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Chattar Singh And Others v. Khetu And Another

Punjab & Haryana High Court
May 2, 1966
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H.R. Khanna, J. - This appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent by Chattar Singh and Rattan Singh minor sons of Jugti through their next friend Ram Sarup, is directed against the judgment of learned Single Judge whereby he allowed the appeal filed by Khetu decree-holder respondent and set aside the orders of the Courts below dismissing the execution application of the decree-holder. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 11th August, 1958 Khetu instituted a suit for possession of land in dispute measuring 32 Kanals in the allegation that the same had been sold to him by Jugti for Rs. 2,000/-. As the land was in possession of Chattar Singh and Rattan Singh, minor sons of Jugti, and as the possession of the same was not delivered to the plaintiff, the plaintiff claimed decree for possession of the land against Jugti, Chattar Singh and Rattan Singh. 3. The suit was contested by Chattar Singh and Rattan Singh on the ground that the land in dispute had been gifted in their favour on 3rd September, 1951 by Jugti. Jugti was stated to have no title in the land after the above gift and as such he was not entitled to sell the land in favour of the plaintiff. In 29th August, 1959 a compromise was effected between the plaintiff and the contesting defendants with the leave of the Court in the following terms :- "That the defendant are owners of the suit land by gift but as their father has executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff, the defendants by way of pious obligations, are ready to pay Rs. 1,000/- towards the consideration and as to the rest of money amounting to Rs. 1,000/- the plaintiff will be entitled to seek his remedy against Jugti and as such the suit be decreed on the condition that if the defendants pay Rs. 1,000/- upto 1st May, 1960 to the plaintiff then the suit of the plaintiff shall stand dismissed and he will have no right in the land and if the defendants Chattar Singh and Rattan Singh do not pay Rs. 1,000/- within time or do not deposit the same in Court then the suit shall stand decreed and plaintiff will be entitled to take the possession of the land. The parties shall in both cases bear their own costs". A decree in terms of the compromise was granted by the Court. Chattar Singh and Rattan Singh appellants deposited the amount of Rs. 1,000/- through their guardian ad litem on 11th May, 1960. The order of the Court on the application for deposit of the money was that the money might be deposited subject to any objection by the decree-holders on 1st June, 1960. Khetu decree-holder applied for cheque of Rs. 1,000/- on and 2nd June, 1960 an order for issuing the cheque to Khetu was made. Instead of receiving the cheque, Khetu decree-holder applied on 3rd June, 1960 for the execution of the decree for possession on the ground that amount of Rs. 1,000/- had not been deposited within agreed time. Objections to the execution were raised by the two appellants and it was averred inter alia that if any default has been committed by the appellants in the deposit of the money, relief might be granted to them as the term in the compromise about a decree for possession in the circumstances was of a penal nature. 4. The Executing Court held that the clause that the decree-holder would be entitled to decree for possession of the land in case the amount of Rs. 1,000/- was not deposited by a particular date, was of a penal nature and relief should be afforded to minor judgment-debtors from the rigorous of that clause. The decision of the Executing Court was affirmed on appeal by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Hissar. On second appeal the learned Single Judge held that the clause in question was not penal in nature but was merely concession. The decree-holder was held entitled to enforce the claim for recovery of possession of the land in accordance with the compromise decree. The decree-holder's appeal was accordingly allowed and the decisions of the Courts below were set aside. 5. In Letters Patent Appeal Mr. Mittal on behalf of the appellants has argued that the clause in question about the decree for possession is of a penal nature and as such the learned Single was in error in setting aside the decisions of the Courts below. As against that, Mr. Ram Rang on behalf of Khetu decree-holder respondent has canvassed for the correctness of the view of the learned Single Judge. After giving the matter our consideration were are of the view that the clause in the compromise, that if the appellants did not pay or deposit Rs. 1,000/- upto 1st May, 1960 the plaintiff's suit would stand decreed and he would be entitled to recover possession of the land, is of a penal nature. The principle, which should weigh with the Courts is determining whether a clause in a compromise decree of a penal nature or not, has been enunicated by Tek Chand, J. in Jhanda Singh v. Piara Singh, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 23, while quoting with approval the dictum laid down in the earlier case Jwala Ram and another v. Mathra Das and others, A.I.R. 1931 Lahore 696, in the following terms :- "Where a decree is passed as a result on an agreement between the parties it does not stand on a higher footing than the agreement which preceded it, and therefore the Court has the power to relieve the defaulting party from the consequences of the default; but the Court does not possess unrestricted power in the matter inasmuch as it cannot interfere with the effect of default if as a result thereof the decree holder seeks merely to take away a concession which he had given to the judgment-debtor. If, on the other hand, as a result of the default, the decree-holder is attempting to realize more than was really due to him, in other words, if he is enforcing a penalty, then the Court is entitled to step in and give relief to the judgment-debtor against the forfeiture". The same view was re-affirmed by Tek Chand, J. In Mitha and others v. Remal Dass and others, A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 828. The learned counsel for both the parties have accepted as correct the dictum laid down above, and the learned Single Judge has also relied upon the above dictum, applying the principle enunicated above to the facts of the present case, we find that according to the very opening words of the compromise the appellants are the owners of the land in dispute because of the gift in their favour by their father. The land was, subsequent to the gift, sold by the father, of the appellants in favour of Khetu respondent, and though the appellants in their written statement questioned the right of their father to sell the land after the gift, in the compromise they agreed to pay Rs. 1,000/- to Khetu plaintiff-respondent by way of pious obligation by first May, 1960. The clause in the compromise, that if the appellants failed to pay or deposit in Court the above amount by the agreed date the suit would stand decreed, should be held to be a of a penal nature because Khetu decree-holder by that clause was getting more than what was really due to him. The appellants being the owners of the land by virtue of the gift in their favour Khetu could not on the basis of a subsequent sale in his favour by Jugti acquire any title in the land and as such had no right to claim decree for possession of the land. Despite this infirmity in the title Khetu, to enforce the above clause and to grant possession of the land in dispute Khetu because of delay of ten days in the disposit of the amount of Rs. 1,000/- by the appellants would manifestly be exacting obedience of a clause which is penal and has the element of punishment and unduly drastic consequences and not one embodying a mere withdrawal of concession or favour. The Executing Court as well as the Court of First Appeal, in the circumstances, were justified in granting relief to the appellants against the rigours, of the penal clause. We would, therefore, accept the penal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and restore the order of the Executing Court and the First Appellate Court. The parties, in the circumstances, shall bar their own costs throughout. Falshaw, C.J. - I agree. Appeal accepted.