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Madhusudan Prasad Gupta v. State Of M.P .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal is by the accused-appellant, Madhusudan Prasad Gupta, against conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge (Additional Sessions Judge), Shivpuri, in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1977. The accused was convicted under Section 161, Indian Penal Code, and under Sections 5(1)(a) & (b) read with Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment for each offence with a fine of Rs. 100/-, default to further rigorous imprisonment for three months; substantive sentences were to run concurrently and jail custody already undergone was to be deducted.
The prosecution case: several labourers (including Pyarelal, Ramcharan and Gaganlal) working on road in the National Park, Shivpuri, complained that the accused (time-keeper) demanded Rs. 5 each per month from them as bribe and that they had collected Rs. 50 for that purpose. On 3/9/1976 the complaint was marked to police, money notes were produced and a trap was arranged by D.S.P. R.S. Margekar. On 4/9/1976 Pyarelal signalled after giving the notes to the accused inside his house; Margekar with other officers entered, disclosed identity, searched and allegedly recovered the notes from the accused's pant pocket and arrested him. Sanction for prosecution was obtained from the Executive Engineer (Ex. P. 17) on 4/1/1977 and the case was challaned.
The accused denied guilt and contended that the complainants stole wood from the National Park and had ill-will against him for having complained against them. After trial the accused was convicted and sentenced; this appeal followed to the court hearing the opinion summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a valid sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act was granted by the Sanctioning Authority in accordance with law.
- Whether the prosecution proved that the accused habitually accepted or obtained illegal gratification so as to attract Section 5(1)(a) & (b) read with Section 2 of the Act.
- Whether the alleged recovery of the bribe-notes from the person of the accused was proved by reliable, cogent and unshaken evidence.
- Whether the conviction under Section 161 IPC and/or Section 5(1)(a) & (b) read with Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act could be sustained on the evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- There is no valid sanction for prosecution (i.e., the sanction is vitiated).
- Habitual acceptance and/or obtaining of illegal gratification by the accused is not proved.
- There is no reliable evidence regarding the alleged recovery of the notes from the accused's person.
- There is no reliable and cogent evidence to sustain conviction under Section 161 IPC or under Section 5(1)(a) & (b) read with Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Respondent / State's Arguments
- The State (through learned Panel Lawyer Shri Mahi Pal Singh Bhadoria) submitted that the appellant's contentions lack force and that the conviction and sentence should be maintained.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P., (1979) 4 SCC 172 : AIR 1979 SC 677 (1979 Cri LJ 633) | Requirement that prosecution must prove that a valid sanction was granted by the sanctioning authority after it applied its mind to the facts; sanction must either be produced in original showing facts and grounds of satisfaction or be proved by evidence aliunde showing facts placed before the authority and the satisfaction arrived at. | The court invoked the principles in this decision to examine the legality of Ex. P. 17 (the sanction). The court held that the sanction's validity was seriously undermined because the sanctioning authority admitted he acted on oral narration and a police letter only, indicating the 'satisfaction' was illusory rather than the product of applying a judicious mind. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) validity of the sanction and (B) sufficiency and reliability of evidence to establish the statutory offences.
A. Validity of Sanction
- The court applied the principle from Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (supra) that sanction must be shown to have been granted after the sanctioning authority applied its mind to the facts; proof may be by production of original sanction containing facts and reasons, or by evidence aliunde demonstrating facts and satisfaction.
- The sanctioning authority in this case, K.D. Kathuria (P.W. 4), gave evidence that he granted a sanction (Ex. P. 17) on the basis of an oral narration by a police officer (whose name he could not state) and a letter from the Superintendent of Police (Ex. D. 7); no other documents were placed before him.
- The court found that the factual part of Ex. P. 17 closely paraphrased the police letter and that the authority's testimony showed the 'satisfaction' recorded in the sanction was not the product of an independent application of mind but appeared mechanical or 'illusory'.
- The court rejected the State's submission that a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act should be drawn in favour of regularity, holding that such a presumption did not arise where evidence affirmatively showed the sanctioning authority relied solely on oral information and the police letter.
- On this basis the court concluded that Ex. P. 17 could not be regarded as a valid sanction under the principles laid down in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed's case.
B. Sufficiency and Reliability of Evidence on Guilt
- Even assuming, arguendo, that the sanction were valid, the court examined whether evidence established the ingredients of criminal misconduct under Section 5(1)(a) & (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 IPC.
- To prove 'habitually accepts or obtains illegal gratification' (Section 5(1)(a)/(b)), the prosecution relied on testimony that for the two months prior to the occurrence Pyarelal collected Rs. 5 from several persons and added his own Rs. 5 generating Rs. 50. The court noted contradictions and gaps: the Range Officer (P.W. 6) denied receiving such a complaint, and there was no reliable evidence that the collected money had actually been paid to the accused. The court held that the 'habitual' ingredient was not duly proved.
- On the pivotal issue of the recovery of notes from the accused's person, the court identified material infirmities:
- Testimony indicated the Search Officer (R.S. Margekar) may not have given and taken search in the presence of witnesses before entering the accused's house, undermining assurance that he was empty‑handed.
- Discrepancies existed about who entered the house at the time of the alleged recovery: Pyarelal said he entered with Gaganlal and Ramcharan, whereas Ramcharan and Gaganlal said they remained outside; these contradictions impaired the credibility of the recovery account.
- There was also inconsistency about where seizure memos were prepared: the seizure-memo testimony of Margekar conflicted with Govind Singh's (P.W. 9) statement that seizure memos were drawn up at the police kotwali rather than on the spot.
- The court concluded that the circumstances permitted the possibility of planting of the notes and that the recovery was shrouded in suspicion; the evidence did not constitute reliable and cogent proof of acceptance or recovery of illegal gratification.
- Finally, the court observed a plausible motive for false implication: the complainants had been engaged in clandestine removal of wood from the National Park and had ill-will against the accused for objecting to that conduct (admitted in the depositions). This supported the finding that the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the accused-appellant are set aside and he is acquitted.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the accused's conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Judge are overturned and the accused is acquitted.
- The court ordered that the disposal of the seized notes (Arts. 2 to 10) be carried out in accordance with paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment (as directed therein).
- The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles (notably Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed on the requirements for valid sanction); no broader novel legal rule was announced in the text of this opinion.
Note: This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning contained in the provided opinion.
1. This is an appeal by the accused-appellant against his conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge (Additional Sessions Judge), Shivpuri, in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1977 under Section 161, I.P.C and S. 5(1)(a) & (b) read with S. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), sentencing him to one year's rigorous imprisonment in respect of each of the aforesaid offences and imposing a fine of Rs. 100/- only, in default of payment of which three months' rigorous imprisonment is to be undergone. The Prosecution case, briefly stated, is as under:—
2. Pyarelal (P.W 1), Ramcharan (P.W 2), Gaganlal (P.W 7), Chatura, Gulla, Rammu, Angad and others used to work as labourers on road in the National Park, Shivpuri. At the relevant time, accused-appellant Madhusudan Prasad Gupta was time-keeper in the said National Park. Accused was sent on deputation to the aforesaid post vide order (Ex. P. 4) dated 14/3/1965 from the post of Time-keeper in Pichhore Sub-Division in P.W.D (Block No. 1), Pichhore to the aforesaid post in the Forest Department by orders of the then Executive Engineer, Shri S.M Shrivastava, Pyarelal (P.W 1), Ramcharan (P.W 2), Gaganlal (P.W 7) along with certain other persons approached Shri Atul Sinha, Collector and District Magistrate, Shivpuri (P.W 3), with a complaint (Ex. P1) which was signed by Pyarelal, Ramcharan, Gaganlal and others against the accused-appellant Madhusudan Prasad Gupta to the effect that he takes from each one of them by way of bribe Rs. 5/- per month on the threat of either not taking them on work or marking them absent for 2-3 days. In the said complaint, it was also stated that they have collected Rs. 50/- for being given as bribe to the accused-appellant. On receipt of this complaint, the District Magistrate, Shivpuri, marked it to the Superintendent of Police, Shivpuri. On 3/9/1976 with the endorsement (‘C to ‘C’) “for necessary action. I have signed nine notes of denominations 10/- 5/- 2/- and 1/- given to complainant.”
3. On being approached, Shri J.C Johri, D.S.P (H.Q) Shivpuri (P.W 8) marked the application to Shri R.S Margekar (P.W 10), D.S.P (Administrative) with the following endorsement:
“Please take necessary legal action” Thereafter, Pyarelal and other persons approached R.S Margekar (P.W 10) and presented the application (Ex. 1) to him and handed over three notes of Rs. 10/- each three notes of Rs. 5/- each; two notes of Rs. 2/- each and one note of Re. 1/-, bearing the following numbers:—
Notes of Rs. 10/-
1) No. G/78-676282
2) No. G/78-786824
3) No. G/78-676229
Notes of Rs. 5/-
1) No. C/13-062536
2) No. C/71-589197
3) No. C/71-691395
Notes of Rs. 2/-
1) No. T/36-409704
2) No. W/30-519619
Note of Re. 1/-.
1) No. K/38-898119 G.
seizure memo was prepared at 10.00 hours on 3/9/1976, which is Ex. P. 2 by Shri R.S Margekar (P.W 10). He directed Pyarelal and the aforesaid persons to contact him at 8 A.M on 4/9/1976. Thereafter, at 8 A.M on 4/9/1976, Pyarelal, Gaganlal, Ramcharan contacted R.S Margekar (P.W 10) and told him that their other colleagues having gone on their work have not come-Pyarelal informed him that the accused-appellant was at that time at his residence. Thereupon. R.S Margekar (P.W 10) handed over the aforesaid notes bearing signatures of the Dist. Magistrate, Shivpuri dated 3/9/1976 to Pyarelal and asked him Page: 573to raise his hand after the aforesaid money was given by him and accepted by the accused-appellant. He further told him that they will be waiting in the lane outside the house of the accused. Accordingly, Pyarelal went inside the house of the accused-appellant and gave the aforesaid signal by raising hand after the said notes were handed over by him to the accused-appellant by way of bribe. On signal being given by Pyarelal. R.S Margekar (P.W 10), in presence of Govind Singh (P.W 9), and Kamarlal went inside the house of the accused and disclosed his identity. After giving his and taking witnesses' search, Shri Margekar took search of the accused-appellant and recovered the aforesaid notes from right side pocket of his pant (Art. P. 1), which the accused-appellant was putting on at that time. Seizure memo (Ex. P. 13) was prepared by Shri R.S Margekar (P.W 10). The room where the accused was sitting and wherefrom the notes were recovered, as stated above, is shown at serial No. 3 in the spot map. The accused was arrested on the spot vide arrest memo (Ex. P. 13). Thereafter, after obtaining sanction (Ex. P. 17) from the Executive Engineer, P.W.D (B & R), Shivpuri, which was sent to the Police vide Ex. P. 18 vide letter No. 84 dated 4/1/1977, the case was challaned vide Ex. P. 16 in the court of special Judge (Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri).
4. The accused-appellant abjured his guilt and took the plea that Pyarelal, Ramcharan, Gaganlal and other used to cut and take away wood from the National Park. The Accused-appellant had complained against them in that behalf. Accordingly, they had harboured ill-will against him and on that account they have falsely implicated him in the case.
5. After trial, learned Special Judge has convicted the accused-appellant under Section 161, I.P.C and S. 5(1)(a) & (b) read with S. 2 of the Act, and sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment for each of the offences and imposed a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default whereof he was to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Substantive sentences have been directed to run concurrently and the period in which the accused remained in judicial custody has been directed to be deducted from the aforesaid sentence. Aggrieved by this conviction and sentence, the accused-appellant has preferred this appeal.
6. In this appeal. Shri N.P Mittal, learned counsel for the accused-appellant, contended that (i) there is no valid sanction; (ii) that habitual acceptance and/or obtaining of illegal gratification is not proved; (iii) that there is no reliable evidence regarding the alleged recovery of the notes from the person of the accused-appellant; and (iv) that there is no reliable and cogent evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant either under Sec. 161, I.P.C or under Section 5(1)(a) & (b) read with S. 2 of the Act.
7. Shri Mahi Pal Singh Bhadoria, learned Panel Lawyer for the State, submitted that none of the aforesaid contentions has any force and that the conviction and sentence deserve to be maintained.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the Parties, I have come to the conclusion that the appeal deserves to be allowed.
9. In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P, (1979) 4 SCC 172 : AIR 1979 SC 677 : (1979 Cri LJ 633) it has been held that—
“It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. Any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. What the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same; any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the grant of sanction is wholly irrelevant. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which afford a protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned”.
(Emphasis supplied by me).
10. Now, I proceed to examine the present case in the light of the aforesaid principles. In the instant case, K.D Kathuria (P.W 4) is the Sanctioning Authority. He was Executive Engineer at the relevant time. He has granted Sanction (Ex. P. 17) dated 4/1/77, which reads as under:—
11. The aforesaid sanction consists of two parts, viz. (i) narration of facts; and, (ii) expression of satisfaction. Now satisfaction of the Sanctioning Authority is not expected to be illusory, but is expected to be outcome of application of judicious mind. At an earlier occasion when approached by the Investigating agency Shri K.D Kathuria (P.W 4) had granted sanction evinced by Ex. D. 6 on 6/12/1976 which neither contained statement of facts constituting the offences nor contained any ground for ‘satisfaction’. Accordingly, Page: 575the investigating agency approached him again for grant of sanction. The sanction which he granted for the second time is Ex. P. 17, reproduced above. In his cross-examination (para 4) of his deposition, K.D Kathuria (P.W 4) has stated that the facts relating to the case were orally stated by some Police Officer whose name he is unable to state. It was on the basis of that oral narration of facts and on the basis of letter of the Police No. B/5085 dated 5/11/76 (Ex. D. 7) sent by the Superintendent of Police, Shivpuri, that had granted the aforesaid ‘sanction’. He has further clearly admitted that except Ex. D. 7 and the aforesaid oral information no other documents were placed before him at the time when he accorded the ‘sanction’ (Ex. P. 17). No doubt, it is true that it is open to the prosecution to adopt any of the methods laid down by the Supreme Court, in order to prove that a valid sanction has been granted in the matter by the Sanctioning Authority. But, in the instant case, it appears that the prosecution has resorted to both the methods to prove grant of the valid sanction in the matter, inasmuch as the prosecution did not feel satisfied with production of the Sanction (Ex. P. 17), but also produced evidence Aliunde by examining the sanctioning Authority, K.D Kathuria as P.W 4. Accordingly, if from the aforesaid facts brought out in the cross-examination of K.D Kathuria (P.W 4), it appears that the act of grant of the sanction was considered by him to be mere an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise and not a solemn and sacrosanct act, the prosecution cannot escape the consequences flowing from leading such evidence. As such, the satisfaction appears to be wholly ‘illusory’ and expression with regard to the ‘satisfaction’ contained in Ex. P. 17 appears to be merely mechanical, more so, because the factual part of Ex. P. 17 is virtually paraphrase of the letter of the Superintendent of Police (Ex. D. 7). Thus the validity of the sanction (Ex. P. 17) stands considerably shaken, rather destroyed by the testimony of the Sanctioning Authority K.D Kathuria (P.W 4) himself.
12. At this stage Shri Mahi Pal Bhadoria, Panel Lawyer for the State tried to persuade this court to raise a presumption of the regularity in the matter of grant of sanction with the aid of Section 114, Evidence Act, read with its Illustration (e). In the first place, there is no question of such presumption being available to the Sanctioning Authority because at that stage the occasion for drawing a presumption never arises since there is no case in the Court. Secondly, no such presumption can be available in view of the facts stated by K.D Kathuria (P.W 4) in para 4 of his statement, as stated above. Accordingly, the sanction (Ex. P. 17) cannot be regarded to be a ‘valid sanction’ according to the principles laid down in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed's case (1979 Cri LJ 633) (SC) (supra).
13. Even otherwise, if the sanction (Ex. 17) be assumed to be ‘a valid sanction’ on merits, the conviction of the accused-appellant cannot be sustained in view of the following considerations as will be clear from the discussion of the evidence led by the prosecution in the case. In order to constitute an offence of ‘criminal misconduct’ falling within Section 5(1)(a) & (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, inter alia, it has to be proved that the accused ‘habitually accepts or obtains any illegal gratification, other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as mentioned in Sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The word ‘habitually’ means ‘usually’ ‘generally’ or ‘according to custom’. It does not refer to the frequency of occasions but rather to the invariability of practice. Accordingly, the word ‘habitually (occurring in Section 5(1)(a) & (b) of the Act) has to be regarded not to refer an isolated act of ‘criminal misconduct’ but to ‘indicate’ persistency in doing the acts of accepting or obtaining of illegal gratification. In order to prove this ingredient of the offence the prosecution has led evidence to the effect that for the last two months Pyarelal (P.W 1) used to collect Rs. 5/- each from Ramcharan (P.W 2), Gaganlal (P.W 7) and seven other persons and used to add his own Rs. 5/- and given total Rs. 50/- for two months preceding the occurrence. It has been admitted by Pyarelal (P.W 1) in para 6 of his statement that merely oral complaint was made of the aforesaid fact to the Range Officer. However, the Range Officer, Mahesh Prakash Sharma as P.W 6 has stated in his cross-examination that no such complaint was ever made to him by Pyarelal (P.W 1) or any one of these persons. It may be that after collecting money from 9 other persons Pyarelal (P.W 1) might have pocketed it himself. There is no evidence worth reliance to the effect that the money so collected was paid to the accused, applicant. Page: 576Thus, one of the essential ingredients, namely, ‘habitually accepts or obtains illegal gratification’ is not duly proved.
14. Even if all the facts preceding the, actual laying of the trap are regarded to be proved by legal evidence, the point which is pivotal in the case is: proof of acceptance of illegal gratification by and recovery of Notes (Arts. 2 to 10) from the accused-appellant. Nothing substantial turns on the facts that (i) Pyarelal (P.W 1) and others approached the District Magistrate, Shivpuri, with complaint (Ex. P. 1) dated 3/9/1976; and that (ii) the Distt. Magistrate put an endorsement ‘C’ to ‘C’ directing the Superintendent of Police, Shivpuri, to take necessary action; and that (iii) the D.S.P (H.Q) who was acting (as) SP, in turn directed them to D.S.P (Adm.) R.S Margekar (P.W 10). On the crucial question with regard to the alleged recovery of the notes from the pant which the accused-appellant was putting on, it is stated by Govind Singh (P.W 9) in para 3 of his deposition that when the Search Officer R.S Margekar (P.W 10) entered the house of the accused he had not given his search and taken search of the witnesses before entering the house. The actual words are:—
15. Pyarelal as P.W 1 has also stated likewise in para 9 of his deposition. R.S Margekar (P.W 10) D.S.P, of course, states to the effect that he had given and taken search, but his testimony appears to be an outcome of an urge to see that the trap laid by him succeeds. From the evidence afforded by Pyarelal (P.W 1) and Govind Singh (P.W 9) it is clear that the Search Officer did not convince the witnesses that he was empty handed. Accordingly, the possibility of planting of the notes (Arts. 2 to 10) cannot be ruled out. As such, the recovery of the Notes from the person of the accused-appellant appears to be shrouded by a cloud of suspicion and the factum of recovery is shaken, more so, because the evidence led by the prosecution on the point as to who entered the house of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged recovery is also materially discrepant. Pyarelal (P.W 1) in para 8 states that Gaganlal (P.W 7) and Ramcharan (P.W 2) entered the house of the accused-appellant with him, whereas Ramcharan (P.W 2) in para 5 states that Gaganlal (P.W 7) and he did not enter into the house of the Accused-appellant at the aforesaid time. Gaganlal (P.W 7) in para 3 also states that he remained outside. Thus the testimony of Pyarelal (P.W 1) stands contradicted by the evidence afforded by Ramcharan (P.W 2) and Gaganlal (P.W 7). Furthermore, R.S Margekar (P.W 10) in para 3 of his deposition states that seizure memo regarding the Notes (Arts. 2 to 10) and seizure memo-regarding the pant (Ex. P. 12) were prepared on the spot whereas Govindsingh (P.W 9) does not support it on the point and contradicts by stating in para 3 of his deposition that seizure memos Ex. P. 11 and P.W 12 were drawn up in Police Kotwali., Thus the factum of recovery of the Notes (Arts. 2 to 10) from the person of the accused-appellant is not proved by reliable and cogent or legal evidence. It appears that Pyarelal (P.W 1), Ramcharan (P.W 2) Gaganlal (P.W 7) and seven other complainants used to take away wood from the National Park forest clandestinely, and the accused-appellant used to object in their doing so. This fact has been admitted by Pyarelal (P.W 1) in para 10 of his deposition and by Ramcharan (P.W 2) in para 6 and Gaganlal (P.W 7) in para 5. It appears that feeling annoyed by this conduct of the accused-appellant, the complainant party has contrived to implicate him falsely in this case. Thus the guilt has not been brought home to the accused-appellant by evidence worthy of credence. The ingredients of offence punishable under Sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and/or that punishable untfer Sec. 5(1)(a) & (b) of the Act have not been established in the case. Accordingly, the finding of guilt of the accused-appellant recorded by the Courts below cannot be sustained. In view of the aforesaid discussion the appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the accused-appellant are hereby set aside and he is acquitted. The disposal of the Notes (Arts. 2 to 10), will be as per directions contained in para 18 of the impugned judgment.
16. Appeal allowed.
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