Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Vinod Kumar And Another v. Suresh Pal .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 30, 1984
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Opinion — Civil Revisions (CR. Nos. 181, 182 and 183 of 1985)

Factual and Procedural Background

Owners of land in village Naharpur, Tehsil Jagadhari, district Ambala, sold the land to three sets of vendees (the petitioners). Sale deeds were executed on 3 January 1983 and registered on 10 January 1983 at Delhi under Section 30(2) of the Registration Act. The plaintiff-respondent, Suresh Pal, filed three separate pre-emption suits for possession on 23 August 1984 and applied for condonation of delay. The trial Sub-Judge, Jagadhari, allowed the applications for condonation of delay on 12 September 1984. The vendees challenged those orders by filing these three civil revisions, which raise identical questions of fact and law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Sub-Judge lawfully permitted the filing of the three pre-emption suits after the expiry of the period of limitation under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  2. Whether non-compliance with Section 67 of the Registration Act (i.e., failure to forward endorsements/certificates to the Sub-Registrar where the property is situated) affects the date from which limitation runs for pre-emption suits.
  3. Whether Explanation I to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act (regarding notice of prior registered instruments) affects the computation of limitation for pre-emption suits registered under Section 30(2) of the Registration Act.
  4. Whether alleged fraudulent registration at Delhi (and/or failure to mutate or inform the pre-emptor) brings the case within Section 17(i)(b) of the Limitation Act so that limitation would run from the date of the plaintiff's knowledge of the sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (plaintiff Suresh Pal) — Arguments

  • The trial Court’s condonation was justified because the sale deeds were registered at Delhi and the plaintiff only became aware of them in July 1984; the suits were filed within one year of that knowledge.
  • Non-compliance with Section 67 of the Registration Act (failure to forward instruments to the Sub-Registrar where the property is situated) means the period of limitation should be computed from the date of knowledge of the registration rather than from the date of registration itself.
  • Explanation I to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act (dealing with notice of previous sale to a subsequent vendee) supports computing limitation from the date the plaintiff learned of the sale, particularly when registration was effected under Section 30(2) of the Registration Act and earliest filing of any memorandum by the Sub-Registrar in the property's jurisdiction is relevant.
  • Alleged fraud by the petitioners in getting the deeds registered at Delhi (and failure to mutate or inform the respondent) invokes Section 17(i)(b) of the Limitation Act so limitation should begin when the plaintiff learned of the sale.
  • Relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdish Rai v. Suraj Kumar Singh (AIR 1939 All 113) as authority where fraud justified computing limitation from the date of discovery of fraud.

Petitioners (vendees) — Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the petitioners' legal arguments beyond their challenge to the trial Court's condonation orders and reliance on the statutory date of registration (Article 97 of the Limitation Act) as the point from which limitation runs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachan Singh v. Darbara Singh, (1964) 66 Pun LR 91 Interpreting period of limitation under Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (period counted from attestation of mutation or from vendees taking physical possession). The Court held this precedent inapplicable because the present cases are governed by Article 97 of the Limitation Act, not Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act.
Jagdish Rai v. Suraj Kumar Singh, AIR 1939 All 113 Authority where courts found fraud by vendees and allowed pre-emption suit within one year from discovery of the fraud. The Court found this decision inapplicable on facts: it involved findings of fact (fraud) that the appellate courts had not disturbed, and therefore it did not support the respondent here where no such finding of fraud had been made.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified Article 97 of the Limitation Act as the governing provision for pre-emption suits and noted that the latter part of Article 97 applies where the subject-matter does not admit physical possession: limitation runs from "when the instrument of sale is registered." The sale deeds in these cases were registered on 10 January 1983; therefore the one-year limitation began to run from that date and the suits filed on 23 August 1984 were time-barred.

The trial Court's condonation—based on the ground that the plaintiff only learned of the registrations in July 1984—was held to be legally erroneous because Article 97 fixes the start of limitation on the date of registration, not on the date of the pre-emptor's knowledge.

The Court addressed the respondent's contentions in turn:

  • On Section 67 of the Registration Act: non-compliance with Section 67 (forwarding of copies/endorsements to the Sub-Registrar where the property is situated) does not defer or alter the date of registration under Section 30(2). The date of registration remains the date when the instrument was actually registered in Delhi; non-fulfillment of Section 67 does not make the instrument unregistered nor extend the limitation period under Article 97.
  • On Explanation I to Section 8 (Transfer of Property Act): the Explanation deals with notice of prior registered instruments to subsequent vendees and is intended for the protection of subsequent vendees. It has no connection with computation of limitation for pre-emption suits and therefore does not assist the respondent.
  • On fraud under Section 17(i)(b) of the Limitation Act: the vendees were legally entitled to register the deeds at Delhi under Section 30(2) and were not obligated to send copies to the local Sub-Registrar or to inform the pre-emptor. Mere failure to mutate or to inform the respondent does not establish the fraud contemplated by Section 17. The Court distinguished Jagdish Rai (AIR 1939 All 113) as a case where courts had found fraud on appraisal of evidence—a mixed question of fact and law—not comparable to the present facts.

On these bases, the Court concluded that the trial Court misapplied law in condoning delay and that the suits were barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The three revision petitions are allowed; the impugned orders of the trial Court are set aside; and all three pre-emption suits are dismissed as barred by time. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Revision allowed.

Implications: The direct effect is the dismissal of the respondent's three pre-emption suits as time-barred and the setting aside of the trial Court's orders condoning delay. The Court did not announce any broader change in law; it applied Article 97 of the Limitation Act and related statutory provisions to the facts and found no basis to extend limitation by reference to knowledge, non-compliance with Section 67, Explanation I to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, or the circumstances alleged as fraud.

Show all summary ...

By this judgment I am going to dispose of three civil revisions (CR. Nos. 181, 182 and 183 of 1985) wherein identical questions of fact and law are involved.

2. The facts briefly stated giving rise to these revisions are that owners of land situate in village Naharpur. Tehsil Jagadhari, district Ambala, sold the same to three sets of vendees who are the petitioners in these revisions. The sale deeds were executed on 3rd of January, 1983, and were registered on 10th of January, 1983, at Delhi under Section 30(2) of the Registration Act. Normally, under Section 28 of the said Act such sale deeds are to be registered in the office of a Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property is situate but Section 30(2) authorises the Registrar of the Delhi district to register the sale deeds without regard to the situation in any part of India of the property. The plaintiff-respondent Suresh Pal brought three separate suits for possession on 23rd of August, 1984, to pre-empt these sales. Applications were also filed along with the suits for condonation of delay in the filing of the suits. These applications were allowed by the trial Sub-Judge, Jagadhari, on 12th of September, 1984. The orders passed by the trial Court have been challenged by the vendees of the three sale deeds in these revisions petitions.

3. The core question for determination in these cases is whether the trial Sub-Judge had lawfully permitted the filing of the three suits after the expiry of the period of limitation. Article 97 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which relates to pre-emption suits, is as follows:—

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run “97. To enforce a right of preemption whether the right is founded on law or general usage or on special contract. One year When the purchaser takes under the sale sought to be impeached, physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold, or, where the subject-matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession of the whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered.”

In the present case it is not disputed that the latter part of this Article is applicable and the limitation of one year is to be computed from the tune when the instruments of sale were registered. In other words, the period of limitation had started running for these suits with effect from 10th of January, 1983, and so the suits had to be filed within one year of that date. The suits having filed on 23rd of August, 1984, were manifestly barred by time. The Page: 363learned trial Court condoned the delay in the filing of the suits on the ground that the sale deeds having been registered at Delhi, the plaintiff came to know about them in the month of July, 1984 and since the suits had been filed within one year from the knowledge about the sale deeds, there was justification in condoning the delay. This view in my opinion, is erroneous in law Article 97 of the Limitation Act clearly provides that the period of limitation would start from the date when the sale deed is registered and not from the date on which the plaintiff came to know of the registration of the instrument. Hence the delay in filing of such pre-emption suits cannot be condoned simply because the pre-emptor became aware of the sale deeds long tune after the registration of the instruments.

4. The trial Court has placed reliance on a judgment of this in Bachan Singh v. Darbara Singh, (1964) 66 Pun LR 91 to condone the delay in filing of the suits. However this judgment is entirely inapplicable to these cases. It was held in that judgment that the period of limitation in that case was governed by Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and as such the period of limitation had to be counted either from the date of attestation of the mutation or from the date when the vendees took physical possession of any part of the property. The cases with which I am dealing now are not governed by Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act but by Article 97 of the Limitation Act.

5. The respondents counsel contended that the sale deeds having been registered at Delhi under Section 30(2) of the Registration Act, although the property is situated in tehsil Jagadhari, copies of the instruments along with endorsements and certificates thereon should have been forwarded to the Sub-Registrar in whose jurisdiction the property was situate as provided in Section 67 of the Registration Act and since the provisions of Section 67 were not complied with, the period of limitation should be computed from the date of knowledge of the registration and not from the date of registration itself. I do not find this contention acceptable. The effect of non-compliance of Section 67 cannot be deferment of the date of registration of the sale deed. It cannot be said that the sale deed is to be deemed registered only when the provisions of Section 67 are complied with. It is quite clear that despite non-fulfilment of the procedure laid down in Section 67, the date of registration of the instrument remains the same when it was actually registered under Section 30(2) of the Act. It is, therefore, inevitable that according to Article 97 of the Limitation Act the period of limitation has necessarily to be counted from the date of registration of the sale deed and not from the date when the provisions of Section 97 of the Registration Act were complied with. In the present case it is stated that even till today Section 67 has not been complied with. Would it be justifiable to hold that the sale deeds in question have not been registered so far? The answer must be in the negative. In my opinion therefore, the non-compliance of Section 67 does not extend the period of limitation as provided in Article 97 of the Limitation Act.

6. It is next contended by the plaintiffs counsel that Explanation I appended to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable to the present case and the period of limitation would start only from the time when the plaintiff-respondent came to know of the sale deeds. This argument is clearly fallacious because Explanation I deals with the notice of the previous sale to the subsequent vendee. This Explanation provides that where any transaction relating to immovable property is required to be effected by a registered instrument any person acquiring such property subsequently shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument from the date of registration or where the registration has been effected under Section 30(2) of the Indian Registration Act, from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by the Sub-Registrar within whose jurisdiction any part of the property is situated. This provision of the Registration Act has no connection with the period of limitation regarding pre-emption suits. It has been enacted for the benefit of the subsequent vendees who happen to acquire property without knowledge of the previous transaction. Hence the Explanation attached to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act is of no help to the respondent.

7. It is lastly contended by the respondent's counsel that fraud has been committed by the petitioner-vendees by getting the sale deeds registered at Delhi and so under Section 17(i)(b) Page: 364of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would start flowing from the date of plaintiff-respondent came to know of the existence of the sale deeds. There is no merit in this contention. The vendees were entitled in law under Section 30(2) of the Registration Act to get the sale deeds registered at Delhi. It was not their duty to send copies of the registered sale deeds to the office of the Sub-Registrar in whose jurisdiction the property is situate. They were not obliged to inform the plaintiff or any other pre-emptor regarding the property purchased by them. In such circumstances it cannot be held that any fraud had been committed by the vendees upon the respondent. The respondent's counsel drew my attention to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdish Rai v. Suraj Kumar Singh, AIR 1939 All 113. In that case the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, on appraisal of evidence, had held that they vendees had committed fraud on the pre-emptor and consequently the pre-emptor was entitled to file suit within one year from the date when the fraud was practised. This being a mixed question of fact and law, the Allahabad High Court did not interfere in the same in second appeal. This judgment is, therefore, wholly inapplicable to the present cases. Simply because the vendees did not get the sales in their favour mutated and did not inform the respondent about the transactions, it cannot be held that they are guilty of fraud envisaged under Section 17 of the Registration Act.

8. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, it is not possible to uphold the impugned orders passed by the trial Court. The respondent's suits for pre-emption were evidently barred by time and the delay in the filing of the same could not be lawfully condoned by the trial Court. In this view of the matter, these three revision petitions are allowed, the impugned orders of the trial Court are set aside and all the three suits are hereby dismissed as barred by time. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.

Revision allowed.