Mela Ram v. Government Of India And Others

Shamsher Bahadur, J. - The contest in the petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is between the petitioner Mela Ram and the third respondent Gopal Dass. The Settlement Commissioner, respondent 2 whose order is impugned, and the first respondent, Government of India do not appear to be interested in the result of these proceedings as they are not represented in this Court. Thus indisputable facts leading to the petition are these. As a displaced person the petitioner was allotted a portion of house No. B IX/164 in Ludhiana town, the other portion being allotted to Gopal Dass, respondent 3. Both the contesting parties are claimants, the gross compensation of the petitioner being Rs. 4,511/- and that of the third respondent Rs. 6,522/-. The entire property unit was transferred to the petitioner whose gross compensation was nearest to the value of the property whose reserve price was fixed at Rs. 2,802/- by an order of the processing officer on 18th November, 1958. This was in accordance with the provisions of rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1958, as it then was. No conveyance deed had been drawn up for allotment of the house but in all other respects the allotment of the house but in all other respects the allotment in favour of the petitioner had become final, no appeal having been preferred from the order. Meantime, the third respondent had been contesting that property No. B-IX/164 and B-IX/135 formed one indivisible unit and should have been transferred to him. It was his prayer in the alternative that B-IX/164 should be allotted to him as his gross compensation was the highest. Both these contentions were rejected by the Settlement Officer in his order of 23rd of May, 1961. It may be explained that rule 30 had been amended by a notification of 24th of March, 1961, and the person entitled to allotment in case of competing claimants was the person whose gross compensation was the highest and not nearest to the value of the property as before. It was argued before the Settlement Officer that the allotment proceedings being still pending the amended rule was applicable and not the old one. Holding that the amended rule had no retrospective operation the appeal of the third respondent was rejected. In the revision, however, the settlement Commissioner took the view that as the allotment proceedings were pending at the time when the amendment was made in rule 30 on 24th of March 1961, the person whose gross compensation was the highest should be preferred to the one whose gross compensation was nearest to the value of the property. This view was confirmed by the Central Government in an application preferred by the petitioner under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. It may be observed that the petitioner was represented in all these proceedings in which the third respondent was agitating his right for preferential treatment in respect of property N. B-IX/164. Mr. Gandhi, for the petitioner, contends that the proceeding for the allotment of B-IX/164 had been finalised by the order of the 18th of November, 1958 from which no appeal had been preferred. The proprietary rights, however, were not transferred to the petitioner and as observed by Shri Sapra in his order of the 25th of September, 1961 (Annexure `C' the right of the petitioner still remained insolate and incomplete. Moreover, the third respondent had been agitating his right in properties B-IX/64 and B-IX/135 and the matter had not been finally decided till the order was passed by Shri Sapra in revision on 25th of September, 1961. Mr. Gandhi submits that the order of 18th of November, 1958 gave the petitioner vested right of which he could not be deprived by any subsequent amendment of the law which could not operate retrospectively. He has cited the authority of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others, A.I.R. 1960(1963) S.C. 655, in which it was laid down that where an amendment affects vested rights the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication. This authority would have been helpful to the petitioner if he had acquired a vested right. The petitioner had not been granted a sanad of the proprietary rights and the claim in respect of property No. B-IX/164 was still being agitated before the appropriate authorities and in those proceedings, as I have already mentioned. The petitioner was a party throughout. Mr. Gandhi has also brought to my notice my own decision in Dr. Khushi Ram v. Union of India, 1962 PLR 755, in which I said that the amendment to rule 30 cannot be given retrospective operation as it was not a mere amendment in procedure. This decision would clearly be inapplicable to the facts of the present case where the petitioner had acquired no proprietary rights. It is well known that the authorities and Courts exercising appellate and revisional jurisdiction can take account of the change in the law and it was held in Gommalapure Taggina Matade Kotutruswami v. Setra Veravva and others, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 577, that an amendment in the statutory unless would apply to a matter which has not been finally settled and is awaiting a decision either before an appellate or a revisional authority. In another case decided by me on 28th of October, 1960, Civil Writ No. 32 of 1960, Sardar Sajjan Singh v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner. I said that the amended rule would be applicable where the matter came up for consideration before an appellate authority after it had been brought into force. Reference also be invited to a latest decision of this Court given by Pandit, J., in Asa Nand v. The Central Government, 1963 P.L.R. 214. The learned Judge observed that when a revision under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, is pending before the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the rights of the parties are in a fluid state and are not complete or finally settled. No party to the dispute can be said to have acquired a vested right in the property. I, therefore, do not see any ground to interfere in these proceedings and would accordingly dismiss this petition. In the circumstances, however I would make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.