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Tankeswar Das And Another v. Bhagaban Chandra Choudhury And Others

Gauhati High Court
Jan 22, 1968
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted by Bhagaban Chandra Choudhury (the plaintiff / first respondent in the second appeals) seeking a declaration of tenancy right and possession of 2B 4K. 7 lechas of land. The plaintiff alleged purchase by a sale deed dated 5-6-1967 executed in his favour by Mustt. Sabitri Bala Dasya (the widow of the late Golok Chandra Das). Sabitri was also the mother of two minor pro forma defendants (Nos. 8 and 9). Pro forma defendant No. 10 (Sabtiri) contended that there was no legal necessity for the sale and that no consideration had passed; the Court-appointed guardian for the minors filed a written statement to a similar effect.

The trial Court (Munsiff's Court at Barpeta) decreed the suit as regards the share of Sabitri (pro forma defendant No. 10) but dismissed the suit insofar as the share of the minors (pro forma defendants 8 and 9), holding that the sale as to the minors' share violated Section 8(3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

The plaintiff appealed the Munsiff's decision in Title Appeal No. 74/61, principally challenging the dismissal as to the minors. Separately, the heirs and legal representatives of defendant No.1 (including defendants who died during the suit) filed Title Appeal No. 76/61 challenging the trial Court's judgment, claiming they had been denied an opportunity to produce an original partition deed that would show the property belonged to Balak Chandra Kalita and not to Golok Chandra Das.

The Subordinate Judge delivered a judgment disposing of these appeals (the text records both dismissal and allowance references in a passage that appears inconsistent, but subsequent proceedings show two second appeals were filed). Thereafter two second appeals were instituted to the court issuing this opinion:

  • Second Appeal No. 91/64 — preferred by the minor pro forma defendants Nos. 8 and 9 (represented by the Court guardian) against the Subordinate Judge's judgment in Title Appeal No. 74/61.
  • Second Appeal No. 92/64 — filed by the widow, daughters and sons of defendant No. 1 (and defendants Nos. 2 and 3) against the Subordinate Judge's judgment in Title Appeal No. 76/61.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Title Appeal No. 74/61 had been properly filed and whether the minors (pro forma defendants Nos. 8 and 9) were properly represented in that appeal given the appointment of a guardian-ad-litem at trial and the provisions of Order 32 Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
  2. What is the legal effect of non-compliance with Order 32 Rule 3(5) (continuance of a guardian-ad-litem throughout proceedings) when an appeal is pursued against a minor without impleading the court-appointed guardian-ad-litem?
  3. Whether the appellants in Title Appeal No. 76/61 (Second Appeal No. 92/64) could fault the appellate process in the second appeal on the ground that they were denied opportunity in the trial Court to produce a partition deed, when they had not sought permission under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC in the first appeal to adduce additional evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in Second Appeal No. 91/64)

  • Mr. Bhattacharjee (learned counsel for the appellants) argued that once a guardian-ad-litem is appointed under Order 32 Rule 3(1) at trial, the appointment continues throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit (including appeals) by virtue of Order 32 Rule 3(5), and therefore the guardian-ad-litem alone must represent the minor in appeal.
  • He contended that because the appeal (Title Appeal No. 74/61) was filed against the minors without the court-appointed guardian-ad-litem being impleaded and instead showing the mother (Sabtiri) as representing them, the appeal was not properly filed and the minors were not represented within the meaning of the CPC.
  • The appellants relied on the strict wording of Order 32 Rule 3(5) to assert that any appeal prosecuted against a minor without the guardian-ad-litem is invalid insofar as it affects the minor's rights.

Respondent's / Plaintiff's Arguments (as presented by Dr. Medhi)

  • Dr. Medhi, counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, acknowledged the absence of the guardian-ad-litem in the appeal but placed reliance upon several judicial decisions that, in his submission, treated similar omissions as irregularities or did not render subsequent proceedings void.
  • He argued that the lack of representation was an irregularity that could be cured proceduraly — supporting, in his submission, either validation or remand to permit proper representation of the minors in the appeal.
  • He also pointed to the fact that appellants did not press other issues before the lower appellate Court (as noted in the judgment), implying that those omissions worked against the appellants' case, though the court considers this argument irrelevant in light of the minors' lack of representation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1907) ILR 29 All 290 The opinion cited the case as an earlier decision dealing with representation issues before present CPC. The Court noted this decision is of similar effect to another old decision but observed it predates the present Code of Civil Procedure and thus is of limited assistance.
Dammar Singh v. Pirbhu Singh (referenced with ILR citation) Cited by respondent's counsel in support of the contention that omission to implead a guardian-ad-litem can be treated permissively in some circumstances. The opinion records the citation but does not describe its rule or its direct application in detail; the Court treated it as not decisively helpful.
(1908) ILR 30 All 55 Instances where a guardian-ad-litem of a respondent was not made a party to an appeal until after limitation had expired; raised issues of representation and limitation. The Court observed it was held there that the appeal was not time-barred on that ground, but the opinion states that the decision does not clearly explain how the minor was represented and is therefore of limited assistance.
Rup Chand v. Dasodha, AIR 1948 Bom 180 Addressed the effect of appointing different guardians in subsequent proceedings and treated passing over a certificated guardian as a mere irregularity absent fraud/prejudice. The Court noted the decision but explained it did not consider Order 32 Rule 3(5) (continuance of guardian into appellate proceedings) and thus is not directly applicable to the facts of the present litigation.
Onkar Bhika (Plaintiff) v. Vithal Onkar (Defendant) [citation as mentioned in the opinion] This decision was cited by the respondent's counsel. The opinion lists it among authorities relied upon by Dr. Medhi but does not summarise the rule or its application; the Court did not treat it as significantly assisting the respondent.
AIR 1954 Pat 349, Krishna Behari v. Kedar Nath Decision dealing with matters relating to Order 32 and an amendment (Rule 4(4) of Order 32) by the Patna High Court. The Court observed that the Patna decision involved a local amendment of Rule 4(4) of Order 32 and therefore cannot be of assistance in the present matter under the unamended general law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from statutory text and procedural structure to practical consequences:

  1. Statutory/Procedural foundation: The Court examined Order 32 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in particular sub-rule (1) (obligation of the Court to appoint a guardian for a minor defendant), sub-rule (4) (requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard in making guardian-related orders), and sub-rule (5) (the specific provision that a person appointed to be guardian for the suit shall, unless the appointment is terminated, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit including appellate and revisional proceedings).
  2. Application to the facts: The trial Court had appointed a guardian-ad-litem for the minors and the trial decree was passed in their favour with that guardian representing their interests. Title Appeal No. 74/61, filed against the minors, proceeded without impleading the court-appointed guardian-ad-litem; instead the minors were shown as represented by their mother (the natural guardian). This was contrary to the mandatory language of Order 32 Rule 3(5).
  3. Effect of non-compliance: Given the clear statutory command that the guardian-ad-litem continues as the representative throughout the litigation, the Court concluded that an appeal pursued against minors without the court-appointed guardian-ad-litem being impleaded is not a properly filed appeal so far as it affects the minors. The Court emphasised that the statute vests the guardian-ad-litem with exclusive authority to represent the minor's interests in the continuations of the same litigation.
  4. Assessment of precedents: The Court considered precedents cited by the respondent that treated similar omissions as irregularities or reached outcomes in special factual settings. It found those authorities either predating the present CPC, not addressing sub-rule (5), or based on local amendments, so they were of limited or no assistance in displacing the clear statutory command before the Court.
  5. Prejudice and substance of proceedings: The Court reasoned that because the minors were not represented by the guardian-ad-litem in the appeal, their interests were necessarily prejudiced — the appellate court failed to examine the central question (whether there was legal necessity to support the alienation by the natural guardian) as vigorously as would have been the case had the minors been properly represented. Hence, reversal of the decree in appeal caused substantial injustice to the minors.
  6. Rejection of a remedial remand: The Court rejected the respondent's suggestion that the defect was a mere irregularity that could be cured by remanding the matter to permit the guardian-ad-litem's participation. The Court held that allowing such a curative measure would effectively revive an appeal that had ceased to exist by efflux of time and would unfairly benefit a negligent party, thereby causing prejudice to the minors.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

  • Second Appeal No. 91/64 (filed by minors pro forma defendants Nos. 8 and 9) — ALLOWED. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge in Title Appeal No. 74/61 (so far as it affected the minors) are set aside.
  • Second Appeal No. 92/64 (filed by the widow, daughters and sons of defendant No.1 and others) — DISMISSED. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge in Title Appeal No. 76/61 are confirmed.
  • Consequently, the trial Court's judgment and decree are confirmed in their entirety.

Direct consequences on the parties:

  • The decree in favour of the minors passed by the trial Court stands restored because the appeal prosecuted against them was not validly filed for want of representation by the court-appointed guardian-ad-litem.
  • The other appellants (those in Title Appeal No. 76/61) fail in their second appeal for procedural reasons: they did not pursue the appropriate mechanism under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC before the lower appellate Court to adduce additional evidence that the trial Court had excluded.

The opinion does not purport to establish a broader novel principle beyond enforcing the clear mandatory language of Order 32 Rule 3(5) CPC; it resolves the disputes before the Court by applying that provision and by declining to treat the omission as a curable irregularity under the facts of this case.

Costs

The Court ordered that there should be no order as to costs in both Second Appeal No. 91/64 and Second Appeal No. 92/64.

Ordered accordingly.

Show all summary ...

1. These two second appeals arise out of a suit brought by the first respondent in these appeals for a declaration of tenancy right and for possession in regard to 2B 4K. 7 lechas of land on the ground that the plaintiff Bhagaban Chandra Choudhury had purchased the said land along with other lands on 5-6-67 under a sale deed executed in his favour by one Mustt. Sabitri Bala Dasya, widow of late Golok Chandra Das and mother of pro forma defendant No. 8 Tankeswar Das and pro forma defendant No. 9 Ratneswar Das, who are minors. In the suit pro forma defendant No. 10 contended that there was no legal necessity for the sale and that no consideration had passed and to a similar effect was the written statement filed by the Court guardian appointed for the minors.

2. On trial the Munsiff's Court at Barpeta decreed the suit in regard to the share of Sabitri Bala Dasya pro forma defendant No. 10 in the suit properties. He however, dismissed the suit against the share of the minors pro forma defendants 8 and 9, holding that the sale was in violation of Section 8(3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The plaintiff in the suit preferred an appeal against this judgment and decree of the Munsiff and this appeal was numbered Page: 62as Title Appeal No. 74/61 and this appeal was preferred mainly against the minors who are shown as represented by their natural guardian, the mother Sabitri Bala Dasya pro forma defendant No. 10. It may be noticed that the main contention in this appeal was that the Court below should have granted a decree not only in regard to the share of the mother pro forma defendant No. 10, but also in respect of the shares of the two minors—pro forma defendants 8 and 9.

3. The widow, daughters and two sons of late Balak Chandra Kalita defendant No. 1 as heirs and legal representatives of defendant No. 1, and defendants Nos. 2 and 8, who are also sons of defendant No. 1, who died during the pendency of the suit, preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Munsiff in the above suit and this appeal was numbered as Title Appeal No. 76/61.

4. In this appeal they claimed that they were not given an opportunity to produce the original partition deed under which Balak Chandra Kalita, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants in Title Appeal No. 76/61 and Golok Chandra Das, husnand of pro forma defendant No. 10 and father of minor pro forma defendants 8 and 9, had divided their family properties and that if that deed had been allowed to be produced, it would have shown that the suit property fell to the share of Balak Chandra Kalita and not to the share of Golok Chandra Das, so that there could be no decree against them in regard to the suit property.

5. The same judgment dismissed Title Appeal No. 76/61 and allowed Title Appeal No. 76/61. Second Appeal No. 91/64 has been preferred by the minor pro forma defendants Nos. 8 and 9, represented by the Court guardian, against the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge in Title Appeal No. 74/61 and Second Appeal No. 92/64 was filed by the widow, daughters and sons of defendant No. 1, as also by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge passed as regards Title Appeal No. 76/61.

6. So far as Second Appeal No. 92/64 filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 is concerned, the matter could be disposed of easily. When these defendants applied to be given time to produce the partition deed and time was not granted by the learned Munsiff, it was open to these defendants to have applied under O. 41 R. 27 of the CPC in the appeal before the lower appellate Court pointing out that the Subordinate Judge may be pleased to permit additional evidence being recorded, which had not been permitted in the trial Court. This opportunity was not availed of. It is, therefore, not open to the appellants to contest in second appeal that certain evidence had been shut out and on that ground this Court should interfere with the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court. No other ground has been urged in support of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

7. The point for consideration in Second Appeal No. 91/64 is whether the Title Appeal No. 74/61, which was filed against the minor pro forma defendants 8 and 9, had been properly filed and whether the minors could be said to have been properly represented in their appeal and whether the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court could be supported on the materials placed on the record. The main point that Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the appellants sought to urge is that as the minors were represented in the trial Court by a guardian-ad-litem appointed by the Court, whose appointment continues throughout the proceedings in appeal as well, and as this guardian-ad-litem has not been impleaded in the appeal itself before the lower appellate Court to represent the interests of the minors, as it should have been, the minors must be held not to have been represented at all in the appeal. Mr. Bhattacharjee further contended that not only there was no representation, but there has been no proper filing of the appeal itself against the minors, as the appeal was not filed against the minors represented by the Court guardian.

8. In support of this contention Mr. Bhattacharjee placed reliance under Order 32 R. 3(5) of the CPC, which runs as follows:—

“A person appointed under sub-rule (1) to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement, removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit including proceedings in any Appellate or Revisional Court and any pro ceedings in the execution of a decree”.

9. From this it is contended that the only person that could represent the minors once a guardian-ad-litem is appointed, is that guardian and no other, and if the minors are not represented by him, it must be deemed that the minors had not been represented at all in the litigation. In this context sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of O. 32 and sub-rule (4) of Rule 3 of Order 32 may be noticed. sub-rule (1) provides:

“Where the defendant is a minor, the Court on being satisfied of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for such minor”.

10. Sub-rule (4) provides:

“No order shall be made on any application under this rule except upon notice to the minor and to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent Page: 63in that behalf, or, where there is no such guardian, upon notice to the father or other natural guardian of the minor, or, where there is no father or other natural guardian, to the person in whose care the minor is, and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person served with notice under this sub-rule”.

11. From this sub-rule it follows that no order shall be made on any application under this rule except upon notice to the minor and to any guardian-ad-litem of the minor appointed or declared, and sub-rule (5) follows it up by making the continuance of an appointment of a guardian-ad-litem throughout the proceedings obligatory even in the appellate and revisional stages.

12. It is not disputed in this case that Title Appeal No. 74/61 was filed against the minors, without their being represented by the guardian-ad-litem, who had been appointed in the suit representing the interests in the litigation. On the other hand, contrary to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mother of the minors was shown as the person in whose custody the minors are and who is supposed to represent them as such in the appeal. Thus sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of Order 32 has not been complied with in this case. The question that falls to be considered consequently is what is the effect of such non-compliance. In this context Dr. Medhi, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent No. 1 placed reliance on a number of decisions, namely, (1907) ILR 29 All 290, Dammar Singh v. Pirbhu Singh, (1908) ILR 30 All 55, Rup Chand v. Dasodha, AIR 1948 Bom 180, Onkar Bhika…Plaintiff v. Vithal Onkar…Defendant . and AIR 1954 Pat 349, Krishna Behari v. Kedar Nath. In (1908) ILR 30 All 55, where a guardian-ad-litem of a defendant respondent was not made a party to an appeal filed by the plaintiff until after the period of limitation for filing such appeal had expired, it was held that the appeal was not for this reason time-barred. It is not clear from this decision how the minor was represented if the guardian-ad-litem had not been impleaded as a party. Apparently as the appeal in that case had been preferred against the minor, the elementary precaution of making the guardian-ad-litem of the respondent a party representing the interest of the minor had been overlooked. However, in the absence of any clear indications on the facts of this case, this decision is not of much assistance.

13. The decision in (1907) ILR 29 All 290, is also to the similar effect. It must also be noticed that this decision was of the year, 1907, that is, before the present Code of Civil Procedure had been enacted.

14. In AIR 1948 Bom 180, the question arose as regards the determination of a guardian in a subsequent suit. Obviously sub-rules (4) and (5) of Order 32, Rule 3 of the CPC deal with cases of the same proceedings or subsequent proceedings arising out of the initial proceedings. It is observed in this case that where a guardian of a minor has been appointed by the Court but in a subsequent suit against the minor on a mortgage, another person is appointed as the minor's guardian-ad-litem, the previous appointment not having been brought to the notice of the Court, and such a person defends the suit and decree is passed and property sold in execution, the passing over of the certificated guardian is no more than a mere irregularity and would not of itself vitiate either the decree or a sale consequent upon such a decree. It was further, held that in the absence of any allegation of fraud or prejudice to the minor caused by such an irregularity, the proceedings must be regarded as valid and the auction sale upheld. But the learned Judge in that case apparently did not consider the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of Order 32 of the CPC, which dealt with the appointment of a guardian for the suit and his continuance during the stages of appeal and revision arising out of that suit. The decision in AIR 1954 Pat 349, cannot be of much assistance, as it is based on the amendment of Rule 4(4) of Order 32 by the Patna High Court, with which we are not concerned in this case.

15. The Code of Civil Procedure enjoins under Order 32 R. 3(5) that once a person is appointed a guardian-ad-litem, he should continue to represent the minor's interest throughout the litigation, in which the appointment of the guardian-ad-litem is made. As the decree in favour of the minors was passed by the trial Court with the guardian ad-litem representing them, whereas the appeal against that decree of the trial Court was filed without the minors being represented by a guardian-ad-litem, the appeal before the lower appellate Court cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to have been properly filed. Again it is clear that the trial Court had taken all the trouble of appointing a guardian-ad-litem for the litigation and all the care which the law bestowed in protecting the interest of the minors in a litigation is, as it were, thrown to the winds by the guardian-ad-litem not being impleaded to represent the minors before the lower appellate Court. If some unconnected, or otherwise irresponsible person is shown as a guardian to represent the minors, it is not difficult to hold that the minors' interest had not been represented at all in the litigation. All this would be academic in view of the plain language of sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of Order 32 of the CPC, which enjoins that when in a litigation a guardian-ad-litem is appointed, he and he alone could represent the interest of the minor.

16. In this view the position comes to this that when an appeal had been preferred against the minors to get rid of a decree passed in favour of the minors without the minors being represented by the guardian-ad-litem and the decree is reversed by the Page: 64appellate Court, injustice and prejudice would be writ large in these proceedings, and no further proof is really necessary to show that the minors' interest must necessarily have been prejudiced. It is because of the fact that the minors have not been represented that the learned Sub-ordinate judge did not care to go even to the most vital question, namely, whether there was legal necessity or not to support the alienation made by the natural guardian. Dr. Medhi's placing reliance on the appellants not pressing other issues before the lower appellate Court has no relevance as the minors were not represented and there was nothing that they could press in regard to the issues in which the decision of the trial Court was in their favour. Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration. I am satisfied that there has been no valid appeal preferred before the lower appellate Court against the minors, pro forma defendants, Nos. 8 and 9 and, therefore any decree passed in such an appeal cannot stand the scrutiny of law.

17. Dr. Medhi contended that as the lack of representation of the minors is a kind of irregularity, the whole matter should be regarded on that footing and could be set right by a remand, so that proper steps may be taken to have the minors represented by the Court guardian and the appeal proceeded with for hearing. This would amount to giving a new lease of life to an appeal, which had ceased to exist by efflux of time and nothing can be more prejudicial to the interest of the minors than extending such a privilege to a negligent party, who did not take necessary steps or procedure in filing an appeal against the minors appellant. In the result, therefore. Second Appeal No. 92/64 is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the Court below in Title Appeal No. 76/61 are confirmed and Second Appeal No. 91/64 is allowed and the judgment and decree of the Court below in Title Appeal No. 74/61 are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are thus confirmed in their entirety.

18. In the circumstances, there should be no order as to costs in both Second Appeal No. 91/64 and Second Appeal No. 92/64.

GGM/D.V.C

19. Ordered accordingly.