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Ahmed v. The Union Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Judgment (Extracted from the Provided Opinion)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was an Assam State/All-India Service officer whose career advanced from Extra Assistant Commissioner up to appointment in the Indian Administrative Service as Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate of Nowgong (held until August 1960) and later Director of State Small Savings Scheme at Shillong.
On 14 September 1960 the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam (Respondent No. 3) signed a notification placing the petitioner under suspension. By a memo dated 13 September 1960 the petitioner was directed to show cause why he should not be removed from service or otherwise punished under Rule 5(1) read with Rule 10 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 read with Article 311 of the Constitution; a statement of allegations was appended.
The show-cause proceedings arose out of a large-scale disturbance in Assam (referred to as the "Language Disturbance") while the petitioner was Deputy Commissioner, Nowgong; the petitioner alleged that the proceedings were based on an enquiry report by Shri A.N. Kidwai, a copy of which the petitioner requested but was not provided.
An enquiry was conducted by a State Government officer, Sri K. Balachandran, I.C.S. The petitioner sought permission to be represented by counsel because of ill-health, but permission was refused. The petitioner also alleged denial of adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and bias on the part of the Enquiry Officer.
The petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 31-1-1962. The State Government issued a series of retrospective notifications purporting to retain him in service beyond that date (sequence: retention for 3 months from 31-1-1962 expiring 1-5-62; a further memo dated 21-6-62 purporting to retain retrospectively from 1-5-62 for three months to 1-8-62; a notification on 1-9-62 retaining for six months retrospectively from 1-8-62 to 1-2-63; another on 23-2-63 for six months from 1-2-63 to 1-8-63; and one on 28-8-63 to retain from 1-8-63 till the conclusion of the enquiry).
Ultimately the Central Government (Ministry of Home Affairs/President) removed the petitioner from service by an order dated 11-10-1963. The petitioner filed the present Civil Rule challenging the procedure, the validity of the purported extensions of service and the legality of subsequent disciplinary removal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 16(2) of the All-India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 applied to the petitioner (i.e., whether the charges were “misconduct” so as to prevent retirement until enquiry was completed).
- If Rule 16(2) did not apply, whether there had been valid extensions of the petitioner's service (by the State Government or Central Government) such that he remained in service and could be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and dismissal after his superannuation date.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner claimed he was not furnished a copy of Shri A.N. Kidwai's report on which the show-cause notice was based, and that this refusal denied him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
- The petitioner asserted the Enquiry Officer refused permission for him to be represented by counsel and restricted cross-examination of important witnesses, resulting in denial of a fair hearing.
- He contended that his service terminated on superannuation (claimed dates: either 31-1-1962 or effectively 1-2-1962), and that subsequent unilateral retrospective notifications by the State Government purporting to extend his service after expiry were without jurisdiction and void; accordingly he had ceased to be amenable to departmental proceedings after his retirement date.
- Counsel argued that, as an IAS officer, State Government alone could not lawfully extend service beyond an aggregate of six months under Rule 16(1) and that the State's further extensions (and any purported retrospective effect) were invalid absent Central Government sanction.
- He claimed the charges against him were negligence/inefficiency (omissions, failure to take preventive measures, lack of leadership) and not misconduct attracting Rule 16(2); thus Article 311 protections and the proper procedural safeguards had been violated.
Government's Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)
- The Government framed the charges as alleging the petitioner had failed to take adequate preventive measures, showed lack of leadership and initiative, failed to supervise or keep the Government informed, and otherwise performed negligently — the gravamen being negligent conduct and errors of judgment during the disturbances at Nowgong.
- The Government relied on its sequence of retention notifications, treating those notifications as keeping the petitioner in service for the purpose of enquiry and possible disciplinary action culminating in removal by the Central Government on 11-10-1963.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moore v. Brampton County Court High Bailiff, (1893) 62 LJ QB 498 | Authority cited (via Stroud's Judicial Dictionary) for the proposition that acts of negligence, errors of judgment or innocent mistakes do not constitute "misconduct." | The court relied on this principle to distinguish negligence/inefficiency from misconduct when interpreting Rule 16(2). |
| P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 | Principle that government cannot terminate service unless entitled to do so after proper enquiry; that termination for inefficiency or negligence is not necessarily termination for misconduct covered by Rule 16(2). | The court cited this decision to support the view that Rule 16(2) does not cover cases where termination is based on inefficiency or negligence. |
| State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath, AIR 1966 SC 447 | Authority for the proposition that retention in service merely for the purpose of enquiry (under the relevant rule) was improper and that such an extension could be illegal. | The court treated this decision as directly applicable and supportive of the conclusion that extensions of service made merely to conduct an enquiry were illegal and not valid "public grounds" extensions under Rule 16(1). |
| State of Assam v. Padma Ram Borah, AIR 1965 SC 473 | Principle that a State Government cannot, by unilateral retrospective action after the expiry date, create a fresh contract of service; a belated extension passed after expiry is ultra vires and void. | The court relied on this decision to hold that the State Government had no jurisdiction to issue extensions after the expiry dates and that such late extensions were nullities. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the statutory and rule framework: Sections of the All-India Services Act, 1951 and rules framed thereunder, specifically the All-India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954 and the All-India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. It quoted Rule 16(1) and Rule 16(2) of the 1958 Rules and analysed their scope.
The court parsed Rule 16(2) into three necessary conditions before it could apply:
- The officer must have been placed under suspension on a charge;
- The charge must be one of "misconduct"; and
- If the above are fulfilled, the officer shall be retained in service and not permitted to retire until enquiry is concluded and a final order passed.
Applying these conditions, the court observed that the petitioner had been placed under suspension (condition 1 satisfied) but examined closely whether the charges were "misconduct." The court set out the specific allegations (failure to take preventive measures, lack of leadership, not visiting disturbance sites, not keeping Government informed, ineptitude and lack of foresight) and concluded these allegations amounted to negligence, omission and errors of judgment rather than misconduct involving a guilty mind or mens rea.
To support the interpretation of "misconduct" the court relied on dictionary authorities and case law (Moore v. Brampton County Court High Bailiff and P.L. Dhingra). It distinguished negligent performance or inefficiency from "misconduct" — the latter requiring some form of wrongful act or ill motive. The court held that mere negligence or inability cannot be equated with misconduct unless there is evidence that the negligence flows from a guilty mind or wilful conduct; no such situation was present here.
Because Rule 16(2) was not applicable, the court found that the State Government had no authority under Rule 16(1) to retain the petitioner in service beyond an aggregate of six months without Central Government sanction. The court examined the sequence of purported extensions and concluded that the State's retrospective extensions issued after the expiry of a retention period had the effect of creating gaps which broke the continuity of retention. The court held that a State cannot, by unilateral action taken after expiry, create a fresh contract or continuation of service (relying on State of Assam v. Padma Ram Borah).
The court also treated the specific holding in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath as directly applicable: extensions purportedly made solely for the purpose of inquiry are not proper public-ground extensions under Rule 16(1) and are illegal.
Assessing all the above, the court concluded that the petitioner must be deemed to have retired on attainment of superannuation (1-2-1962 as the operative date found by the court) and that subsequent disciplinary action, including dismissal by the Central Government on 11-10-1963, was taken when the petitioner was no longer in service and was therefore without jurisdiction.
The court also set out factors relevant to judging whether a finding of negligence was justified (nature/quantum of danger, speed and spread of disturbances, police availability, transport, communication delays, on-the-spot appreciation, repercussions of hasty action, etc.) and observed there was insufficient material to conclude misconduct.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court allowed the petition. It ordered that the Central Government order dismissing the petitioner be quashed and declared the actions taken against him after his date of retirement to be without jurisdiction.
Core Ruling: The petitioner is to be deemed to have retired from service on 1-2-1962; the disciplinary/dismissal order dated 11-10-1963 is illegal, invalid and quashed; the petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute with costs (Advocate's fee Rs. 250/-).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: all punitive or disciplinary action taken after the petitioner's retirement date was quashed as being without jurisdiction; the petitioner is treated as having retired on the date found by the court.
- The decision rests on applying Rule 16(1) and (2) and on established authority that negligent conduct/inefficiency is not the same as "misconduct" under Rule 16(2); and that retrospective extensions by a State Government after the expiry date cannot revive or create a fresh contract of service.
- The opinion applies existing precedent and statutory interpretation; it does not assert that it establishes any novel legal principle beyond applying and reconciling the Rules and cited authorities to the facts of this case.
Costs and formal result as recorded in the opinion: Petition allowed; Rule made absolute with costs; Advocate's fee: Rs. 250/-. (Final line: "Petition allowed.")
C. Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, C.J:— The petitioner in this Civil Rule was appointed Extra Assistant Commissioner by the Government of Assam, in which capacity he apparently worked till 1956, during which period he was promoted as Sadar S.D.O and ultimately in 1958 as the A.D.M, Nowgong and soon after promoted to the I.A.S cadre and appointed as Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate of Nowgong in 1959, in which post he continued till August 1960, when he was appointed Director of State Small Savings Scheme and transferred to Shillong. During the period he was holding this post, he received a Notification No. PLA.441/60/Pt/33 A dated 14th September, 1960, signed by the then Chief Secretary, Government of Assam (Respondent No. 3 herein), placing him under suspension. (Annexure ‘A’). Later, by a Memo No. PLA.441/60/Pt/36 dated 13th September, 1960, the 3rd respondent directed the petitioner to show cause by the 5th October, 1960 why the petitioner should not be removed from service or otherwise punished under Rule 5(1) read with Rule 10 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 read with Article 311 of the Constitution. A statement of allegations against the petitioner was appended to the above communication. (Annexures B-1 and B-2).
2. During the period the petitioner was holding the post of the Deputy Commissioner, Nowgong, a general disturbance hereinafter referred to as the ‘Language Disturbance’, took place all over Assam. Shri A.N Kidwai, the then Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, made enquiries into the causes of disturbances at Nowgong and the responsibility of the District officials in that regard. According to the petitioner, the show cause notice against, the petitioner and the statement of allegations served on him were based on the report submitted by the said Shri Kidwai.
3. The petitioner by his letter dated 17th September, 1960, addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, requested the latter to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the report of Shri A.N Kidwai, but that copy of the report was, however, not furnished to the petitioner, in spite of the fact that in the show cause notice served on the petitioner, the Government had expressly made Page: 46a reference to the enquiry made and the report submitted by Shri A.N Kidwai and that the report had shown that the petitioner, who was then the Deputy Commissioner, Nowgong, was negligent in the performance of his duties, as borne out by the report of Shri A.N Kidwai. The petitioner claims that the refusal to furnish him with the copy of the report of Shri A.N Kidwai, on which the whole proceedings against him were based, amounted to a negation of the reasonable opportunity that he was entitled to have to defend himself. Consequentially the petitioner had to submit his explanation on 11th January, 1960, without having the benefit and advantage of perusing the report made by Shri A.N Kidwai against him in the matter. (Annexure ‘D’). An officer of the State Government, Sri K. Balachandran. I.C.S (Respondent No. 4 herein) was then appointed to enquire into the charges against the petitioner. As the petitioner was not in good health, he applied for permission to engage a counsel to represent him at the enquiry, which prayer, however, was refused by the Enquiry Officer (Respondent No. 4) (Annexures E-1 and E-2). The petitioner claims that the refusal by the Enquiry Officer to give him permission to be represented by a Lawyer in the departmental proceedings resulted in the denial of a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence.
4. The petitioner further submits that he was not allowed full opportunity to cross-examine important witnesses and was sometimes stopped from cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on vital points. The petitioner pointed out in his petition a number of reasons from which, according to the petitioner, it could be concluded that the Enquiry Officer was very much biased and prejudiced against him. Consequently, the petitioner applied to the Government for a change in the Enquiry Officer, but his request was turned down.
5. After the enquiry was concluded, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India asked the petitioner in his communication No. F.7/2/62-Viz. dated 22nd February, 1963 to show cause why he should not be removed from service and directed the petitioner to submit his explanation in writing. A copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was enclosed with the communication. (Annexures 1(1) & I(2)).
6. The petitioner was due to retire from service on 31-1-1962 on his completing the age of 55, but the Government of Assam by Memo No. AAI.24/60/43 dated 31-1-1962 retained the petitioner in service for a period of 3 months or till the termination of the departmental proceedings whichever is earlier, and this period of 3 months expired on 1-5-62. Some 52 days thereafter, on 21-6-62, the Government of Assam issued a Memo No. AAI-24/60/52 retaining the petitioner in ser-vice for a further period of 3 months retrospectively from 1-5-62, and this period of 3 months again expired on 1-8-1962. Some 31 days thereafter, on 1-9-62, the Government issued yet another notification under Memo No. AAI/24/60/160 directing the retention of the petitioner in service for a further period of six months, retrospectively front 1-8-62, which period of six months again expired on 1-2-63. On 23-2-63 the Government issued another notification under Memo No. AAI.24/60/Pr/28 directing the retention of the petitioner in service for a further period of six months, retrospectively from 1-2-63 and this period of six months again expired on 1-8-63, and the Government again issued a further notification under Memo No. AAI.24/60/196 on 28-8-63, that is, 28 days after 1-8-63, ordering the retention of the petitioner in service for a further period from 1-8-63 till the conclusion of the enquiry and the passing of final orders in the proceedings.
7. The petitioner submitted that the clear effect of the order dated 31-1-1962 was that the service of the petitioner came to an end on 1-5-62 and the State Government had no jurisdiction to extend the service of the petitioner some 52 days after the expiry of the period on 1-5-62. The petitioner submitted that the State Government had no jurisdiction to create a fresh contract of service by unilateral action on 1-5-62, and that all notifications issued by the State Government retaining the petitioner in service without his consent after 1-5-62, were null and void and, therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have retired from service at least by 1-5-62, and was, therefore not amenable to any departmental proceedings being taken against him thereafter.
8. Further, the petitioner submitted that a copy of the notification of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, No. 7/2/62 viz. dated 11-10-63 was sent to him which read that the President in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, removed Shri J. Ahmed, an officer borne on the Assam Cadre of Indian Administrative Service, from service with immediate effect. (Annexure ‘K’). The petitioner submitted a memorial to the President of India under R. 20 of the Indian Administrative Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 against this order of removal from service, but this memorial was rejected.
9. The petitioner claimed that the procedure and the provisions of law as laid down in Rule 5 of the Indian Administrative Page: 47Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules have not been complied with by the Enquiry Officer and that the Opposite Party No. 1, that is, the Union of India, Ministry of a Home Affairs, New Delhi, instead of coming to the tentative conclusion as regards the guilt of the petitioned in relation to the charges, came to the conclusion that the charges were proved even before the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation. The petitioner claims that he was thus deprived of his constitutional rights under Article 311 of the Constitution.
10. The petitioner further claims that as the petitioner's services came to an end oil 1-5-62, as indicated above, any further notification, either treating him as or retaining him in service, was without jurisdiction and a nullity in law, and that, in any case, the orders referred to above purporting to retain the petitioner in service beyond six months having been passed without the sanction of the Central Government are void and inoperative. The petitioner further claimed that the order purporting to remove him from service at a time when he had ceased to be in service, is a nullity and not legal and that the departmental proceedings as welt as the orders passed subsequently, purporting to remove the petitioner from service had no legal effect. Accordingly, the petitioner prayed for a declaration that he had retired from service on 1-5-62 and that the subsequent notifications of the Government relating to his service or his removal from service were all null and void, and prayed for appropriate writs in this regard.
11. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had retired from service on 1-2-62 on superannuation, and that, thereafter, he was no longer in Government service. He further contended that the Government had no jurisdiction to order unilateral extensions of the petitioner's service without his consent, and that, assuming that the Government had the power and jurisdiction, the first extension having come to an end on 30-4-62, there being no further extension on the expiry of the period, the petitioner ceased to be in Government service at least from 1-5-62. In other words, as the first extension, assuming it to be valid had expired on 1-5-62 and no order of extension having been made on or before 1-5-62, the petitioner ceased to be a Government servant, and that the Government had no further jurisdiction to deal with him, as if he were continuing in service, the point taken being that the further extensions relied on by the Government cannot have any retrospective effect.
12. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner being an I.A.S Officer, any extension of service by the State Government in this connection could not be for a period longer than six months. In support of this proposition, he placed reliance on Rule 16(1) of the All-India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’. This Rule provides for the Central Government extending the service of the petitioner for a further period of six months and, in the instant case, the Central Government had extended the service of the petitioner for six months with effect from 1-8-62, whereas the petitioner was removed from service by the order of the Respondent No. 1 on 11-10-63. Therefore, it is contended that between the period 1-2-63 and 11-10-63 the petitioner's service was not extended by the Central Government but was extended by the State Government, who had no power to do so, their power to extend the same having been exhausted by 1-5-62. It is further claimed that Rule 16(2) of the Rules is not applicable to the petitioner. It is further contended that as the petitioner had retired on 1-2-62 and, at any rate, deemed to have retired on 1-2-63, no action could be taken against him thereafter by way of departmental proceedings.
13. It is further claimed that the extensions of service of any employee of the Government could only be given on public grounds and not to clutch at jurisdiction to punish the officer.
14. Before examining the contentions raised by the petitioner, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the All-India Services Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, as well as the rules framed by virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government by that Act. Section 3 of the Act provides for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service and it is as follows:
“3. (1) The Central Government may, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, including the State of Jammu and Kashmir, make rules for the regulation of recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to an All-India Service.
(2) All rules made finder this section shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before Parliament as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as Parliament may make on a motion made during the session in which they are so laid”.
15. It is in exercise of this power that the All-India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954 and the All-India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, have been framed.
16. Rule 3 of the All-India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954, is as follows:
“3. GENERAL.—Every member of the service shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty.”
17. Rule 16 of the Rules is in the following terms:
“16. SUPERANNUATION GRATUITY OR PENSION:—
(1) A member of the Service shall be required compulsorily to retire from the service with effect from the date on which he attains the age of 55 years:
Provided that he may be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement on public grounds which shall be recorded in writing—
(a) for an aggregate period not exceeding six months by the State Government; and
(b) for any period beyond six months, with the sanction of the Central Government:
Provided further that a member of the service shall not be retained in service beyond the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances.
(2) A member of the Service under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to retire from the service, but shall be retained in service until the enquiry into the charges against him is concluded and a final order is passed.
18. Considering the above Rules, we are clearly of opinion that unless the case fell within the scope of Rule 16(2), quoted above, the maximum extension of service that the State Government could give, is only six months, and thereafter, any further extension could only be given by the Central Government. It may be seen from the above, therefore, that the petitioner's service could not be extended beyond six months by the State Government acting on its own, but it is open to the Central Government to extend the service of the I.A.S Officer for any period they may choose, normally not beyond 50 years of age.
19. Undoubtedly. If the case fell under Rule 16(2), there is no question of any extension of service, as the member of the Service concerned will not be required or permitted to retire from the service, but shall be retained in service, until the enquiry into the charges against him is concluded and a final order is passed.
20. Two main questions/therefore, fall to be determined in this Civil Rule:
(1) Whether the case of the petitioner falls sunder Rule 16(2) of the Rules; in other words, whether Rule 16(2) could be made applicable to the petitioner in the instant case?
(2) If it did not apply, whether there had been valid extensions of service of the petitioner, so that he could be held to have been retained in service so as to be amenable for disciplinary action to be taken by the authorities concerned, whether it be State Government or Central Government?
21. As regards the first question, the scope and applicability of Rule 16(2) of the Rules would have to be examined. This rule requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before it could be applied:
(1) The Officer should have been placed under suspension on a charge;
(2) The charge should be one of misconduct;
(3) If conditions (1) and (2) are fulfilled, the officer shall be retained in service and shall not be permitted to retire from service until the enquiry into the charges against him is concluded and a final order is passed.
22. It has to be examined further whether all these conditions have been fulfilled in this case.
23. That the petitioner has been placed under suspension is not disputed. But, what is disputed is that the charges on which he had been placed under suspension are not charges of misconduct. The charges against the petitioner, as seen from Annexure B-1, may be briefly stated as follows:
(1) That the petitioner completely failed to take any effective preventive measures against widespread disturbances breaking out in Nowgong District in spite of adequate warning;
(2) That the petitioner showed complete lack of leadership when the disturbances actually broke out and failed to give proper directions to his subordinate Magistrates and the Police to restore law and order;
(3) That the petitioner did not personally visit the scenes of disturbances within the town or in the rural areas to take personal control of the situation and to exercise necessary supervision;
(4) That he did not keep the Government informed of the actual picture and the extent of the disturbances;
(5) That he showed complete Ineptitude, lack of foresight, lack of firmness, and capacity to take quick and firm decision, and that, consequently, there as complete breakdown of law and order in Nowgong town as well as in the rural areas of the Nowgong District. Consequently, it is claimed that the petitioner had proved himself completely unfit to hold any responsible position. Based on these specific charges, the petitioner was given a show cause notice under Rule Page: 495(1) read with Rule 10 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, read with Article 311 of the Constitution, why he should not foe removed from service or otherwise punished for the charges stated above.
24. It is seen from the above description of the charges against the petitioner, as well as from the statement of allegations made against him, all that was alleged, is that the petitioner was negligent in the performance of his duties. Throughout, the allegations related to the omission to take certain steps and actions, and some defective feature of his ability, such as lack of leadership, inaptitude, lack of foresight, lack of capacity to take quick and firm decisions. The burden of the song obviously is negligence and inability, and not misconduct. There is no allegation anywhere of any misconduct attributed to the petitioner; for example, it was not stated anywhere that the petitioner's negligence was due to any guilty mind or mens rea.
25. There is a good deal of difference, in our opinion, between negligent conduct and misconduct. The expression ‘misconduct’ has been defined in the Larger Oxford Dictionary as follows:
“improper conduct; wrong behaviour.”
26. The verbal form of expression was treated as equivalent ‘to misbehave oneself’. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, the expression ‘misconduct’ has been defined as follows:
“‘misconduct’ means misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistakes, do not constitute such misconduct (Moore v. Brampton County Court High Bailiff, (1893) 62 LJ QB 498).”
27. Apart from the dictionary meaning, we are satisfied that the expression ‘misconduct’ used in Rule 16(2) means ‘misbehaviour’ involving some form of guilty mind or mens rea. Mere negligent performance of the duty or neglect in the performance of the duty, or, for the matter of that, an error of judgment in the performance of his duties, cannot amount to ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of Rule 16(2). Inaction, or inability to take & action either through incapacity or lack of foresight or otherwise, cannot, in our opinion, mean or amount to ‘misconduct.’ ‘Misconduct’ implies doing something had or doing something in a wrong or illegal way. ‘Neglect’ or ‘negligence’ involve the mi doing of a thing or neglect in the doing of it.
28. In our opinion, the two are entirely different concepts and, therefore, mere negligent conduct can never amount to ‘misconduct’, unless in very special cases, where the negligence is the result of a guilty mind and wilful, and has as its basis a mens rea. Such is not the case here. Hence, we are satisfied that the charges levelled against the petitioner amounted to a mere negligent conduct and passible errors of judgment and not misconduct, and hence Rule 16(2) has no application to the case of the petitioner, and there can, therefore, be no question of his not being permitted to retire from service.
29. In other words, the Government had no authority or power under the Rule to stand in the way of the retirement of the petitioner in the normal course. Such being the case we are satisfied that the petitioner must be deemed to have retired from service on 1-2-1962 when lie attained the age of superannuation. That being the case, he was no longer amenable, after that date, to any disciplinary action being taken against him by the Government, and any action so taken, in our opinion, must be deemed to have been taken without jurisdiction and, therefore is null and void.
30. The gravamen of the charges against the petitioner, according to the Government, is, that he lacked the Initiative and did not make a correct appreciation of the situation of the possible dangers developing at different parts of the town of Nowgong as well as the District-Apart from the fact that what is alleged as pointed out by us earlier, is only negligent conduct and possible errors of judgment and not misconduct, one has got to notice that even the negligence alleged, which Involved the not taking of the action, which, according to the Government, should have been taken in the manner they felt was the correct one. The decision on this aspect of the matter is dependent on so many factors.
31. If we may analyse the same, the following would enter into the calculations:
(1) the nature of the danger;
(2) the quantum of risk;
(3) the quickness with which the feelings were provoked among the public and the disturbances consequently spread in all directions;
(4) the amount and the adequacy of police force available at the disposal of the petitioner;
(5) the availability of transport which could move the policemen to different pockets of trouble;
(6) the question as to how quickly the information as to the outbreak of disturbances at different places could have reached the petitioner;
(7) the appreciation of the situation?
(8) the making of a judgment as to what action would suit the particular situation, and the particular place, and the nature and the extent of the disturbances;
(9) the probable repercussions on aggressive action being taken in a hurry Involving grave risk to the petitioner as Page: 50well as to his own officers and the police force.
32. These and perhaps some more factors enter Into the calculations in judging whether the petitioner could be held to have been negligent in the performance of his duties.
33. The judgment of a distant authority, sometimes may be wrong, whereas that of the man on the spot may be more correct. To judge the decision and judgment of the petitioner in the light of the judgment of the Government reached several days after the occurrence, in the light of different types of information received by them meanwhile, would be neither just nor proper. Having considered all these aspects of the case, we are clearly of opinion that there is no material placed before us on record on the points referred to above, which would enable us, even to a remote degree, to hold that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties.
34. Looked from another aspect, the allegations in Annexure B-1 may make out a charge on the ground of inefficiency. Inefficiency, in our opinion, can never take the place of misconduct. An efficient person may be guilty of misconduct whereas an inefficient person may claim to be free from the vice of misconduct. Inefficiency can well be the motivating force of an order of removal, discharge or dismissal, but such an order on that score would not per se be one for misconduct.
35. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of P.L Dhingra v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 at p. 42, that the Government cannot terminate the services of an employee unless it is entitled to do so, amongst others, after a proper enquiry on notice to him of misconduct, negligence inefficiency or any other disqualification. It is well settled that a permanent Government employee's mere termination of service will prima facie be a punishment but that does not mean that when his service is terminated for inefficiency or for negligence, it is a termination for misconduct. [Sic] (It is?) clear therefore that Rule 16(2) of the aforesaid Rules will not cover a case of termination of service when the same is based on a charge of inefficiency or negligence.
36. Alternatively it is contended that the Government has the power to extend the retention of the petitioner in Government service after the date of the compulsory retirement only on public grounds, and even then only for an aggregate period not exceeding six months at the instance of the State Government, and retention for any period beyond the period of 6 months could only be with the sanction of the Central Government This being the case, the State Government had extended the service of the petitioner up to 30-4-1962 and thereafter no order of extension having been received before the expiry of the period, the petitioner retired from service on 1-5-62, the extension period of three months having expired on that date. It is contended that the subsequent extension of service of the petitioner made by the Government on 21-6-1962 for a further period three months, had no legal validity or effect.
37. In State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath, AIR 1966 SC 447 at p. 449, it was held by their Lordships as follows:
“We find it sufficient to say that we agree that the rentention of Bagchi in Service under R. 75(a) for the purpose of enquiry was not proper and the extension of the service was illegal.”
38. This decision directly applies to the instant case and we are clearly of opinion that apart from other grounds, the extension of service for the purpose of conducting enquiry against the officer is clearly illegal and cannot be regarded as an extension on public grounds within the meaning of Rule 16(1).
39. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that once the period of extension had expired, the services of the petitioner must be deemed to have come to an end with the Government, and if he is not deemed to have retired on 1-2-1962, it must necessarily be held that he retired from service on 1-6-1962 and, that subsequently, he was no longer in Government service. The order issued by the Government of Assam in its Memo No. AAI. 24/60/52 dated 21-6-1962 extending the service of the petitioner for a further period of three months cannot have any legal validity or effect and cannot have the effect of bringing back the petitioner into service, he having retired at least by 1-5-1962. The subsequent extensions ordered by the Government for the same reasons, in our opinion, cannot have the effect of keeping the petitioner in service.
40. This conclusion of ours receives support from a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Padma Ram Borah, reported in AIR 1965 SC 473, wherein their Lordships held as follows:
“The clear effect of the order of January 6, 1961 therefore, was that the service of the respondent came to an end on March 31, 1961. This was so not because retirement was automatic but because the State Government had itself fixed the date up to which the service of the respondent would be retained. The State Government made no further order before March 31, 1961, but about a month or so after passed an order on May 9, 1961 extending the service of the respondent for a further period of three months Page: 51with effect from April 1, 1961. We do not think that the State Government had any jurisdiction to pass such an order on May 9, 1961. According to the earlier order of the State Government itself, the service of the respondent had come to an end on March 31, 1961. The State Government could not by unilateral action create a fresh contract of service to take effect from April 1, 1961. If the State Government wished to continue the service of the respondent for a further period, the State Government should have issued a notification before March 31, 1961.”
41. Accordingly, their Lordships held in that case that the respondent had ceased to be in service on March 31, 1961 by the very order of the State Government and that the order of retention in service passed more than a month thereafter, was a mere nullity and cannot be sustained.
42. The gaps in the extensions made by the Central Government, in our opinion, have also the effect of breaking the continuity of the retention of the petitioner in service and hence, we are clearly of opinion that on the date on which the order dismissing the petitioner was passed, namely, on 11-10-1963, the petitioner was no longer in service and neither the Central Government nor the Government of Assam had any jurisdiction to pass any order of dismissal against the petitioner on that date. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the order of the Central Government ordering the dismissal of the petitioner, is clearly illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction. We accordingly, order that the same should be quashed. The result of our decision, therefore, is that the petitioner must be deemed to have retired from service on 1-2-1962 and that the punitive or disciplinary action taken against him after that date is completely without jurisdiction and wholly unjustified and should be quashed, which we hereby order.
43. We, accordingly, allow this petition and make the Rule absolute with costs. Advocate's Fee: Rs. 250/-.
44. Petition allowed.
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