Gujral, J. - The petitioner, K.K. Jaggia, joined the service as Sub Divisional Officer in Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department of the State of Punjab on 18th January, 1949 in the scale of Rs. 250-25-450/25-750 per mensem with usual allowance. In April, 1955, he was selected for promotion as officiating Executive Engineer, but this promotion was held in abeyance because in the meantime some complaints had been made against him. Subsequently, a formal First Information Report was recorded against the petitioner and he was placed under arrest on 11th April, 1956. He was also placed under suspension. In the meantime a number of vacancies occurred in the posts of Executive Engineers with the result that the Government sent the names of eligible Temporary Engineers to the Punjab Service Commission for assessment of their suitability for promotion. Some of the Temporary Engineers were found suitable while in the case of petitioner the Government was advised that the result of the enquiry pending against him may be communicated in due course and till then a vacancy be kept reserved for him. Even though the First Information Report had been recorded, this did not result in criminal proceedings being instituted against the petitioner. A departmental enquiry was, however, held as a result of which he was dismissed on 6th October, 1961. The order of dismissal was quashed by this Court in Civil Writ No. 279 of 1962 and this decision led to the reinstatement of the petitioner on 20th September, 1963. But he was again suspended on the same date to stand a fresh enquiry. It was also ordered that during the period of suspension, the petitioner would be allowed subsistence allowance admissible to him under rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume I, Part I. After his reinstatement on 20th September, 1963, the petitioner claimed arrears of salary for the period between the date of his suspension till the date of his reinstatement. This claim of the petitioner led to the following order of the Punjab Government contained in a note of the Director-cum-Under Secretary, Vigilance Department, to Secretary to Government Punjab, Irrigation Department, a copy of which was sent to the petitioner :- (a) for the period of the officer's suspension prior to his dismissal, he was to be paid only subsistence allowance permissible under the rules applicable to such officers. (b) for the period between the officer's dismissal and his subsequent reinstatement, he should be allowed full pay and allowances, and, (c) before making the payment, it should be verified from the officer what amount, if any, he had earned during the period he remained dismissed, and that amount should be deducted from the pay and allowances due to him. 2. Dissatisfied by the above decision of the Government the petitioner challenged this in a writ petition (C.W. 1946 of 1964) praying that writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Punjab directing it to pay him full salary and allowances for the entire period between the date of suspension till the date of his reinstatement. This writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Shamsher Bahadur and Gurdev Singh, JJ. and was allowed on 28th September, 1965. A direction was issued to the respondent to pay him full salary and allowances, admissible to the petitioner for the entire period between the date of his first suspension and the date of reinstatement. On 30th July, 1965, the petitioner filed another writ petition challenging the notification of the Punjab Government dated 27th September, 1963, whereby he had been allowed subsistence allowance admissible to him under rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I. This writ petition was dismissed by a full Bench of this Court on 14th February, 1966 (reported in A.I.R. 1968 page 67). 3. After the success of the petitioner in C.W. No. 1646 of 1964, the Government of Punjab vide letter No. 10448-Irr-Estt. 1(1)-66/19328 dated -- October, 1966, ordered that the period from the date of the suspension to the date of the reinstatement be treated as spent on duty for all purposes and this led to the payment of arrears of salary and allowances to the petitioner by Accountant General Punjab from time to time, through different authority slips. The order of suspension of the petitioner which was passed on 27th September, 1963, was revoked by the Government on 15th January, 1966 and the petitioner was reinstated. This reinstatement was ordered "without prejudice to the final decision which may be taken as a result of departmental proceedings pending against him." 4. The petitioner having been reinstated only as a temporary Engineer and finding that the officers junior to him had already been promoted as Executive Engineer, he filed another writ petition being Civil Writ No. 781 of 1966 claiming that his seniority as Executive Engineer be restored under the `next below rule'. Before this writ petition could be decided the enquiry proceedings pending against the petitioner came to an end on 5th March, 1969 and resulted in the position of punishment whereby one increment of the petitioner was stopped without cumulative effect. On 10th March, 1969 when Civil Writ No. 781 of 1966 came up for final hearing Shri Saini appearing for the State made a statement that the inquiry against the petitioner having concluded his case for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer would be considered and finally decided within three months. On this undertaking being given the petition was withdrawn and was dismissed as such. On 3rd April, 1969 the petitioner was provisionally promoted as officiating Executive Engineer pending final decision respecting his seniority in the cadre. In the meantime the petitioner challenged the penalty imposed on him in the inquiry, through Civil Writ No. 2790 of 1969 which was allowed by the order of this Court dated 17th September, 1970. After consideration of the entire case of the petitioner with regard to his promotion and seniority, the Haryana Government ultimately issued two notifications on 15th December 1970 - Annexures D and E. By those notifications though the petitioner was promoted as Executive Engineer with effect from 7th November, 1955 and as Superintending Engineer with effect from Ist June, 1968 but he was not allowed arrears of pay and allowances for the period he did not actually work as Executive Engineer or as Superintending Engineer. It is this part of the notifications Annexures D and E that the present writ petition is mainly directed. Challenge also made to Annexure J by which an order under rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I, was passed whereby the period of interim suspension from 20th September, 1963 to 14th January, 1966 was treated as period of duty for all purposes but he was allowed only 95 per cent of pay and allowances for this period. After orders Exhibits D and E wee conveyed to the petitioner he made a representation to the Government through Annexures G pointing out the anomalies created by orders Annexures D and E and claiming arrears of pay as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer from the dates he was promoted. A prayer in this representation was also made for obtaining orders of the Government allowing him to cross the efficiency bar in the grade of the Executive Engineer which had fallen due on 7th November, 1966. Except declaring the petitioner eligible for selection grade in the pay scale of Rs. 1300-50-1600 with effect from Ist February, 1969 no action was taken on Annexure G, with the result that the petitioner served another notice (Annexure H) on 8th February, 1971. This notice was also ignored and the petitioner then filed the present petition. 5. The petition was contested by the respondent and respondent No. 1 filed an affidavit by way of reply. In this affidavit the facts stated by the petitioner in the petition were substantially admitted and it was added that in accordance with the undertaking given through this Court the petitioner was promoted as Executive Engineer and the other demands of the petitioner were under consideration of the Government. It is also stated that though Civil Writ No. 2290 of 1969 has been accepted but the basis of the order of this Court being only that the order awarding punishment was not a speaking order, the order did not debar the Government from starting fresh proceedings had been struck down by the High Court. With regard to the specific demands made by the petitioner, the right of the petitioner to claim promotion with effect from 6th April, 1955 was denied. It was further added that the petitioner had not been promoted under the `next below rule' and was, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of the rule. The petitioner's claim for the pay in the higher grades from the dates he was promoted was, therefore, not accepted. The reason for not giving pay to the petitioner as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer from the dates he was promoted as such which was contained in paragraph 8 of Annexure D and paragraph 5 of Annexure E was reiterated in the reply of the respondent. The basis of the denial is that the petitioner had not worked against those posts for the period he was claiming the pay. The bar of limitation is also pleaded as the claim was for a period of beyond three years from the date of petition. So far as Annexure J is concerned, the position taken by the respondent is that the matter would be finally decided after a decision has been taken on the disciplinary proceedings. In this way all the claims of the petitioner were declined and it was prayed that the petition be dismissed with costs. 6. Shri Jaggia filed a counter-affidavit in which he reiterated the position taken by him in the petition. He, however, placed on record Annexure O by which he had been allowed to cross the efficiency bar in the scale of Rs. 625-409-1025/50-1275 with effect from 7th November, 1966. Another affidavit of Sukhdev Parshad was also filed on 4th August, 1971 in which it was stated that on reconsidering the matter regarding the grant of arrears of pay to Shri Jaggia the Government formed the view that there was no justification for accepting the same considering the fact that Shri Jaggia had not actually worked either as Executive Engineer or as Superintending Engineer during the period for which the claim for arrears of pay was being made. The copy of the order passed by the Government in the Irrigation and Power Department was also placed on the record. 7. Before proceeding to consider the respective contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to set down precisely the claim made by the petitioner in this writ petition and these are as follows :- (1) Promotion of the petitioner as officiating Executive Engineer from 6/7th April 1955 instead of 7th November, 1955; (2) Pay as Executive Engineer from 6th April, 1955 to 31st May, 1968; (3) Pay as Superintending Engineer with effect from Ist June, 1968 to 15th December, 1970; and (4) Quashing of the order imposing a cut of five per cent for the period of the second suspension. 8. On behalf of the respondents the main challenges to the claims are that they are barred by time and that the petitioner not having worked against these posts during the periods for which the pay is claimed was not entitled to the arrears as rule 4.13 was not attracted. It was also urged that the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to file a suit and not to claim arrears through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner cannot be allowed to get over the bar of limitation or to avoid the payment of the Court fee which he would have to pay in a suit for the recovery of the amount claimed, says the learned counsel for the respondents. The observations made by Gurdev Singh, J. in K.K. Jaggia v. The State of Punjab, 1965 PLR 1092 (Civil Writ No. 1646 of 1964) are a complete answer to this argument which was also advanced on behalf of the State in the earlier writ petition filed by Mr. Jaggia. It was observed that the existence of other legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution and there is no obligation imposed on the Court to relegate the aggrieved party to other legal remedies available. Reference in this respect was made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 S.C. 1044, and Shyam Sunder Derey and Others v. Union of India, AIR 1955 Cal. 281 and on the basis of the ratio in these cases it was ruled that in appropriate cases a writ of mandamus directing the authority concerned to pay arrears of salary would lie. 9. Having regard to the peculiar facts of the present case I have no doubt that there was no justification for refusing the relief to the petitioner merely because of the existence of an alternative remedy. On the respondent's own admission the petitioner was entitled to pay as Assistant Engineer even though he had not worked in that capacity. Moreover, the petitioner was found to be entitled to promotion as Executive Engineer with effect from 7th November, 1955 and as Superintending Engineer with effect from Ist June, 1968. Not only that his promotion was ordered from those dates but his pay was also fixed by proceeding on the basis as if he had actually been promoted on the dates mentioned above. 10. For the contention that the claim of the petitioner was barred by time as it was in respect of a period beyond three years from the date of the petition, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Syed Qamarali, 1967 S.L.R. 228, and a Full Bench decision of this Court in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, 1969 S.L.R. 376. In Qamarali's case the petitioner had been dismissed from service in the Central Province Police Force with effect from 22nd December, 1945. His appeal to the State Government having failed a suit was brought by him on the allegations that the order for dismissal was contrary to paragraph 241 of the Police Regulations and being contrary to law and void the plaintiff was entitled to recover pay and allowances for three years immediately preceding the date of the institution of the suit. One of the contentions raised in the case was that the order of dismissal, even if contrary to the provisions of paragraph 241 of the Police Regulations remained void until and unless an order was obtained from a competent Court setting aside the same and that no relief in respect of salary could be granted when the time for obtaining an order setting aside the order of dismissal had elapsed whether the period of limitation for such a suit be under article 14 or article 120 of the Limitation Act. This plea of the State was rejected on the ground that "the order of dismissal having been made in breach of a mandatory provision of the rules, subject to which only the power of punishment under Section 7 could be exercised, was totally invalid and that the order of dismissal had, therefore, no legal existence and it was not necessary for the respondent to have the order set aside by the Court". It was further observed that the defence of limitation which was based only on the contention that the order had to be set aside by a Court declaring it invalid must, therefore, be rejected. 11. The ratio of the decision in Qamarali's case, therefore, is that an illegal order of dismissal may be ignored by the party affected and the party can proceed to recover the salary treating the order of dismissal as non-existent. It is not necessary that the order of dismissal be first got quashed before arrears of pay can be claimed. 12. In Jagdish Mitter's case the question before the Full Bench was "whether a Government employee whose dismissal from service has been found to be void and unlawful can recover by a suit or proceeding filed in time his claim for arrears of salary in respect of the entire period when he remained out of employment or is limited only to a period of three years before institution of the suit or proceeding". On a review of the entire case law on the point it was held that a "public servant, after his dismissal or removal has been declared to be unlawful, can claim wages or salary only up to a period of three years and two months from the date when the cause of action accrued". It was accepted that the time from which the period would begin to run was governed by Article 102 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding to article 7 of the Limitation Act, 1933 which is in the following terms :- Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For wages in the case of any other Three years When the wages are due In case where the order of dismissal is considered totally invalid and had no legal existence there was continued accrual of wages during the period of dismissal. On the basis of this legal fiction it was found that the Government servant could only claim wages for three years preceding the institution of the suit or petition. 13. In the present case, however, the position is entirely different. By order dated 20th November, 1963 the order of dismissal was set aside and the petitioner was reinstated as Assistant Engineer. He was again suspended with effect from the same date and was then reinstated on 15th January, 1966 as Assistant Engineer. It was not till 3rd April, 1969 that the petitioner was provisionally promoted as Executive Engineer. Before the date when an order promoting the petitioner as Executive Engineer was passed there was no occasion for the petitioner to claim pay as Executive Engineer. The only right that the petitioner had was to be considered for promotion as Executive Engineer and not to be appointed against this post. Till the question of his promotion to the post of Executive Engineer was decided by the Government there was no occasion for him to claim pay of that post and wages as Executive Engineer would accrue due only after the order promoting the petitioner as Executive Engineer was passed. The rule laid down in Qamarali's case or Jagdish Mitter's case is not attracted to the facts of the present case as the authorities had not passed the order by which the petitioner was aggrieved till 3rd April, 1969. In fact, it was only through Annexures `D' and `E' that the petitioner was told for the first time that pay and allowances as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer for the period he had not worked against those posts would not be admissible to him. His wages as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer would therefore, be due from the date the orders of promotions were passed and the wages were refused to him and not earlier than that. In coming to this conclusion, I am influenced by the view taken by this Court in State of Punjab v. Bhagwan Singh grewal retired Head Assistant, 1967 S.L.R. 739. In this case the plaintiff was working in the pay scale of Rs. 80-8-330 and the increment raising his pay from Rs. 88 to Rs. 96 fell due on 13.3.1949. He was to get his next increment on 13.3.1950 but in the meantime the plaintiff's pay grade was revised to that of Rs. 100-10-200/-10-250. The Accountant General, however, decided to pay to him Rs. 100/- with effect from 1.3.1950. The Government decided the objection of the plaintiff on 13.2.1961 admitting his claim that he was to get Rs. 110 with effect from 13.3.1950 and not Rs. 100/-. The question in this case arose as to whether the period of limitation was to start running from 13.2.1961 when the Government decided the matter or when the Accountant General passed the order. On these facts, finding that Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was applicable it was held as under :- "If the decision of the Government had been against the plaintiff, it is only then that he could file a suit in a civil Court. He could not go to the civil Court earlier than that date, because in that case, the same would have been dismissed as premature because the proper authority which had to fix his pay in the new time scale had not given any decision against him. It is only to challenge an adverse decision that one goes to a civil Court to get it rectified. In the instant case the appropriate authority had not given any decision against the plaintiff. The plaintiff's pay was rightly fixed on 13.2.1961 and consequently, it would be on this date that the wages at the enhanced rate fell due to him. Admittedly, the suit was brought within three years from this date." The above observations are fully attracted to the facts of the present case and I, therefore, find no merit in the objection raised by the respondents that the claim of the petitioner was time barred. 14. Considering the claims of the petitioner separately, I find that there is no order promoting the petitioner from 6th/7th April, 1955. The petitioner was promoted only with effect from 7th November, 1955. Merely because at one stage it was considered to promote the petitioner it cannot be plausibly contended that the petitioner should be deemed to have been promoted with effect from 6th April, 1955. In fact, during arguments the petitioner did not press this claim seriously. 15. The second and third claim of the petitioner can be considered together. From the side of the petitioner it is urged that having been promoted as Executive Engineer from 6th April, 1955, and as Superintending Engineer from Ist June, 1968, there was no reason to deprive the petitioner of the pay of these posts for the period he had not worked against these posts. It is pointed out that it was only because of the illegal orders passed by the Government that the petitioner had not been able to perform his duties as Executive Engineer or Superintending Engineer and that the Government could not take advantage of their own illegal acts. Furthermore, it was contended that even though the petitioner had not worked as Assistant Engineer before his reinstatement on 15th January, 1966, after the order of suspension was revoked he was allowed pay and allowances as Assistant Engineer for the entire period of his suspension. According to the petitioner, there was no difference between the two situations and if he was entitled to pay as Assistant Engineer for the period he had not worked against that post he was also entitled to pay as Executive Engineer and as Superintending Engineer for the period he had not worked against these posts. Support for these arguments was sought from rule 4.13 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I. Reference was specifically made to note 4 of under this rule. So far as the argument based on note 4 under rule 4.13 of Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I, is concerned, this rule proceeds on the basis that the Government servant was working either in his regular line or outside the ordinary line. The rule contained in note 4 referred to above is not applicable to a case where a Government servant is either under suspension or has been dismissed. Once it is found that the dismissal is wrong and the Government servant would be deemed to continue in service, it is not necessary to refer to note 4 in order to find out as to when the promotion of the Government servant would be due. In that case, on the basis of the legal fiction that the Government servant had continued in service all along, it will have to be worked out as to when he would have been promoted if the illegal order had not been passed. For this purpose it is not required to be seen as to when the Government servant junior to the petitioner had been promoted. "Next below rule' to which reference is made in note 4 envisages a situation where a Government servant is working out of his regular line while all the Government servants senior to the Government servant who is out of the regular line have been given officiating promotion. In that situation, it is provided in the "next below rule" that a Government servant who is working out of his regular line should not suffer by forfeiting officiating promotion which he would have otherwise received had he remained in his regular line. This rule has no applicability in a situation where an illegal order of dismissal has been passed but which has been subsequently quashed and the Government servant is deemed to have been in service all along. 16. Coming to the second part of the argument, the learned counsel appearing for the State has not been able to point out any basis for the refusal to pay wages to the petitioner as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer for the period he had not worked against these posts if pay could be allowed to him as Assistant Engineer for the period that he had not actually performed the duties of an Assistant Engineer. If a Government servant is debarred from performing his duties on account of an illegal order having been passed, he cannot be deprived of his pay and allowances for this period. Accepting this rule, the State allowed pay to the petitioner as Assistant Engineer after the order of his dismissal was quashed even though he had not worked against that post. There is no rational basis for not extending this rule while considering the question of paying to the petitioner his wages as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer. In coming to this conclusion, I am influenced by the view taken in B.S. Bhima Rao v. The State of Mysore and Another, 1970 S.L.R. 190. In this case, the petitioner was suspended pending departmental enquiry against him. His promotion was also withheld on this account. Subsequently, the enquiry was dropped and the petitioner was treated as having been promoted as Overseer with effect from 4th December, 1958. He was, however, only allowed to take charge on Ist January, 1961. He was given pay and allowances in the pay scale of an Overseer with effect from Ist January, 1961 and not from 4th December, 1958, though for purpose of increment his service as Overseer was counted from 4th December, 1958. For refusing the pay of the higher post the authorities relied on the ground that the petitioner had not actually worked as Overseer during this period. While repelling this contention, Chandrashekhar, J., speaking for the Court, observed as under : "As the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were dropped, there was no adverse finding against him. Hence, he has to be placed in position in which he would have been had the disciplinary proceedings not been started, and had he not been kept under suspension. It is in recognition of this position, that the Government directed in its letter Annexure-B, that his pay should be fixed at what he would have got had he been promoted on the due date but for the pending enquiry against him. Having treated him as having been on duty and having promoted him as Overseer, as if the disciplinary proceedings had not been taken, it is not open to the Government to deny him the benefits flowing from treating him as being promoted on 4th December, 1958 (the date on which, according to Exhibit B, he would have been promoted but for the disciplinary proceedings). The petitioner not holding the actual charge as Overseer between 4th December, 1958 and Ist January 1961 was due to no fault of his; that was entirely due to the unjustified order of suspension. Hence, it is not open to the Government to deny payment to him of the pay and allowances of the post of Overseer during that period on the sold ground that he did not actually hold charge of the post of Overseer". The above observations are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. For no fault of his the petitioner was unable to perform his duties as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer as he was illegally not promoted to these posts at the time his promotion was due. There is, therefore, no room for contending that the pay of these posts may not be paid for the duration that he has not worked against these posts, especially so when we find that while fixing his pay as Executive Engineer and as Superintending Engineer the period from the date he has been promoted against these posts has been taken into account and the petitioner has been given increments as and when they fell due. This has been done on the basis of the legal fiction that the petitioner had actually been promoted as Executive Engineer from 7th November, 1955 and as Superintending Engineer from Ist June, 1968. He was also allowed to cross efficiency bar in the grade of Executive Engineer on 7th November, 1955 and he was given selection grade in the pay scale of Rs. 1350-1600 with effect from Ist February, 1969. These benefits could only be given by treating the petitioner as having been promoted on the dates promotion was shown due. In this connection reference may also be made to rules 4.8 and 4.9 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I, which relate to the crossing of the efficiency bar and to the increments in a time scale. All duty in a post on a time scale counts for increments in that time scale under rule 4.9. It would, therefore, follow that by giving the increment to the petitioner in the grades of Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer, on the basis of his promotion from the dates shown in Annexures `D' and `E' the Government was accepting that he had spent this period as on duty in the time scale of that post. The legal fiction will, therefore, have to be extended so as to take the situation to its logical conclusion that the petitioner would be deemed to have worked against these posts from the dates he was due his promotion. 17. On behalf of the petitioner reference was made to number of including K.R. Deb v. The Collector of the Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 S.C. 1447 and Shivappa Laxman Sattigeri v. State of Mysore and Others, 1967 SLR 942 to show that whenever an order of dismissal was quashed, and a Government servant was considered to have continued to be in service he was allowed full pay and allowance that were due to him but it is not necessary to consider all these cases in detail as in none of those cases the right of the Government servant to be paid his wages was challenged on the reasons that it is being challenged in this case. In fact, in all these cases the orders proceeded on the basis that once the dismissal or reduction having been found illegal, the petitioner was entitled to his pay and allowances unless the claim was barred on the ground of limitation or on any other ground. The following observation made in Shivappa Laxman Sattigeri's case (supra) may, however, be read with advantage :- "What is necessarily implicit in the abandonment of disciplinary proceedings and the acquittal by a criminal court is that there were no grounds for reversion, and, that is what entitled to Sattigeri to full pay and allowances during the period preceding his reinstatement. So, the Deputy Commissioner was in error in directing by his order of reinstatement that the period preceding the reinstatement should be treated as leave without allowances. What he should have done was to recognise the right of Sattigeri to full pay and allowances as if he had not been reverted." I am, therefore, unable to find any basis for the orders contained in para 8 of Annexure `D' and para 5 of Annexure `E'. Consequently, this part of the order in Annexures `D' and `E' is quashed. 18. The last claim of the petitioner relates to the cut of 5 per cent for the period of the second suspension imposed by Annexure `J'. According to this Annexure, under rule 7 (3) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I, Shri Jaggia was allowed ninety five per cent of his pay and allowances for the period of his suspension from 20th September, 1963 to 4th January, 1966. The amount already received by him as subsistence allowance and other allowances during this period wee to be adjusted. Excepting this cur the period from 20th September, 1963 to 4th January, 1966 was to be treated as spent on duty for all purposes. 19. The cut imposed by the above order in Annexure `J' has been challenged on two grounds namely, that it was violative of principles of natural justice and that the cut could not be imposed after the completion of the enquiry and by taking into account the result of the enquiry. It was urged that the basis for reducing the pay was to be considered at the time the order revoking the suspension was passed. 20. For the first argument, support is sought from M. Gopala Krishna Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1967 S.L.R. 800. In this case the petitioner M. Gopala Krishna Naidu was suspended and prosecuted under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction of the petitioner was set aside in appeal and second attempt to prosecute him also failed. A departmental enquiry was, however, then held and disagreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer, the Government served a show cause notice why the petitioner should not be dismissed. Ultimately, it was held that the charges had not been proved beyond doubt. Acting under Fundamental Rule 54 sub-rule (5) it was ordered that the petitioner be not allowed any pay beyond that he had actually received during the period of his suspension. Being dissatisfied with this order, the petitioner filed writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed. On a certificate being granted, the petitioner challenged the order in the Supreme Court and the main ground of attack was that the order had been passed without giving opportunity to the petitioner to be heard. Considering the scope of rule F.R. 54 it was observed as under :- "It is true that the order under F.R. 54 is in a sense a consequential order in that it would be passed after an order of reinstatement is made. But the fact that it is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the Government servant has to be given an opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the Government servant would ordinarily have had an opportunity to show cause. In such a case, the authority no doubt would have before him the entire record including the explanation given by the Government servant from which all the facts and circumstances of the case would be before the authority and from which he can form the opinion as to whether he has been fully exonerated or not and in case of suspension whether such suspension was wholly unjustified or not. In such a case the order passed under a rule such as the present Fundamental Rule might be said to be a consequential order following a departmental inquiry. But there are three classes of cases as laid down by the proviso to Article 311 where a departmental inquiry would not be held viz. (a) where a person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on criminal charge, (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; and (c) where the President or the Governor as the case may be is satisfied that in the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Since there would be no inquiry in these classes of cases the authority would not have before him any explanation by the Government servant. The authority in such cases would have to consider and pass the order merely on such facts which might be placed before him by the department concerned. The order in such case would be ex-parte without the authority having the other side of the picture. In such cases the order that such authority would pass would not be a consequential order as where a departmental inquiry has been held. Therefore, an order passed under fundamental rule 54 is not always a consequential order nor is such order a continuation of the departmental proceedings taken against the employee. It is true as Mr. Sen pointed out that F.R. 54 does not in express terms lay down that the authority shall give to the employee concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order. Even so, the question is whether the rule casts such a duty on the authority by implication. The order as to whether a given case falls under clause 2 or clause 5 of the fundamental rules must depend on the examination by the authority of all the facts and circumstances of the case and his forming the opinion therefrom of two factual findings; whether the employee was fully exonerated and in case of suspension whether it was wholly unjustified. Besides, an order passed under this rule would obviously affect the Government servant adversely if it is one made under clauses 3 and 5. Consideration under this rule depending as it does on facts and circumstances in their entirety, passing an order on the basis of factual finding arrived at from such facts and circumstances and such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the Government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if any opportunity to show cause against the action proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice." 22. The above observations fully support the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner that the order Annexure `J' was without jurisdiction as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard before order under rule 7.3, was passed. Having regard to the ratio of the decision in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu's case the conclusion is inescapable that an order under rule 7.3 adversely affecting the Government servant cannot be passed without giving him an opportunity of being heard. The order Annexure `J' has, therefore, to be quashed. Considering the view that I have taken in regard to the first argument, it is not necessary to consider the second argument in detail. 22. For the reasons recorded above, the petition is allowed, the order contained in para 8 of Annexure `D' and para 5 of Annexure `E' and Annexure `J' so far as it imposes a cut of five percent, are quashed. It is also directed that necessary writ shall issue to the respondents to pay full salary and allowances admissible to the petitioner as Executive Engineer and Superintending Engineer from the dates he was promoted to these posts, deducting the amount which the petitioner has already received. 23. On behalf of the petitioner prayer was also made that as he has been illegally deprived of large sums of money for a long period, he should be awarded interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the date those amounts were due. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to award interest to the petitioner and this request is consequently declined. It may, however, be added that it would be proper for the respondents to make payment of the sum due to the petitioner at an early date. I have no doubt that the State Government will keep in view the fact that the petitioner has considerably suffered for having been denied pay and promotion for a long time and will now ensure that no further delay in giving relief to the petitioner is caused. 24. In view of the fact that the points requiring consideration in this petition were not free from difficulty, I will leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.