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The British India Corporation Limited, v. The Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur And Another,
Case Summary — Sodhi, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment disposes of two connected writ petitions: Civil Writ No. 1526 of 1964 and Civil Writ No. 1540 of 1968. The petitions raise common questions of law and fact; arguments were advanced in the leading petition (No. 1526 of 1964). The factual difference identified in the opinion is that Writ No. 1526/1964 challenges house-tax assessments for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64, whereas Writ No. 1540/1968 challenges an enhanced assessment for the year 1966-67.
Brief chronology as recited in the opinion: - The town of Dhariwal progressed from a Notified Area Committee to a Small Town Area Committee and, from 1952-53, became subject to the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (the "Act"). - Prior assessments (1952-53 onward) had placed the total annual value at Rs. 60,032 (1952-53) and Rs. 64,194 (from 1953-54), on which the company paid tax until 1961-62. - The Municipal Committee undertook a revision: a sub-committee reported an increase to Rs. 75,900; the Municipal Committee varied that to Rs. 94,070 by resolution dated 11 January 1963. - The petitioner appealed under Section 84 to the Deputy Commissioner, who (on 24 April 1963) set aside the assessment for failure to give the petitioner an opportunity to be heard before the Municipal Committee itself and ordered fresh assessment after hearing. - The Committee, after hearing the petitioner, confirmed the earlier assessment by resolution on 30 September 1963. A subsequent appeal to the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed on 18 April 1964. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in determining "annual value" or the gross annual rent for assessment of house tax under the Punjab Municipal Act, the assessing authority must be guided by the provisions and criteria of the applicable Rent Control Act (here described as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 / Punjab Rent Control Act).
- Whether the enhanced assessment impugned is arbitrary or invalid because it lacks any stated formula, objective data, or "speaking" reasons justifying the increase.
- Whether an assessment (or revised assessment list) finalized on 30 September 1963 could validly operate retrospectively for the assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64, having regard to Section 66 read with Section 68 of the Punjab Municipal Act and the use of words like "next ensuing" and "in the following year".
- Whether the Municipal Committee was empowered to act under the Punjab Municipal Act (versus the Punjab Small Towns Act, 1921) in the assessments impugned.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner Company's) Arguments
- The Municipal Committee was required to fix gross annual rent by reference to the Rent Control Act; where the Rent Control Act applies the gross annual rent cannot exceed the "fair rent" as fixed by a Rent Controller, and even if fair rent is not fixed, the Municipal Committee must be guided by the Rent Control Act's principles in determining fair rent.
- The enhanced assessment is arbitrary because the authorities gave no formula, objective data, or basis for the increase; assessing authorities must act on objective data and pass a "speaking" order explaining the basis for the increase.
- The assessment made on 30 September 1963 cannot validly operate for assessment year 1962-63 (which had run its course) and cannot operate for 1963-64 because Sections 66 and 68 of the Act require assessment procedure to be completed so that the assessment takes effect from the first day of January or April "next ensuing" and not retrospectively.
Respondent's (Municipal Committee's) Arguments
- The amounts described as "rent" are only maintenance charges paid by employees and the premises have not actually been let; fair rent is relevant only when premises have been let and fair rent is actually fixed.
- The Municipal Committee may assess hypothetical letting value on what a hypothetical tenant would pay given economic conditions, demand and supply; a municipal authority is not bound to adopt the fair rent unless the Rent Control Act has actually fixed it.
- The increased rental value over ten years reflected genuine increase in rental value and the enhanced assessment is reasonable (although no specific formula was pointed out in support).
- On the question of retrospectivity, it was argued that Sections 66 and 68 do not require completion of the entire assessment process before the start of the ensuing year; rather, proceedings relating to assessment must have commenced before the relevant first day of January/April.
- The tax, it was contended, was imposed under the Punjab Small Towns Act, 1921, making reference to sections of the Punjab Municipal Act irrelevant (an argument rejected by the court as explained below).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Corporation of Calcutta v. Smt. Padma Debi and others (Supreme Court) | The Rent Control Act must be taken into account when assessing hypothetical/annual rent; rent-control law places an upper limit on the rent a landlord can reasonably be expected to obtain. | The court relied on its ratio to hold that laws controlling rent (and their penal/limiting effect) constrain what can be deemed the "reasonable" letting value; municipal assessing authorities cannot ignore such statutory limits. |
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Das (Division Bench of this Court) | Section 3(1)(b) definition of "annual value" is to be modified by the Rent Control Act; "reasonably be expected to let" means the amount recoverable under law, not sums recovered in violation of law. | The court cited this decision approvingly as supporting the proposition that annual rent cannot exceed fair rent under rent-control law. |
| Oriental Government Security Life Insurance Company Ltd. v. The New Delhi Municipality, New Delhi (unreported) | Referenced as a supporting authority for the view adopted in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Das. | Used by the court as part of the chain of authority endorsing the application of rent-control criteria to municipal annual-value assessment. |
| Vidya Parkash v. The Municipal Committee, Simla (unreported; Division Bench of Delhi High Court) | Held that where fair rent is not fixed under the Rent Control Act, municipal authority may ascertain hypothetical open-market rent. | The court expressly disagreed with this Bench decision, stating it was not consonant with the ratio of the Supreme Court authorities relied upon. |
| Motichand Hirachand and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (Supreme Court) | In valuation, "every intrinsic quality and every intrinsic circumstance" affecting rental value must be considered; additional income sources (e.g., terrace advertisement) may be considered in assessing value. | The court treated this decision as addressing valuation by reference to all intrinsic attributes; it held the decision does not conflict with the Corporation of Calcutta's case and is factually distinguishable from Vidya Parkash. |
| Inder Mohan v. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab and others | Where property is subject to the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, it cannot earn nor be reasonably expected to earn more rent than that Act permits. | The court cited this judgment to support the conclusion that assessing authorities must determine annual rental value in accordance with rent-control provisions. |
| Tejaswi Chand Khanna v. The Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab and others | Where fair rent has been fixed by the Rent Controller, assessing authorities must determine annual rent in accordance with the Rent Control Act. | Relied upon to reinforce that assessments must conform to rent-control determinations when applicable. |
| Girdhari Lal v. Excise and Taxation Officer | A view by S.K. Kapur, J. aligning with the position that rent-control criteria govern assessment (noted as not accepted by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court). | The court expressed respectful agreement with the view and cited it as supporting authority for applying rent-control criteria. |
| Kaviraj Khazan Chand v. The New Delhi Municipality | Owners/occupiers entitled to be informed of the formula on which new assessments are proposed; inviting objections is not a mere formality. | The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that assessing authorities must disclose the guiding principle or formula for assessment changes and issue a speaking order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, each applying legal principle to the facts before it:
-
Interpretation of "annual value" and effect of rent-control legislation:
- The court examined the statutory definition of "annual value" (Section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act) and considered relevant precedents, notably the Corporation of Calcutta case. That precedent held that rent-control laws must be treated as circumstances of the market and impose an upper limit on hypothetical rent.
- The court held that this principle applies where the Rent Control Act is applicable: the assessing authority cannot assess annual rent above what the Rent Control Act permits as "fair rent," whether or not the Rent Controller has actually fixed fair rent in a given case. Assessing authorities must apply the criteria of the Rent Control Act when determining annual rent.
- The court rejected the contention (and a conflicting Bench decision in Vidya Parkash) that absence of a formal fixation of fair rent should allow municipal authorities to adopt a higher "hypothetical" open-market rent; the presence of statutory rent-control criteria limits the scope of hypothetical valuation.
-
Challenge to the Municipal Committee's factual contentions:
- The Municipal Committee's argument that premises were not actually let and that sums were only maintenance charges was noted, but the court observed that such a factual plea had not been taken in the return and could not be raised for the first time in argument.
- The court emphasized that the assessment must focus on the value to the owner as constrained by law; contractual sums paid in violation of rent-control limits cannot form the basis for lawful annual value.
-
Requirement of objective data and speaking order:
- The court found the impugned assessment deficient because the Municipal Committee did not state the formula, objective data or reasons that justified the increase from the previously assessed amount to the enhanced figure. As a quasi-judicial body, the Committee should pass a speaking order enabling the assessee to understand the basis of the change and to contest it effectively.
- Reference was made to Kaviraj Khazan Chand to show that inviting objections is not a mere form and that affected parties must be informed of the principles or formula on which new assessments are proposed.
-
Temporal validity (Sections 66 and 68):
- The court analysed Sections 66 and 68 and the procedures in Chapter V for preparing, publishing and finalizing assessment lists. It held that the finalization/authentication of the assessment list is the event that gives rise to liability for the ensuing year specified (first January or first April "next ensuing").
- The court concluded that assessments (or lists) affecting an assessee prejudicially must be completed before the relevant year of assessment commences; the statutory scheme does not permit a settlement of an assessment list to take effect retrospectively. Accordingly, an assessment finalized after the relevant year has commenced cannot validly be made to operate retrospectively.
-
Applicability of the Punjab Municipal Act:
- The court rejected the Municipal Committee's contention that the tax had been levied under the Punjab Small Towns Act, 1921. It observed that the Punjab Small Towns Act was repealed by the Punjab Municipal Amendment Act (XXXIV of 1954) and that from 11 December 1954 the Punjab Municipal Act became applicable. Notices were issued under the Punjab Municipal Act.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of enhanced assessment passed by the Municipal Committee, Dhariwal, as affirmed by the appellate authority, is quashed.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The enhanced assessment as it stood was set aside because (a) the assessing authority failed to apply the criteria of the Rent Control Act in determining annual value, (b) the order did not disclose objective data or a formula justifying the increase (no speaking order), and (c) the assessment could not validly operate retrospectively under Sections 66 and 68.
- The Municipal Committee is permitted, if so advised, to make a fresh assessment. Any fresh assessment must be made in conformity with the observations in the opinion, including taking into consideration the provisions of the Rent Control Act for fixation of fair rent and providing objective reasons/formulae and following the procedural requirements so that the assessment takes effect only prospectively as provided by the Act.
- There will be no order as to costs.
The opinion articulates and applies existing principles from cited precedents to the facts; it does not assert the creation of a novel legal doctrine beyond those applications recorded in the reasoning above.
Sodhi, J. - This judgment will dispose of two connected writ petitions No. 1526 of 1964 and 1540 of 1968. The learned counsel for both the parties are agreed that common question of law and fact arise in both these petitions and arguments have been advanced only in the former writ petition. The only difference on facts in regard to the two writ petition is that Civil Writ No. 1526 of 1964 is directed against the assessment of house tax levied by Municipal Committee, Dhariwal, in respect of certain property of the petitioner company for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64 whereas in the latter writ petition the challenge is against enhanced assessment made in similar circumstances for the year 1966-67. 2. It is alleged in Civil Writ No. 1526 of 1964 that the town of Dhariwal was first a Notified Area Committee and was subsequently declared a Small Town Area Committee. It continued as such upto the year 1952-53 when it was converted into a Committee to which provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as amended upto date and hereinafter called the Act, became applicable. There was an assessment of house tax made for various items of the property owned by the petitioner company on the basis of gross annual rent worked out by the Small Town Area Committee constituted under the Punjab Small Town Act, 1921. The total amount of annual value assessed for the year 1952-53 was Rs. 60, 032/- and from 1953-54 it was increased to Rs. 64,194/- on which amount the house tax was being paid by the company upto the year 1961-62. It occurred to the respondent Municipal Committee to revise the rental value of the various buildings owned by the petitioner Company and by its resolution passed on 21st May, 1962, notices were sent to the petitioners under Section 65 of the Act. The objections had to be filed within thirty days and a sub-committee was appointed to hear those objections. The sub-committee did hear the objections and recommended an increase in the amount of the annual rental value from Rs. 64,194/- to Rs. 75,900/-. The Municipal Committee considered this report at its meeting held on 11th January, 1963, but thought the amount to be too low and decided to increase the same to Rs. 94,070/-. A copy of the resolution passed by the Municipal Committee, whereby the recommendations of the sub-committee were accepted with variation enhancing the amount to Rs. 94,070/- has been attached with the writ petition as Annexure `C'. The petitioner company preferred an appeal under Section 84 of the Act to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, who allowed the same on 24th April, 1963, and set aside the assessment made by the respondent Municipal Committee. A copy of the order of the Deputy Commissioner so passed has not been placed on record by either of the parties but it has been produced now by Mr. D.N. Aggarwal, counsel for the respondent Municipal Committee. The Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that no opportunity as envisaged by law was given to the petitioner company to be heard by the Municipal Committee itself and that hearing of objections by the sub-committee was not a sufficient compliance with law. A fresh assessment was accordingly ordered after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard. The Municipal Committee again considered the matter and after hearing the representatives of the petitioner company and going though their objections, passed a resolution on 30th September, 1963, confirming the same assessment as had been made in its earlier resolution of 11th January, 1963. An appeal was again filed under Section 84 by the petitioner company before the Deputy Commissioner but it was dismissed on 18th of April, 1964. Hence the present writ petition. 3. Mr. Bhagirath Dass, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised three contentions. It has been submitted that it was incumbent upon the Municipal Committee to have fixed gross annual rent of the buildings in question by keeping in view the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act No. 3 of 1949), hereinafter called the `Rent Control Act. According to the learned counsel, the Rent Control Act is applicable to the town of Dhariwal and in such a situation the gross annual rent of any house or building at which such house or building can be let for use or enjoyment or can reasonably be excepted to be so let cannot be more than what is the fair rent of such a building or a house as fixed by a Rent Controller and, if any such rent is not so fixed, the Municipal Committee, must, in the matter of working out the gross annual rent be guided by the principles laid down in the Rent Control Act for the determination of fair rent. The other contention is that the assessment made in the instant case is highly and arbitrary gives no formula or basis on which the increase has been worked out. It is submitted in this contention that there must be some objective data on which the increase is based and in the absence of that the impugned assessment is liable to be quashed. The third contention is that the annual assessment for the year 1962-63 was made on 30th September, 1963, when actually the financial year 1962-63 from (1st April, 1962 to 31st March, 1963) had run out itself and in regard to assessment year 1963-64 it is urged that the assessment having been made on 30th September, 1963, could also not be valid since in terms of Section 66 read with Section 68 of the Act it could operate only prospectively with effect from the first day of January or the first day of April, of the following year and not retrospectively with effect from January or April, 1963. Emphasis has been laid on the words "ensuing year" as appearing in Section 66(1) and `in the following year' as used in Section 68 of the Act. Section 66(1) and Section 68 are in the following terms :- "66(1) After the objections have been enquired into and persons making them have been allowed an opportunity of being heard either in person or by authorised agent as they may think fit, and the revision of the valuation and assessment has been completed, the amendments made in the list shall be authenticated by the (signatures of not less than two members of the committee), who shall at the same time certify that no valid objection has made to the valuation and assessment contained in the list, except in the cases in which amendments have been entered therein; and subject to such amendments as may thereafter be duly made, the tax so assessed shall be deemed to be the tax for the year commencing on the first day of January or first day of April next ensuing as the committee may determine, or in the case of a tax then imposed for the first time for the period between the date on which the tax comes into force and such first day of January or April as the case may be." 68. New list need not be prepared every year : It shall be in the discretion of the committee to prepare (for the whole or any part of the municipality) a new assessment list every year or to adopt the valuation and assessment contained in the list for any year, with such alterations as may in particular cases be deemed necessary, as the valuation and assessment for the year following, giving to persons affected by such alterations the same notice of the valuation and assessment as if the new assessment list had been prepared." 4. Mr. D.N. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the Municipal Committees, controverts the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner company and firstly submits that the premises in dispute have not actually been let out to the employees, the amount described as rent is being paid only by way of maintenance charges, and that is only when the premises have been let out and fair rent actually fixed that it can be said that the leting value, which an owwner may reasonably be expected to have, is the fair rent. According to the learned counsel, the reasonable letting value to the owner of the building is what a hypothetical tenant would be prepared to offer keeping in view the economical conditions prevailing in the society and the matter of demand and supply. The contention is that when fair rent has been fixed the landlord is prohibited under the Rent Control Act from recovering more than that rent and unless it is done, a Municipal Committee is not bound to take fair rent as the basis of the reasonable letting value. 5. The other argument of Mr. Aggarwal is that the rental value during this period often years had much increased and the enhanced assessment is, therefore, reasonable and not arbitrary. He could not, of course, support this contention by pointing out any formula which can be said to have been adopted by the respondent Municipal Committee in increasing the annual valuation and consequently the house tax. As regards the objection of the petitioner company that the increase could not be made to take effect retrospectively, the contention of Mr. Aggarwal is that the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Sections 66 and 68 is not correct and all that is necessary is that the proceedings relating to assessment must have commenced before the first day of January or the first day of April following the year for which the assessment is sought to be made. It the also submitted on behalf of the respondent committee that in the instant case, the house tax was levied under the Punjab Small Towns Act, 1921 and reference to the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act is, therefore, irrelevant. 6. It cannot be disputed that the premises with regard to which the house tax has been levied are occupied mostly by the employees of the petitioner company and they are paying rent therefore though it may be less than the normal rent that such premises could fetch in the open market. There are residential quarters, shops and bungalows, the occupants whereof are paying rent to the petitioner company at different rates. It was never the case of the Municipal Committee before the appellate authority that the premises had not been let out. In the return filed in this Court in Civil Writ No. 1526 of 1964, no such plea has been taken by the respondent and the learned counsel cannot be permitted to raise a question of fact for the first time during the course of arguments. In order to determine the house tax the Municipal Committee has first to determine the annual rental value of the building concerned. The annual value has been defined in Section 3(1)(b) of the Act and the definitions runs as under :- "3(1) `annual value' means - (a) in the case of any house or building, the gross annual rent at which such house or building, together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use or enjoyment therewith, may reasonably be expected to let from year to year, subject to the following deductions :- (i) such deduction not exceeding 20 per cent of the gross annual rent as the committee in each particular case may consider as reasonable allowance on account of the furniture let therewith, (ii) a deduction of 10 per cent for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross annual rent. The deduction under this sub-clause shall be calculated on the balance of the gross annual rent after the deduction (if any) under sub-clause (i); (iii) where land is let with a building such deduction, not exceeding 20 percent, of the gross annual rent, as the committee in each particular case may consider reasonable on account of the actual expenditure, if any, annually incurred by the owner on the upkeep of land in a state to command such gross annual rent; Explanation 1. - For the purposes of this Clause it is immaterial whether the house or building, and the furniture and the land let for use or enjoyment therewith, are let by the same contract or by different contracts, and if by different contracts whether such contracts are made simultaneously or at different times. Explanation II. - The terms "gross annual rent" shall not include any tax payable by owner in respect of which the owner and tenant have agreed that it shall be paid by the tenant. 7. The sole question that arises for determination is as to what can be said to be the gross annual rent at which the premises in dispute could be reasonably expected to be let for use or enjoyment for the year under assessment. It is true that is not the actual rent fetched that matters but it is the value to the owner of the house or building. The expression "reasonably" came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Corporation of Calcutta v. Smt. Padma Debi and others, and it has been observed that :- "The word `reasonably' is not capable of precise definition. "Reasonable" signifies "in accordance with reason". In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact. Whether a particular act is reasonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given situation. A bargain between a willing lessor and a willing lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous circumstances may afford a guiding test of reasonableness. An inflated or deflated rate of rent based upon fraud, emergency, relationship, and such other considerations may take it out of the bounds of reasonableness". It was a case where the Corporation of Calcutta sought to impose tax and in fixing the annual valuation of certain premises. It took as the basis the monthly rental value of the premises. The West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1950, (XVII of 1950) came into force after the notices of assessment based on the annual valuation as fixed by the Corporation had been issued. The Rent Controller fixed the standard rent and an objection was raised by the assessees that the Corporation had no power to fix the annual valuation at a figure higher than the standard rent. The objection was overruled by the Special Officer who confirmed the assessment as levied by the Corporation. The assessees aggrieved by the order of the Corporation filed an appeal in the Court of Small Causes and the learned Judge upholding the objection of the assessees allowed the appeal fixing the annual valuation on the basis of the standard rent as determined by the Rent Controller. The High Court on appeal, affirmed the decision of the Judge of the Court of Small Causes, and an appeal to the Supreme Court, on a certificate granted by the High Court, was also dismissed. An argument was raised before the Supreme Court that under Section 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 the Corporation had to ascertain only the hypothetical rent realisable from a hypothetical tenant at the time of assessment and not the actual rent payable at that time by any tenant. It was accordingly contended that the Corporation was not bound to take into consideration the standard rent fixed by the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act. This argument was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The Rent Control Act applicable to Calcutta not only laid down a procedure for fixation of the fair standard rent and prohibited the recovery of any rent more than the standard rent but also provided certain penalties for the landlord who knowingly received whether directly or indirectly any sum on account of rent of any premises in excess of the standard rent. It was observed by their Lordships that a landlord could not reasonably be expected to let a building for a rent higher than the standard rent and the law of the land with its penal consequences could not be ignored in ascertaining the reasonable expectation of a landlord in the matter of rent. The following observations are of great significance and may be quoted in extenso :- "In this view, the law of the land must necessarily be taken as one of the circumstances obtaining in the market placing an upper limit on the rate of rent for which a building can reasonably be expected to let : It is said that Section 127(a) does not contemplate the actual rent received by a landlord but a hypothetical rent which he can reasonably be expected to receive if the building is let. So stated the proposition is unexceptionable. Hypothetical rent may be described as a rent which a landlord may reasonably be expected to get in the open market. But an open market can not include a "black market", a term euphemistically used to commercial transactions entered into between parties in defiance of law. In that situation, a statutory limitation of rent circumscribes the scope of the bargain in the market. In no circumstances the hypothetical rent can exceed that limit." The aforesaid observation leave no manner of doubt that in the matter of fixation of annual rental value, the law relating to control of rents cannot be ignored. As a matter of fact, such a law lays down the upper limit on the rate of rent for which any house or building can reasonably be expected to let. A Division Bench of this Court in a case reported a Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Das, had an occasion to consider Section 3(1)(b) of the Act defining the annual value and held, relying on an unreported judgment of this Court in Oriental Government Security Life Insurance Company Limited v. The New Delhi Municipality, New Delhi, that the Rent Control Act modified the definition of the `annual value' as given in the Punjab Municipal Act and observed that expression "reasonably be expected to let" means the amount which a landlord can recover under the law, but not the sum which he chooses to receive from his tenant in violation of the law. It was, of course, a case where fair rent had been fixed by the Rent Controller. There was no reference in this case to the Corporation of Calcutta's case decided by the Supreme Court. 8. The position is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that in cases where fair rent had been fixed the Municipal Committee is barred from making an assessment on the basis of any other annual rent than the one fixed by the Rent Controller. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that in cases where no rent has actually been determined under the Rent Control Act containing no such penal provisions as are to be found in the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, it is open to a Municipal Committee to ascertain the hypothetical rent which may be got in the open market from a willing lessee. He has in this connection invited my attention to an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Vidya Parkash v. The Municipal Commitee, Simla, where the same view as now contended before me by Mr. Aggarwal has been taken. The learned Judges in making reference to the case of the Corporation of Calcutta have observed that certain provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act different from those of the Rent Control Act applicable in Calcutta inasmuch as the latter Act provides penalties for charging more than the standard rent. Reliance has also been placed by the learned Judges on some observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Motichand Hirachand and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,. With greatest respect, I cannot persuade myself to agree with the view taken in the Bench decision of the said High Court which to my mind is not in consonance with the ratio in either of the two Supreme Court cases. The mere fact that fair rent has not been fixed in a particular case should make no difference in determining the reasonable letting value of a house or building. It may be that actual contractual rent is being recovered by the landlord from his tenant who has not chosen to make an application to the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act for fixation of the fair rent but it cannot be overloaded that a ceiling of the fair rent has certainly been fixed by the said Act. It is no doubt correct that the Punjab Rent Control Act does not contain the penal provisions as those in the Calcutta Rent Control Act but it cannot also be said that where the Punjab Act applies it is lawful for a landlord to charge more than the fair rent. If the test of the annual rental value is the value of the property to the owner, and according to the prevailing law a landlord is not entitled to more than fair rent, I do not understand how can it possibly be said that simply because a tenant is paying certain black market rent as contractual rent, that should be treated by the assessing authority as the annual rental value. If this argument were accepted, the annual rental value can immediately change at the volition of the landlord only if he cares to make an application to the Rent Controller for determination of the fair rent where a tenant has agreed to pay certain amount of rent, which is in excess of the fair rent and then makes an application for the fixation of the same, he is entitled under Section 8 of the Rent Control Act to recover the amount which he has already paid in excess of the fair rent. Can it in these circumstances be argued that the recovery of any amount in excess of fair rent is lawful for a landlord ? It will lead to startling results if the annual rental value is allowed to be assessed more than what could be the fair rent whether the same has been got fixed or not on an application to the Rent Controller. The assessing authorities can and should have before them the same criteria as the Rent Controller would have in order to determine the fair rent which alone will be the basis of the annual rental value for which a landlord can reasonably be expected to let the building concerned. In my opinion, it should make no difference if the Punjab Rent Control Act does not contain similar penal provisions as are to be found in the Calcutta Rent Control Act. It may be that the Punjab Rent Control Act does not mean that non-fixation of the fair rent can give any legal sanction to charge a rent more than what is the fair rent. In the Bench decision of Delhi High Court, if I may say with all respect, the true import of the observations made by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the Corporation of Calcutta's case and also in that of Motichand's Hirachand's case has not been correctly appreciated In Motichand Hirachand's case the only question before their Lordships was as to whether the assessing authority could legitimately take into consideration for determining the annual rent some extra income which that building could yield. It was in these circumstances that it was observed that the hypothetical tenant looking at the building as it is would be prepared to pay. There was a building situate a the corner of Marine Drive and Sandhurst Road in Bombay. This building consisted of several floor and the Municipal Corporation of Bombay had been assessing the rateable value of the building as equivalent to the rents recovered by the owners. After the assessment had been made for the year 1956-57, it was found by the assessing authority that the terrace of the building was used for advertising purpose and this gave an additional income to the landlord. The Corporation sought to amend the assessment by increasing the rateable value. The landlord objected to this increase and the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, disallowed the same. The High Court on appeal set aside the order of the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, holding that the Municipal Corporation was entitled to take into account income earned by the owners under an agreement with the tenant relating to income from use of the terrace for advertisement purposes. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this context observed that in valuing the property "every intrinsic quality and every intrinsic circumstances which tends to push the rental value up or down must be taken into consideration. In other words, in estimating the hypothetical rent `all that could reasonably affect the mind of the intending tenant ought to be considered'. It was also observed by their Lordships that :- "Where estimating the rent which he would be prepared to pay, he would naturally take into consideration all the advantages, together with the disadvantages attached to the property, that is, the maximum beneficial use to which he would be able to put the property. In doing so he is bound to take into consideration the fact of the property being situated at an unique place as the instant property undoubtedly is, viz., at the juncture of two of the most prominent roads with the additional advantage of Chowpatty Sea Face being opposite to it where in the evenings and on week-ends, it cannot be questioned, large crowds usually gather. Coupled with this would be the advantage that a neonsign advertisement can be vividly seen if fixed on the top of the building by people pedestrains and those in vehicles, from fairly long distance in all directions, especially as the advertisement happens to be a rotating one. There can therefore, be no doubt that if a property possesses such an amenity, such amenity is bound to add to its beneficial value and the tenant who desires to take into consideration while making up his mind as to the rent which he can profitably offer as to how much income he would be able to derive from exploiting such an amenity." I fail to see how the Bench decision has drawn help from this judgment which on facts is clearly distinguishable and says nothing contrary to what had been laid down earlier in the Corporation of Calcutta's Case. 9. I also do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the definition of `reasonable letting value' in the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, is different from that of `fair rent' in the Punjab Rent Control Act and that `reasonable letting value' under the former Act is to be determined by the theory of supply and demand and what a willing prospective lessee is prepared to pay in respect of the building concerned, irrespective of the prevailing law relating to rent control. This approach to my mind is wholly erroneous. Under the Rent Control Act, there is a definite formula laid for determining the fair rent and that will be rental value for the year of assessment whichever that year be. The method of ascertaining `annual value' for the purposes of Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1940, is given in Rule 4 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1941, and is also as given below :- "4. (e) An enquiry shall be made about the gross annual rent earned or which could reasonably be earned in respect of the property during the financial year immediately preceding the current financial year. (f) If in the opinion of the assessing authority the average gross annual rent of any property ascertained under clause (e) when compared with any other property in that locality, be not fair or reasonable, the assessing authority shall determine from such other data as may be available, the gross annual rent at which such property may reasonably be expected to let from year to year." It will be seen that `annual rent' as referred to in the aforesaid Rule is understood in the same sense in the Act. Mahajan, J. in Inder Mohan v. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab and others has held that when the property is subject to the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, it cannot earn nor can it reasonably be expected to earn more rent than what that Act permits. In this case the assessing authority acting under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act proceeded to make assessment of a house owned by Inder Mohan. The assessing authority fixed the rental value of the House at Rs. 1260/- and an objection was raised that this much amount could never be the rent for the house in view of the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The objection was overruled by the assessing authority and on a writ petition being preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the learned Judge directed the assessing authority to proceed to determine the annual rental value in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Act. In a similar situation, Shamsher Bahadur, J. has held in Tejaswi Chand Khanna v. The Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab and others, that where a fair rent has been fixed by the Rent Controller, the assessing authority has to determine the same in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The Corporation of Calcutta's case was relied upon by the learned Judge in this connection. It was a case under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act which as to already mentioned, has the same definition of `annual rent' as to be found in the Act. The same view has been taken by S.K. Kapur, J. in Girdhari Lal v. Excise and Taxation Officer, which has not been accepted by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. I am in respectful agreement with the view of law taken by Mahajan, Shamsher Bahadur and S.K. Kapur, JJ. It must, therefore, be held that the annual rent at which a building or a house may be let from year to year cannot be assessed by the assessing authority under the Act at an amount higher that what is or will be the fair rent of the same whether it has been determined or not by the Rent Controller acting under the Rent Control Act. The assessing authority has to make an assessment of annual rent in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Act keeping in view of the criteria laid down therein for determining the fair rent. 10. The next contention of Mr. Bhagirath Dass, learned counsel for the petitioner, that on a correct interpretation of Sections 66 and 68 of the Act, the assessment lists of house tax as envisaged in the Act have to be completed before the first day of January or first day of April following the year for which the tax is proposed to be levied is also not without merit. It is provided in Section 62(11) that a tax leviable by the year shall come into force on the first day of January or on the first day of April or on the first day of July or on the first day of October in any year. A Municipal Committee when it proceeds to make an assessment has first to prepare an assessment list of all buildings and lands on which the tax is to be imposed giving certain particulars including the annual value thereof as defined in Section 3(1) of the Act. The proposed assessment list is then published and a public notice given thereof making it available for inspection of every person claiming to be either owner or occupier of property included in the list. He may inspect the lists so prepared either himself or through his authorized agent. The Public notice has also to specify the time not less than one month after the date of publication within which all objections to the proposed valuation and assessment have to be submitted in writing. The objections are then enquired into and the persons makings the same have to be allowed an opportunity of being heard either in persons or by authorised agent. The final assessment list is then completed which has to be authenticated by the signatures of not less than two members of the committee. In terms of Section 66, this final assessment is deemed to be the tax for the year commencing on the first day of January or the first day of April next ensuing as the Municipal Committee may determine. It is a common ground that it is not a case of imposition of tax for the first time but of revision of tax. It is not necessary that a new list of assessment should be prepared every year and it is open to a Municipal Committee to prepare a new list every year or to adopt the valuation or assessment with alterations, if any, contained in the list for any year. This has also to be done in advance so as to make it operative for the following year since an opportunity has to be given to the affected assesses, if any alterations are being made to their prejudice. The liability to pay tax can arise only when the list has been finally settled after following the prescribed procedure as contained in Chapter V of the Act. The assessment for any particular year must, therefore, be completed by the Municipal Committee before the relevant year of assessment commences. The expression "next ensuing" as used in Section 66 of the Act when read in its true context leaves no manner of doubt that the tax assessed shall be deemed to be a tax only from the first day of January or the first day of April following the completion of the assessment. The provisions of law relating to assessment of tax as contained in Chapter V of the Act, particularly Section 66 and 68, do not permit a settlement of assessment list which can take effect retrospectively whether this list is newly prepared for a year or is a revised one making alterations affecting any assessee prejudicially. Any tax imposed not in accordance with the prescribed procedure is certainly invalid and cannot create any liability. There may be an appeal preferred to the prescribed appellate authority by any assessee but the time taken before the appellate authority cannot validate a tax which is otherwise invalid because it has not been imposed by the Municipal Committee in accordance with procedure prescribed and completed before the year of assessment. 11. The third contention of Mr. Bhagirath Dass is that the increase in assessment is arbitrary giving no guiding principle or formula which the authorities can be said to have adopted in effecting the increase. This contention is also full of force. The assessing authority except saying that the value of the property has increased does not say how and on what data this assumption is warranted. The assessing authority proposing to impose a tax must act on objective data and direct its mind to the circumstances justifying the increase. It must also say so in its assessment order so that the assessee can know why the increase has been effected. In other words, as a quasi-judicial body it must pass a speaking order. I am afraid, in the instant case, the order does not disclose any material that could reasonably lead to the increase in assessment. A Division Bench of this Court in Kaviraj Khazan Chand v. The New Delhi Municipality, while dealing with the provisions of Section 63 to 66 of the Act has said that the inviting of objections is not a mere force and that the owners or occupiers are entitled for the proper disposal of theirs objections to be informed of the formula on which it was proposed to base the new assessments. I am afraid, no such guiding principle is to be found in the impugned order of assessment. 12. The contention of Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondent Municipal Committee, that the tax was imposed under the Small Towns Act, 1921, and not under the Punjab Municipal Act warranting the applicability of Section 61 to 68 of the Act is to be noted only to be rejected. The Punjab Small Towns Act was repealed by the Punjab Municipal Amendment Act (XXXIV of 1954) and with effect from 11th December, 1954, the Punjab Municipal Act became applicable. Notices were also issued under the Punjab Municipal Act. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of enhanced assessment passed by the Municipal Committee, Dhariwal, as affirmed by the appellate authority, is quashed. The Municipal Committee can, however, if so advised, make a fresh assessment in the light of the observations made above by taking into consideration the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act for fixation of fair rent. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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