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Bhagwan Singh Deceas... v. Nawab Mohammad Iftik...
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff claims that defendant No. 1, Nawab Mohd. Iftkhar Ali Khan, agreed by an agreement dated 12 January 1966 to sell 12/13 bighas of land at Malerkotla to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,900 per bigha, and received Rs. 1,000 as earnest money. The agreement stipulated execution of the sale deed by 1-3-1966 and provided that if defendant No. 1 failed, the plaintiff could get the deed executed through the Court and claim Rs. 5,000 as compensation. The plaintiff alleged readiness and willingness to perform, breach by defendant No. 1 and further alleged that defendant No. 2 had knowledge of the agreement. The plaintiff sought specific performance and, alternatively, damages of Rs. 5,000. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 filed separate written statements denying the contract's validity and, in defendant No. 2's case, pleading bona fide purchase for value and lack of knowledge of the alleged agreement. The trial court held the plaintiff was ready and willing but that the agreement was vague and indefinite as to identity of the land, dismissed the suit for specific performance, and decreed return of Rs. 1,000 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed against the trial court's judgment and decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement of sale dated 12 January 1966 is vague and indefinite as regards the identity of the land such that specific performance cannot be granted.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The agreement was not vague or indefinite; the parties knew the particulars of the land agreed to be sold.
- Statements of the plaintiff, Abdul Gafoor (P.W.5) and defendant No. 1 show that the land was ascertained before the agreement was executed.
Defendants' Arguments
- Defendant No. 1 pleaded the agreement was void as indefinite and vague and alleged the plaintiff committed breach of the agreement.
- Defendant No. 2 pleaded she had no knowledge of the alleged agreement, that the agreement was vague and indefinite as to identity of the land, and that she was a bona fide purchaser for value.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Phuljhari Devi V. Mithai Lal and others; AIR 1971 Allahabad 484 | In a suit for specific performance the contract must be definite and precise; if uncertain it is void under section 29 of the Indian Contract Act; specific performance is equitable and oral evidence is not admissible to add to terms of the agreement. | The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the agreement was vague and indefinite and therefore not enforceable by specific performance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the relevant portions of the agreement which described the land only as "about 12 or 13 bighas having width of 30 karams and length of 160 karams" and by reference to nearby features, but did not state the exact area, boundaries or the point from which measurements were to be made. The plaintiff's filed map measured from the south-east corner of defendant No. 1's land, but that point is not identified in the agreement, so the agreement does not establish that as the point of measurement. The court observed ambiguity in directionality: the same descriptive measurements could yield different parcels (160 karams East–West and 30 karams South–North, or vice versa), both of which would fit the agreement's description. The court held that, under sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, evidence extrinsic to the written agreement cannot be admitted to fix the exact location; consequently the oral statements of witnesses could not be used to cure the uncertainty. Even if those statements were considered, they were inconsistent (plaintiff and P.W.5 giving one orientation, defendant No.1 giving another), leading the court to conclude the land was not ascertained. The court applied section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and section 29 of the Indian Contract Act to conclude that a vague or indefinite agreement is void and cannot be enforced by specific performance, and cited Smt. Phuljhari Devi to support that principle.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct effect: The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs, sustaining the trial court's conclusion that the agreement is vague and indefinite and denying specific performance; the trial court's decree for recovery of Rs. 1,000 as earnest money remains effective. No new legal principle was established beyond application of the cited statutory provisions and precedent.
2. Briefly, the case of the plaintiff is that Nawab Mohd. Iftkhar Ali khan, defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement dated 12th of January, 1966 with the plaintiff and agreed to sell land measuring 12/13 bighas situated at Malerkotla. He received Rs. 1,000/- as advance. It was further agreed that the sale deed was to be executed by defendant No. 1 before 1-3-1966 and in case he failed to do so, the plaintiff was entitled to get the same executed through the Court and to receive Rs. 5,000/- as compensation. The plaintiff further states that he has been always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement but the defendant committed breach of the agreement and sold some land in favour of defendant No. 2, who had full knowledge about his agreement with defendant No. 1 and agreed to sell some land to defendant No. 3. Consequently, he prayed that a decree for specific performance be passed in his favour. In the alternative be claimed Rs. 5000/- as damages. 3. The suit was contested by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who filed separate written statements. Defendant No. 1 inter alia pleaded that the agreement was void being indefinite and vague and that the plaintiff committed breach of the agreement. Defendant No. 2 pleaded that she had no knowledge of the alleged agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and that the same was vague and indefinite as regards the identity of the land, she further stated that she was a bona fide purchaser for value of the land and consequently the suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. The learned trial Court held that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and the defendant committed breach thereof, that defendant No. 2 had come to know about the factum of agreement to sell was vague and indefinite as regards identity of the land. Consequently it dismissed the suit for specific performance. However, it passed a decree for recovery of Rs. 1,000/- given as earnest money, in favour of the plaintiff. He has come up in appeal against the judgement and decree of the trial Court to this Court. 5. The only question that arises for determination is as to whether the agreement of sale dated 12th of January, 1966, is vague and indefinite as regards the identity of land. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the agreement is not vague and indefinite as was held by the Court. He submits that the parties knew the particulars of the land which was agreed to be sold in favour of the plaintiff. He also referred to the statement of Abdul Gafoor P.W. 5 and defendant No. 1 to show that the land was ascertained before the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement for sale. 6. I have considered the argument of the learned counsel but am not impressed by it. In order to determine the issue, it is necessary to set out the relevant portions of the agreement which are as follows :-
"Received a sum of Rs. 1000/-....... on account of earnest money in respect of land measuring about 12 or 13 bighas having width of 30 karams and length of 160 karams out of that of the well known as `Chah imliwala' situate near the Tube-well, Dhob Ghat adjacent to the land cultivated by S. Bhawan Singh Sahib, Vendee, son of the S. Kaku Singh Sahib ..... The aforesaid land shall be sold to the Sardar Sahib at the rate of Rs. 1,900/- (Rs. one thousand nini hundred) per bigha......."7. The agreement neither contains the exact area of land to be sold to the plaintiff nor the boundaries. It is true that it gives the length and breadth of the land but it does not pin point the place from which it was to be measured. Unless the point from which it was to be measured was given, no demarcation can be made at the spot. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff produced a map in which measurements were made from South-East corner of the land belonging to defendant No. 1. That point, however, is not given in the agreement. Therefore, it cannot be held that the measurements were to be made from that point. Even if that point is admitted correct, it is still not clear in what directions 160 Marlas and 30 Karams were to be measured. In the plan, disputed area is shown 160 Marlas from East to West and 30 Karmas from south to North from that point. It is not disputed that land of defendant No. 1 from South to North is also more than 160 Karmas. Thus, the plaintiff can be given 160 Karamas from South to North and 30 Karamsfrom East to West and also 160 Karams from East to West and 30 Karams from South to North. The description of the land in both the eventualities remain the same and tally with that given in the agreement. Consequently, it cannot be said that the agreement is not vague. 8. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to the statements of the plaintiff, Abdul Gafoor P.W. 5 and defendant No. 1 and urged that those should be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the exact location. It is well settled that under sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, no evidence other than the agreement can be taken into consideration for determining the exact location of the land. Consequently, their statements are not admissible for determining the land at the site. Even if they are taken into consideration I am of the view that land was not ascertained before the agreement, as argued by Mr. Achhra Singh and that the exact location of the land to be sold cannot be determined. According to the plaintiff and Abdul Gafoor 160 Karmas are to be measured from East to West and 30 Karams from South to North. According to defendant No. 1,160 Karams are to be measured from South to North and 30 Karams from East to West. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the agreement to sell regarding the property to be sold is vague and indefinite. 9. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that where any relief of specific performance is claimed in respect of a contract, the defendant may plead any ground which is available to him under the law relating to contracts. Under section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the agreements which are vague and indefinite are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced under the Specific Relief Act. In the aforesaid view, I find support from Smt. Phuljhari Devi V. Mithai Lal and others, AIR 1971 Allahabad 484, where in it is observed that in a suit for specific performance the contract of sale must be definite and precise and if it is uncertain it must be held to be void under section 29 of the Indian Contract Act. It is further held that specific performances is an equitable relief and the contract of sale of which specific performance is sought must be definite and precise and no oral evidence is admissible to add to the terms of the contract or the agreement. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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