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Suraj Karan v. Nazim Aii Mirza And Others
Judgment Summary — Manohar Pershad, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was brought by Suraj Karan (creditor) against two orders of the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board dated 16 October 1954 and 11 April 1955 which rejected his claim as time-barred and refused reconsideration.
Relevant facts (from the opinion):
- On 11 February 1952, Kazim Ali Mirza (respondent 1), a jagirdar, filed a Form I listing six creditors; Suraj Karan was not named.
- On 23 February 1953, Kazim Ali Mirza and his wife Khairunnissa (respondent 2) filed a second Form I adding one creditor; Suraj Karan was not named in that form either. The general notifications under section 21(5) were issued for the Form I dated 11 February 1952 but not for the Form I dated 23 February 1953.
- Pursuant to notifications, Suraj Karan filed Form III on 27 October 1953 for settlement of a debt of Rs. 40,000 based on a City Civil Court decree dated 22 October 1953. The Board rejected that Form III on 9 December 1953 as time-barred.
- No action was taken by Suraj Karan against the Board's rejection of Form III at that time.
- On 3 September 1954, two separate Forms II were filed by respondents 1 and 2 seeking settlement of debts relating to Suraj Karan (i.e., a compromise/settlement). The Board by majority rejected these Forms II on 16 October 1954 on the ground that Suraj Karan's claim, once held time-barred, could not be revived by compromise under sections 15 or 16 of the Act. A third member dissented on 1 March 1955, finding Form II within time.
- A subsequent Board order of 11 April 1955 rejected a challenge that no notice under section 21(b) on the joint names of the debtors was issued. The appellant also challenged this order in the present appeal.
- Before this Court, respondents 1 and 2 filed petitions admitting Suraj Karan's claim and requested allowance of the appeal, but contended the claim was nonetheless time-barred. The third respondent contested the claim.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an application under section 15 (recording a settlement/compromise) of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act is independent of an application under section 11 (settlement of debts by application) or whether section 15 depends on a pending section 11 petition.
- Whether an application under section 15 must be made on or before the government-notified date (the date prescribed under section 11) or whether it must only be filed within thirty days of the settlement as provided by section 15.
- Whether Form II filed on 3 September 1954 (stating a settlement dated 3 September 1954) was timely and properly filed under section 15, notwithstanding an earlier Form III (rejected as time-barred).
- Whether a creditor's earlier failure to challenge an order (the rejection of Form III dated 9 December 1953) bars subsequent proceedings under section 15.
- Whether the absence of a publication/notification under section 21(b) in respect of the joint Form I (filed by Kazim Ali Mirza and Khairunnissa) prevents an order being made against the creditor Suraj Karan on that basis.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Suraj Karan) — principal contentions (as presented by Sri Bhargava)
- Under sections 21(a) and (b) a notification was necessary; the notification issued related only to the debt of Kazim Ali Mirza and not to the joint debt of Kazim Ali Mirza and his wife, so there was no limitation effect against the appellant in respect of the joint debt.
- The majority view of the Board — that once the creditor's claim was held time-barred it could not be re-opened by compromise (Form II) — was erroneous because a petition under section 15 is independent of section 11.
- Form II (filed by debtors on 3 September 1954) was within thirty days of the settlement and therefore valid under section 15.
Respondents (represented by Sri Shanker Rao, Sri Vishnu Rao, Sri Shanker Rao Sarangpurkar)
- The Board correctly held that Suraj Karan's claim, once rejected as time-barred, could not be revived on the basis of a compromise (i.e., Form II could not restore a claim already declared time-barred).
- No action could be taken on Form II where the claim had already been declared time-barred by the Board.
- Further, it was argued that because the appellant did not take action to challenge the Board's earlier order of 9 December 1953 dismissing Form III, that order had become final and barred subsequent relief.
- Respondents 1 and 2 also contended that, even if they filed petitions admitting the claim in this Court, such admission would not affect the question of limitation (i.e., would not make the claim within time).
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a statutory analysis focusing on the interplay between the relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act — principally sections 11, 15, 21 and 22 — and on the procedural facts of the case.
Step-by-step reasoning (as set out by the Court):
-
The Court set out the statutory framework:
- Section 11: jurisdiction to the Board for settlement proceedings on or before a government-notified date; applications by debtor or creditor; prescribed form and contents.
- Section 21: after an application under section 11, the Board must give notice to the debtor and creditors and publish a general notice (section 21(a) and (b)); statements must be filed within one month (subject to extension).
- Section 22: extinction of debts if no application is made under section 11 within the specified period, or if no application under section 15 within its specified period (30 days), or where required statements are not submitted.
- Section 15: provides for recording a settlement reached between debtor and creditor(s) and requires an application within thirty days of the settlement; the Board must give notice and may record the settlement if bona fide and voluntary; once recorded and certified the settlement is binding and generally not reopenable; clause (5) of section 15 treats certain recorded settlements as if they were section 11 applications where other debts are discovered.
- The Court also referenced provisions governing accounts, awards and execution (sections 23, 24, 25, 27–31, 35–36, 41–42, 47) for context as to the Board's overall procedures.
-
On the principal statutory question — independence of sections 11 and 15 — the Court analysed both text and purpose:
- The Court observed that sections 11 and 15 provide different modes of procedure: section 11 for initiating a general settlement process (with the requirement of general notification under section 21), and section 15 for recording an agreed settlement/compromise reached by the parties.
- Clause (5) of section 15 (which treats a section 15 application as a section 11 application in specified circumstances) demonstrated that section 15 is not dependent on section 11; if section 15 were dependent, clause (5) would be unnecessary.
- Further, section 15 itself requires a notice to parties under clause (3) and mandates calling upon the debtor under clause (4), which would be redundant if section 15 required a pre-existing section 11 petition.
- Conclusion: section 15 is independent of section 11; an application under section 15 may be made even if no section 11 petition is pending.
-
On limitation and timing:
- The Court contrasted the distinct time limits: section 11 applications must be made on or before the government-notified date (the Court noted 30 June 1953 was the notified date), while section 15 applications must be made within thirty days of the settlement.
- Section 22's operation — extinguishing debts where no application is made under the relevant provision within its specified period — reinforced that section 15 has its own 30-day limitation and was not intended to fall under the notified-date requirement of section 11.
- Conclusion: an application under section 15 must be filed within 30 days of the settlement, not on or before the notified date applicable to section 11 applications.
-
Application of these legal conclusions to the facts:
- Form II dated 3 September 1954 stated the date of the settlement as 3 September 1954. The Court found that the Form II was therefore proper and filed within the 30-day requirement of section 15.
- The Board's majority had rejected Form II on the ground that an earlier Form III by Suraj Karan had been dismissed as time-barred and that thereafter Form II could not revive the claim. The Court rejected this reasoning: because section 15 proceedings are independent, a prior rejection under section 11 (Form III) does not preclude the parties from arriving at a settlement and applying under section 15 within the statutory 30 days.
- The Court emphasized it was unnecessary for the debtor to enter into a compromise simultaneously with all other creditors for section 15 to apply — the statute allows any debtor and any or all creditors to arrive at a settlement and apply within 30 days.
-
On the contention that the appellant's failure to challenge the 9 December 1953 order made that order final and barred further relief:
- The Court held this contention had no force in the circumstances because Form III (section 11 type proceedings) are independent of Form II (section 15 proceedings). Given the independence and the fact that debtors (respondents) had abandoned a limitation plea in subsequent steps, the earlier order did not stand as a bar to the proceedings under section 15.
-
On the point concerning lack of section 21(b) notification for the joint Form I (filed by Kazim Ali Mirza and Khairunnissa):
- The Court reviewed Board records: an office note indicated concern about the genuineness of Khairunnissa's signature and the chairman had directed she be summoned and if she claimed jagirdar status she should file a separate section 11 application. However, in the present proceedings before the Court, the genuineness of Khairunnissa's signature was admitted.
- The Court found that no notification under section 21(b) appeared to have been issued showing the joint debtors, although the creditor (Suraj Karan) had appeared in pursuance of notice issued on Kazim Ali Mirza's application and had put forward his claim against both debtors.
- The Court held that if there was no notice under section 21(b), then an order could not properly be passed against the creditor on that basis, and the Board was in error to treat the absence of notification as cured by the earlier rejections of Forms III and II.
-
Net result of the analysis:
- The Court agreed with the minority Board member's view (dissent dated 1 March 1955) that Form II was proper and within time and that the question of extinction of the debt did not arise.
- The Board majority's view treating Form II as incapable of reviving a claim once Form III was rejected was held to be incorrect as a matter of law and statutory interpretation.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court set aside the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board orders dated 16 October 1954 and 11 April 1955, and remitted the matter to the Board with directions to dispose of the case in accordance with law (in the light of the Court's analysis regarding sections 11, 15, 21 and 22 of the Act).
Immediate implications (direct effect on the parties):
- The Board's rejections of the appellant's claim (by the orders dated 16 October 1954 and 11 April 1955) have been quashed.
- The case is remitted to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board to proceed consistently with the Court's determinations: specifically, to treat the Form II as a section 15 application (if otherwise compliant with the 30-day requirement and other statutory conditions) and to consider whether proper notices under section 21 were issued where relevant.
- Costs were directed to "abide the result before the Board" (i.e., costs reserved to be determined in the Board proceedings).
Broader legal precedent or principle: The opinion interprets and clarifies the statutory independence and distinct limitation regimes of sections 11 and 15 of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act, but the Court's statement of implications in the opinion is limited to the parties and the remittal; no broader prospective rule beyond the statutory interpretation and application to the present facts is expressly framed as a novel precedent in the text.
Manohar Pershad, J.:— This appeal on behalf of Suraj Karan, one of the creditors, Is directed against the orders of the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board, dated 16th October, 1954 and 11th April, 1955, rejecting his claim as time-barred and refusing to reconsider it.
2. The facts which give rise to this appeal are: On 11th February, 1952, Kazim Ali Mirza, respondent 1 herein, a jagirdar, filed Form I mentioning the names of six creditors, of whom Suraj Karan was not one. On 23rd February, 1953, he along with his wife Khairunnissa, respondent 2 herein, also a jagirdar, filed a second Form I which contained the name of one more creditor (who was not Suraj Karan). The usual general notifications under section 21(5) of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were issued on the Form I, dated 11th February, 1952, but not on Form I, dated 23rd February, 1953. In pursuance to the notifications, Suraj Karan, the appellant herein, on 27th October, 1953, Page: 358filed from III for the settlement of his debt amounting to Rs. 40,000 on the basis of a decree passed by the City Civil Court on 22nd October, 1953. This Form. III filed by Suraj Karan was rejected by the Board on 9th December, 1953, on the ground that it was time-barred. It appears that no action was taken by the creditor, Suraj Karan, against this rejection of Form III by the Board. Later on, two separate Forms No. II were filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein on 3rd September, 1954, for settlement of the debts relating to Suraj Karan, the creditor who had filed Form III earlier which was rejected. These forms were rejected by the Board by majority on 16th October, 1954, on the ground that once the claim of Suraj Karan had been held to be time-barred, the same could not be revived on the plea of compromise either under section 15 or 16 of the Act. The third member constituting the Board did not agree with the majority view and held that Form II filed by the debtors being within 30 days from the date of the settlement, the question of extinction of the debt did not arise and that therefore, in his opinion, it was well within time and he ordered Form I to be a taken on record and proceeded further. He passed a dissenting order dated 1st March, 1955. A subsequent application, challenging the previous orders of the Board on the ground that no notice under section 21 (b) on Form I on the joint names of the debtors was issued, was also rejected by the Board by an order dated 11th April, 1955. This appeal is preferred by Suraj Karan, one of the creditors, against the orders, dated 16th October, 1954 and 11th April, 1955, mentioned above. Sri Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that under section 21 (a) and (b) of the Act, a notification was necessary and as the notification issued only relates to the debt of Kazim Ali Mirza and not to the joint debts of Kazim AIL Mirza and his wife, there was no question of any limitation at all. It is next contended that the majority view of the Board that once the claim of the creditor was held as time-barred, the same could not be re-opened on the ground of compromise in the shape of Form II was erroneous in law, because a petition under section 15, was independent of section 11 of the Act. Sri Shanker Rao, learned counsel for respondent 1, contended that the Board has rightly held that the claim of Suraj Karan, once rejected could not be revived on the basis of compromise. As regards the argument relating to Form II, the learned counsel contended that the Board was right in holding that no action could be taken on this petition when already the claim of the creditor has been declared as time-barred. Similar contentions were: raised by Sri Vishnu Rao and Sri Shanker Rao Sarangpurkar, learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 respectively. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel, a reference to the relevant provisions of the Act is necessary, but, before discussing those provisions, we would like to state that in the appeal before us also, both the jagirdar-debtor-respondents (respondents 1 and 2), viz., Kazim Ali Mirza and Khairunnissa Begum have filed petitions admitting the claim of the creditor, Suraj Karan, and requested this Court to allow their Appeals. Sri Sanker Rao and Sri Vishnu Rao, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 herein, after ascertaining from their clients, admitted their having filed such petitions, but contended that it would not affect the fact that the claim of the creditor was time-barred. As the third respondent is contesting the claim of the appellant herein and the arguments of the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 is also that their accepting the claim here would not amount to admitting it to be within time, we have to go into this question and see whether it is really time-barred.
3. The relevant provisions for the purpose of the point in issue, in our opinion, are sections 11, 15, 21, 22, 25, 36, 42 and 47. Section 11, which give jurisdiction to the Board to start proceedings, refers to an application for settlement of debts to be filed by the debtor or the creditor. It runs:
“11. (1) Any jagirdar ordinarily residing in any part of the State of Hyderabad or his creditor may make an application to a Board of competent jurisdiction on or before such date as the Government may notify in the Jarida for settlements of debts due by the jagirdar.
(2) Every application made under sub-section (1) shall be in writing in the prescribed form and shall be signed, verified and presented in the prescribed manner.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 an application made under this section shall contain also the amounts and particulars of all debts specified in the section due by the debtor.”
4. After an application is filed under, section 11, notification is issued under section 21(a) and (b).
5. Section 21 runs thus:
“On receipt of an application for settlement of debts, the Board shall—
(a) give notice to the debtor (unless the debtor is himself an applicant) and to every creditor (other than the creditor who is himself an applicant) whose name and address are given in the application, and
(b) publish a general notice, requiring the debtor and all creditors to submit a statement in the prescribed form within one month from the date of the service of the notice or the publication of the general notice whichever is later:
Provided that if the Board is satisfied that the debtor or any other creditor is for good and sufficient cause unable to comply with the notice within the time specified therein, it may extend the period for the submission of the statement”.
6. After the general notification is issued, under the above provision, under section 12 every creditor and debtor has to file a true and correct statement before the Board within one month from the date of receipt of such notice, provided that the Board may, for sufficient cause, extend from time to time the period within which, the creditor or the debtor may file such statement. If no application is filed under section 11 of the Act within the specified period, every debt due from a debtor would’ be deemed to be extinguished under section 22. Section 22, which provides for the extinction of the debt, is to the following effect:
“(1) Every debt due from a debtor in respect of which no application has been made under section 11 within the period specified in the said section 11 or in respect of which no application for-recording a settlement is made under section 15 within the period specified in the said section 15 or in respect of which an application made to the Board is withdrawn under section 19 and no fresh application is made under section 11 and every debt due from such debtor in respect of which a statement is not submitted to the Board by the creditor in compliance with the provision of section (2) shall be extinguished.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply—
(a) to any debt in respect of which the debtor and creditor agree in writing before the Board that the said sub-section shall not apply thereto, or
(b) to any debt due from any person who has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted his creditor to believe that he is not a debtor for the purposes of this Act or that no application under section 11 can be entertained in respect of any debt owed by such person to such creditor by reason of the provisions of section 18.”
7. Section 23 casts a duty on the debtors and creditors to produce books of accounts and inventories of the property and list of creditors and debtors and of the debts due. Thereafter, under section 24, the Board has to decide the preliminary issues whether the person for the settlement of whose debts the application has been made is a debtor and whether the total amount of debts due from such person on the date of the application is or exceeds Rs. 5,000. Under section 24(2), if the Board finds that such person is not a debtor or that the total amount of the debts due from such person on the date of the application is less than Rs. 5,000, the Board shall dismiss the application. Section 25 relates to the transfer of pending suits, appeals, applications and proceedings to the Board. After the determination of the preliminary issues, the Board then proceeds to take accounts, as provided under sections 27, 28 and 29. After taking the accounts under section 28 of the Act, the Board determines the particulars of the property belonging to the debtor, the value of the said property, the particulars of any encumbrances on the said property and the paying capacity of the debtor under section 31 of the Act. Section 35 gives the power to the Board to scale down the debts. After determining the amount after scaling down the debt, the Board makes an award under section 36. Section 41 of the Act gives power to the Board to reopen the award if the Board is of the opinion that the debtor has other property which was not disclosed to the Board when the award was made, or that any property included in the award did not belong to the debtor Page: 360Section 42 provides for the registration of the award and the proceedings for execution. Section 47 relates to the right of appeal.
8. Apart from section 11, there is another section in the Act which prescribes a different mode of settlement on the basis of a compromise and that is provided under section 15 of the Act. It reads:
“15. (1) If any debtor and any or all of his creditors arrive at a settlement in respect of any debt due by debtor to the creditor, the debtor or any of the creditors may within thirty days from the date of such settlement, make an application to the Board for recording such settlement.
(2) Every such application shall be in the prescribed form, and shall be signed and verified in the prescribed manner.
(3) On receipt of such application the Board shall, after giving notice to the creditor or the debtor, as the case may be, and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit, it is satisfied that the settlement arrived at is bona fide and voluntary and is not made with intent to defeat or delay any of the creditors of the debtor, and is in the interest of the debtor, and that the debtor is a person who fulfils the conditions referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24, record such settlement and certify the same. Every such settlement so recorded and certified shall be binding upon the parties thereto and shall not, save as otherwise hereinafter provided, be reopened.
(4) After the Board has recorded and certified a settlement under sub-section (3), the Board shall call upon the debtor to make a declaration whether there are any other debts due by the debtor which are not included in the settlement. If the debtor makes a declaration that there are no such debts, the Board shall make an award in terms of such settlement.
(5) If the Board is satisfied, after recording such settlement, that there are other debts due from the debtor which are not included in the settlement the Board shall treat the application made under sub-section (1) as an application for settlement of debts under section 11.”
9. After an application is filed under this section, a notice to the creditor or the debtor, as the case may be, is issued under clause 3 of section 15. If no application is filed within time under section 15, the debt will be extinguished under section 22. Under section 23, a duty is cast on the debtor and the creditor to produce their account books, to file inventories of the property, a list of the creditors and the debtors and the debts as the case may be. After the issue of the notice under clause 3 of section 15 and on an enquiry, if the Board is satisfied that the settlement arrived at was bona fide and voluntary and was not made with intent to delay or defeat any of the creditors of the debtor and was in the interests of the debtor and the debtor is a person who fulfils the conditions referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24, the Board would record the settlement and certify the same. The settlement so recorded and certified would be binding upon the parties thereto and would not be reopened.
10. Clauses (4) and (5) of section 15 prescribe as to what action the Board has to take after recording and certifying the settlement. Clause (4) enjoins that the Board will call upon the debtor to make a declaration whether there are any other debts due by the debtor which are not included in the settlement. If the debtor makes a declaration that there are no such debts, the Board shall make an award in terms of the settlement. If the Board is satisfied, after recording such settlement, that there are other debts from the debtor which were not included in the settlement, the Board shall treat the application made under sub-section (1) of section 15 as an application for settlement of debts under section 11.
11. From a reading of the above sections, it would appear that two procedures are provided under this Act for settlement of debts one for settlement of the debts by an application by the debtor or the creditor under section 11 and the other for recording settlement, i.e, an application under section 15 of the Act. If the application is filed under section, 11, a general notification under section 21 is essential whereas in an application under section 15 no such general notification is necessary, the only condition being that a notice has to be given to the creditor or the debtor as the case may be except when, under clause 5 of section 15, such an application has been treated as one under section 11. Different limitations are prescribed for applications under sections 11 and 15. An application under section 11 has to be made on or before such date as the Government may notify in the jarida for the settlement of debts due by a jagirdar. It is common ground that 30th June, 1953, was Page: 361the date notified. Section 15 provides that an application has to be made within thirty days of the settlement. The procedure relating to the extinguishment of the debt as enjoined under section 22 is the same with regard to applications under sections 11 and 15. When there are two modes provided under the Act, one under section II and the other under section 15, questions arise—(1) whether they are independent of each other; (2) whether an application under section 15 could be made without there being any petition pending under section 11 of the Act; and (3) whether the application under section 15 has also to be made on or before the date notified by the Government in the jarida as is provided for the application under section 11 of the Act? It is contended on behalf of the creditor-appellant by Sri Bhargava, the learned counsel, that the petition under section 15 is an independent petition and that it is not necessary that before any action is taken on it there should be a petition already pending under section 11 of the Act and that such an application should be filed on or before the notified date. What is necessary, he urges, is that it should be filed within thirty days of the settlement, whereas the contention of Sri Vishnu Rao and Sri Shankar Rao for respondents 1 and 2 is that an application under section 15 cannot be taken to be an independent application and that such application should also be filed on or before the notified date. Though sections 11 and 15 form part of the same chapter which relates to the procedure for settlement of debts, it would appear, as discussed above, that different modes of procedure have been provided for the said applications. To our minds also, it appears that section 15 of the Act is independent of section 11 and that for recording a settlement under section 15, it is not necessary that there should already be an application under section 11 pending. Clause (5) of section 15 supports this view of ours, which provides that if the Board is satisfied, after recording such settlement, that there are other debts due from the debtor which are not included in the settlement, the Board shall treat the application made under sub-section (1) as an application for settlement of debts under section n. If section 15 was dependent on section 11 and the condition precedent was that there should be a petition already pending under section 11, then there was no necessity to make this above provision. Further, if section 15 were dependent on section 11, there would not be any need for a further notice to be issued by the Board to the debtor or creditor as the case may be under clause (3) of section 15 and also under clause (4) to call upon the debtor to make a declaration whether there are any other debts due by the debtor which are not included in the settlement. We are therefore definite that sections 11 and 15 are independent provisions, one for settlement of the debt by the Board after enquiry under section 11 and the other for recording settlement which has already been arrived at by the parties and it is not necessary, in our opinion, for an application under section 15 for recording settlement that there should already be a petition pending under section 11 of the said Act. Even if no petition is pending under section 11 and if the debtor and the creditor arrived at a settlement, they can, in our opinion, apply to the Board under section 15 and request the Board to record the settlement and make an award in terms of such settlement.
12. The next question that arises is whether an application under section 15 for recording settlement has to be made on or before the notified date as is necessary in the case of an application under section 11 of the said Act. We are of the opinion that an application under section 15 of the Act has to be made within thirty days of the settlement and not on or before the date of the notification. If the intention of the Legislature was that an application under section 15 had to be made on the notified date, provisions similar to that appearing in section 11 would have been made in section 15. On the other hand, what is provided under section 15 is that an application under this section should be made within thirty days of the settlement. Section 22, which relates to the extinction of the debt, also supports our view that an application under section 15 was not intended to be filed on or before the notified date. Under the above provision, if no application is made under section 11 within the notified date or within the specified period under section 15, namely, within 30 days of the settlement, the debt would be deemed to be extinguished. Page: 362If an application under section 15 had to be filed on the notified date, this distinction would not have been there in the above provision.
13. In the light of the above discussion, when we refer to the facts in the instant case, we find that Form-II application dated 3rd September, 1954, was filed on 3rd September, 1954, and the date of the settlement shown in that form is the same, i.e, 3rd September, 1954. It follows therefore that this petition was proper and filed in time in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of the Act. The Board, we find, has not rejected this petition on the ground that this petition was not presented on or before the notified date as provided under section 11, but has rejected it on the ground that, since an earlier petition filed by the creditor (Form III) was dismissed as time-barred, the petitioner could not seek redress by filing Form-II, as, under section 15, Form-II had to be treated as an application under section 11, if a debtor does not enter into a compromise simultaneously with the other creditors. We cannot agree with the view of the Board. As discussed above, petition under section 15 is independent of a petition under section 11 and even if a petition of a creditor is rejected under section 11 as being time-barred, it is still open to the debtor and the creditor to arrive at a settlement and apply to the Board to record the settlement accordingly. What the Board has to see then is whether the petition is made within thirty days of the settlement. If the Board is satisfied that it is filed in compliance with the provisions of the, section, the Board has to proceed with the matter as provided under section 15 and the subsequent sections relating to it. We cannot agree with the view of the Board that Form-II has to be treated as an application under section 11 only if the Board, after recording the settlement under clause (3) and certifying the same, calls upon the debtor to make a declaration whether there are any other debts due to the debtor which are not included in the settlement under clause (4), and if the Board is satisfied, after recording such settlement, that there are other debts due from the debtor which are not included in the settlement. It is not necessary for an application under section 15 that a debtor should simultaneouly enter into a compromise with the other creditors. Section 15 clearly enjoins that, if any debtor and any or all of his creditors arrive at a settlement in respect of any debt due by the debtor to the creditor, the debtor or any of the creditors may… … make an application.
14. In this view of the matter, we cannot agree with the majority opinion in the order, dated 16th October, 1954. We agree with the minority view contained in the order dated 1st March, 1955 and hold that Form-II filed by the creditor was proper and within time and that the question of extinction of the debt did not arise.
15. Yet another argument was advanced by Sri Vishnu Rao and Sri Shanker Rao, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2, that since the appellant has not taken any action against the order of the Board dated 9th December, 1953, dismissing Form-III as being time-barred, that order was final. In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any force in this contention. The proceedings relating to Form-III being independent of the proceedings relating to Form-II and having regard to the fact that the debtors gave up their plea of limitation, the order dated 9th December, 1953, in our opinion, will have no effect and is not a bar to the subsequent proceedings under section 15 of the Act. The appellant has challenged the order of the Board dated 11th April, 1955. also in this appeal. That order relates to Form-I filed by the joint creditors Kazim Ali Mirza and Khairunnissa Begum on 22nd February, 1953. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, as no action has been taken on this form and as no notification under section 21 was issued, there was no question of the creditor putting forward his claim and the debt being extinguished on his failure to do so. From a perusal of the record, we find that Form-I was filed jointly by the debtors. We perused the record also to find as to what order was passed by the Board and we find as follows. On 25th July, 1953, the office made a note Page: 363that there was a joint form in the names of Kazim Ali Mirza and Khairunnissa mentioning the names of seven creditors, but that the signature of Khairunnissa on Form-I in its opinion appeared to be different from her other signatures and that the file was submitted for orders. On 28th July, 1953, the chairman directed the office to summon Khairunnissa Begum in person so that she may be questioned in the matter of her signatures and so that, if she claimed to be a jagirdar, the correct procedure for her would be to file a separate application under section 11. But, in these proceedings before us, the genuineness of the signature of Khairunnissa Begum in the application is not disputed but is admitted. As she did not appear on 22nd September, 1953, the Board proceeded ex parte against her and Kazim Ali Mirza. It appears that, thereafter this matter was not pressed and no furher action seems to have been taken. On 11th April, 1955, this question was taken up for the fist time by the creditor Suraj Karan before the Board. It was contended by Sri Bhargava, learned counsel appearing for Suraj Karan, that as no notice was issued under section 21(a) and (b) of the Act in the joint names of the debtors, no order could be passed against Suraj Karan, the creditor. The Board rejected this plea on the ground that Suraj Karan's Form III was rejected on 9th December, 1953, that subsequently Form II filed by him was also dismissed on 16th October, 1954, and that those orders of the Board being final and conclusive, could not be reopened. We cannot agree with the view of the Board that because of Form II and Form III filed by Suraj Karan having been rejected, this question could not be reopened; for, if there was no notice issued as required under section 21 (b), the question of any order being passed against him would not arise. In the instant case, we find, that no notification seems to have been issued under section 21 (b) showing the joint debtors of Kazim Ali Mirza and Khairunnissa, though the creditor himself, in pursuance of the notice issued under section 21(1)(b) on the application of Kazim Ali Mirza, had appeared before the Board and put forward his claim against both the debtors. In the light of the above, as the petition under section 15 is an independent petition, the order of the Board dated 9th December, 1953, is not a bar to entertain the petition under section 15.
16. Appeal is allowed, the orders of the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board, dated 16th October, 1954 and 11th April, 1955, are set aside and the case is sent back to the Board with a direction that it should, in the light of the above directions, dispose of the matter according to law. Costs of this to abide the result before the Board.
17. Appeal allowed.
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