Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Baij Nath Singh v. The State Of Utter P...

Allahabad High Court
Jan 2, 1964
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — D.D. Seth, J. (Article 226 Petition)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran (opposite party No. 3) to the post of Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board (subsequently Nagar Mahapalika) of Allahabad. An advertisement was published on 2 May 1956; about ninety applications were received, 38 candidates were called for interview, 21 appeared, and Sri Ishwar Saran was selected by the Interview Board and appointed on 10 October 1956, with confirmation by the State Government on 5 December 1956.

The petitioner (who had also applied but was not selected) represented to the State Government claiming that Sri Ishwar Saran did not possess the statutory qualifications (having only an Acting Teachers Certificate). The Director of Education queried the appointment to the State Government; initially the State Government rejected the petitioner’s representation by letter dated 31 March 1958 (with a direction interpreting Acting Teachers Certificate holders as trained for the purposes of municipal appointments), but on further representation the State Government clarified by letter dated 7 August 1958 that the earlier order was not of general application and applied only to Sri Ishwar Saran as a special case. The petitioner then filed this petition seeking (a) a writ in the nature of quo warranto to compel Sri Ishwar Saran to show lawful authority to hold the office, (b) a mandamus to the State Government to withdraw its approval, and (c) a direction to the Municipal Board to treat the post as vacant and fill it in accordance with law.

A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Sri Ishwar Saran and a rejoinder affidavit by the petitioner. Counsel for the State did not appear.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner had locus standi and could maintain a petition under Article 226 to challenge the appointment.
  2. Whether the petition was barred by delay (whether the filing about two years after appointment was too late).
  3. Whether the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran complied with the statutory scheme — specifically the U.P. Primary Education Act and the rules framed under Section 18 (notably R.4 and sub-rule (x) requiring a "trained" Superintendent of Education).
  4. Whether the State Government’s orders (notably those of 31 March 1958 and 7 August 1958) were lawful or whether they were arbitrary/discriminatory and in conflict with the statutory rules, thereby violating Article 16(1) of the Constitution (equality of opportunity).
  5. Whether relief in the form of quo warranto/mandamus should be granted, taking into account the discretionary nature of Article 226 remedies and the facts that had developed since the appointment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Sri S.N. Kacker)

  • The office of Superintendent of Education is a statutory post governed by the U.P. Primary Education Act and the rules made under Section 18; appointments must conform to those provisions.
  • R.4(x) (rules framed under the Act) required that the Superintendent be a "trained teacher"; the minimum qualifications laid down by Government orders (2 August 1949 and 15 May 1956) required a trained M.A. or M.Sc. for municipalities of certain size.
  • Sri Ishwar Saran possessed only an Acting Teachers Certificate (A.T.C.), specifically of the third category (awarded in 1948), and that certificate did not confer the status of a "trained teacher" (the specific phrase "on the same terms as a trained teacher" was absent from the third-category ATC form).
  • The Acting Teachers Certificate was a limited concession meant to permit continued employment in aided institutions after a short refresher course; it was not equivalent to training from a proper teacher-training college.
  • State Government orders of 31 March 1958 and 7 August 1958 either treated A.T.C. holders as trained generally or, by later clarification, treated Sri Ishwar Saran as a special case — those orders were in conflict with the statutory rule and were discriminatory, violating Article 16(1) (equality of opportunity) and therefore void.

Respondent's / Opposing Arguments (as presented by counsel for Sri Ishwar Saran)

  • Two preliminary objections were raised: (1) the petitioner lacked a legal right to file the petition because the petitioner himself was allegedly not qualified for the appointment (claimed to be below the age of 35 at the time of interview) and therefore was not an aggrieved person; (2) the petition was barred by delay, having been filed about two years after the appointment (filed on 17 September 1958).
  • A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Sri Ishwar Saran (the opinion records the filing but does not elaborate detailed substantive defences beyond the preliminary objections).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sonu Sampat Shewale v. Jalgaon Borough Municipality, ILR (1958) Bom. 113 The principle that where an appointment is illegal every day that the person acts in that office gives rise to a fresh cause of action; thus delay in presenting a quo warranto petition is not a bar. The court relied on this authority to reject the preliminary objection based on delay, holding that if the appointment was illegal a petition could be entertained even after a lapse of time because each day of unlawful exercise of office creates a new cause of action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded methodically: it first addressed the preliminary objections and then considered the substantive merits.

Preliminary objections — locus and delay.

  • On locus standi (the objection that the petitioner himself was not qualified and therefore not an aggrieved person), the court held that the factual question whether the petitioner was below 35 at the time of interview was a question of fact not suitable for determination in an Article 226 petition. Furthermore, Article 226 confers broad powers and, in the court's view, every citizen has the legal right to approach the High Court by writ where there is an alleged violation of statutory provisions affecting public interest. Accordingly, the petitioner had locus to challenge the appointment if it was alleged to contravene statutory provisions.
  • On delay, the court rejected the submission that the petition was too belated. The court applied the principle from Sonu Sampat Shewale (ILR (1958) Bom. 113), observing that if the appointment is illegal each day the office is held gives rise to a fresh cause of action; therefore, the mere lapse of time did not preclude the petitioner from seeking a writ of quo warranto.

Merits — statutory qualification and equality of opportunity.

  • The court accepted that the office of Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board was a statutory office governed by the U.P. Primary Education Act (which supplements the U.P. Municipalities Act) and by rules framed under Section 18 of that Act. R.4 (and specifically sub-clause (x) of R.4) contemplated that the Superintendent and his assistants shall be "trained teachers" appointed in consultation with the Circle Inspector of Schools.
  • The court examined Government orders (2 August 1949 and 15 May 1956) prescribing minimum qualifications (for certain municipalities a trained M.A. or M.Sc.). The court reviewed the nature of the Acting Teachers Certificate (A.T.C.) and the forms used for certificates awarded to three categories of teachers. It observed that the third-category A.T.C. (awarded in 1948 and applicable to Sri Ishwar Saran) omitted the phrase "on the same terms as a trained teacher" that appeared in earlier-category certificates, and therefore did not have the same effect as a qualification conferred by a training college.
  • The court considered the content of the Government order of 13 January 1947 and related provisions (para. 143 of the Education Code) and concluded that the rules referred to applied to appointment of teachers in recognised Higher Secondary Schools and were not intended to equate A.T.C. with training for the statutory post of Superintendent in a municipal administration.
  • On the proper meaning of "trained" in R.4(x), the court held that the word implies training imparted by a duly constituted training college; thus the court concluded that Sri Ishwar Saran, having only a third-category A.T.C., was not a "trained teacher" within the meaning of sub-rule (x) and therefore was not qualified for appointment as Superintendent under the statutory scheme.
  • The court then examined the State Government orders of 31 March 1958 (Annexure D) and 7 August 1958 (Annexure E). It found these orders to be in direct conflict with R.4 and that the order of 7 August, by singling out Sri Ishwar Saran, was discriminatory. The court invoked Article 16(1) (equality of opportunity in matters of appointment to any office under the State) and Article 12 (to show local authorities are included in "State") to conclude that these orders were arbitrary and denied equality of opportunity to other candidates.

Exercise of judicial discretion under Article 226.

  • Despite concluding that the petitioner’s legal contentions were well-founded (i.e., the appointment did not comply with the statutory requirement and the State orders were arbitrary/discriminatory), the court emphasized the discretionary nature of remedies under Article 226.
  • The court weighed equitable and pragmatic considerations: Sri Ishwar Saran had been holding the office since 1956, and the Municipal Board (Nagar Mahapalika) apparently had no complaint about his performance. The court considered that issuing a writ of quo warranto at that stage would be vexatious and would disturb an established position despite the absence of complaint from the local authority.
  • Balancing the public interest and the discretionary nature of Article 226 relief, the court declined to disturb the incumbent’s possession of the office and dismissed the petition while ordering each party to bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is DISMISSED. The court dismissed the petition under Article 226, though it found the petitioner’s substantive objections to the appointment (non-compliance with statutory qualifications and discriminatory State orders) to be well-founded in law; the court declined to grant the writ in the exercise of its discretion because it would be vexatious to disturb the incumbent after a prolonged period in office and in the absence of complaint from the municipal authority.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: Sri Ishwar Saran remains in office as Superintendent of Education and the petitioner’s request for quo warranto and mandamus relief was refused. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
  • Broader legal implication: Although the court held that the appointment appeared to contravene the statutory rule and that the State orders were arbitrary and discriminatory, the court expressly declined to exercise its discretion to remove the incumbent. The judgment therefore does not constitute a precedent that the court would enforce a general rule of automatic removal in similar circumstances; instead it demonstrates that even where legal infirmity is found, Article 226 relief is discretionary and courts may refuse relief for equitable or pragmatic reasons. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel binding precedent beyond application of established principles (including the cited authority on delay and the discretionary nature of writ relief).
Show all summary ...

D.D Seth, J.:— This is a petition under Article, 226 of the Constitution. The opposite party No. 2 in the petition was the Administrator, Municipal Board. By an order passed on an application made by the petitioner the name of the Administrator was removed from the array of opposite parties and in his place Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad through the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari Allahabad was substituted.

2. The tacts, in brief, according to the petition, are that on 2nd May, 1956 an advertisement was published in the local papers of Allahabad inviting applications from trained M. As or M. Sce. for the post of Superintendent of Education in the then Municipal Board of Allahabad. In response to the advertisement ninety applications were received and 38 persons were called for interview who were all post graduates and either held the degree of L.T or B.T or held Acting Teachers Certificate. Out of the 38 persons called for inter view only, 21 persons appeared before the Interview Board and one of those 21 persons was Sri Ishwar Saran opposite party No. 3 to the petition. The Interview Board decided to appoint Sri Ishwar Saran in preference to other candidates and the appointment was duly made on 10th October 1956. It was confirmed by the State Government on 5th December 1956. The District Inspector of Schools also gave his approval to the proposal of the Interview Board to appoint Sri Ishwar Saran as Superintendent of Education. The petitioner had also applied for the appointment to that office but was not selected by the Interview Board. The petitioner addressed a representation on 8th October, 1957 to the Secretary to Government U.P, Education Department, Lucknow and drew the attention of the State Government to the illegality committed in appointing Sri Ishwar Saran as Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board, Allahabad. According to the petitioner Sri Ishwar Saran was not qualified for being appointed to that post. It appears that the Director of Education was not satisfied with the appointment and wrote to the State Government that Sri Ishwar Saran did not possess the requisite statutory qualifications and requested it to cancel its approval. The State Government, however, by a letter dated 31st March, 1958 informed the Administrator of the Municipal Board that the petitioner's representation had been rejected by it. This order further directed that the persons holding Acting teachers Certificate would be deemed to be trained persons for the purposes of appointment as Superintendent of Education in the Municipalities in Uttar Pradesh. On a further representation to the State Government by the Director of Education the State Government Page: 152directed that its order dated 31st March, 1958 should not be deemed to be an order having general application but one which would apply only to Sri Ishwar Saran as a special case. The joint Director of Education, therefore, by a letter dated 7th August, 1958 informed the petitioner that his representation to the State Government dated 8th October, 1957 had been rejected. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and prayed that a writ in the nature of quo warrant to may be issued directing Sri Ishwar Saran opposite party No. 3 to the petition, to show to the satisfaction of this Court the lawful authority by which he claims to hold the office of the Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board of Allahabad. It was further prayed that a writ of mandamus may be issued to the State Government commanding it to wididraw its approval accorded to the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran as Superintendent of Education and that the opposite party No. 2 be commanded to treat the office of the Superintendent of Education as vacant and not filled up in accordance with law and to take suitable steps to fill up the same.

3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of Sri Ishwar Saran and the petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit.

4. I have heard Sri S.N Kacker the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S.C Khare appearing on behalf of Sri Ishwar Saran and Sri Yashodanandan appearing on behalf of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. Nobody has appeared before me on behalf of the State. Sri S.C Khare has raised two preliminary objections. His first objection is that the petitioner has no legal right to file the petition as he was not qualified for the appointment to the post of Superintendent of Education as at the time of the interview in 1956 he was below 35 years of age and hence he was not an aggrieved party on that date. The second objection is that the petition is much too belated as the petition was filed in this Court on 17th September 1958, i.e after about two years of the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran. I find no force in these objections.

5. The question whether the petitioner was below 35 years of age at the time of the interview is a question of fact which cannot be decided in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the relief asked for in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution must be one to enforce a legal right and the legal right must be of the petitioner himself who complains of the violation of such a right but Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide in its scope, it confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned in that Article. In my view every citizen has a legal right to file petitions for writs in the nature of habeas Corpus or quo warranto as every citizen has the right to approach the Court for relief where the freedom of the individual is threatened or if he thinks that there has been a violation of any statutory provision or rule in making an appointment in which the public at large has some interest. The petitioner, therefore, has the locus standi to challenge the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran if, in his view, the appointment was made against a statutory provision.

6. This petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay also. In Sonu Sampat Shewale v. Jalgaon Borough Municipality* ILR (1958) Bom. 113 a Bench of the Bombay High Court held as follows:

“If the appointment of an officer is illegal, every day that he acts in that office a fresh cause of action arises; there can, therefore, be no question of delay in presenting a petition for a writ of quo warranto in which his very right to act in such a responsible post has been questioned.”

7. A similar relief is capable of being granted in the present case also and, therefore, the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay.

8. I now proceed to consider the points urged by Sri S.N Kacker. He submitted that the office of Superintendent of Education in the then Municipal Board of Allahabad was a statutory office which could be filled up only in accordance with the provisions contained in the U.P Primary Education Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the rules framed thereunder which was not done in this case. In this connection he further submitted that the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran was in conflict with the minimum requisite qualifications prescribed by R. 4(x) of the rules framed under Section 18 of the Act and as such the appointment was void since he was not a trained teacher as he did not possess the necessary qualifications as are required by the rules framed under the Act. The next submission of Sri Kacker was that the appointment of Sri Ishwar Saran was unconstitutional and void as in appointing him to the post of the Superintendent of Education the State Government and the Administrator Municipal Board denied to the petitioner and to the other persons who had applied for appointment to that post equality of opportunity in the matter of the appointment as provided by Article 16 of the Constitution.

9. Sri Kacker urged that under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act the Act was part of and supplementary to the U.P Municipalities Act. Under Section 3 of the Act the State Government had issued a notification making primary education for boys and girls compulsory within the municipal limits of Allahabad. Under Section 18 of the Act the State Government was given authority to make rules for determining generally what shall be considered to be the adequate provision for compulsory and free primary education. Rule 4 framed under Section 18 of the Act provided that adequate provision for primary education for purposes of Section 4 of the Act shall comprise of various things mentioned in the said Rule. One of the things mentioned in sub-clause (viii) of Rule 4 is that a Superintendent of Education shall be appointed in every municipality. Sub-clause (x) of R. 4 framed under the Act provided that the Superintendent of Education and his assistants shall be trained teachers who shall be appointed by the Municipal Board in consultation with the Circle Inspector of schools

10. By an order dated 2nd August, 1949 which was subsequently supplemented by another order dated 15th May, 1956 the State Government laid down the minimum qualifications for the cadre of Superintendents of Education and Assistant Attendance officers in various municipalities. These two Page: 153orders provided that for the municipality of Kaval town the minimum qualifications for a Superintendent of Education shall be a trained M.A or M. Sc. According to Sri Kacker Sri Ishwar Saran was working as an Assistant Attendance officer at the time he was called for interview by the Interview Board. Although he was M.A he did not possess any regular training certificate as he possessed only an Acting Teachers Certificate (A.T.C) which was not a regular training certificate. Sri Kacker submitted that the Acting Teachers certificate was only a concession awarded by the Education Department to some old untrained teachers working in aided schools so that their services might not be terminated by the management of those schools on the ground that they were not trained. He also submitted that the said certificate was granted without passing any examination and only after a refresher course of only two months had been undergone by the teachers concerned.

11. According to Sri Kacker the said certificate specifically declared that the holder thereof was fit to work as a teacher only in aided institutions in Uttar Pradesh. Sri Kacker urged that Sri Ishwar Saran held Acting Teachers Certificates of a category the requisite minimum qualifications for which were that the teachers should have at least passed the High School examination and put in five years of continuous and satisfactory service before 31st December, 1946 and as such he was not a trained teacher within the meaning of sub-rule (x) of Section 4 framed under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that the office of the Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board of Allahabad was a statutory office. It, therefore, follows that it could be filled up only in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Section, 68 of the U.P Municipalities Act gives power to the Municipal Board to appoint by special resolution principal officers of its technical departments including the Secy, and Superintendent of Education. This section is certainly an enabling section but the necessary qualifications for the post of the Superintendent of Education in a Municipal Board have not been prescribed by the U.P Municipalities Act.

12. It is the Act which is part of and supplementary to the U.P Municipalities Act which prescribes those qualifications. Who is a trained teacher has not been defined by the Act or the rules framed thereunder. The fact that Sri Ishwar Saran possessed only an Acting Teachers Certificate is admitted. Annexure B. 3 to the petition is relevant in this connection. It reads as follows:

“Acting Teachers Certificate Pramanit Kiya jata hai ki Ishwar Saran ne jo Municipal Board Allahabad ke Adhyapak hain do mas May tatha June, 1947 ki rifresher kors ki shikchha prapt ki hai. Inka kam Santosh janak tha. Yeh Ukta prant men Sarkari sahayata pane wale Vidhyalaya men Adhyapak niyukta Idye jane ke yogya ghosit kiye jate hain.”

Sd/- R.P Klchalu,

M.A.L.T

Registrar,

Shikchha Vibhag Parikcha.

Ukta prant.

7-10-1948.

13. It may be noted that the Acting Teachers Certificate was awarded to three categories of teachers working in aided institutions. The first category was of those teachers who were appointed before 1st January 1927. The form in which the certificate was awarded to the first category of teachers is given in Annexure B1 to the petition. It mentions that he is hereby declared eligible for appointment in the Unite Provinces as a teacher in an aided institution on the same terms as a trained teacher. The Second category of teachers to whom Acting Teachers Certificate was granted was of those teachers who were appointed between 1st January, 1927 and 1st August, 1931 and had at least passed the Intermediate Examination. The form in which certificates were granted to the second category of teachers is given in Annexure B2 to the petition which mentions that he has satisfied the Director of Public Instruction, United Provinces, that he is an efficient teacher and is hereby declared eligible for appointment in the United Provinces as a teacher in an aided institution on the same terms as a trained teacher.” It is, therefore significant that the words on the same terms as a trained teacher are missing in the acting teachers certificate awarded to the teachers of the third category which consisted of those who were granted the certificate in the year 1948.

14. Sri Ishwar Saran admittedly belonged to the 3rd category of teachers, and was awarded the Acting Teachers Certificate the form of which is given in Annexure B3 to the petition and from which the words “on the same terms as a trained teacher” are missing. That fact itself shows that the Acting Teachers Certificate granted to the petitioner did not make him a trained teacher. Annexure 1 to the counter affidavit is a copy of the Government order dated 13th January, 1947 issued by the Secretary to the Government, Education Department which provides that the Acting Teachers Certificate should be granted to such untrained teachers (both men and women) serving in recognised Anglo Hindustani Schools of these provinces as fulfil the following conditions: Para. 143 of the Education Code of Uttar Pradesh provides rules regarding the appointment of teachers in all recognised institutions. These rules were framed for the purpose of appointment of teachers in the recognised Higher Secondary Schools and not for the office of the Superintendent of Education in a Municipal Board. It is true that sub-rule (x) of R. 4 of the rules framed under the Act did not require any particular type of training but it cannot be said that any kind of training was sufficient for the appointment of a Superintendent of Education in a Municipal Board. In my opinion the word “trained” implies training imparted by a duly constituted training college. It, therefore, must be held that Sri Ishwar Saran was not a trained teacher within the meaning of sub-rule (x) of R. 4 framed under the Act and he was, therefore, not qualified to be appointed as Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board of Allahabad.

15. As regards the submission of Sri Kacker that in appointing Sri Ishwar Saran to the post of Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board of Allahabad the State Government and the Administrator of the Municipal Board denied to the petitioner and to the other persons who had applied for that appointment equality of opportunity as Page: 154provided by Article 16 of the Constitution, attention may be drawn to Annexures D and E to the petition. Annexure D is an aider passed by the State Government on 31st March, 1958 and was in reply to a letter sent to the State Government by the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. It reads as follows:

“Mahodey, t

16. Aapke patra sankhya 4234 A.D.M S.T.E.D Dinank December 27, 1057 ke parsang men mujhe aapko soochit karnt ka aadesh hua hai ki rajyapal mahodey me uparyukkt vishey per Sri Baij Nath Singh ke savedan patra ko radd kar diya hai aur aadesh diya hai ken nagar palikayon men shiksha adhikashak ke pad per niyukti ke liye A.T.C Trained ke anusar manya hai.”

17. Annexure E is another order of the State Government dated 7th August 1958. It makes a reference to the previous order dated 31st March, 1958 and mentions that;

“……………dinank March 31/1958 men shasan ne jo aagya di hai woh samanya agya nahin, waran nagar palika Allahabad men Sikchha Adhikachhak ke pad per kewal Sri Ishwar Saran matra ki niyukti ke liye hi vyaktigat adesh ya rajagya hai, jo tathaya aap bhavisya ke liye kripya vishes rup se not kar len.”

18. These two orders are directly in conflict with R. 4 of the rules framed under the Act. I find in Sri Kackers' submission that these orders favoured Sri Ishwar Saran alone and were discriminatory as far as the other candidates to the post of the Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board of Allahabad were concerned. No orders could be passed by the State Government which were in conflict with the statutory provisions contained in R. 4 of the rules framed under the Act. The two orders which are Annexures D and E to the petition were in my opinion arbitrary. Article 16(1) of the Constitution reads thus:

“(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State”

19. Local authorities are included in the word “State” as is clear from Article 12 of the Constitution, which reads thus:

‘In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government of India and the Government and the legislature of each of the State and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India”

20. What Article 16(1) of the Constitution guarantees is equality of opportunity to all citizens in respect of the matters relating to employment to any office under the State. The order dated 7th August, 1958 issued by the State Government which is Annexure E to the petition picked out Sri Ishwar Saran for preferential treatment and must, therefore, be held to be discriminatory as far as the petitioner and the other candidates who had applied for the post of Superintendent of Education in the Municipal Board were concerned. R. 4 framed under the Act contemplates no such discrimination. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner was denied equality of opportunity in the matter of employment by the Municipal Board. Both the arguments of Sri Kacker are, therefore well-founded.

21. The petitioner, however, is not necessarily entitled to the issue of a writ of quo warranto as Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary in nature. There are circumstances in this case which, in my view, favour the exercise of my discretion in favour of opposite party No. 3. It will be, in my opinion, vexatious to issue a writ of qua warranto in this case as Sri Ishwar Saran has been holding the office of the Superintendent of Education since, 1956 and the Municipal Board of Allahabad or the Nagar Mahapalika seem to have no complaint against him. It will, therefore, not be proper to disturb the existing position. I, therefore, dismiss this petition but under the circumstances T order the parties to bear their own costs.

GH/LKB/V.B.B

22. Petition dismissed.