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Gurdit Singh Petitioner, v. Jagjit Singh .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 11, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — I.S. Tiwana, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 19, 1974 the Senior Sub Judge, Jullundur, passed a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff (respondent here) directing the defendant (petitioner here) to execute and register the sale deed for H. No. 407, Rainbow Road, Jullundur City on payment of the balance price of Rs. 30,000/-. The operative part of the decree ordered execution of the sale deed by 30th January, 1975 and required the defendant to put the plaintiff in full possession and to pay costs.

The petitioner contended that he asked the respondent to pay the balance and get the sale deed registered but the respondent avoided performance; the petitioner alleged he went to the Sub-Registrar's office on 30 January 1975 and his application to register the deed was returned with a remark that he should seek a remedy before the proper Court. The petitioner then filed an appeal (R.F.A. No. 118 of 1975) in this Court (the opinion records the appeal as filed on March 4, 1977) challenging the decree; that appeal was dismissed on August 25, 1983, thereby affirming the trial court's decree.

On October 11, 1983 the respondent filed an execution application to enforce the decree. By an order dated November 17, 1983 the Court directed the respondent to deposit Rs. 35,625 (comprising Rs. 30,000 balance and Rs. 5,625 for stamp and registration etc.), which he deposited on November 18, 1983. The petitioner filed an application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act on November 19, 1983 seeking rescission (nullification) of the contract/decree on the ground that the respondent had failed to deposit the balance within one month of the decree (i.e., by 19 January/30 January 1975 as alleged). The lower Court dismissed that application; the petitioner challenged that dismissal by the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the decree for specific performance on the ground of alleged default by the decree-holder in depositing the purchase money within the time allegedly allowed by the decree, should have been allowed.
  2. Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing the petitioner's section 28 application without permitting the parties to lead evidence and without recording findings on factual disputes raised by the petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The lower Court dismissed the petitioner's application under section 28 casually and without permitting the parties to lead evidence or without recording findings on contested facts.
  • The respondent (decree-holder) failed to perform his part of the decree because he did not deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- and the requisite stamp and registration charges within thirty days of the decree dated 19 December 1974; accordingly the contract should be rescinded and the decree nullified.
  • The petitioner relied on observations in Onkar Nath and another v. Basheer and others (A.I.R. 1986 Pb. & Hr. 152) to support the contention that failure to comply within the stipulated period could warrant rescission; counsel for the petitioner asserted that that authority supported his case.

Respondent's Position (as recorded)

  • The respondent filed an execution application on October 11, 1983 and, pursuant to the Court's direction dated November 17, 1983, deposited Rs. 35,625 on November 18, 1983 (Rs. 30,000 plus Rs. 5,625 for stamp and registration etc.).
  • The lower Court found that the petitioner's application was filed to delay final execution of a decree arising from proceedings initiated in 1971; the recorded position is that the petitioner neither showed willingness to perform the contract after dismissal of his appeal nor took steps to comply with the decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Onkar Nath and another v. Basheer and others, A.I.R. 1986 Pb. & Hr. 152 Authority where the Single Judge concluded from record material that the plaintiff (decree-holder) had failed to comply with the decree within the stipulated period, supporting rescission in those facts. The Court distinguished that case, noting that its facts were materially different because in the present case the trial Court had not fixed any time within which the decree-holder was to deposit the purchase money; therefore the cited authority did not help the petitioner.
Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and others, (2) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1124 The principle that when an appeal is pending the appellate order (once rendered) is the operative order, and that the lower court's decree merges in the appellate court's order; the appellate authority's order is the operative order after disposal of appeal. The Court applied this principle to hold that defaults alleged during the period when the decree was sub judice (while the appeal was pending) were irrelevant; the operative decree is that of the Appellate Court after dismissal on August 25, 1983.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory ground under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescinding an agreement decreed for specific performance: the purchaser must have "committed default in paying the purchase money or such other sum as directed within the time allowed under the decree." The Court observed that in the present case the trial Court's decree of 19 December 1974 did not fix any specific time within which the decree-holder was required to deposit the balance sale consideration or the stamp/registration charges. Similarly, this Court when dismissing the petitioner's appeal did not specify any time for deposit.

The Court then addressed the petitioner's conduct. It noted that the petitioner had challenged the decree by appeal and had obtained an order staying operation of the decree (the opinion records an order on March 5, 1975) — in consequence the decree remained sub judice from the date of the appeal's prosecution until its final disposal on August 25, 1983. Because the decree was under appeal, the Court emphasized the settled legal principle (adopted from Collector of Customs) that only the appellate court's order is operative once the appeal is disposed of; therefore defaults alleged while the decree was sub judice were not relevant to a section 28 application based on non-payment within a period fixed by the decree.

The Court further observed that after the appeal was dismissed the petitioner never indicated willingness to perform his part of the contract nor alleged any such willingness in his section 28 application. By contrast, the respondent, after dismissal of the appeal, proceeded with the execution application and complied with the Court's direction dated 17 November 1983 by depositing Rs. 35,625 on 18 November 1983.

The Court noted the discretionary nature of the power under section 28: rescission of a contract or nullification of a decree for specific performance requires a clear case of default by the decree-holder. On the facts here — absence of any time fixed by the decree for deposit, the pendency of the appeal, the respondent's prompt deposit after the appeal was dismissed and Court direction, and the petitioner's failure to show willingness to perform — the Court found no established clear case of default warranting rescission.

Finally, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the lower Court's dismissal was casual: the impugned order ran to four typed pages and was founded on facts on record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and effects (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The petitioner's invocation of section 28 did not establish a sufficient ground to rescind the decree for specific performance in the circumstances of this case.
  • The respondent had complied with the Court's direction by depositing Rs. 35,625 on 18 November 1983; the execution application proceeded accordingly.
  • The petitioner was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 500/- as determined by the Court.

The opinion does not purport to lay down any broad new principle of law; it applies established principles (including the rule on the operative effect of appellate orders) to the facts and confines its outcome to the direct effect on the parties in this matter.

Show all summary ...

I.S Tiwana, J. — The petitioner makes a grouse of the dismissal of his application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In. order to resolve the controversy raised in this petition the following facts deserve to be noticed.

2. On December 19, 1974, a decree was passed against the petitioner by the Senior Sub Judge, Jullundur, directing him to specifically perform the agreement contained in the receipt exhibited as P. 5 in that suit. The operative part of the decree concededly reads as follows:—

“As a result, I pass a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale as per receipt Ex. P.5 of H. No. 407, Rainbow Road, Jullundur City on payment of balance price of Rs. 30,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The defendant to get the sale deed registered by 30th January, 1975 and to do all acts to put the plaintiff in full possession of the pro perty and to pay the costs of the suit. The other relief claimed by the plaintiff is disallowed.”

It is maintained by the petitioner that since he was directed to execute the sale deed by January 30, 1975, he requested the plaintiff-respondent a number of time to pay him the balance amount of Rs. 30,000/- and to get the sale deed registered in terms of the above noted decree, but the latter always got on avoiding to perform his part of the contract. He further claims Page: 520that on January 30, 1975, he even went to the office of the Sub Registar, and submitted an application to him showing that he had come to that office with a view to get the sale deed registered but the said application was returned to him with the remarks tbat “he should seek a proper remedy before the proper Court”. It is then his pleaded case that since the respondent decree holder failed to carry out his part of the decree, he ‘per force’ had to file an appeal (R.F.A No. 118 of 1975) in this Court on March 4, 1977 assailing the decree but the said appeal was dismissed on August 25, 1983, affirming the decree of the trial Court.

3. On October 11, 1983, the respondent decree holder filed an application for the execution of the decree passed in his favour by the trial Court on December 19, 1974 and as affirmed by this Court on August 25, 1983. On November 17, 1983 the Court directed the respondent decree bolder to deposit Rs. 35625/-, i.e, Rs. 30,000/- as balance of the sale consideration and Rs. 5625/- by way of stamp and registration charges, etc. This amount was admittedly deposited by the respondent on the very next day, i.e, November 18, 1983. It is only on November 19, 1983, that the present application under section 28 of the Act was filed by the petitioner with the assertion that the respondent decree holder had failed to perform his part of the contract in as much as he never deposited the balance sale consideration, i.e, Rs. 30,000/- within one month from the date of passing of the decree by the Court on December 19, 1974 and is view of that the contract of sale be rescinded, meaning thereby that the decree in question be nullified. This application, as already indicated in the opening part of this judgment, has been dismissed by the lower Court.

4. It is now being contended rather seriously by Mr. G.S Sachdev, learned counsel for the petitioner that firstly the trial Court could not dismiss his application casually without permitting the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective pleas and recording finding there upon, and secondly, in the light of the above noted facts it is established beyond any doubt that the respondent decree holder had failed to perform his part of the contract as he did not deposit the balance of the sale consideration, i.e, Rs. 30 000/- and also the requisite stamp and registration charges within the prescribed period of thirty days from the date of the passing of the decree in his favour, i.e December 19, 1974. Having given by thoughtful consideration to the entire matter in the light of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I, however, find no merit in this petition.

5. It is not disputed before me that the only ground on which the Court can make an order reminding the agreement of sale under section 28 of the Act is that the purchaser had committed default in paying the purchase money or such other sum as directed within the time allowed under the decree. If that is so, as it then it is patent in the instant case that the trial Court which decreed the suit of the respondent on December 19, 1974, did not fix any time within which the respondent decree-holder was required to deposit the balance of the sale consideration, i.e, Rs. 30,000/- and the other stamp and registration charges, etc. Similarly this Court, while dismissing the petitioner's appeal, did not choose to specify the time or date by which the respondent decree holder was to deposit or to pay the balance of the sale consideration, i.e, Rs. 30,000/- or any other sum. It is not the case of the petitioner that before the filing of the appeal (RFA No. 118 of 1975) in this Court, he had issued any notice specifying the date for the performance of the agreement in question or compliance of the decree as such. Rather the very fact that he preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial Court is indicative of his state of mind that he did not accept the decree and thus there was no question of his being willing to perform his part of the agreement or to comply with that decree. Not only he preferred this appeal, but also made a move and actually obtained an Page: 521order from this Court on March 5, 1975 staying the operation of the said decree. This order remained in force till the final disposal of this appeal. It is thus patent that the decree in question remained sub judice in this Court from March 4, 1975 to August 25, 1983. It was only after the dismissal of this appeal that the respondent decree-holder filed the execution application on October 11, 1983 and in the light of the direction of the Court dated November 17, 1983, for the deposit of Rs. 35625/- referred to above, deposited the said amount the very next day, i.e, on November 18, 1983. It is not the case of the petitioner even remotely that after the dismissal of the appeal by this Court on August 25, 1983, he ever disclosed his intention to carry out or comply with the decree in any manner. I, therefore, find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the lower Court that this application “has been filed just to delay the final execution of the decree” passed as a result of the proceedings which were initiated as long back as the year 1971.

6. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner at one stage sought to rely on certain observations made by this Court in Onkar Nath and another v. Basheer and others A.I.R 1986 Pb. & Hr. 152 but having perused the judgment. I find that the facts in that case were materially different from those of the case in hand. That was a case where the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion on the basis of the material on record that the plaintiff respondent (decree-holder) had failed to comply with the decree within the stipulated period. In the instant case, as already pointed out above, the trial Court never fixed the time within which the decree-holder was to deposit the purchase money or any other sum before the execution of the sale deed by the judgment debtor. As per the phraseology of the section, a purchaser can only be deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in a suit far specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property if he “does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such farther period as the Court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay.”

7. Above all this the default alleged to have been committed by the respondent decree holder subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial Court on December 19, 1974 and prior to the disposal of the petitioner's appeal by this Court on August 25, 1983, appears to be totally irrelevant in view of the settled principle of law tbat where a decree is appealed against, the only executable decree would be that of the Appellate Court, may it be a decree of revevsal or affirmance. The final Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and others, (2) A.I.R 1963 S.C 1124 after an exhaustive analysis of the earliar case law has, in this regard, firmly ruled as follows:—

“When an appeal is made, the appellate authority can do one of three things, namely,—(i) it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus confirm the order without any modification. In all these three cases after the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In law the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification.

The principle viz:, that the appellate order is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, is the basis of the rule that the decree of the lower Court merges in the decree of the appellate court. On the same principle it would not be incorrect to say that the order of the original authority is merged in the order of the appellate authority what so ever its decision-whether of reversal or Page: 522modification or mere confirmation.”

As has already been pointed out above, subsequent to the dismissal of his appeal, the petitioner neither ever disclosed his willingness to perform his part of the contract nor has he alleged anything in this regard in the application filed by him. In such a situation, to my mind, a decree holder is only supposed to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration or to perform his part of the agreement within a reasonable time of the passing of the decree in his favour. The respondent did the same on November 18, 1983 when he deposited Rs. 35625/- in compliance with the direction of the Court dated November 17, 1983. The power under section 28 of the Act is undoubtedly discretionary and the Court cannot on flimsy grounds annul the decree once passed by it. A clear case of default has to be established against the decree holder for rescinding a contract or to nulify the decree of specific performance.

8. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the application has been dismissed by the lower Court in a casual manner, has no weight in view of the fact that the impugned order running into four typed pages has been founded on facts available on the records of the case.

9 In the light of the discussion above, this petition fails and is dismissed costs which I determine at Rs. 500/-.

Petition dismissed.