Mohammed Aejaz Ahmed Petitioner v. Vigaruddin & Co. Respondenst.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Manohar Prasad, J.

This is a reference by our learned brother Srinivasachari, J. The facts which give rise to this reference are: The respondeet herein applied to the Rent Controller for the fixation of fair-rent stating that the former tenant which was Abkari Department, was only paying Rs. 190 for 16 rooms and that therefore the rent of Rs. 300 now claimed by the landlord was excessive. The Rent Controller Page: 931after going into the matter assessed the fair rent at Rs. 178. The landlord being aggrieved by this order, appealed to the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, who agreed with the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. The landlord came up in revision to this Court which came up before our learned brother Srinivasachari, J. It was urged before our learned brother Srinivasachari, J., on behalf of the landlord, relying on an unreported decision of the erstwhile Hyderabad High Court in C.R.P No. 275/4 of 1955 of which one of us was a member, that when the proceedings were pending before the Rent Controller, the tenant had left the premises and therefore the relationship of the landlord and tenant had ceased to exist and as such the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to adjudicate about the matter that was pending before him. Our learned brother Srinivasachari, J., did not agree with the Bench decision and has hence made this reference.

2. It is not denied that at the time when the application for the fixation of fair rent was filed before the Rent Controller, the respondent was a tenant in the premises. The question that arises for consideration is whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to fix the amount of fair rent after the tenant had vacated the premises. In the case of Imadali v. A.M Ansan C.R.P No. 275/4 at 1955 a Division Bench of the erstwhile Hyderabad High Court, of which one of us was a member, took the view that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to fix the rent when the tenancy had already terminated. The decision of the Privy Council in Karnam Industrial Bank v. Satya Niranjan Shaw (1928) L.R 55 I.A 344 , 55 M.L.J 464, seems to us to be directly in point. This is a decision given under the Bengal Tenants Protection Act. The definition of a ‘tenant’ in House Rent Control Act is very similar to that in Bengal Tenants Protection Act. This was a case on an appeal. The appellants (the Bank) took a lease from the respondents (landlords) for a term of three years from November 1, 1920, at a rent of Rs. 5,400, a quarter payable in advance. On August 15, 1923, the landlords served the Bank with a notice to determine the lease for breach of the conditions of the rent agreement and on September 10, 1923, they instituted proceedings in ejectment claiming possession, arrears of rent, mesne profits and damages. On December 1, 1923, the appellants filed an application under section 15 of the Rent Act to the Controller to fix the standard rent of the premises and to grant a certificate of the standard rent. On the 11th March, 1924, the Rent Controller, fixed the standard rent at Rs. 1,420 per mensem and granted the certificate.

3. Aggrieved by this, the landlords filed an appeal to the President of the Improvement Tribunal and the appellants also filed an appeal. Both these appeals were dismissed on the ground that the Act had ceased to apply to the premises and therefore he had no jurisdictson. The landlords applied to the High Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, to revise the order of the President. A rule nisi was granted and the hearing stood over until the hearing of the ejectment suit. The suit was heard by Ghose, J., and he held that the lease was determined on August 15, 1923 and that the Bank had given up possession on January 24, 1924. He gave judgment for mesne profits from August 15, 1923 to the January 24, 1924, measured by the standard rent fixed by the Controller of Rs. 1,420 per mensem. He further gave judgment for the damages for breach of covenant to repair with a reference to the Registrar to asssess the amount. The learned Judge made no order for the payment of arrears of rent.

4. On June 19, 1925, the High Court heard the arguments on the rule nisi and gave judgment setting aside the order of the Controller on the ground that he had no jurisdiction at the time of the application. The Bank appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal filed by the Bank was dismissed and cross-appeal was allowed and an order for arrears of rent was passed. On appeal it was held;

“Under section 15, of the Act the Cotroller had jurisdiction to detemine when the premises were first let, and whether there is any difficulty which makes it, in his opinion, just to fix the standard rent under sub-section 3(a). He did in fact consider both questions, and if he came to a wrong conclusion the remedy is not by way of attack on his jurisdiction, but by appeal to the President of the Improvement Tribunal under section 18. The Controller has power to fix the standard rent so as to operate retrospectively.”

5. It was further observed:

“Where the contractual rent has been paid from the begining of the tenancy, and the sum so paid has become irrecoverable by lapse of six months after the last payment, the landlord is entitled to hold the sums so paid, for, the contractual rent on the basis of the standard rent, will only run after the date up to which the contractual rent has been so paid. In such a case the appellants were entitled to be debited with the standard rent from the beginning of the tenancy.”

6. This ruling is a clear authority for the proposition that the Rent Controller has got the jurisdiction to fix the fair rent for the period during which the tenant was occupying the premises even after the tenant had vacated the premises.

7. The Madras High Court in the case of Kandaswami Chettiar v. Arunachala Mudaliar (1958) 2 M.L.J 392 following the decision of the Privy Council in Karnani Industrial Bank v. Satya Niranjan Shaw (1928) L.R 55 I.A 344 , 33 M.L.J 464, has held:

“A tenant who has vacated the building in his occupation under a landlord, but who is liable to pay arrears of rent to the landlord in respect of the premises, has got a right to file an application for fixation of fair rent for the premises formerly in his occupation, even though he might not be in actual occupation of the same on the date of the filing of the application. An extenant can claim the benefit of the Act to wipe out his arrears.”

8. Similar view has been adopted by Falshaw, J., in Manohar Lal Nathan Mal v. Nandanlal Murari Lal A.I.R 1956 Punj. 190, and it has been held:

“Where a tenant applies for the determination of standarce rent in a suit brought against him by the landlord for ejectment, the fact that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises in dispute does not render his interest in the determination merely academic. If the standard rent is determined to be substantially less than the rent previously paid by him he would get the benefit of a reduction for a period extending upto six months before the institution of the suit which means that his actual pecuniary interest in the result cannot be regarded as negligible.”

9. In the light of the Privy Council decision and on a reconsideration of the matter, we feel that the view taken by one of us in C.R.P No. 275/4 of 1955 that once the tenant vacates the premises, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to fix the fair rent, is not correct. In the instant case what the Rent Controller had decided is only in respect of the rent that was payable during the period that the tenant was in occupation of the premises. The Rent Controller, it must be stated, was not giving the decision with regard to the fair rent for a period when the tenant ceased to occupy the premises. It is therefore clear that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to fix the amount of fair rent for the period during which the respondent was the tenant.

10. In the result we do not find any force in this revision. It is dismissed. Having regard to the facts of the case, we do not pass any order regarding costs of the Court.

Revision dismissed.