. It was alleged that the whole of the land in dispute was owned in equal shares by Ganda Singh and Santa Singh sons of Gurdit Singh. Ganda Singh died in the year 1924 leaving behind Harnam Kaur as his widow. The appellants are the sons and daughters of Santa Singh. Harnam Kaur performed a Karewa marriage with one Hazura Singh son of Sarup Singh resident of village Mangewala about 45 years before the institution of the suit. Since Ganda Singh and the appellants were governed by the custom, Harnam Kaur forfeited all her rights in the suit property coming to her from Ganda Singh. It was further alleged that the property was ancestral qua the appellants and that they alone were the rightful owners of the same and Harnam Kaur had nothing to do with it. They further claimed themselves to be in actual possession of the suit land and thus filed a suit for declaration of their title without seeking any consequential relief. It was further alleged that Harnam Kaur had herself admitted the facts of a Karewa marriage with one Hazura Singh vide affidavit dated 30th October, 1967, Exhibit P.W 5/2. Harnam Kaur denied all the allegations. She admitted that she is the widow of Ganda Singh but emphatically denied having entered into any Karewa marriage with one Hazura Singh. She further asserted that she had been continuing as owner in possession of one half share of the suit land all along and as such the suit filed by the appellants for a simple declaration is not maintainable. She also raised legal objections to the effect that the suit is barred by limitation and the appellants had no locus standi to file the suit. On the Pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:—

1. Whether the suit is within limitation? O.P.P

2. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? O.P.D

3. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable? O.P.D

Page: 784. Whether Harnam Kaur contracted a Karewa marriage with Hazura Singh and thus forfeited her rights in the property of Ganda Singh deceased? O.P.P

5. Whether the suit property is ancestral? O.P.P

6. Whether the plaintiffs and Ganda Singh deceased are governed by custom? O.P.P

7. Relief.

As has already been mentioned above the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the appellants, it retimed the findings on the different issues either in favour of the appellants or against Harnam Kaur. She therefore, preferred an appeal which has been accepted by the learned Additional District Judge vide judgment and decree under appeal. It has been held therein that the suit filed by the appellents was barred by limitation. It has also been found that Harnam Kaur was in possession of are half of the suit land, the suit for mere declaration without asking for a consequential relief could not be maintained. It was further held that the appellant had failed to prove that Harnam Kaur had contracted a karewa marriage with Hazura Singh and for that reasons had forfeited her rights in the property of Ganda Singh deceased. The findings of the trial court on issue Nos. 2, 5 and 6 were maintained.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the appellent is that Harnam Kaur died on 4.6.1977 during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Additional District Judge. Her legal representatives were not brought on the record and as such the appeal abated. The decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court in her fovour on 27.7.1977 is, therefere a nullity. He urged that the only course open in this situation is that the decree under appeal should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the first Appellate Court for considering the question whether or not the abatement should be set aside and whether the legal representatives of Harnam Kaur should be allowed to be brought on the record and then it should decide the appeal on merits. To canvass this proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Amarsangji Indrasangji v. Desai Unel A.I.R 1925 Bombay 290, Ram Saran Ahir and others v. Prithvi Nath Singh and another, A.I.R 1952 Patna, 267, State of Gujarat v. Chandramani Shanker Jadhavlal Sanghvi and others, A.I.R 1963 Gujarat 243 Jiviban Lavji Raganath v. Jadavji Devshanker and others A.I.R 1978 Gujarat 32.

4. I am of the view that this contention of the learned counsel has no force. Harnam Kaur died on 4. 6. 1977. Order 22 Rule 3 read with Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, and Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 provide that where a sole surviving appellant dies and the right to sue survives the court on an application made in that behalf shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased-appellant to be made a party and shall proceed with the appeal. Where within the period of 90 days no application is made for bringing on record the leggl representatives of the appellant, the appeal shall abate. Thus the abatement of the appeal was to take place on the expiry of the period of 90 days from 4. 6. 1977. However much before that the appeal was heard and decided by the learned Additional District Judge on 27. 7. 1977. All the precedents cited by the learned counsel for the appellant pertain to appeals or suits which had abated on expiry of the period of limitation and the legal representatives of the deceased appellant having not been brought on the record. The present case is therefore, clearly distinguishable. In fact, this matter stood already concludtd by an order dated September, 8, 1981 by J.M Tandon, J. (as he then was) while deciding Civil Misc. Nos. 11.83-C of 1981, 2262 C of 1978 and 2031-C of 1978. The following observations from the said order are relevant:—

Page: 79“Harnam Kaur had died on June 4, 1977, whereas the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda, accepted her appeal on July 27, 1977. Under these circumstances, the appeal decided by the Additional District Jadge, Bhatinda, in favour of Harnam Singh cannot be taken having abated.”

Vide this very order, the learned Judge allowed the present respondents to be brought on the record as legal representatives of Harnam Kaur, defendant. I, therefore, reject this contention. Then next the question which I would take up for decision is whether the suit for declaration simpliciter filed by the appellant was maintainable, while dilating on this issue, it would be of help to set out some of the undisputed facts borne out from the record of rights.

5. The land in suit was admittedly owned by Gurdit Singh. He had four sons from his wife Smt. Saddi namely, Ganda Singh, Same Singh, Arjae Singh and Sunder Singh. Arjan Singh and Sunder Singh pre-deceased Gurdit Singh. When Gurdit died in the year 1918, mutation Exhibit PX regarding inheritance of his estate was sanctioned in favour of his two sons Ganda Singh and Santa Singh snd his widow Smt. Saddi in equal shares i. e. 1/3rd shara each. Ganda Singh died in the year 1924 and on his death mutation Exhibit D.W 9 was sanctioned on 22.9.1924 in favour of his widow Harnam Kaur. The revenue record after that shows Harnam Kaur. Santa Singh and Smt. Saddi as owners in possession of the suit land in equal shares. Smt. Soddi died on 9.2.1942, Mutation Exhibit D.W.9/A in respect of her inheritance was sanctioned on 12.4.1942 Her Estate was inherited in equal shares by Harnam Kaur and Santa Singh. Jamabandi for the year 1941-42 shows Haram Kaur and Santa Singh as owners in possession in equal shares of the suit land. It appears that Santa Singh died. Later, Jamabandi for the year 1915-46. Exhibit D.W 8.B, shows that his widow Kishno and his two sons Nazar Singh and Saudagar Singh appellants are shown owners in possession of 1/2 share of the suit land while the other 1/2 share is recorded to be in the ownership and possession of Harnam Kaur. This position continued uptill the Jamabandi for the year 1945-46, Exhibit D W.8.F. It appears that subsequent thereto Kishno had died. Therefore, in the Jamabandi for year 1961-62, Exhibit D.W.8/G, while Harnam Kaur was recorded as owner in possession of 1/2 share of suit land, the appellants Nazar Singh, Santa Singh and Mukhtiar Kaur (daughter of Santa Singh) are recorded as owners of 4/18th, 4/18th and 1/18th shares in the suit land which means that the share of Smt. Kishno was inherited equally by the appellants. This veary position with regard to ownership and possession of the suit land is borne out from the Jamabandi for year 1964-65, Exhibit D.W 8.H and Jamabandi for the year 1969-70, Exhibit D.W.8/J. However, in, the Khasra Girdawari entery for the crop harvest 1970-71, Exhibit D.W 8.K, the name of Harnam Kaur was omitted. She was vigilant, enough to assert her right and applied for correction of wrong entry in the Khasra Girdawari. Her application was allowed by the order of the Collector, dated 6.12.1972, Exhibit D.W.9/6. These entries in the record of rights are presumed to be ture and correct unless these are rebutted by cogent evidence which is altogether missing from the record. In fact, as many as five witnesses have come forward to corroborate that Harnam Kaur had all along been owner in possession of the suit land. They are Mota Singh, D.W.3, Khazan Singh, D W.4, Pritam Singh, D.W.6, Dalbara Singh, D.W.7 and Harnam Kaur D.W.9 Their depositions that Harnam Kaur is owner in possession of the suit land all along was not questioned in the course of the cross-examination. The bare statement of D.W 9 and some of the witnesses produced by him that the appellants are in exclusive possession of the entire suit land has rightly been rejected by the learned Additional District Judge. Once it is held that Harnam Kaur has been in possession of the suit land, suit Page: 80for declaration simpliciter filed by the appellants without asking for a consequential relief of possession would not be maintainable as laid down by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963. I, therefore, affirm the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on Issue No. 3.

6. As a corollary to the above, it would be expedient to go into the question whether the suit filed by the appellants on 6.7.1971 was within limitation. Article 58 of the Limitation for a suit for declaration in the following terms:

58. To obtain any other declaration. Three yers When the right to sue first accrues.

The case of the appellants is that Harnam Kaur having entered into a Karewa marrige with one Hazura Singh about 45 years before the institution of the suit had forfeited her right to the estate of Ganda Singh and that since she had refused to accept this position about a week before the institution of the suit cause of action had arisan to them. In view of the language of Artrcle 58 ibid it has to he seen when the cause of action first accrued to the appellants. Even if it be taken that a couple of years after the death of Ganda Singh, Harnam Kaur allegedly entered into a Karewa marriage with one Hazura Singh and the predecessor of the appellant, namely, Santa Singh, did not care to have the record of rights corrected, the first occasion for him to do so arose when Mutation Exhibit D.W 9.A with respect to inheritance of Smt. Saddi was sanctioned on 14.4.1942 Her share in the land by virtue of this mutation was recorded to Have been inherited by Harnam Kaur and Santa Singh in equal sharest. It was on this date that the right first accrued to the prodecessor in interest of the appellant to seek a declaration from the civil court that Harnam Kaua had forfeited her right in the property but he did not do so. When Sant-Singh died and inheritance of his estate was entered into the name of Naza. Singh, Saudagar Singh and their mother Kishno to the extent to only 1/2 share and remaining 1/2 share wes recorded to be the ownership and post session of Harnam Raur as reflected in the Jamabandi for the year 1945-46. Exhibit D.W 8F, this was the second time when the appellants could have filed a suit for declaration thae Harnam Kaur had forfeited her rights in the property. The third occasion arose when after the death of Smt. Kishno her share in the suit laud was inherited in equal share by all the appellants and Harnam Kaur continued as owner in possession of 1/2 share as reflected in the Jamabandi for the year 1961-1962, Exhibit D.W 8.G. In fact, the position in the record of rights continued to be the same till the last Jamabandi for the year 1969-1970. No doubt an attempt was made by the appellants to get a stray entry in the Khasra Girdawari for the crop harvest 1970-1971, Exhibit DW.8.K to obliterate the ownership of possession of Harnam Kaur, but that was of no avail to them because Harnam Kaur immediately moved the revenue authorities and vide Exhibit P. W.9/6, an order was passed by the Collector on 6.12.1972, correcting the Khasra Girdawari. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that whenever another threat is posed to the right of ownership and possession of the suit land by Harnam Kaur the appellants got a fresh cause of action to file the suit for declaration. Their averment in the plaint is that a week preceding the date of institution of the suit Harnam Kaur refused to accept the act that she had forfeited her rights in the suit property gave them a fresh cause of action to bring the suit within limitation. I am afraid this contention is no longer valid in view of the clear language of Article 58 ibid. No doubt under the Limitation Act 1908 there was a conflict of decision as to whether there may be successive denials of the plaintiff's right so as to furnish successive causes of action for a suit for a declaration. This conflict stands resolved by the express provision of Article 58 ibid to the effect that time will begin to run from the date when the cause Page: 81of action first accrues. I am, therefore, of the firm view that the suit of the appellant was not within limitation and the finding recorded to this effect under Issue No. 1 by the learned Additional District Judge is affirmed.

7. The last point which was in fact argued at great length by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge on Issue No. 4 is not correct. He contends that the affidavit dated 30th October, 1967, Exhibit P.W 5/2 is proved to have been executed by Harnam Kaur. She categorically stated therein that she had entered into a Karewa marriage with one Hazura Singh after the death of her husband Ganda Singh. He tried to find fault with the appreciation of evidence of Karnail Singh, P.W 5, Saudagar Singh P.W 9 and the Handwriting Expert P.W 7. I have carefully scrutinized the finding recorded by the learned First Appellate Court. In my view, the affidavit Exhibit P.W 5/2 has beer, rejected for very cogent reasons. There was no occasion for Harnam Kaur to execute this affidavit. Karnail Singh P.W.5 has been rightly held to be a handy witness with the appellants. He firstly denied that Saudagar Singh, appellant, was present when the affidavit was allegedly executed, Later he made a non-committal statement but his stand was belied by the statement of Saudagar Singh, P.W 9 himself who had admitted that he was present at the time when the affidavit was executed. The statemement of P.W.7 is of no help. He stated that the thumb marks on the affidavit are supar-imposed and did not admit of comparision with the admitted thumb marks of Harnam Kaur. As regards the two sale deeds dated 15-3-1965, the learned First Appellate Court has rightly held that these deeds are of no help to the appellants even if these are found to have been proved. There is no mention in these affidavits that Harnam Kaur had entered into a Karewa marriage with Hazura Singh and when. If it is taken a fact that she entered into a Karewa marriage with Hazura Singh in 1965, this again is so go helo to the appellants because on the coming into fores of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Harnam Kaur had already become absolute owner of her share in the suit land and her re-marriage was not to forfeit her rght therein. Learned Additional District Judge has also noticed inconsistent stands taken at different times by the appellants as to when Harnam Kaur entered into a karewa with Hazura Singh. Here it may also be noticed that Harnam Kaur filed a suit for partition of her share in the suit land with the revenue authorities. The appellants filed a written statement on 1.7.1971 in that suit, copy of which is Exhibit D.W 5.A. It is stated therein that Harnam Kaur entered into a karewa marriage with Hazura Singh 4/5 years earlier which takes us to the year 1965-1966. Only 5 days later the instant suit was filed in which allegatioas were made that Harnam Kaur entered into a karewa marriage 45 years earlier. For all the reasons stated by the learned Additional District Judge his finding on Issue No. 4 that the appellants have failed to prove that Harnam Kaur entered into a karewa marriage with Hazura Singh and thus forfeited her rights in the property of Ganda Singh deceased is correct. It does not warrant any interference at the stage of Second Appeal before me. I, therefore, affirm this finding.

8. Thus, there being on force in the appeal, the same is dismissed with costs. C.M No. 3831-C of 1987 is dismissed as infructuous.