A.N. Grover, J. - This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, of a medical student, Sham Sunder studying in the Medical College, Amritsar. It is alleged that he was in the second professional M.B.B.S. Class in the year 1962 and when the examination for the first professional M.B.B.S. were held in April, 1962, one Ravi Loona, who was a student of the first professional M.B.B.S class, was appearing in his Anatomy paper on 13th April, 1962. When he came out of the examination hall to go to the bath room it is alleged by the petitioner that he was standing along with some other students near the College Library which was near the examination hall. When Ravi Loona was going back to the Examination Hall, some students gave him a chit. This was detected by the Superintendent or some invigitator who immediately tried to recover the chit from Ravi Loona but the latter swallowed it. Ravi Loona made some statement prejudicial to the petitioner but he did not know what that statement was as that was not taken in his presence. The Deputy Registrar, Punjab University, sent for the petitioner on 13th May, 1962, and asked him to answer a Questionnaire. The allegation made in the petition is that Deputy Registrar Shri K.C. Walia, was on very friendly relation with Ravi Loona and wanted to save him and it was on his prompting that the petitioner answered the Questionnaire in the manner suggested by him. A questionnaire was also handed over to Ravi Loona but only after the petitioner had answered to the questionnaire placed before him. Subsequently the petitioner came to know that the had been disqualified from appearing in the second professional M.B.B.S. examination for one year, although a copy of the order was not sent to him. He filed an appeal against the order to the Vice Chancellor but the latter dismissed the appeal without hearing him. Later on, the petitioner requested the Registrar to furnish him with attested copies of various documents set out in paragraph 13 of the petition but the same were not supplied. The main grievance of the petitioner is that he was not afforded an ample opportunity to represent his case and explain his conduct and there has been a violation of the rules of natural justice. 2. In the written statement filed by the University, one of the preliminary objections that has been taken is that the petition is belated as the period of disqualification has already expired and the petitioner is entitled to appear in the examination to be held during the month of September. It was asserted in categorical terms that it was the petitioner who had given the chit to Ravi Loona on 16th April, 1963 and not on 13th April as alleged which was swallowed by the latter. This was detected at that very time by Shri P.C. Khanna, the Supervisor, who made a report to the Deputy Superintendent by whom the statement of Ravi Loona was recorded on that very day which was as follows :- "Mr. Sham Sunder 3rd year student had handed over a paper to me which I never saw. The Superintendent saw it, I became afraid and swallowed it". This was signed by Ravi Loona. Along with the written statement copies of the report of the Supervisor (Annexure R/1), the Deputy Superintendent (Annexure R/2) and the letter of the Superintendent to the acting Principal of the Medical College (Annexure R/3) have been attached. It is further stated that on 13th May, 1962, the petitioner was examined in respect of the charge against him and gave the answers in writing to the Questionnaire (copy of which is annexure R/4). It was denied that the Deputy Registrar had any connection with Ravi Loona and actually an affidavit sworn by Shri K.C. Walia, the Deputy Registrar, to that effect has been filed and a copy of the questions and answers of Ravi Loona (Annexure R/5) have also been attached. It is necessary to set out the material part of paragraph 11 of the written statement. "That all the material including the report of the Supervisor, the statement of Loona, the report of the Deputy Superintendent, and the report of the Superintendent dated 16th April, 1962, and the Questionnaire and answers given by the petitioner and Ravi Loona on the 13th May, 1962 were duly submitted to the Standing Committee for Unfair Means on the 15th of June, 1962. As the members of the Unfair means Committee were not unanimous and there was a difference of opinion amongst them, the matter was submitted to the Vice-Chancellor as required under Regulation 19. The Vice-Chancellor agreed with the recommendation that Sham Sunder petitioner was as much guilty of giving unfair assistance as the other candidate was found guilty of receiving it and that both should be punished. Sham Sunder was ordered to be disqualified for a year under rule 12(c) and Ravi Loona for 2 years under rule 12(b). The order of disqualification of the petitioner was perfectly legal, valid and justified and was not an arbitrary one". It is admitted that an appeal was filed by the petitioner to the Vice-Chancellor but the same was rejected. It is maintained that the petitioner was fully aware of the accusation made against him and he had been given an opportunity to explain the same and that there has been no violation of the rule of natural justice. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, (1962 P.L.R. 575), where it has been laid down that though there is nothing express one way or the other in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act or the regulations, casting a duty on the Examination Committee to act judicially, the manner of the disposal based as it must be on materials placed before it, and the serious effects of the decision of the Committee on the examinee concerned must lead to the conclusion that a duty is cast on the Committee to act judicially in determining cases of misconduct and that when cases of examinees using unfair means at the examination are dealt with, the Committee acts in a quasi- judicial capacity and the principles of natural justice would apply to the proceedings before the Committee. The following observations, however, at page 581 are noteworthy :- "As to the manner in which it should give an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be heard, that is a matter which can be provided by Regulations or Bye-laws if necessary. As was pointed out in Local Government Board v. Alridge, (1915 A.C. 120), all that is required is that the other party should have an opportunity of adequately presenting his case. But what the procedure should be in detail will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There is no doubt that many of the powers of the Committee under Chapter VI are of administrative nature; but where quasi-judicial duties are entrusted to an administrative body like this it becomes a quasi-judicial body for performing these duties and it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the principles of natural justice are followed and adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee". It may be mentioned that in the case which was decided by their Lordship no opportunity whatever had been afforded to the examinees to rebut the allegations against them in the enquiry made by the Committee which resulted in the resolution cancelling the results of the examination. There can be no doubt from the above observations that in the present case it was not necessary for the Disciplinary Sub-Committee of the University to have personally heard the petitioner. Indeed, it would appear that their Lordships had accorded approval to the principles enunciated in Local Government v. Alridge, (1915 A.C. 120), by which the extent and the content of such opportunity would be governed. The above decision of the House of Lord as also other relevant decisions on the point were examined at length in the Privy Council in University of Ceylon v. Fernando, (1960) 1 Allah E.R. 631. There the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ceylon appointed a Commission of inquiry consisting of himself and two others to assist him in inquiring into certain allegations which had been made by B, a woman student, and which, if they were true, were explicable only on the footing that F, a student, who was taking a university examination, had acquired knowledge of a German passage in one of the examination papers before taking the examination F was informed by letter of the allegations against him and of the appointment of the commission and was asked to attend before the commission on two occasions. F attended before the commission, when it was made clear to him, so the Court, found, what the charge was and he was given an opportunity to state his case. When other witnesses including B, gave evidence before the commission, F was not present. F did not ask that he should be allowed to question any of these witnesses. The commission found the allegations against F to be true and reported accordingly. He was found guilty of an examination offence and suspended indefinitely from all university examinations. He brought an action against university for a declaration to the effect that the decision was null and void on the ground that the inquiry was not conducted in accordance with principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court of Colombo granted the declaration. Before their Lordships on appeal it was not disputed that the inquiry was of a quasi-judicial nature but it was held that the fact that the commission did not tender B, or any other witness, for cross-examination by F, was not a failure to comply with the rules of natural justice, but the position might have been different if F had asked to be allowed to cross examine B and had not been allowed to do so; neither was the fact that two witnesses had been questioned by the Vice-Chancellor alone a failure to comply with the principles of natural justice, and the finding of the commission had been reached with due regard to those principles. The result was that the appeal was allowed and the suit of F was dismissed. At page 638 their Lordships approved the observations of Harnam, J. in Burne v. Kinematograph Rerters Society Ltd., (1958) 2 All. E.R. 579 at p. 599, which were as follows :- "What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind ? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more". 4. It is in the light of the principles set out above that the case of the present petitioner has to be considered. The principal grievance which has been agitated on his behalf is that he was not supplied with the copies of the reports made by the Supervisor, the Deputy Superintendent and the Super- intendent of the examination nor was he apprised of the purport of their report and he was thus deprived of an opportunity of explaining away those reports or showing in what manner and how those persons were prejudiced against the petitioner or were hostile to him. It is submitted that no other evidence was taken and if any evidence was recorded by the Disciplinary Sub-Committee it was behind the back of the petitioner and he had no occasion at all at any stage to know what that evidence was. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the University submits that the petitioner had been fully informed of the charge against him and by means of the Questionnaire he had been given every opportunity to give a full and proper explanation which had been duly considered. It seems to me that the rule of natural justice does require that a person should be informed not only of the accusation against him but also of any evidence which may have been taken in respect of the alleged offence in his absence because otherwise he would have no means of knowing what had been deposed against him or of the existence of the pieces of evidence which needed explanation. This follows from the observations made by their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd., v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1954) 26 I.T.R. 775, at pages 782-783 :- "In this case we are of the opinion that the Tribunal violated certain fundamental rules of justice in reaching its conclusions. Firstly, it did not disclose to the assessee what information had been supplied to it by the departmental representative. Next, it did not give any opportunity to the company to rebut the material furnished to it by him, and lastly it declined to take all the material that the assessee wanted to produce in support of its case. The result is that the assessee has not a fair hearing". The same rule has been followed in a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party (Union of India v. Om Parkash, Letters Patent Appeal No. 217 of 1960, decided on 27th August, 1961.) 5. In the present case, however, it is significant that the petitioner never asked at the time when he answered the Questionnaire that he should be told what the evidence was on which action was proposed to be taken against him. Indeed, the entire evidence on which the Disciplinary Sub-Committee took action consisted of the reports of the officers who were incharge of the examination and the statement of Ravi Loona himself which he gave on the spot when he was caught swallowing the chit. In the Questionnaire itself there was question No. 12 which was as follows :- "Were you known to any of the members of the supervisory staff i.e. Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent or the Supervisor ?" The answer given was - "None". There was no suggestion at that stage as indeed it has now been made that the Supervisor or the Deputy Superintendent had any motive in implicating the petitioner falsely or imputing to him something of which he was not guilty. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the opportunity which was afforded to the petitioner was ample and sufficient according to the principles laid down in the cases referred to before. 6. My attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to certain decisions e.g. Ram Chander v. The Punjab University, (1963 P.L.R. 632); R. Nagalingam v. The University of Madras, (1963(1) M.L.J. 24; and Chittra Shrivastava v. Board of H.S. & I Exam., (A.I.R. 1963 All. 41, but the facts in those cases were different and it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail. 7. An attempt was made on behalf of the petitioner to raise a new point, namely, that he could not have been disqualified under the regulations as he was not a examinee. This point was never raised in the petition and, therefore, no question arises of examining its correctness. 8. In the result, the petition is dismissed, but I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.