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Bal Rajaram Tukaram Padval v. Maneklal Mansukhbhai

Bombay High Court
Jul 30, 1931
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Judgment Summary — Patkar, J. (with concurring opinion of Tyabji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to recover principal and interest under a mortgage-deed (Exhibit 42) executed on April 23, 1923. The mortgage was executed by defendant No. 1 Rajaram Tukaram (hereafter "Rajaram"), his wife Laxmibai (defendant No. 2), and Rajaram as guardian of his two minor sons Bal and Chimu (defendants Nos. 3 and 4). Rajaram carried on a large import business in the name of S. Narayan & Co.; for the purposes of the appeals the courts proceeded on the assumption that that firm was the separate/self-acquired business of Rajaram and not an ancestral joint-family business.

The plaint was originally filed in October 1925 in a subordinate court as Suit No. 387 of 1925, later transferred in August 1927 to the District Court as Suit No. 7 of 1927. A preliminary decree was passed on September 30, 1927 (leading to Appeal No. 546 of 1927 by Bal) and a final decree was passed on September 22, 1928 (leading to Appeal No. 104 of 1929). After the appeals were filed defendant No. 4 died and the appeals were prosecuted by defendant No. 3.

At trial the judge excluded certain evidence proposed by the minor defendants as to whether S. Narayan & Co. was a joint family business and as to extensive details of other transactions of Rajaram, while accepting certain prepared statements at their face value. The principal factual controversies addressed by the Court included the nature and history of Rajaram's business (profits and losses across years and lines), the existence and urgency of debts evidenced by accepted bills and bank letters, and whether the mortgage was given to discharge antecedent debts and/or whether debts were illegal, immoral or avyavaharika.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage (Exhibit 42) was executed to discharge antecedent debts of Rajaram and, if so, whether those antecedent debts bind the minor sons' interests in the mortgaged property.
  2. Whether the debts in respect of accepted bills were illegal, immoral or avyavaharika (such that the sons would not be liable).
  3. Whether the plaintiff (mortgagee) acted in good faith and made reasonable inquiry when advancing the loan secured by Exhibit 42.
  4. Whether compound interest with quarterly rests provided for in the mortgage is penal and should be disallowed or adjusted.
  5. Whether the appellant (a minor son and an agriculturist) was entitled to the benefits of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (defendant No. 3 — the surviving minor son) — principal arguments

  • The circumstances of the mortgage show want of good faith on the part of the plaintiff-mortgagee.
  • The plaintiff has not proved that there was any antecedent debt of the father prior to the mortgage-deed.
  • Even if there was an antecedent debt, it was avyavaharika (i.e., incurred due to the father's failings/follies or otherwise improper) and therefore the sons are not liable — reliance was placed on Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur.
  • Compound interest with quarterly rests provided in the mortgage is penal and ought not to be allowed.
  • Being an agriculturist, the appellant should be allowed the benefits of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act.

Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (Rajaram and Laxmibai) — positions recorded

  • Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 admitted execution of the mortgage and contended that the rate of interest was excessive and that the provision for payment of compound interest was penal.

Plaintiff (mortgagee) — position as shown in the record

  • The mortgage was given as security for loans advanced to meet urgent liabilities of Rajaram: the mortgage-deed recitals and a declaration (Exhibit 170) and letters from various Banks (Exhibit 169 with accompaniments) showed that Rajaram had accepted bills and that the Banks were pressing for payment to avoid sale of goods held by Banks; the total debts shown by the Bank letters amounted to £17,441 15s., and these letters predated the mortgage.
  • There was no allegation of fraud against the plaintiff in the written statement; the plaintiff took the declaration and the bank letters before advancing the loan and there was no evidence on record to justify a finding of bad faith by the mortgagee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur (1908) 32 Bom. 348 Held that a son is not liable for debts which the father ought not, as a decent and respectable man, to have incurred; used to define "avyavaharika" as debts attributable to failings/follies/caprices of the father. Appellant relied on it. Court reviewed the decision and the broader conflict of authorities; the Court found Knight, J.'s wide rendering of "avyavaharika" ("unusual" or debts the father ought not to have incurred) difficult to accept as a universal test in this case.
Raghunathji Tarachand v. The Bank of Bombay (1909) 34 Bom. 72 Concerns liability in cases involving ancestral business. Held not of avail to the plaintiff-mortgagee here because the case proceeds on the assumption that S. Narayan & Co. was the separate property of Rajaram, not an ancestral business.
Ram Krishna Muraji v. Ratan Chand (1931) L.R 58 I.A 173; s.c. 53 All. 190 Authority concerning continuation of ancestral business and effect of speculative transactions on status. Court stated it would not be applicable to the present case because S. Narayan & Co. was taken to be the father's separate business for purposes of these appeals.
Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (1923) L.R 51 I.A 129; s.c. 46 All. 95 Distinguishes managing member of joint family and a father-manager; holds father may burden estate to discharge antecedent debts (if not immoral); antecedent debt means antecedent in fact and in time; son's liability arises during father's lifetime. Identified by the Court as the governing principle applicable to facts here; Court applied its propositions to hold that if the mortgage discharged antecedent debts which were not illegal or immoral, then the mortgage binds the sons' interests.
Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh (1917) L.R 44 I.A 126; s.c. 39 All. 437 Remarks that antecedent-debt doctrine arose to protect third parties (purchasers for onerous consideration in good faith). The Court noted this authority but observed that its authority was weakened by Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad on key points.
K.B Mian Karim Bakhsh v. Dargah Pir Rattan Nath (1931) P.C. Appeal No. 121 of 1929 Raised the question whether unascertained claims against the father could amount to debt (point not decided in that decision). Cited for the procedural note that the Privy Council considered but did not decide the exact point; Court observed the point was not determinative here because debts were in fact ascertained (accepted bills).
Venkatacharyulu v. Mohana Panda (1920) 44 Mad. 214 Madras High Court did not accept the contention that unascertained claims are not debts. Cited to support the proposition that accepted-but-time-extended liabilities may still constitute antecedent debts.
Damodaram Chetty v. Bansilal Abeerchand (1926) 51 Mad. 711 Held that when a Hindu father purchases goods on credit there is a debt due even within the credit period and such a debt may constitute an antecedent debt. Cited to support the finding that liabilities evidenced by accepted bills were antecedent debts despite any extension of time by banks.
Annabhat Shankarbhat v. Shivappa Dundappa (1928) 52 Bom. 376 Holds sons liable for trade debts of father even if trade started by father himself. Cited to support the proposition that trade debts of the father bind the sons' interests even if trade was originated by the father.
Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji (1925) 49 Mad. 211 Supports the view that sons are liable for trade debts of their father. Cited as authority consistent with the Court's conclusion that trade debts bind sons.
Govind v. Sakharam (1904) 28 Bom. 383 Authority on timing of son's liability (arising during father's lifetime). Cited among authorities supporting that son's liability arises during father's lifetime.
Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji (1918) 43 Bom. 612 Deals with the scope of "avyavaharika" and the son's liability for father's civil wrongs; held decretal debt for breach of civil duty as trustee was not avyavaharika. Cited in the discussion of the meaning and scope of "avyavaharika" and for the proposition that certain civil liabilities are not excluded.
Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad (1911) 39 Cal. 862 Interprets "avyavaharika" as not "lawful, usual or customary"; takes a narrower view than Durbar Khachar Cited as part of the conflicting authorities on the meaning of "avyavaharika"; Court considered this narrower definition in its analysis.
Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Ghetty (1912) 37 Mad. 458 Offers a definition of "avyavaharika" as "not supportable as valid by legal arguments and on which no right could be established in the creditor's favour in a Court of Justice." Cited among authorities giving alternative definitions; Court considered this formulation when rejecting the contention that the debts were avyavaharika.
Gursarn Das v. Mohan Lal (1922) 4 Lah. 93 One of the decisions not in accord with Durbar Khachar's broad test for "avyavaharika". Cited to show divergent judicial views; Court noted the conflict among High Courts.
Bai Mani v. Usafali (1930) 33 Bom. L.R. 130 Discussed the conflict of opinion on "avyavaharika" in text and commentary. Cited by the Court to note the existing conflict of opinion and commentary on the term "avyavaharika".
Chintamanrav Mehendale v. Kashinath (1889) 14 Bom. 320 Illustrates that evidence of father's immorality/extravagance without connection to the particular loan is irrelevant. Cited to support exclusion of generalized evidence of the father's other transactions which were not shown to be connected to the specific debts secured by the mortgage.
Bhagbut Pershad v. Mussumat Girja Koer (1888) L.R. 15 I.A. 99; s.c. 15 Cal. 717 Same proposition on relevance of evidence linking immorality to particular liability. Cited for the same evidentiary principle limiting relevance of evidence of father's general misconduct.
Dattatraya Vishnu v. Vishnu Narayan (1911) 36 Bom. 68 Shows limitation on relevance of general evidence of immorality to defeat a specific debt. Cited to support trial judge's limitation of evidence and Court's holding that the particular accepted bills were not shown to be avyavaharika.
Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) L.R. 1 I.A. 321 Historical authority reflecting change in law that sons are liable for father's debts which are neither illegal nor immoral. Cited in the survey of authorities to show the legal position that sons' liability relates to the nature of the debt, not of the estate.
Ramkrishna Trimbak v. Narayan (1915) 40 Bom. 126 Held sons could not escape liability where father started a trade contrary to certain rules; immorality in private relations is the crucial test. Cited as authority narrowing Durbar Khachar's rationale and as part of the analysis on what constitutes "immorality" or "avyavaharika".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in these principal steps (constrained to matters as set out in the record):

  1. Preliminary matters and assumptions: The trial judge excluded detailed evidence as to whether S. Narayan & Co. was an ancestral business and also excluded detailed evidence about Rajaram's other dealings from 1914–1925 as irrelevant to the specific transactions leading to the mortgage. The appellate Court proceeded on the assumption accepted at trial that the firm was the father's separate acquisition and accepted the prepared statements produced on behalf of the minor defendants at their face value.
  2. Identification of the core legal question: The central issue (adopted also by Tyabji, J.) was whether the mortgage discharged antecedent debts of the father and, if so, whether those antecedent debts were legal (i.e., not illegal, immoral or avyavaharika) so as to bind the minor sons' interests.
  3. Factual findings relevant to liability: The Court reviewed the business history and financial statements accepted at trial, noting years of profit and years of heavy loss, especially in the piece-goods line, and also land and share speculation losses. Importantly, the Court found that the debts in question arose from trade transactions for goods that had in fact arrived in Bombay and were in the possession of Banks, and that Rajaram had accepted bills of exchange in respect of those goods.
  4. Antecedent-debt analysis: The Court examined documentary evidence in the record — in particular Rajaram's declaration (Exhibit 170) and letters from Banks (Exhibit 169) dated between August 14, 1922 and March 1923 — showing that the Banks were pressing for payment on accepted bills prior to the mortgage (which was executed April 23, 1923). The Court held that these liabilities evidenced by accepted bills were antecedent debts even though the Banks might have given time to pay; it cited decisions such as Damodaram Chetty and others to support this treatment.
  5. Good faith of the mortgagee: The plaintiff produced the declaration and bank letters and there was no allegation of fraud; the Court was not satisfied that the record showed anything to justify an inference that the plaintiff acted other than in good faith when it advanced the loan.
  6. Meaning and scope of "avyavaharika": The Court conducted a detailed review of authorities and textual/commentary materials on the term "avyavaharika" (Usanas / Mitakshara / Mayukha, various judicial definitions). It noted conflicting judicial definitions — from Knight, J.'s broader "debts a decent man ought not to incur" (Durbar Khachar) to narrower meanings such as "not lawful, usual or customary" or "not supportable by legal arguments" — and surveyed dictionary and commentary usages of "vyavahara" and "avyavaharika."
  7. Application of "avyavaharika" to the present debts: The Court emphasized that the debts before it comprised numerous individual items, each evidenced by an accepted bill for the price of goods (with the Banks holding documents of title). The Court reasoned that even if Rajaram's overall conduct in expanding transactions might be condemned as reckless, each individual liability was an ordinary commercial debt and did not involve gambling, wagering, or moral turpitude; thus they could not be classified as "avyavaharika" within the scope of the exceptions in the classical texts and decided cases relied upon.
  8. Conclusion from precedents: The Court applied the Privy Council's principles in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad to hold that where a mortgage is to discharge antecedent debts incurred by the father for lawful trade transactions (not illegal/immoral/avyavaharika), the mortgage binds the sons' interests. The Court therefore rejected the appellant's contentions that the debts were not antecedent or were avyavaharika and rejected the suggestion of plaintiff's bad faith.
  9. Remedies and adjustments: Having dismissed the substantive contentions of the appellant, the Court nevertheless varied the trial judge's allowance of compound interest with quarterly rests as penal, holding that simple interest should be applied: 12% simple interest from the date of the mortgage up to March 22, 1929, and 6% simple interest from that date till payment. Cross-objections by defendant No. 1 were dismissed. The Receiver was ordered to continue until discharged by the lower Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals were dismissed and the plaintiff's claim under the mortgage allowed subject to an adjustment of the interest provision. Specifically, the Court ordered recovery on the mortgage at 12% simple interest from the date of the mortgage (April 23, 1923) up to March 22, 1929, and at 6% simple interest from March 22, 1929 until payment. Cross-objections by defendant No. 1 were dismissed and the Receiver was directed to continue until discharged by the lower Court.

Implications: In direct effect, the mortgage (Exhibit 42) was held to secure antecedent trade debts of Rajaram and therefore binds the interests of the minor son (the appellant) to the extent adjudicated; the plaintiff-mortgagee succeeds subject to the court's reduction of the interest regime from compound quarterly rests to the simple rates stated. The opinion applied and relied upon existing authorities (notably Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad) in respect of antecedent debts and the scope of "avyavaharika"; the Court did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying established authorities and interpretations to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and holdings recorded within the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Patkar, J.:—

These are two appeals from a preliminary decree passed by Mr. Sanjana, Joint Judge of Thana, and a final decree passed by the same Judge as District Judge of Thana in Suit No. 7 of 1927 brought by the plaintiff to recover the principal and interest on a mortgage-deed, Exhibit 42, passed by defendant No. 1 Rajaram Tukaram, his wife Laxmibai, defendant No. 2, and by defendant No. 1 as guardian of his two sons, Bal and Chimu, defendants Nos. 3 and 4.

Defendant No. 1, Rajaram, carried on a large import business in saffron, piece-goods and other commodities in the name of S. Narayan & Co. S. Narayan & Co. was an old firm and had four partners. Defendant No. 1 Rajaram's father Tukaram Tatya, one of the partners, had 6½ annas Page: 39share. At the end of 1897 Tukaram Tatya left the Company and Rajaram, defendant No. 1, became a partner the next day with a share of 2½ annas. Out of a large balance standing to the credit of Tukaram Tatya, Rs. 25,000 were transferred to the new account opened in the name of Rajaram as his capital. In 1899 Tukaram Tatya died, and Rajaram separated from his only brother soon afterwards. Rajaram continued to be one of the partners of S. Narayan & Co. and bought off the other partners, and from 1914 continued as the sole owner of the firm. Bal, the eldest of his son, is stated in the judgment of the lower Court to have been born in 1918, but according to the appellant he was born on June 22, 1914. On April 23, 1923, the mortgage in suit, Exhibit 42, was passed by Rajaram, defendant No. 1, for himself and as guardian of his two minor sons Bal and Chimu, defendants Nos. 3 and 4, then stated to be 6 and 2 years of age, and by his wife Laxmibai, defendant No. 2. It is not clear why Laxmibai was joined as a party to the mortgage.

The recital in the mortgage-deed as to the purpose of borrowing the loan is as follows: [His Lordship then set out the recital which is quoted above in the statement of facts and continued:]

Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 admitted execution of the mortgage and contended that the interest was excessive and the provision for payment of compound interest was penal. The only contending parties in the lower Court were the sons, defendants Nos. 3 and 4. The principal contention on their behalf was that the mortgage was not of such a nature as would justify a Hindu father in mortgaging his sons' share in the ancestral property.

On October 3, 1925, the plaint was filed in the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court and the suit was numbered 387 of 1925. In August 1927, the suit was transferred to the District Court and was numbered as Suit No. 7 of 1927. A preliminary decree was passed by the Joint Judge on Page: 40September 30, 1927, and Appeal No. 546 of 1927 was filed Bal against that decree. A final decree was passed by the District Judge on September 22, 1928, and Appeal No. 104 of 1929 was filed against the final decree. After the filing of the two appeals defendant No. 4 died on May 27, 1929. The present appeals are conducted by defendant No. 3.

At the outset it is necessary to mention that the learned trial Judge excluded certain evidence proposed to be adduced on behalf of the appellant. It appears that after the deposition of Amthalal, Exhibit 365, was taken, the learned trial Judge held that the question whether S. Narayan & Co. was the business of Rajaram alone or of the joint family did not arise in the case, for in either event the debt of the father would be binding on the shares of the sons in the family property. He, therefore, ruled out, once for all, all inquiry on the subject whether or not S. Narayan & Co. was or was not the joint family business. Another order of the learned trial Judge excluding evidence on behalf of the minor defendants appears at Exhibit 375 and was passed on September 16, 1927. Counsel appearing on behalf of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 proposed to lead at considerable length evidence as to the nature of the various dealings carried on by Rajaram from 1914 to 1925 in order to satisfy the Court as to the highly speculative nature of his transactions in general and by inference to establish the similar character of the particular transactions leading to the mortgage in suit and prepared certain statements with that view. The learned trial Judge by his order excluded evidence as to the nature and details of the other dealings of Rajaram which were wholly irrelevant, and intimated that he was prepared to accept the statements at their face value and have the question argued out on the assumption of their general correctness.

The view of the learned Judge was that whether S. Narayan & Co. was the ancestral business of the family or not, defendants Nos. 3 and 4, as sons of Rajaram, were under Page: 41the pious obligation to pay their father's debts, and if the mortgage in suit was passed in order to pay the antecedent debts of the father, which were neither illegal nor immoral, the mortgage would be binding on defendants Nos. 3 and 4, and it would not be necessary to go into the question as to whether S. Narayan & Co. was an ancestral family business. Further, he excluded detailed evidence as to the allegation that defendant No. 1 carried on speculative transactions from 1914 to 1925. He was prepared to accept the statements produced by the learned counsel on behalf of the minor defendants at their face value, but though he excluded evidence as to other dealings of Rajaram, he did not exclude any evidence as to the nature of the particular transactions which led to the mortgage in suit. We must, therefore, for the purpose of this appeal, proceed on the assumption that the firm of S. Narayan & Co. was not the ancestral firm of the family but was the self-acquisition of defendant No. 1, and for the purposes of this appeal we must also assume that the statements produced on behalf of the minor defendants are correct.

It is urged on behalf of the appellant, defendant No. 3, first, that the circumstances under which the mortgage-bond, Exhibit 42, was effected show want of good faith on the part of the plaintiff the mortgagee; secondly, that the plaintiff has not proved that there was any debt of the father antecedent to the one created by the mortgage-deed; thirdly, even if there was an antecedent debt it was avyavaharika and fell within the text of Ushanas dealt with in the case of Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur (1908) 32 Bom. 348; fourthly, that compound interest with quarterly rests ought not to be allowed; and lastly, the appellant being an agriculturist ought to be allowed the benefits of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act.

Before dealing with the several points stated above, it is necessary to ascertain the real facts in the case. Having Page: 42regard to the way in which the case was dealt with by the lower Court, we have to proceed on the assumption that the business of S. Narayan & Co. was not an ancestral business. The learned Judge held that the business earned profits till 1919 but from 1920 onwards it sustained serious losses, that the goods ordered and received in 1919 and 1920 were far in excess of the average quantity of the previous five years, that some new lines were opened in 1919 and 1920, as sugar, rice, machinery and motors, of which sugar and rice resulted in considerable profits, and that the loss sustained was the heaviest in the piece-goods line which was the old commodity in which the firm of S. Narayan & Co. dealt. It appears, however, that defendant No. 1, though he dealt in piece-goods, carried on business on a limited scale on behalf of himself and his constituents, but since 1920 he carried on the business of piece-goods on a huge scale on his own account. It also appears that defendant No. 1 speculated in lands and shares to a certain extent. The loss in shares was less than Rs. 30,000 while the loss in land speculation was Rs. 1,31,500 and out of the loss of Rs. 15,00,000 at the end of 1924, deducting the loss of Rs. 1,64,000 incurred in land and shares and insurance transactions, most of the balance of the loss was in piece-goods business. It appears from statement No. 3, Exhibit 204, that from 1914 to 1919 the business was carried on principally in saffron and piece-goods and resulted in profit. In 1920 the transactions in sugar brought in a profit of Rs. 68,148-5-10 and the loss in the two lines, saffron and piece-goods, in which the Company always dealt was Rs. 60,880-3-6 and Rs. 65,508-11-0. In 1921 there was a profit in saffron and the new lines of sugar and rice to the total of about Rs. 39,814-4-7 and the loss was incurred largely in the piece-goods or indent business to the extent of Rs. 10,219-13-11, and on account of interest paid and office charges in connection with the indent business. In 1922 there was a profit in saffron to the extent of Page: 43Rs. 67,322-4-1 and also in the new line of sugar, and there was a loss of about Rs. 93,378-4-1 in the piece-goods business and interest and office charges in connection, therewith. In 1923 there was a profit in saffron and there was a loss of about Rs. 1,03,784-13-9 in the piece-goods business and on account of interest and office charges in connection therewith. In 1924 there was a profit in saffron of Rs. 12,278-9-5 and a loss of Rs. 23,932-1-10 in piece-goods business and a loss in China Mutual Trading Co. of Rs. 92,970-2-0 which was subsequent to the date of the mortgage, and loss on account of interest and office charges.

It would thus appear from the statements which the learned trial Judge has accepted at their face value that in connection with the old lines of business, namely, saffron and piece-goods, there was a considerable profit in saffron and huge losses in the Indent, i.e the piece-goods business. The other lines either brought a profit or a negligible loss except in the case of China Mutual Trading Co. which brought a loss of Rs. 92,000 in the year 1924 after the date of the mortgage. The principal business which brought losses was the old line of piece-goods in which S. Narayan & Co. dealt from the beginning. It appears from Exhibit 207 that there was a loss to defendant No. 1 to the extent of Rs. 1,31,500 on account of speculation in land transactions from 1918 to 1925, and from Exhibit 208 that the loss in shares was Rs. 28,900. It appears from Exhibit 220 that from 1914 to 1918 defendant No. 1 dealt moderately on his own account and also on account of his constituents, but in 1919 he ordered on his own account goods of £62,816, and in 1920 of £272,927, far in excess of his previous commitments, but in 1921, 1922, and 1923 he ordered goods on his own account to the extent of £10,229, £3,189 and £5,005 respectively much less than in the years 1916 and 1917 in which he earned profits.

It is clear that all the liabilities incurred by defendant No. 1 were on account of trade transactions except those in shares and land, and even with regard to the piece-goods business it appears that from 1919 and 1920 business so far as it was conducted on behalf of S. Narayan & Co. apart from the business of the constituents was intended to be carried on for the purpose of securing huge profits. It appears from the evidence that while the exchange ranged from Rs. 7-8-0 to Rs. 8 per pound, that is an exchange at the rate of 2 shillings 6 pence, it fell down soon afterwards before the goods arrived and the rate was Rs. 15 to Rs. 16 per pound or at 1 shilling 4 pence or even a little less. It is clear from the evidence that there was no wagering and no element of gambling in the transactions entered into by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 when examined stated: “I did no Satta. I ordered goods with a view to take delivery and obtain profits by sale of the said goods. I could not fulfil my land contracts as I had no money and then prices of land went down.” It appears from Exhibit 56, an application made on behalf of the minor defendants for change in the frame of issue No. 2 that it was not the contention of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 that their father, defendant No. 1, engaged in the business which was purely Satta as such, and their contention was that the said business was not done by their father for the benefit of the family and was done on an unlimited scale in a foolish maimer without proper circumspection, and that the debt incurred in respect of the same was avyavaharika.

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that defendant No. 1 took objection to the statement in the draft of the mortgage-deed that S. Narayan & Co. was an ancestral firm but that he subsequently waived the objection in order to secure the loan from the plaintiff. It is contended on the other hand that the solicitors of defendant No. 1 were mistaken as to the instructions from defendant No. 1 when they objected to the draft of the mortgage-deed. It Page: 45is not necessary in these appeals to go into this question as the claim of the plaintiff is not based on the ancestral character of the business of S. Narayan & Co., and the case has proceeded on the assumption that it was the self-acquisition of defendant No. 1. The appellant is sought to be held liable on the mortgage effected by his father on the ground that it was for payment of an antecedent debt which is not shown to be illegal or immoral. The decision, therefore, in Raghunathji Tarachand v. The Bank of Bombay (1909) 34 Bom. 72 would be of no avail to the plaintiff-mortgagee, for the business of S. Narayan & Co. must be assumed for the purposes of this case to be not an ancestral business but the separate property of the father, defendant No. 1. Similarly, the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Krishna Muraji v. Ratan Chand (1931) L.R 58 I.A 173, s.c 53 All, 190 would not be applicable to the present case. It was held in that case that where an ancestral business of a Mitakshara joint family has been carried on in partnership with another person, and upon his retiring there has been a dissolution and winding up of the partnership, the business carried on immediately thereafter on behalf of the joint family in the same commodities and upon the same premises, though under a new firm name and with new books, is not a new business, but a continuation of the ancestral business; that the fact that speculative transactions were entered into later does not make the business a new one so as to support the view that the managers could not bind the property of minor members; and that a mortgage of property of the joint family for the purpose of discharging debts incurred in carrying on the business is binding upon the joint family, including the minor member, if the mortgagee acting honestly and with due diligence has made reasonable inquiry as to the necessity of the loan.

The law applicable to the facts of the present case has been laid down by the Privy Council in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad, (1923) L.R 51 I.A 129, s.c 46 All. 95 where a distinction is made between a managing member of a joint family and a managing member who is the father of the other members of the family, and it was held that the managing member of a joint undivided family cannot alienate or burden the estate except for the purpose of necessity, but if he is the father and the other members are his sons, he may by incurring debt so long as it is not for an immoral purpose lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceedings upon a decree for payment of that debt and that if he purports to burden the estate by a mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate. It was also held that antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached, and that the liability of the son arises during the lifetime of the father.

Considerable stress is laid down on behalf of the appellant on the remark of the Privy Council in the case of Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh, (1917) L.R 44 I.A 126 at p. 132, s.c 39 All. 437 at p. 445 where their Lordships observed that the law on the question of antecedent debt has arisen from the necessity of protecting the rights of third parties, say the purchasers of the property who have taken their title for onerous consideration and in good faith. The authority of Sahu Ram Chandra's case (1917) L.R 44 I.A 126 at p. 132, s.c 39 All. 437 at p. 445 has been weakened by the decision of the Full Court of the Privy Council in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad, (1923) L.R 51 I.A 129, s.c 46 All. 95 in which the decision in Sahu Ram Chandra's case (1917) L.R 44 I.A 126 at p. 132, s.c 39 All. 437 at p. 445 is overruled at least on two points, namely, that there can be an antecedent debt even if it was incurred on the security of the joint family property, and, secondly, that the liability of the son to pay the debt of his father arises during his lifetime.

It is not disputed in this case that the mortgage sued upon is for consideration, and it appears that the mortgagee when he advanced the loan took a declaration, Exhibit 170, from Rajaram in which Rajaram admitted that he had become indebted to several Banks in Bombay on account of a heavy fall in the price of goods imported by his firm resulting in the constituents of the said firm refusing to take delivery, and that it had become absolutely necessary to raise a sum of rupees two lacs immediately to pay off the Banks who held large stock of goods of his firm against accepted bills which they were threatening to sell involving his firm in heavy losses. It appears that defendant No. 1 also wrote a letter, Exhibit 169, enclosing six accompaniments which were letters from the Banks making demands for payment of overdue bills and which were handed over to the plaintiff as evidence of the existence and urgency of the debts for whose payment the loan was taken from the plaintiff. The total amount of the debts due on account of accepted bills as disclosed from the letters from the Banks amounted to £17,441 15s. The letters from the Banks are dated from August 14, 1922, to March 1923, and the mortgage, Exhibit 42, was executed on April 23, 1923. There is no allegation of fraud against the plaintiff in the written statement, and even if it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove good faith, I am not prepared to say on the evidence on the record that there is any evidence which would justify the suggestion that the mortgage was entered into by the plaintiff otherwise than in good faith.

The principal points, therefore, arising in the appeal are whether the debts incurred by the father on the accepted bills, in respect of which the Banks were demanding payment, were antecedent debts and whether the sons have shown that they were illegal or immoral or avyavaharika.

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that there were no antecedent debts because there was no ascertained sum of money which could be demanded from the father and that Page: 48time was given by the Banks to make the payments. The question as to whether unascertained claims against the father would amount to a debt was raised in a recent Privy Council decision in the case of K.B Mian Karim Bakhsh v. Dargah Pir Rattan Nath, (1931) P.C Appeal No. 121 of 1929 (decided on June 11, 1931) but the point was not decided in that case. The contention has not been accepted by the Madras High Court in Venkatacharyulu v. Mohana Panda. (1920) 44 Mad. 214 In the present case, however, there is no allegation that the contracts in this case were of a wagering character, for as a matter of fact the goods had arrived in Bombay and were in the custody of the Banks and defendant No. 1 had accepted bills to the extent of the value of the goods, and the Banks were demanding payment of the amount due on those bills as agents of the manufacturers of the goods. The debt of an ascertained sum was due by the father on the accepted bills, and even though the Banks gave time to defendant No. 1 to pay the debts, it does not cease to be an antecedent debt. In Damodaram Chetty v. Bansilal Abeerchand (1926) 51 Mad. 711 it was held that when a Hindu father purchases goods on credit for a period, there is a debt due and payable by him even within the credit period, though the debt may not be demandable by the creditor during that period, and that such a debt constitutes an antecedent debt and that the father is competent during that period to sell or otherwise alienate the joint family property to pay off such debt so as to bind the share of the son in such property.

We must assume for the purposes of the present case that S. Narayan & Co. was the separate property of the father defendant No. 1 and was not the joint ancestral business of the family, and even so, the trade debts incurred by the father would be binding upon the sons, and the sons under the Hindu law are liable to pay the debts incurred by the father in respect of trade transactions even though the trade Page: 49may be started by the father himself. See Annabhat Shankarbhat v. Shivappa Dundappa (1928) 52 Bom. 376 and Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji. (1925) 49 Mad. 211

It is clear from the authorities that the liability of the appellant would arise during the lifetime of the father: see Govind v. Sakharam, (1904) 28 Bom. 383 Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji (1918) 43 Bom. 612 and Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad. (1923) L.R 51 I.A 129, s.c 46 All. 95

The next question that arises for consideration is whether the sons have shown that the debt which was incurred by the father by acceptance of the bills in respect of the goods ordered by him was illegal or immoral or avyavaharika. It cannot be said to be illegal or immoral but it is contended on behalf of the appellant that it is avyavaharika. In Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur (1908) 32 Bom. 348 it was held that the son is not to be held liable for the debts which the father ought not, as a decent and respectable man, to have incurred, and that he is answerable for the debts legitimately incurred by his father and not for those attributable to his failings, follies or caprices, and it is contended that as the father increased his business in other lines and also sent orders for goods on his own account in excess of the usual trend of the business in former years in respect of piece-goods, the debts must be attributed to his failings, follies or caprices. The decision is based upon the meaning of the word avyavaharika ( Na Vyavaharikam in the original) in the text of Ushanas referred to in the Mitakshara in the commentary of Yajnavalkya, verse 47, and in Mayukha ch. 5, section 4, pl. 15. The word “na vyavaharikam” was translated in Bhattacharya's Hindu Law as “improper”, which, according to the view of Knight J. in Durbar Khachar's case, (1908) 32 Bom. 348 might perhaps be better rendered as “unusual” or “not sanctioned by low or custom”.

There is a conflict of judicial decisions as to the exact meaning of the word “na vyavaharikam” in Ushanas's text. The case of Durbar Khachar (1908) 32 Bom. 348 was considered by this Court in the subsequent cases of Ramkrishna Trimbak v. Narayan (1915) 40 Bom. 126 and Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji. (1918) 43 Bom. 612 The decision in Durbar Khachar's case (1908) 32 Bom. 348 related to the liability of a son to pay damages on account of tort committed by his father, and the meaning of the word “na vyavaharikam” was rendered by Knight, J. as a debt which the father ought not, as a decent and respectable man, to have incurred, and a debt which was not legitimately incurred by the father and which may be attributable to his failings, follies or caprices. In Ramkrishna Trimbak v. Narayan (1915) 40 Bom. 126 it was held that the sons could not escape liability for payment of the debts of their father contracted in a fishing trade which was started by the father in contravention of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, and the decision in Durbar Khachar's case (1908) 32 Bom. 348 was held to amount to this that the civil penalty imposed by way of damages upon a father for a civil wrong committed by him does not give rise to the moral obligation of the son to discharge his debt, and that immorality or impropriety as between the father and the person with whom he traded is the crucial test in the case. In Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji (1918) 43 Bom. 612 it was held that the decretal debt of the father for breach of a civil duty as a trustee was not avyavaharika.

The decision in the case of Durbar Khachar (1908) 32 Bom. 348 has not met with approval in the decisions of other High Courts, in Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad, (1911) 39 Cal. 862 Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Ghetty, (1912) 37 Mad. 458 and Gursarn Das v. Mohan Lal. (1922) 4 Lah. 93 In Bai Mani v. Usafali, (1930) 33 Bom. L.R 130 at p. 133 I have referred to the conflict of opinion as to the exact meaning of the word “avyavaharika” Page: 51in judicial decisions and also in the commentaries. Avyavaharika ( Na Vyavaharikam in the original) has been translated in Durbar Khachar's case (1908) 32 Bom. 348 by Knight, J. as “unusual” or “not sanctioned by law or custom,” by Mookerjee, J. in Chhakauri's case (1911) 39 Cal. 862 as not “lawful, usual or customary,” and by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in Venugopala's case (1912) 37 Mad. 458 as “not supportable as valid by legal arguments and on which no right could be established in the creditor's favour in a Court of Justice”. There is a similar conflict of opinion in the commentaries and translations. Viramitrodaya and Smriti Chandrika describe it as “incurred for drinking”. Vivadachintamani explains it as “excluded by Vyavahara”. Apararka explains it as not righteous or proper, and Balambhatti as not for the benefit of the family. Mandlik, p. 113, translates it as “not proper”. Mookerjee, J. has referred in Chhakauri's case (1911) 39 Cal. 862 at p. 868 to the version of “Vyavaharika” by Girish Chandra Tarkalankar as “necessary for life”, and by Bohtlingk and Roth, Wilson, and Monier Williams as “connected with or relating to an action at law or legal process, customary or usual”. Colebrooke translates it as “debts for a cause repugnant to good morals”, and Gharpure as “not legal or capable of being recovered by a suit”.

The text of Ushanas is cited in the commentary by Mitakshara on Yajnavalkya's verse 47 which lays down the exception to the general rule regarding the pious obligation to pay the father's debts laid down in Yajnavalkya's verse 50. Verse 47 deals with the exception and lays down that the son should not pay the paternal debt which was contracted for the purposes of spirituous liquor, lust or gambling, or which is due as the balances of an unpaid fine or toll as also a gift without any consideration, and though Mitakshara has referred to the text of Ushanas not as defining the nature of the debt but in support of his argument that a son should Page: 52pay not only the balance of the debt but also the entire amount due on account of a fine or toll, Mayukha in Chapter 5, in Chapter 5, section 4, clause 15, however, deals with the text of Ushanas as laying down the description of the debt which a son is not liable to pay Mayukha, Chapter 5, section 4, pl. 15, first refers to Yajnavalkya's verse 47 referred to above, then refers to the text of Brihaspati that a son shall not be made to pay (a debt incurred by the father) for spirituous liquors, for losses at play, for idle gifts, for promises made under the influence of lust and wrath, or for suretyship, and the balance of a fine or toll, and then refers to the text of Ushanas. In Stokes' Hindu Law, page 123, the text of Ushanas is translated as follows:—

“A fine, or the balance of a fine as also a bribe (or toll, shulka) or the balance of it, are not to be paid by the son, neither shall he discharge debts improper, (not sanctioned, by law or custom).”

Gharpure in his translation of Mitakshara at page 74, and Mayukha page 155 translates it as follows:—

“A son need not pay a fine, or the balance of it, a toll or its balance, and also whatever is not legal or capable of being recovered by a suit.”

This conflict arises from the different meanings of the word “vyavahara” The dictionary meaning of “vyavahara” is, first, “commerce or trade”, second, “usage or custom”, and third, “judicial proceedings, trial or investigation of a case and administration of justice”. The first meaning “commerce or trade” has been accepted by Gautama, in his text (Adhyaya 12, Sutras 38 and 41) in which sons are declared as not liable for the trade debts of the father, but according to the decision in Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji, (1925) 49 Mad. 211 the text of Gautama to the effect that the undivided sons of a Hindu are not liable for their father's commercial debts has long become obsolete, and since Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall. (1874) L.R 1 I.A 321 sons are liable for all debts of their father which are neither illegal nor immoral. See Mayne's Hindu Law, 9th Ed., page 404, and the decision in Page: 53the case of Annabhat Shankarbhat v. Shivappa Dundappa. (1928) 52 Bom. 376 The second meaning of vyavahara “usage or custom” has probably been the basis of the definition accepted by Mookerjee, J. in Chhakauri's case, (1911) 39 Cal. 862 and the third meaning of vyavahara “judicial proceeding or trial or investigation of a case” has been accepted by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in Venugopala's case (1912) 37 Mad. 458 and by Mr. Gharpure in his translation of Vyavahara Mayukha and the Mitakshara.

Though I am prepared to accept the meaning of Knight, J. as “not sanctioned by law or custom”, or of Mookerjee, J. as “not lawful, usual or customary”, or of Sadasiva Ayyar, J. as “not supportable as valid by legal arguments and on which no right could be established in the creditor's favour in a Court of Justice”, I find it difficult to accept the definition of Knight, J. as “unusual” or the wide interpretation put by him in his judgment that it means a debt which the father ought not, as a decent and respectable man, to have incurred, or which can be attributable to his failings, follies or caprices.

The judicial decisions have in many cases accepted the comprehensive terms illegal or immoral as including avyavaharika and laid down that the illegality or immorality must relate to the particular transaction and not to the course of other transactions of the father who has incurred the debt. Though evidence was rightly excluded by the lower Court as to the nature of the other transactions entered into by defendant No. 1 from 1914 to 1919, the learned trial Judge did not in his order, Exhibit 375, exclude the evidence as to the illegality or immorality affecting the transactions mentioned in Exhibit 169, the letter with the accompaniments sent by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff at the time of entering into the transaction of the mortgage in suit. The evidence of the father's immorality or extravagance or profligacy, without any evidence of the connection between the particular Page: 54loan and the immoral expenditure, is not pertinent and relevant. I may refer in this connection to Chintamanrav Mehendale v. Kashinath, (1889) 14 Bom. 320 Bhagbut Pershad v. Mussumat Girja Koer (1888) L.R 15 I.A 99, s.c 15 Cal. 717 and Dattatraya Vishnu v. Vishnu Narayan. (1911) 36 Bom. 68 at p. 73

I am not, therefore, satisfied on the evidence on the record that though defendant No. 1 may have acted recklessly or imprudently in the management of his business, the debts which he incurred in accepting the bills in respect of the goods he had ordered were either illegal or immoral or avyavaharika. The contracts were not gambling or wagering transactions as the goods ordered by defendant No. 1 had arrived in Bombay and were in the custody of the Banks who were pressing defendant No. 1 to pay the amount of the bills accepted by defendant No. 1 to the extent of the value of the goods. There is no element of moral turpitude involved in these transactions. The debt cannot be said to be one “not sanctioned by law or custom”, or “not lawful, or customary”, or one “in which no right could be established in the creditor's favour in a Court of Justice.” The debts incurred by the father were antecedent debts and were dissociated in point of fact as well as in time from the mortgage sued upon, and the appellant would be bound by the mortgage according to the decision of the Privy Council in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad. (1923) L.R 51 I.A 129, s.c 46 All. 95

[After dealing with the points regarding rate of interest and the status of the appellant as agriculturist which are not material for the purposes of this report, his Lordship concluded:]

I would, therefore, dismiss both the appeals with costs subject to the variation as to the compound interest with quarterly rests and allow the claim on the mortgage at 12 per cent, simple interest from the date of the mortgage up to March 22, 1929, and six per cent simple interest from that date till the date of payment.

Cross-objections by defendant No. 1 are dismissed with costs payable to the plaintiff.

The Receiver to continue till he is discharged by the lower Court.

Tyabji, J.:—The substantial question in the appeals is, whether there is such an antecedent debt as will support the mortgage, so far as the interest of the minor defendants, or the surviving minor defendant, in the mortgaged property is concerned.

I address myself to the question—adopting the language of the 2nd and 3rd propositions laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad, (1923) L.R 51 I.A 129, s.c 46 All. 95—whether the mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, incurred by the father, not for an immoral purpose. This question involves the consideration, in view of the arguments addressed to us, of, first, whether there was an antecedent debt, and, secondly, whether that debt was “immoral,” or, to use the language of the texts, avyavaharika.

The effort to argue that there was no debt was desperate, as there were bills of exchange accepted by the first defendant on which he could have been summarily sued. There were documents of title relating to goods in the possession of the Banks to whom the debts were due, securing them to the extent of the price that may be obtained by the sale of the goods. This fact was relied upon as making some difference. The answer is plain: The security possessed by the Banks made their position similar to that of mortgagees, without the trammels usually placed on mortgagees, who wish to sell the mortgaged property, or to proceed against the mortgagor personally without selling the mortgaged property.

The real contest, however, lay on the debatable ground as to the meaning of the word avyavaharika, as applied to debts.

The word appears in a text of Usanas, cited in the Mitakshara, in the course of the comment on the 47th verse of Yajnavalkya Smriti. That verse deals with those debts which need not be paid by the sons. The substantive provision that debts should be paid by sons is contained in verse 50 of Yajnavalkya. Mr. Gharpure's translation of the Mitakshara (p. 73) is as follows:—

“(Yajnavalkya Verse 47:—) The son should not pay the paternal debt which was contracted for the purposes of spirituous liquor, lust or gambling, or which is due as the balance of an unpaid fine or toll as also a gift without any consideration.”

The comment of the Mitakshara consists, first, of an explanation of the phrase “debt which was contracted for drinking spirituous liquor,” secondly of glosses on the terms “lust,” “gamblings,” “idle gifts,” and finally it is said that from the use of the word “balance” by Yajnavalkya—“a balance of an unpaid fine or toll,”—it should not be supposed that the entire amount is to be paid.

And, apparently in this last connection, the Mitakshara continues: “As Ausanasa has said: ‘A son should not pay a fine or the balance of it, the (amount of the) toll or its balance, and also whatever is not legal or capable of being recovered by a suit (avyavaharika).’” The commentary proceeds to cite a dictum of Gautama covering the whole ground of Yajnavalkya's 47th verse, and then concludes: “By this (text) a debt which should not be paid has been mentioned.”

On the other hand, in the Mayukha, as translated by Mandlik, pp. 112, 113, the subject is introduced by two statements of the general rule:—

(1) “Brihaspati says:—‘The sons should pay the debt of their father when proved, as [though it were] their own;…”

(2) Yajnavalkya [ch. ii, v. 50]:—“When the father is … immersed in difficulties, his debt, proved by witnesses if disputed, should be paid by the son and the grandson.”

Thirdly, follows an exception to the general rule which is subdivided under three heads: (a) “Yajnavalkya [ch. ii, v. 47]: The son shall not pay the paternal [debts] Page: 57contracted for wines, lust and gambling, or due on account of the unpaid [portion] of a fine or a toll, or [on account of] an idle promise.” (b) A citation from Brihaspati adds to the excepted debts those made under the influence of anger and suretyship: and (c) “Usanas [says]:—The son need not pay the fine, or the balance of a fine, a toll or the balance of a toll, or [any debt of the father] which is not proper” (avyavaharika).

Therefore, according to the Mayukha, it would appear that a “debt which is ‘avyavaharika’” is added as an exception to the rule that sons (and grandsons) should pay the debts of their fathers (and grandfathers),—an exception standing on the same footing as the exception relating to “debts contracted for wine, lust, gambling etc.,” and to “debts made under the influence of anger and for suretyship.”

It is interesting to compare with this the statement of the law made seventy-five years ago, by their Lordships of the Privy Council, their attention being then divided between the nature of the property affected and of the debt: “Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was not the duty of the son to pay it, the discharge of it, even though it affected ancestral estate, would still be an act of pious duty in the son. By the Hindoo law, the freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the father's debt, has respect to the nature of the debt, and not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt”: Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree. (1856) 6 Moo. I.A 393 at p. 421

The meaning to be assigned to the word avyavaharika or to its contrary, ‘vyavaharika’ has been the subject of frequent consideration. The meanings given in Apte's Sanskrit Dictionary are as follows:—

“Vyavaharika—1. Relating to business. 2. Engaged in business, practical. 3. Judicial, legal. 4. Litigant. 5. Usual, customary.

“Vyavahara—1. Conduct, behaviour, action. 2. Affair, business, work. 3. Profession, occupation. 4. Dealing, transaction. 6. Commerce, trade, traffic. 6. Dealing in money, usury. 7. Usage, custom, an established rule or practice. 8. Relation, connection. 9. Judicial procedure, trial or investigation of a case, administration of justice. 10. A legal dispute, complaint, suit, law-suit, litigation. 11. A title of legal procedure, any occasion of litigation.”

The Vyavakara Mayukha as translated by Mandlik, contains the following definition:—

“Vyavahara, [or] a judicial proceeding, is a transaction which inculcates [the rules] whereby the determination of [the party who has committed] the unrecognized wrong [as] between the disputing parties is made known.”

Other translations of the word avyavaharika are as follows:—

—unusual, or not sanctioned by law or custom: Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur. (1908) 32 Bom. 348

—not necessary for life: Girish Chandra Tarkalankar.

—not connected with or relating to an action at law or legal process, not customary, not usual: Bohtlingk and Roth, Wilson and Monier Williams.

—which is not proper: Mandlik.

—improper (that is not sanctioned by law or custom): Jogendra Nath Bhattacharyya, p. 247.

—not lawful, usual or customary: Ashutosh Mookerjee, J. in Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad. (1911) 39 Cal. 862

—nor any debt for a cause repugnant to good morals: Colebrooke, Vol. I, p. 214.

—not supportable as valid by legal arguments and on which no right could be established in the creditor's favour in a Court of justice: Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chetty. (1912) 37 Mad. 458

—not righteous or proper: (Commentary Apararka), Bai Mani v. Usafali. (1930) 33 Bom. L.R 130 at p. 133

—not for the benefit of the family: Balambhatti.

—not legal, or capable of being recovered by a suit: Gharpure, p. 74.

But even if the widest effect be given to the word avyavaharika, it is difficult to see how, or on what principle, the debts due by the first defendant to the Banks can be excepted from those which a son's pious duty makes it incumbent on him to discharge. The debts in question before us consisted of a great number of items, each separate in itself, each covered by an accepted bill of exchange; in connection with each of these debts, one of the great and reputed Banks of Bombay held the documents of title relating to certain goods; each debt was contracted to pay the price of those goods. On what basis could the sons have contended against the Banks that good morals forbade the son to acknowledge the validity of these debts? What was there reprehensible about them? In what way were they avyavaharika,—assuming that we are to judge by a high standard of morality?

That the transactions were at all blameworthy on the part of the first defend ant was not conceded by the learned District Judge. I am inclined to think that, for the purposes of argument, the incurring of these debts may be conceded to be such conduct careful and prudent merchant would not have entered into; though, as it has been pointed out, it is easy to be wise after the event, and the times when these losses occurred were very exceptional. I will, nevertheless, assume that the transactions were blameworthy, on the ground that the first defendant should have been more moderate in the extent of his dealings, that he should not have dabbled in so many different kinds of transactions and should have borne in mind that they might result in losses, though he hoped that they would bring gain. Still, it must not be overlooked, that each individual item, taken by itself, was free from any such criticism. Each item referred to a comparatively moderate quantity of goods. Supposing the individual creditors had sought relief, appealing to the pious duty owed as Hindu sons, could the sons have said to each of them in turn:

“True, your own individual claim is based on an ordinary commercial transaction. But we find that our father entered into a very large number of such transactions. It is also true that you could not have known of the other transactions. But the whole body of transactions, taken in the bulk, became avyavaharika, and our moral sense being shocked, we are absolved from paying the debts relating to these transactions?”

We here reach a point where a distinction emerges that has somewhat disturbed me. Is a debt to be considered avyavaharika on the basis of the conduct of the father when he made himself liable to it? Or the conduct of the creditor when he comes forward to enforce it? Or are both persons and times to be considered? Or is the test to be the piety of the act on the part of the son in discharging the father's liabilities? If the last, then the fact that the father became liable to the debt because he followed a reprehensible course of conduct may not settle the matter. The question may become, whether the transaction was of such a tainted character that the Court will have nothing to do with the enforcement of agreements entered into, or liabilities incurred, for the purpose of carrying it through; that no respectable creditor would seek to enforce those agreements; that no respectable and dutiful son would feel it a duty to discharge the liabilities arising out of those agreements. Such are debts that arise out of illegal and immoral transactions, in which the conduct of the creditor no less than the debtor is immoral. But such are not the liabilities incurred by the father when, for instance, he culpably inflicts a loss upon an innocent person; loss, for which, on principles of good morals, a pious son would feel it his duty to compensate the sufferer. I have referred to this doubt, but as I have already said, the present case does not depend upon its solution. Our decision can be on the broad lines I have already mentioned.

It seems to me, that, however extensive a meaning be given to the word avyavaharika, these debts do not fall within that meaning.

[After dealing with the points regarding rate of interest and the status of the appellant as agriculturist which are not material for the purposes of this report, his Lordship concluded:]

I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs, subject to the variations mentioned by my learned brother.

Decree confirmed.
J.G.R