Muni Lal Verma, J.:— The circumstances giving rise to this second appeal may, be briefly, stated as under:—

2. Ujagar Singh was appointed Lambardar (headman) in village-Pheru Shahar (Ferozeshah) on February 10, 1958 and he collected land revenue from the landowners of that village for the harvests from Rabi Page: 4931958 to Rabi 1963. His land measuring 3 kanals 13 Marlas described in the heading of the plaint (hereinafter called the land) has been sold by the Collector on February 4, 1966 in order to recover Rs. 14,000/- alleged to be arrears of land revenue from him. Land measuring 23 kanalsll Marlas had been purchased by Naunihal Singh (now the appellant) and the remaining land measuring 5 kanals 2 Marlas was purchased by Kuldip Singh and Gurdip Singh in the auction held by the Collector on February 4, 1966 and possession of the said lands was given to the said purchasers on February 11, 1970.

3. Therefore, on June 26, 1971, Ujagar Singh brought the suit for possession of the land with the allegations that he was its owner; that the sale of the land had been illegal, without jurisdiction and void against his rights because no arrears of land revenue were due from him; that he was not defaulter as contemplated by section 3(8) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (hereinafter called the Act); that an amount of Rs. 400/- was due from the Custodian of the Evacuee property and Rs. 2500/- were due from certain landowners of the village and a large amount was due from the Gram Panchayat as land revenue; and that the sale had not been conducted in accordance with law and rules. The suit was contested by the defendants and one of the objections raised by the State of Punjab was that cognizance of the suit by the Civil Court was barred under section 158(xiv) of the Act. Hence, seven issues were settled, out of which issue No. 1 read as follows:—

1. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as per section 158(xiv) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act? OPD.

4. The trial Court answered the said issue in the affirmative and dismissed the suit. Ujagar Singh died thereafter and his grandsons carried appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozepore, disagreed with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, set aside its finding on the aforesaid issue, allowed the appeal and sent back the suit to the trial Court for deciding the same on merits, Aggrieved by the said result, Naunihal Singh has come to this Court in second appeal.

5. In assailing the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, Shri B.S Shant, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that in the year 1966 when the land had been sold to recover arrear of land revenue, Ujagar Singh was a defaulter and the suit, which is in reality for setting aside the sale of the land held by the Collector for recovery of arrear of land revenue, was not cognizable by the civil Court. He relied on Kirpal Singh v. The Collector, Forozepur 1963 PLJ ???, and Gurbakhsh Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar 1967 PLJ 168. Shri K.C Puri, while defending the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, contended that Ujagar Singh could not be said to be a defaulter and he had received the land revenue from the landowners as agent of the State of Punjab and, as such, the sale of his land for recovery of arrear of land revenue, allegedly to be due from him was invalid. He relied on Union of India v. Firm Ralia Ram Raj Kumar AIR 1954 Punj. 271, Sarup Singh v. The Collector, Hissar 1970 PLJ 313 and Gurmukh Singh v. The State of Punjab 1971 PLJ 166.

6. In Kirpal Singh's case as well as in Gurbakhsh Singh's case (supra), it has been held that a Lambardar who fails to deposit the land revenue Page: 494and local rates collected from the landowners is ‘defaulter’ within the scope of sub-section (8) of section 3 of the Act and process of recovery under section 75 of the Act, which relates to the sale of his holding, can be taken against him. A contrary view was taken in Sarup Singh's case (supra), wherein it has been observed that a Lambardar, win had collected the land revenue but had not deposited the same in the Treasury, or the Lambardar who had failed to collect land revenue from the landowners, cannot be termed as defaulter within the definition of the term in sub-section (8) of section 3 of the Act, and therefore, he cannot be arrested and detained in prison for non-payment of arrears of land revenue. The judgment in Sarup Singh's case (supra), was followed in Gurmukh Singh's case (supra), and it was observed that a Lambardar, who had embezzled the land revenue collected by him from the landowners was not a defaulter as denied in sub-section (8) of Section 3 of the Act. In that case, the auction sales of the land of Sarjan Singh, ex-lambardar, for recovery of land revenue had been set aside by the Commissioner under section 91(1) of the Act. A revision petition against the said order was also dismissed by the Financial Commissioner. Thereupon, the auction purchasers filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the validity of the order setting aside the auction sales. The writ petition was dismissed with the finding that the auction sales had been rightly set aside. So, the said case does not render any help for the decision of the present case which, as would be presently seen, is covered by clause (xv) of sub-section (2) of section 158 of the Act. The facts of Firm Ralia Ram Raj Kumar's case (supra) were different. Therein, some property purporting to belong to Ralia Ram Raj Kumar had been attached under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, for realisation of arrears of income-tax, super tax and penalty due from Rur Chand Kishori Lal assessee. Ralia Ram Raj Kumar objected against the said attachment of their property, alleging that the same did not belong to Rur Chand Kishori Lal and that the same belonged to them. Their objections were rejected. So, they instituted a suit for declaration that the attached property belonged to them and was not liable to attachment and sale for recovery of income-tax, super tax and penalty due from Rur Chand Kishori Lal. They succeeded in the suit. In the second appeal, while dealidg with the bar provided in section ???(2)(xiv) of the Act, it was held that when the property which was being proceeded against, belong to the defaulter then the proceedings of the Collector could not be challenged, but when it is some, body else's property which is being proceeded against then there is no principle of law which could bar the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It is important to note that in the said case no property had been sold and it was merely under attachment when the suit had been instituted.

7. So, manifestly there was conflict of judicial opinion between the two judgments relied on by the appellant and the two judgments cited on behalf of the plaintiff respondents on the question is to whether a Lambardar, who had failed to deposit in the State Treasury the land revenue which he had collected from other landowners, is or is not a defaulter. It is significant to note that the two judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant were not referred to in Sarup Singh's case or in Gurmukh Singh's case (supra). The said conflict Page: 495has now been resolved by the Punjab Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1974, by amending sub-section (8) of section 3 of the Act, which after amendment reads as under:—

“(8) “defaulter” means a person liable for an arrear of land-revenue, and includes a person who is responsible as surety for the payment of the arrear; and a village officer who collects land revenue or any other sum recoverable as land revenue and does not pay the same to the State Government in accordance with the rules framed under the Act.”

8. The words underlined have been added by the aforesaid Amending Act. A careful study of the relevant provisions of the Act leads me to the conclusion that the cognizance of suit as framed and instituted by Ujagar Singh, by the civil Court is barred by clause (xv) of sub-section (2) of section 158 of the Act. The provisions contained in sub-section (1) and (2)(xv) of section 158 of the Act, are to the effect that except as otherwise provided by the Act, a Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter which the State Government or a Revenue Officer is empowered by the Act to dispose of or take cognizance of the manner in which the State Government or any Revenue officer exercises any powers vested in it or him by or under the Act; and in particular, a Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any claim to set aside, on any ground other than fraud, a sale for the recovery of an arrear of land-revenue or any sum recoverable as an arrear of land-revenue, Sale of land for recovery of arrear and land revenue can be resorted to and conducted by the Collector with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, vide section 75 of the Act. Sections 79 to 90 of the Act prescribe the procedure to be observed in conducting such a sale. Every sale of land made for recovery of arrear of land revenue by the Collector has to be reported to the Commissioner, vide section 90 of the Act. Any person aggrieved by the said sale may apply to the Commissioner for setting aside the same within 30 days from the date of sale, vide section 91 of the Act. If no such application is made to the Commissioner, or if one is made and rejected, the sale shall be final, vide sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 92 of the Act. All the aforesaid provisions, when read together, leave no room for doubt that the Act itself provides remedies to save the land from being sold for recovery of land revenue, but when such a sale is confirmed it becomes final and cannot be challenged in Civil Court on any ground other than fraud. It is worthy of note that it was not averred in the plaint by Ujagar Singh that the sales had been effected fraudulently. Therefore, in the absence of such averment the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the suit could not be attracted. True, the relief sought in the suit was possession of the land, but then possession of the land could not be claimed by Ujagar Singh or the appellant without setting aside the sales of the land affected under the orders of the Collector in favour of Naunihal Singh, Kuldip Singh and Gurdip Singh, and unless the orders of the Collector effecting the sales are set aside neither Ujagar Singh nor the appellant could obtain possession of the land. In paras 10, 11 and 12 of the plaint, the orders of the Collector and the Commissioner effecting the sales had in fact, been challenged. Therefore, in my opinion, the suit was in reality and substance the one to set aside the sales effected under the orders of the Collector and it did not make any difference if the prayer to that effect was not expressly made in the plaint. It is, therefore, clear to me that Page: 496the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the provisions contained in section 158(1) & (2)(xv) of the Act. The view similar to the one taken by me, was expressed in Raja Safdar Jang v. Kazi Mohd. Azam6. The joint and several responsibility of all the landowners in the estate for the whole land revenue assessed upon it, is emphatically asserted in S. 61 of the Act. Para 503 of the land Administration Manual Clarifies it and says that each shareholder is liabe not only for the payment of the demand due on his own holding but also for any arrears that may arise in respect of another holding. When an estate consists of two or more recognised sub divisions (Pattis or Tarafs), the joint and several responsibility for an arrear arising in any particular sub-division has in the first instance to be enforced against the shareholders in the said sub-division. Admittedly, Ujagar Singh being a Lambardar was also landowner in village-Pheru Shahar (Ferozeshah). Therefore, according to principle of joint and several responsibility of all the landowners, enacted by section 61 of the Act, for payment of the whole land revenue, he was responsible to pay the land revenue which was due from the landowners, especially the land revenue which he had collected from them. Rule 2d of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules imposes a duty on the Lambardar to collect all the land revenue from the landowners of the sub division in which he holds the office and to pay the same in the manner stated therein. To the same effect is para 505 of the Land Administration Mannul, which provides that it is the duty of the village headman (Lamharder) to collect the land revenue from the landowners and to pay it into the Tehsil treasury. Therefore, Ujagar Singh was clearly liable to pay the land revenue which he had collected from the landowners of his Patti in the Tehsil Treasury. According to para 7(2) of the Standing Order No. 20, issued by the Financial Commissioner, the word “unpaid” occurring in section 3(7) of the Act means not paid to the Government, and the sums embezzled by a Lambardar are, therefore, arrears of land revenue and he is a defaulter under section 3(8) of the Act in respect of the same. Sub-para (3) of para 7 of the said Standing Order 20 is to the effect that the land of the Lambardar who has either embezzled the land revenue collected by him from the other landowners or who has failed to pay land revenue due on his own holding, can be sold. True, the Standing Order issued by the Financial Commissioner or the rules contained in the Land Administration Manual may not have the status of law, but it had to be accepted that the same are worthy of affording guidance on the matters dealt by the same.

9. The judgment in Kirpal Singh's case (supra) was rendered on May 23, 1963, and according to the said judgment, as indicated above, Ujagar Singh being a lambardar and having not paid the amounts which he had received from the landowners was a defaulter within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 3 of the Act. His land was sold for recovery of land revenue on February 4, 1966, Therefore, according to the provisions of law and the aforesaid judgment in Kirpal Singh's case, Ujagar Singh was a defaulter at that time. The judgment in Gurbakhsh Singh's case (supra), according to which Ujagar Singh was again a defaulter and his land could be sold under section 75 of the Act for recovery of arrear of land revenue, was given on March 28, 1967. The suit was instituted on June 26, 1971. So, according to Gurbakhsh Singh's case he was again a defaulter under section 3(8) of the Act on that date. The judgment in Sarup Singh's case (supra) was Page: 497rendered on March 18, 1970, i.e, a month after the delivery of possession of the land to the auction purchasers, and judgment in Gurmukh Singh's case (supra) was rendered on January 27, 1971. It is, therefore, clear that according to the judgments and the law as it stood on February 4, 1966, when the lands of Ujagar Singh had been sold for recovery of arrear of land revenue Ujagar Singii was to be considered as ‘defaulter’ within the scope of section 3(8) of the Act and, as such, the said sales were not open to attack at that time. The subsequent judgments recorded in Sarup Singh's case and Gurmukh Singh's case (supra) cannot, in my opinion, turn the said sales into nullity, simply because the same gave different complexion to the definition of defaulter in sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act. Headman, i.e, Lambardar, is a “village-officer”, vide section 2(11) of the Act, and as indicated above after the amendment of section 3(8) of the Act, a Lambardar is definitely a defaulter if he fails to pay the land revenue collected by him from the landowners. Therefore, from whatever angle the case may be viewed the conclusion is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit is excluded by section 158(1) and (2)(xv) of the Act. Viewed thus, I am of the opinion that the lower Appellate Court was not right in setting aside the order of the trial Court and the plaint has to be rejected under Order VII, rule 11(d), Civil Procedure Code. So, the appeal succeeds.

10. Consequently, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower Appellare Court and reject the plaint for the reason that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to hear and decide the suit was barred under section 158(1) & (2)(xv) of the Act. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case. I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

11. Appeal allowed.