Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Municipal Committee Mukerian v. Sub-Divisional Officer (C) Dasuya

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aug 3, 1984
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Municipal Committee, Mukerian (the petitioner-Committee) filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to impugn an order dated 28 September 1981 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (C), Dasuya (respondent No. 1). Respondent No. 2 is a paper mill located in Village Chak-alla-baken on the G.T. Road, outside the municipal limits of Mukerian. The mill imports machinery, raw material and other goods which are received at Railway Station Mukerian (inside the municipal limits) and then transported to the mill premises outside the municipal limits.

The Committee had been realising octroi duty on consignments collected by the mill at the Mukerian Railway Station. Respondent No. 2 challenged the levy and, after an appeal to the Collector (Deputy Commissioner), Hoshiarpur, the matter was sent to respondent No. 1 who, by order dated 28 September 1981 (Annexure P-2), accepted the appeal and set aside the Committee's levy of octroi duty. The present writ petition was filed to impugn that order. The levy complained of included a specific charge of Rs. 48.45 recorded under receipt No. 45/5 dated 14.4.1981 for R.R. No. 837344 dated 4.4.1981.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether octroi is leviable on goods taken delivery of at a railway station inside municipal limits when those goods are intended for consumption, use or sale outside the municipal limits (i.e., whether entry into the municipal limits for the purpose of transit to an outside destination attracts octroi).
  2. Whether the fact that delivery of goods to the mill's representatives is obtained at the railway station (inside municipal limits) means that "sale" occurs there for the purposes of charging octroi.
  3. Whether, in the circumstances, the Committee was entitled to charge octroi or only a transit fee (Rahdari) on goods received at Mukerian Railway Station and transported to the mill outside municipal limits.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Committee's Arguments

  • The Committee contended that the sale of goods imported by the mill takes place at the Railway Station where physical possession passed to the mill; because the sale/supply occurs inside the municipal limits, octroi duty was chargeable.
  • Reliance was placed on Section 82(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act which permits seizure of articles for non-payment of octroi, and on procedural rules governing collection of octroi.
  • Emphasis was placed on the Committee's practice of realising octroi on consignments collected at the Mukerian Railway Station and on the fact that Railway Receipts and bank procedures were involved in the release of goods.

Respondent-Mill's Arguments

  • The mill's pleaded position (uncontroverted at the hearing) was that the goods imported through Mukerian Railway Station were meant solely for use and consumption in the mill's factory premises located outside the municipal limits, and therefore not liable to octroi.
  • The mill asserted that the goods were not to be consumed, used or sold within the municipal limits of Mukerian but merely passed through the area in transit to the outside factory premises.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. The State of Punjab (1974 76 PLR 410) Held (by a Single Judge) that property in goods did not pass until payment was made to the bank and the Railway Receipt released; sale effected when payment made to the bank acting as agent of the owner. The court disagreed with this interpretation for octroi purposes, held that the question whether sale is complete at the station is not the relevant test for levy of octroi, and expressly overruled this authority for the purposes of octroi interpretation in the present context.
Burmah-shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd., Belgaum v. Belagaum Borough Municipality (1976 3 SCC 398) Explains that goods are treated as brought in for purposes of consumption when they are brought for use/consumption or to put them in the way of others in the area who will use/consume; taxable event is entry of goods meant to reach an ultimate user in the area; sale is a means to place goods for consumption/use. The court read these observations and emphasized that if goods are brought in only for transit (and ultimately used outside), octroi is not leviable. The court relied on the principles in this decision to hold the impugned order lawful in the present facts.
Hiralal Thakorial Dalal v. Broach Municipality (1976 3 SCC 398) Held that a trading firm would not be liable to octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re-exported out of the area. The court applied this principle to conclude that goods imported by the mill for transportation to factory premises outside municipal limits are in transit and cannot attract octroi; consequently, the Committee could only claim a transit fee (Rahdari) and not octroi on such goods.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the crucial question as the meaning and scope of "octroi" for the present purpose, referring to Rule V-1 of Appendix V of the Municipal Account Code (Octroi), which defines "octroi" as a cess on the entry into a municipality of goods for consumption, use or sale therein.

The court observed that the words "consumption, use or sale therein" indicate an intention that octroi be leviable only where goods enter the municipal limits for the purpose of being consumed, used or sold within those limits. On the undisputed averment in the mill's written statement that the goods were meant only for use and consumption in the factory situated outside the municipal limits, the court concluded that the goods were not brought into Mukerian for consumption, use or sale therein.

The Committee's contention that the sale was complete at the railway station (so octroi was chargeable) was rejected. The court explained that the question for octroi chargeability is not whether any sale (in terms of Contract Act or Sale of Goods Act) is complete at the railway station, but whether the goods entering the municipal limits are meant to be consumed, used or sold within those limits.

The court considered prior decisions relied upon by the Committee. It disagreed with the view in Amrit Banaspati, which evaluated the point in light of the Contract Act and Sale of Goods Act; the court overruled that authority for the purposes of octroi interpretation. The court then relied on the principles laid down in Burmah‑shell (and the subsequent highlighting in Hiralal Thakorial Dalal) to the effect that octroi cannot be legitimately levied when goods are merely brought in and then re-exported (i.e., brought in only for transit to destinations outside the municipal area).

Applying those principles to the material facts (notably the uncontroverted averment that the goods were destined for the mill outside the municipal limits), the court held that the consignments were only passing through the municipal limits of Mukerian during transit and, therefore, octroi was not chargeable. The appropriate levy, if any, in such circumstances would be a transit fee (Rahdari) rather than octroi.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED.

The court upheld the Sub-Divisional Officer's order dated 28 September 1981 setting aside the Committee's levy of octroi on the goods in question, concluding that the Committee could not charge octroi on consignments brought into Mukerian Railway Station which were destined for use/consumption outside the municipal limits; at most the Committee could claim a transit fee (Rahdari).

The court expressly overruled the authority of Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. insofar as that case was understood to support charging octroi on the basis that sale (for Contract or Sale of Goods Act purposes) is complete at the station. The opinion applies the principles from Burmah-shell and Hiralal Thakorial Dalal to the facts, and disposes of the petition accordingly.

Costs: The court ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs.


Source: Opinion of Surinder Singh, J. (with D.S. Tewatia, J. concurring), as provided.

Show all summary ...

Surinder Singh, J.:— This writ petition filed by the Municipal Committee, Mukerian, (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to impugn order, dated September 28, 1981, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) Dasuya-respondent No. 1 (Copy Annexure P-2). The facts as alleged in the petition may be briefly recapitulated. Respondent No. 2 is a Paper Mill running in the town of Mukerian. During the course of its business of production of paper and other allied goods, the Mill imports machinery, raw material and other goods from different places. The Mill is situated in Village Chak-alla-baken on G.T Road which is outside the municipal limits of town. The goods imported by the Mill are collected from the Railway Station Mukerian which is located within the municipal limits. It is the case of the Committee that in spite of the protests of the Mill (Respondent No. 2), the Committee has been realising octroi duty on the goods imported by the Mill. The stand on behalf of the Mill is that since the premises of their industry are not located within the municipal limits of the Committee, the latter is not entitled to charge octroi duty on the goods which are collected from the Railway Station for being used in the Mill itself. This stand is, however, controverted by the petitioner-Committee with the contention that the consignments of goods reported by the Mill are received at Railway Station, Mukerian and these consignments are collected by the Mill on the basis of Railway Receipts which are sent through certain Banks at Mukerian where the Mill has its accounts. It is further contended that the goods after being received at the Railway Station and un-loaded from the wagons are transported to the factory premises.

2. The particular ground leading to the present petition has been mentioned in paragraph 7 of the writ petition as follows:

“That the petitioner vide receipt No. 45/5 dated 14.4.1981 for R.R No. 837344 dated 4.4.1981 charged Rs. 48.45 P. from respondent No. 2 as octroi duty on the goods. The respondent No. 2 feeling aggrieved from the realisation of the octroi duty per receipt referred to above challenged the same by way of appeal before the Collector (Deputy Commissioner) Hoshiarpur which was later on sent to respondent No. 1 for decision.”

3. As per order, dated September, 28, 1981 (Copy Annexure P-2) respondent No. 1 accepted the above appeal and set aside the levy of octroi duty by the petitioner Committee, referred to above. The present writ petition has been filed with a view to impugn the said order of respondent No. 1.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Committee has contedded that the sale of goods imported by the Mill takes place at the Railway Station where the physical possession of the goods passed into the hands of the Mill. The sale being, thus, complete at the Railway Station which is situated within the limits of the petitioner-Cornmittee, the latter was entitled to charge octroi duty on the goods irrespective of the fact as to how these goods are utilised by the Mill representatives after taking delivery of the same. The counsel referred to section 82(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act according to which, in case of non payment of octroi duty, the officer empowered to collect the same could seize any article on which the octroi is chargeable with a view to satisfy the demand of octroi. Reference was also made to certain rules which prescribe the procedure in regard to various matters connected with the collection of octroi duty. These provisions, however do not have much relevance to the point in controversy. The crucial point for consideration is as to what actually octroi means and for this purpose, it is necessary to peruse Rule V-1 of Appendix V of the Municipal Account Code (Octroi) wherein the term “octroi” has been defined to mean a cess on the entry into a municipality of goods for consumption, use or sale therein. In so far as the consumption or use of the goods in the municipal limits of the petitioner-Committee is concerned, it is the common case of the parties that the goods are neither consumed nor used within the municipal limits. The argument on behalf of the petitioner-Committee, however, is that the sale of the goods takes place within the municipal limits, i.e at the Railway Station. We do not, however, agree with this contention. The use of the word “therein” after the words “consumption, use or sale” is indicative of the intention of the framers of the Code, this intention being that octroi is leviable only on the goods which enter into the municipal limits for the purpose of being consumed, used or sold within the said limits. In the case in hand, it was emphatically averred on behalf of the Mill that the goods imported through Railway Station Mukerian are meant only for use and consumption in the factory of the Mill which is located outside the municipal limits. This assertion has not been controverted by means of a replication or even otherwise at the bar. The interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the word ‘sale’ that the moment the delivery of the goods is obtained by the Mill at the Railway Station the sale is complete, is not based upon a correct approach to the matter. What is required to be seen is not as to whether any sale has taken place at the Railway Station but whether the goods which enter into the municipal limits are meant for being sold consumed or used within that limits. This is evidently not so in the present case in view of the uncontroverted averment made in the written statement.

5. Reliance, on behalf of the petitioner-Commitee, has been placed upon the observations made in certain decisions, which may now be noticed. In Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. The State of Punjab . 1974 76 PLR 410., it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court as follows:—

“………It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the hundies are drawn in favour of the petitioner and the payment is made by it to the banks at Rajpura. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the property in the goods passes to the petitioner before the payment is made by it to the bank and the Railway Receipt is got released. The Railway will be considered to be agent of the person who despatches the goods and draw the hundi. The sale is effected in favour of the petitioner when the payment is made by it to the bank who is agent of the owner of the goods.”

6. We are afraid that the view taken by the learned Single Judge as above is not a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions i.e Punjab Municipal Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Indeed, the learned Judge has considered the impact of the word ‘sale’ in relation to the Contract Act, 1872 and the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. However, as already observed, for the purpose of interpreting the word ‘sale’ in regard to the chargeability of the octroi, all that is necessary to appreciate is whether the goods taken delivery of at the Railway Station are liable to octroi duty, even if they are just to be transported through the municipal limits to a place outside the municipal limits. The question as to whether the sale is complete at the Railway Station or not, is not relevant. We do not, therefore, agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Amrit Banaspati's case (supra) and the overrule the said authority.

7. The learned counsel then cited Burmah-shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd., Belagaum v. Belagaum Borough Municipality, Belagaum . 1976 3 SCC 398, wherein it was held as follows:—

“The goods must be regarded as having been brought in for purposes of consumption when a person brings them either for his own use or consumption; or to put them in the way of others in the area, who are to use and consume. In this process the act of sale is merely the means for putting the goods in the way of use or consumption. It is an earlier stage, the ultimate desitnation of the goods being use or consumption. The earlier stage, namely, the sale by him, does not have the person who brought the goods into the local area from liability to the tax if the goods were brought inside for consumption or use. Further, so long as the goods are brought inside the area for sale within the area to an ultimate consumer, it makes no difference that the consumer does not consume them in the area but takes them out for consumption elsewhere. The word “therein does not mean that all the act of consumption must take place in the area of the municipality. It is sufficient if the goods are brought inside the area to be delivered to the ultimate consumer in that area because the taxable event is the entry of goods which are meant to reach an ultimate user or consumer in the area.”

8. The above observations have, however, to be read in conjunction with the further observations made by their Lordships in the same case to the following effect:—

“xxxxxIt was only when the goods were re-exported out of the area that the tax could not legitimately be levied. xxxxx.”

9. The implication of these words was highlighted in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralal Thakorial Dalal v. Broach Municipality . 1976 3 SCC 398, wherein their Lordships held that trading firm would “not be liable to Octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re exported” In this view of the matter, the goods imported by respondent No. 2 Mill for being transported to the factory premises situated outside the municipal limits can only be deemed to have passed through the municipal limits of Mukerian during the course of their transit to the Mill premises. This being so, the impugned order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (c) Copy Annexure P-2) is quite legal and it was rightly held by the said officer that the committee could only ask for Rahdari (transit fee) and not any octroi duty on the goods so transported.

10. There is no merit in this writ petition which is dismissed. We however, leave the parties to bear their own costs of the same

D.S Tewatia, J.:— I agree.

R.M.S
Petition dismissed.