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S.C Chhabra, Director v. Gontermann Peipers (India) Limited

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Dec 5, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.M. Jain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The complainant, M/s Gontermann Peipers (India) Ltd., filed criminal complaints under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against M/s Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd. (accused No.1) and various office-bearers (including Managing Director, Chairman and other Directors). The complainant alleged that it supplied cotton yarn to the accused-company beginning in October 1997, supplying material worth Rs. 1,34,68,299/-. Payments of Rs. 47,84,000.41 were received; a balance of Rs. 86,85,298.59 remained outstanding. To clear the outstanding amount, the accused-company allegedly issued six cheques (two dated 2.1.1998, two dated 2.2.1998 and two dated 3.2.1998). The complaints were filed in respect of each cheque (one complaint per cheque or group as indicated), and the cheques were allegedly dishonoured with the endorsement "Funds Insufficient" (dishonour memorandum dated 28.2.1998).

The learned Judicial Magistrate recorded preliminary evidence of the complainant and, by order dated 30.7.1998, summoned the petitioners as accused for offences under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Seventeen (17) petitions were thereafter filed in the High Court by various directors and office-bearers of M/s Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd.—some petitions by S. Chhabra, others by S.K. Chhibar, R. Sahni, S.K. Sahni and V.K. Garg—challenging the complaints and the summoning orders as illegal and an abuse of process. The Court consolidated the 17 petitions for a single order because common questions of law and fact were involved.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the criminal complaints and the summoning orders can be quashed on the ground that the complaints failed to state specifically what functions or duties were discharged by the accused-directors (i.e., whether allegations were insufficient to attract liability under Section 141(1) read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act).
  2. Whether the allegations made in the complaint (that the directors were "actively involved in the entire business" and "responsible to the company for the conduct of the business" and had knowledge of the issuance and dishonour of the cheques) satisfy the requirements of Section 141(1) and/or Section 141(2) of the Act to proceed against the directors as accused.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused-petitioners' Arguments

  • The general/bald allegation that the accused-directors were "actively involved" in the business and "responsible" for conduct of the business is insufficient to prosecute them under Section 141; the complaint should specify what functions or duties each accused performed.
  • The complainant failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 141 (as contended in some petitions), and did not make out a case under Section 141(1) for specific directors.
  • Some persons impleaded had ceased to be connected to the company (for example, one resigned w.e.f. 21.6.1996, another had died on 30.5.1996, and another left the company on 30.10.1998) and/or were nominee directors with no involvement in business; thus, their being made accused was mala fide and ground for quashing.
  • The accused-petitioners relied on precedent law including K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. (JT 2000 (Suppl.) SC 519) to support the submission that the complaint must show that at the relevant time the director was "in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business" for Section 141 liability to attach.

Complainant's Arguments

  • The complainant alleged a total dishonour of six cheques amounting to Rs. 86,35,141.44, dishonoured on 28.2.1998, and made specific allegations against the accused-petitioners both in the notices and in the criminal complaints.
  • From the allegations in the notices and criminal complaints, the accused-petitioners were prima facie shown to have committed the offence under Section 138; therefore, the complaints and summoning orders could not be quashed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., JT 2000 (Suppl.) SC 519 Shows that a person other than the company can be proceeded against under Section 141 only if it is established that he was "in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business"; the substance of allegations must satisfy the ingredients of Section 141(1). The Court held the authority inapplicable on the facts before it because, unlike in K.P.G. Nair, the present complaints expressly and specifically alleged that the accused-directors were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business and had knowledge of issuance and dishonour of the cheques. Therefore the accused-petitioners could not take benefit of that precedent.
Harbhajan Singh Kalra v. State of Haryana, 1992 The Criminal Law Times 178 Considered the sufficiency of allegations under Section 141(2) of the Act to proceed against an accused. The Court observed this authority was not applicable because the present case primarily concerned allegations falling under Section 141(1), not Section 141(2).
Raj Kumar Mangla v. Indo Lowenbrau Breweries Ltd., 1997 (2) CLR 326 (P&H) : 1997 (3) RCR (Crl.) 494 (P&H) Deals with quashing where there was no allegation that the partner (petitioner) was in charge of or responsible for conduct of business or that offence was committed with his connivance/neglect. The Court found the precedent inapplicable because, in the present matters, the complainant had made specific allegations against the petitioners that they were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, unlike the factual posture of Raj Kumar Mangla.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the pleadings, the contents of the complaints and the statutory language of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It reviewed Section 141 (reproduced in the opinion) and analysed its two parts:

  • Sub-section (1) deems every person who, at the time the offence under Section 138 was committed, was "in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company," to be guilty and liable to be proceeded against; it also contains a proviso allowing such persons to exculpate themselves by proving lack of knowledge or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the offence.
  • Sub-section (2) creates additional liability where the offence is shown to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer.

Applying this statutory framework, the Court found that the complainant's allegations—expressly stating that the accused-petitioners (as directors) were actively involved in the entire business of the company, were responsible for conduct of the business, and had knowledge of issuance and dishonour of the cheques—fell squarely within the scope of Section 141(1). The complainant had also, in terms, alleged facts relevant to Section 141(2) (knowledge/consent) though the principal reliance was on subsection (1).

The Court rejected the accused-petitioners' contention that more specific allegations setting out the particular functions or duties performed by each director were required at the complaint stage. The Court held that those specifics were not prerequisite to satisfy Section 141(1); the existing allegations were sufficient at the stage of considering petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that the statutory safeguard in Section 141(1) permits the accused to establish at an appropriate stage that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they exercised due diligence to prevent it. Accordingly, the Court concluded that quashing the complaints and summoning orders was not warranted on the grounds advanced.

The Court also analysed and distinguished the precedents relied upon by the accused-petitioners:

  • The K.P.G. Nair decision was distinguished because, there, the complaint did not specifically allege that the director was in charge of and responsible for the business at the relevant time; in contrast, the present complaints did so in express terms.
  • The Harbhajan Singh Kalra and Raj Kumar Mangla authorities were held not to apply on the facts because they involved Section 141(2) issues or lacked allegations of in-charge/responsibility, whereas the present cases included explicit allegations under Section 141(1).

The Court reiterated that at the appropriate stage (trial), the accused-petitioners would be entitled to lead evidence to prove lack of knowledge or that they exercised due diligence to prevent the offence, but that entitlement did not justify quashing the complaints at the present stage.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: After considering the record and submissions, the Court found the petitions to be without merit and DISMISSED all 17 petitions. The opinion concludes with the order: "Petitions dismissed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The criminal complaints under Section 138 read with Section 141 and the summoning orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (dated 30.7.1998) remain in force and are not quashed; the accused-petitioners will stand proceeded against as summoned.
  • Procedure at trial: The decision leaves open the statutory defence available under Section 141(1) (that the offence was committed without the individual's knowledge or that the person exercised all due diligence). The accused-petitioners may raise and attempt to prove those defences at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
  • Precedential impact: The Court distinguished earlier authorities and applied Section 141(1) to the specific allegations made; the opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the statutory interpretation and factual application present in the record. No broader legal doctrine beyond the Court's interpretation in this factual context is announced.
Petitions dismissed.
Show all summary ...

V.M Jain, J.:— This order shall dispose of 17 petitions, bearing Criminal Misc. Nos. 20573-M of 2001, 20575-M of 2001, 20577-M Of 2001, 20579-M of 2001, 20581-M of 2001, 20583-M of 2001, 48751-M of 2001, 48753-M of 2001, 48755-M of 2001, 48757-M Page: 566of 2001, 48759-M of 2001, 48761-M of 2001, 48763-M of 2001, 48765-M of 2001, 4876 M of 2001, 48769-M of 2001, and 48771-M of 2001, filed by the complainants against IV Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Limited and its various office-bearers, including Managi Director and Directors. Six of the petitions have been filed by accused-petitioner S. Chhabra, the other six petitions have been filed by accused-petitioners S.K Chhibar and R. Sahni, while remaining five petitions have been filed by accused-petitioners S.K Sahni and V.K Garg, Directors of M/s Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd. Since common questions law and facts are involved in the 17 petitions, all the 17 petitions are being disposed of by single order. For the sake of convenience, the facts of Criminal Misc. No. 20573-M of 2001 titled as S.C Chhabra, Director… v. Gontermann Peipers (India) Limited… are being noticed.

2. The complainant M/s Gontermann Peipers (India) Ltd. had filed the criminal complain under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against M/s Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd. as accused No. 1 and other office-bearers of the said company, including the Managing Director, the Chairm and the Directors of the said company. In the said complaint, it was alleged that the complainant-company had been supplying cotton yarn to the accused-company and the suppli started in October, 1997 and that total material worth Rs. 1,34,68,299/- was supplied, out which total payment of Rs. 47,84,000.41 had been paid from time to time and that there was total balance of Rs. 86,85,298.59, which was still payable by the accused-company to tl? complainant. It was alleged that in order to clear the above said outstanding amount, the accused-company issued six cheques, out of which two cheques were dated 2.1.1998, two cheques were dated 2.2.1998 and two cheques were dated 3.2.1998, as detailed in para 5 the complaint. The said complaint was filed in respect of one of the two cheques date 2.1.1998 for Rs. 5,34,551.53, while the remaining five complaints had been filed in respe of the other cheques. It was alleged in the complaint that all these cheques were presented but the same were dishonoured, vide dishonouring memo dated 28.2.1998 and the complain ant-company had been informed by its bankers on various dates. It was alleged that as p the dishonouring memo dated 28.2.1998, the cheques were dishonoured with the remarl “Funds Insufficient”. It was alleged that in spite of being informed by the complainant-company in this regard, the accused had failed to make any payment uptill now. It was furth alleged that accused No. 1 is the company, accused No. 2 is the signatory to the cheque (also the authorised signatory-cum-Managing Director/Director of the said company), accuse No. 3 was the General Manager, accused No. 4 was the Chairman, while accused Nos. 511 were the Directors, “who were actively involved in the entire business of the company ar were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business as well as the company ar were responsible for the encashment of the cheques and were having the knowledge of th issuance of the cheques, as well as dishonouring of the cheques. Therefore, all these person are guilty of an offence committed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act…………”

3. After the criminal complaints were filed, the learned Judicial Magistrate, recorded the preliminary evidence of the complainant and thereafter, vide order dated 30.7.1998, the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh, ordered the summoning of the petitioners (in all the cases) as accused for the offence under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Aggrieved against the filing of the criminal complaints and the summoning orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate in all the six criminal complaints, various Directors of the accused-company filed the above mentioned 17 petitions in this Court, seeking the quashment of the criminal complaint and the summoning orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate, being illegal and abuse of the process of Court.

4. In the petitions, it was alleged by the accused-petitioners that the accused-petitioner were dealing in the affairs of the company. It was further alleged that the complainant in the complaint had not alleged that as to what functions or duties were being discharged by the accused-petitioners in the alleged handling of the affairs of the company. It was alleged that the complainant had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act. It was alleged that the complaint filed by the complainant was mala fide, inasmuch as accused at Sr. No. 6 had already resigned w.e.f 21.6.1996 Accused at Sr. Page: 567No. 7 had already expired on 30.5.1996 while accused at Sr. No. 10 had left the company on 30.10.1998 and still the complainant had impleaded them as accused and the trial Magistrate had ordered their summoning. It was alleged that some of the Directors were the nominee Directors and had nothing to do with the business of the company. It was alleged that no case for proceeding against the accused-petitioners was made out in the criminal complaints filed by the complainant and as such the complaints and summoning orders were liable to be quashed.

5. The said petition was contested by the complainant by filing the written reply. It was alleged that these complaints were filed for dishonouring of six cheques, total amounting to Rs. 86,35,141.44 and that these cheques were dishonoured on 28.2.1998 It was further alleged that there were specific allegations against the accused-petitioners not only in he notices but also in the criminal complaints. It was alleged that from the allegations made in the notices and the criminal complaints, the accused-petitioners were proved to have committed the offence under Section 138 of the Act. It was alleged that the complaints and the summoning orders could not be quashed when there were specific allegations in the complaint against the accused-petitioners.

6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties in all the 17 petitions and have gone through the record carefully.

7. The learned counsel for the accused-petitioners has submitted before me that the mere allegation of the complainant in the criminal complaint under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act that the accused-petitioners (who are Directors of the accused-company) were actively involved for the business of the company and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and were responsible for the encashment of the cheques and were having the knowledge of the issuance of the cheques as well as the dishonouring of the cheques, would not be enough to prosecute the accused-petitioners (who were Directors of the company) and/or to proceed against them. It was submitted that the complainant had failed to allege in the complaints as to what functions or duties were being discharged by the accused-petitioners in the alleged handing of the affairs of the company. It was alleged that in the absence of any such allegation, the bald allegation made by the complainant that the accused-petitioners were involved in the business of the company and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and were responsible for the encashment of the cheques, would not be enough to make the accused-petitioners liable for the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act. Reliance has been placed on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported as K.P.G Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd.”, JT 2000 (Suppl.) SC 519.

8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record, I find no force in this submission of the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners.

9. In these cases, as referred to above, the complainant had specifically alleged in the criminal complaints that the accused-petitioners (who are the Directors of the accused-company) were actively involved in the entire business of the company and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and were having knowledge of the issuance of the cheques as well as dishonouring of the cheques and as such all the accused-petitioners were guilty for the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141of the Act. The complainant having made all these allegations in the criminal complaints, in my opinion, had discharged the obligation as required under Section 141 of the Act for prosecuting the petitioners as accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. Nothing else was required to be alleged by the complainant in the criminal complaints in order to show that the accused-petitioners were liable of the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act. In my opinion, the complainant was not required to allege in the criminal complaints as to what functions or duties were being discharged by the accused-company, as submitted before me by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners.

10. Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, reads as under:—

“Offences by companies—(1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was incharge of, Page: 568and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

Explanation—For the purposes of this section:—

(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and

(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

11. From the above, it would be clear that Section 141 is in two parts. Sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act provides that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under the said Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance if, or is attributable to, any neglect on part of any director, manager, secretary or Other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. This would show that sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act is in addition to sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act. This would mean that a person, who is covered by sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Besides that, those persons who are covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act, shall also be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall also liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, in addition to the persons who are covered in sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act. With regard to the persons who are covered by sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act, it has been provided that nothing contained in the said sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Thus, in respect of the persons covered by sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act, the legislature has already provided a safeguard inasmuch as those persons having been given a right to show that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

12. In the present case, at this stage, the case of the accused-petitioners is squarely covered by the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act, inasmuch as in the criminal complaints, it has been specifically alleged that the accused-petitioners were actively involved in the entire business of the company and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and were responsible for the encashment of the cheques and were having the knowledge of the issuance of the cheques as well as the dishonouring of the cheques. In fact, the complainant while making the above said allegations in the criminal complaints had also tried to cover the case of the accused-petitioners in sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act, by alleging that the accused-petitioners were having the knowledge about the issuance of the cheques as well as the dishonouring of the cheques, meaning thereby that the offence had been committed with the consent of the accused-petitioners, Page: 569who were the Directors of the company. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the allegations made by the complainant in the criminal complaints clearly bring the case of the accused-petitioners within the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act. However, at the appropriate stage, the accused-petitioners would be entitled to prove that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. However, at this stage, in my opinion, the criminal complaints and the summoning orders passed by the learned Magistrate, cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the complainant had not alleged in the criminal complaints, that as to what functions or duties were being discharged by the accused-petitioners in handling the affairs of the company.

13. The authority JT 2000 (Suppl.) SC 519 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, in my opinion, would have no application to the facts of the present case. In the reported case, the petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C filed by the accused-petitioner, seeking the quashment of the criminal proceedings emanating from the complaint filed by the respondent against him and others, under Section 138 of the Act, was dismissed by the Delhi High Court, taking the view that the averments made in the complaint read along with the statements of the witnesses, prima facie, go to show that at the relevant time, the appellant (petitioner) being the Director of the accused-company, was also in charge of and responsible for the business of the accused-company. In the appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was submitted by the counsel for the accused-appellant that from a plain reading of the relevant allegations made in the complaint do not even, prima facie, make out a case against the appellant and that he is sought to be prosecuted in view of the provisions of Section 141 of the Act, as he happened to be the Director of the accused-company at one point of time. On the other hand the learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that from the allegations made in the complaint it has to be inferred that the accused-appellant was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the accused-company at the time when the offence was committed. In the reported case, in the criminal complaint, it was not specifically alleged by the complainant that the accused-appellant (who was one of the Directors of the accused-company), was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company.

14. After referring to Section 141 of the Act, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a person other than the company can be proceeded against under Section 141 of the Act only if that person was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the words of Section 141(1) of the Act, need not be incorporated in a complaint as magic words but it also could not be disputed that the substance of the allegation read as a whole should answer and fulfil the requirements of the ingredients of the said provision. After going through the allegations made in the complaint, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the allegations made in the complaint do not either in express words or with reference to the allegations contained therein, make out a case that at the time of commission of the offence, the appellant was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was under those circumstances that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had quashed the proceedings in question against the accused-appellant alone.

15. In my opinion, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the above mentioned authority, would be of no help to the accused-petitioners in the present case. In the present case, as the complainant had specifically, in express words, alleged in the complaints that the accused-petitioners being the Directors of the company were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and as such they were liable to the proceeded against. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the above mentioned authority, had held that even if the language of Section 141(1) of the Act has not been incorporated in the complaint, still the person can be made accused if the substance of the allegations, if read as a whole, should answer and fulfil the requirements of the ingredients of the said provision. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint itself fulfil the requirement of Section 141(1) of the Act. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the accused-petitioners cannot take any benefit of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Page: 570Court, in K.P.G Nair's case (supra).

16. The other authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, reported as “Harbhajan Singh Kalra v. State of Haryana,” 1992 The Criminal Law Times 178, in my opinion, would also have no application to the facts of the present case. In the reported case, this Court had considered the provisions of Section 141(2) of the Act for considering as to whether the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to proceed against the petitioner as accused. However, the case of the complainant in the present case is in respect of the allegations covered by Section 141(1) of the Act. Similarly, the other authority reported as “Raj Kumar Mangla… v. Indo Lowenbrau Breweries Ltd.….,” 1997 (2) CLR 326 (P&H) : 1997 (3) RCR (Crl.) 494 (P&H), relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, would have no application to the facts of the present case. In the reported case, there was no allegation against the petitioner, who was one of the partners of the firm, that he was in charge of or responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business or that the offence was committed with his connivance or due to his neglect. It was under these circumstances that it was held by this Court that the complaint and the summoning order qua the said petitioner Were liable to the quashed. However, as referred to above, in the present case, the specific allegations have been made by the complainant against the petitioners, in the various complaints filed by the complainant against them.

17. No other point has been urged before me in these petitions.

18. For the reasons recorded above, finding no merit in these petitions, all the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Petitions dismissed.