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Chhotibai Bhratar Da... v. Mansukhlal Jasraj, M...

Bombay High Court
Jul 26, 1940
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Case Summary — Beaumont, C.J. (Ahmednagar Execution Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an execution application (a darkhast) filed on March 28, 1936, seeking sale of immovable property described in clause 5 of a compromise decree. The underlying suit was an ordinary money suit in which, on July 7, 1932, a compromise decree was recorded. The decree noted the plaintiff's original claim to be approximately Rs. 11,000 with interest and recorded that the defendants admitted the claim and agreed to a settlement. Under the compromise:

  • The plaintiff agreed to purchase lands mentioned in clause 6 and accepted Rs. 7,500 as the amount due on his claim.
  • Clause 3 provided that defendant No. 2 was to give possession of the land referred to in clause 6 and stated that certain properties, which had been the subject of an injunction under Civil Procedure Code, O. XXXIX, r. 1, would remain under injunction until defendant No. 2 executed the sale-deed.
  • Clause 4 provided for a decree of Rs. 7,500 against defendant No. 2 payable by five instalments and specified that on failure to pay any three instalments the plaintiff could recover the balance by sale through Court of the mortgaged properties mentioned in clause 5.
  • The decree recorded that defendant No. 2 had mortgaged to the plaintiff the properties in clause 5 as security for the Rs. 7,500, and the decree also contained the statement that “defendant No. 2 is not personally liable for the said debt.”

In the court below the learned Judge assumed the compromise decree required registration under the Indian Registration Act but held that, although the decree could not be enforced as a mortgage decree (because it was not registered), the property could nevertheless be attached in execution of the decree regarded as a money decree. The present appeal challenges that result.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a compromise decree in a pure money suit which purports to create or charge immovable property (a mortgage or charge) requires registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act (specifically cl. (vi) of sub-section (2)).
  2. Whether an order for attachment before judgment (an interlocutory order) which had been made in respect of the immovable property can be treated as making the land the subject-matter of the suit so as to avoid the registration requirement.
  3. If the decree is unregistered, whether the court may still enforce sale of the immovable property in execution of the decree by treating the decree as a money decree (and not as a registered mortgage deed).
  4. Whether clause 4 of the compromise decree (which states that defendant No. 2 is not personally liable for the debt) prevents attachment or sale of the mortgaged property in execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the compromise decree purported to create a charge on immovable property and therefore fell within section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration Act, requiring registration; having not been registered, it could not create any mortgage or charge on immovable property (and the court could not treat it as creating such a charge under s. 49 of the Act).
  • Mr. Rao for the appellant argued that clause 4's provision that “defendant No. 2 is not personally liable for the said debt” meant that the property could not be attached in execution (i.e., the clause prevented attachment through personal liability). Thus the property should be exempt from sale in execution.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Mr. Kane for the respondent relied on authority to argue that the immovable property had been the subject-matter of an interlocutory order for attachment before judgment and that an application for attachment before judgment is a distinct proceeding; therefore an order made on that proceeding made the land the subject-matter of the (combined) proceeding and so the decree need not be registered under s. 17(2)(vi).
  • According to this argument (supported by cited cases), the compromise decree merely extended the earlier attachment and therefore did not create a new charge requiring registration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govindaswami v. Rasu, (1934) 58 Mad. 781 Used to support the proposition that an interlocutory application for attachment before judgment is a “proceeding” whose subject-matter may be the immovable property attached; thus a compromise decree extending that attachment would not require registration under s. 17(2)(vi). The Court answered and rejected this authority: it criticised the reasoning (including an odd interpretation of “dismissed”), held that “proceeding” in cl. (vi) means an independent originating proceeding (not an interlocutory application), and further stated that an order for attachment before judgment is an in personam injunction that does not create a right or interest in rem in the land. The Court concluded Govindaswami was wrongly decided and refused to follow it.
Krishna v. Madhav, (1938) 40 Bom. L.R. 929 Applied the reasoning of Govindaswami v. Rasu to similar facts (single Judge decision applying the Madras reasoning). The Court observed that Krishna v. Madhav merely applied Govindaswami without considering its correctness; the Court did not follow that line of authority and treated it as unpersuasive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and its sub-section (2), clause (vi). Clause (vi) makes clear that a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit requires registration. The Court observed that, prima facie, a compromise decree in a money suit that creates or purports to create a charge on immovable property falls within clause (vi).

The Court then examined the respondent's contention (advanced by Mr. Kane) that because there had been an order for attachment before judgment in respect of the land, the attachment-proceeding made the land the subject-matter of the proceeding and therefore the compromise decree did not require registration. The Court analysed the meaning of the word “proceeding” in clause (vi). It concluded that, in that context, “proceeding” naturally refers to an independent originating proceeding (such as one under a special Act) and not to interlocutory applications within a suit. The Court rejected the argument that attachment before judgment converts the land into the subject-matter of the suit.

Further, the Court gave a substantive reason why an order for attachment before judgment cannot be treated as creating an interest in rem in the land: an order for attachment is an in personam injunction restraining the defendant from disposing of the land and does not create any right or interest in the land itself. On these bases the Court concluded the case of Govindaswami v. Rasu was wrongly decided and should not be followed; Krishna v. Madhav had merely followed Govindaswami without addressing its correctness and was therefore not persuasive.

Accepting that the compromise decree required registration (as the Court below had assumed), the Court next turned to the enforcement question. The lower Court had held (and the present Court considered) that although the unregistered decree could not be enforced as a mortgage decree, the property could nevertheless be attached in execution of the compromise decree treated as a money decree. The appellant contended this should not be permitted because clause 4 stated defendant No. 2 was not personally liable.

Beaumont, C.J. analysed clause 4 in two ways. If read with reference to the mortgage aspect, clause 4 can mean that although defendant No. 2 is ordered to pay in instalments, on default recovery is limited to sale of the mortgaged property (i.e., recovery is by sale of the security). If the clause is read ignoring any reference to the mortgage (as s. 49 of the Registration Act requires the court to do in considering an unregistered instrument), the clause becomes an order that defendant No. 2 pay a sum of money coupled with a statement that she is not personally liable — an apparent inconsistency. Construing that statement without reference to the mortgage, the Court thought it meant there was no personal liability in the sense of liability of the person (i.e., attachment of the person), but it did not mean the property was exempted from attachment. The Court concluded that, whichever construction is adopted, clause 4 did not exempt the particular mortgaged property from attachment in execution.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was DISMISSED and the decree of the lower Court was confirmed (with costs).

Implications (direct, as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court held that a compromise decree in a money suit which comprises immovable property not being the subject-matter of the suit falls within section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration Act and requires registration; an unregistered decree cannot be treated as creating a mortgage interest.
  • The Court rejected the view that an interlocutory order for attachment before judgment makes the land the subject-matter of the suit so as to avoid registration; it criticised and declined to follow Govindaswami v. Rasu (1934) 58 Mad. 781 and noted Krishna v. Madhav (1938) 40 Bom. L.R. 929 merely followed that reasoning without evaluating its correctness.
  • Despite an unregistered compromise decree being ineffective to operate as a registered mortgage, the Court upheld the lower Court's conclusion that the mortgaged property could nevertheless be attached and sold in execution of the decree regarded as a money decree; clause 4 of the compromise (that defendant No. 2 is “not personally liable”) did not exempt the property from attachment.
  • The decision directly affected the rights of the parties by permitting execution-sale remedies against the property described in clause 5 despite the compromise decree not having created a registrable mortgage title; the appeal was dismissed and the execution application effectively allowed to proceed as ordered below.
Decree confirmed.

End of summary (based exclusively on the provided opinion).

Show all summary ...

Page: 36Beaumont, C.J:—

This is an appeal from a decision in execution of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Ahmednagar, and it raises an interesting question under the Indian Registration Act. The suit in which this darkhast arises is an ordinary money suit, and on July 7, 1932, there was a compromise decree. The decree notices that the plaintiff's claim was for Rs. 11,000 odd and interest, and states that the plaintiff's claim is admitted by the defendants, and that it is agreed that this suit and some other suit, of which we have no particulars, were to be settled. The plaintiff was to purchase lands mentioned in cl. 6 and he was also to accept a sum of Rs. 7,500 as the amount due in respect of his claim. Then in cl. 3 there is a provision that defendant No. 2 was to give possession of the land referred to in cl. 6 as therein mentioned and then appears a statement that under Civil Procedure Code, O. XXXIX, r. 1, certain properties, against which an injunction had been issued, should continue subject to the injunction until defendant No. 2 executed the sale-deed. Then in cl. 4 it is provided that a decree for Rs. 7,500 should be passed against defendant No. 2, and then occur the words that “defendant No. 2 do pay the said sum of Rs. 7,500 by five instalments”. Then there is a provision that on failure to pay any three instalments the plaintiff should recover the whole of the amount then remaining due by sale through Court of the mortgaged properties mentioned in cl. 5, and it was stated that defendant No. 2 had in accordance with this compromise mortgaged to the plaintiff the properties belonging to her mentioned in cl. 5 for the said sum of Rs. 7,500, and then comes a statement that “defendant No. 2 is not personally liable for the said debt”.

This darkhast was filed on March 28, 1936, and it asks for sale of the property referred to in cl. 5 and mortgaged by the decree.

The first point taken by the appellant is that the decree required registration under s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, and that, not having been registered, it cannot create any mortgage interest in the plaintiff, nor is the Court at liberty to look at it as creating a charge on the immoveable property, that being the effect of s. 49 of the Act. Under s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, all non-testamentary instruments which operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property require registration. But by sub-s. (2) certain exceptions are introduced, and cl. (vi) is in these terms:—

“Any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding.”

So that, if a decree or order is made on a compromise which comprises immoveable property other than that which is the Page: 37subject-matter of the suit or proceeding, the decree requires registration. Prima facie this case clearly falls within cl. (vi), because the decree in a purely money suit creates or purports to create a charge on immoveable property.

However, Mr. Kane for the respondent has taken a point which is supported by two cases to which he has referred. The point which he takes is this: that the immoveable property over which the compromise decree purported to create a charge had been the subject-matter of the order for attachment before judgment which is mentioned in the decree (and I will assume that to be so, though the record does not establish it), that the application for attachment before judgment was a proceeding, that an order made on that proceeding had, as its subject-matter, the land in question, and that such order did not require registration, and that as the compromise decree extends the attachment, the effect is to make the land attached the subject-matter of the suit.

In support of his argument Mr. Kane has referred us to the case of Govindaswami v. Rasu, (1934) 58 Mad. 781 which was a decision of a single Judge. In that case the suit was for a money decree, and an application had been made for attachment before judgment of certain immoveable property, and that application was to be heard with the decree. An order was made at the hearing “Petition is dismissed”, which I should have thought effectively disposed of the application. But the learned Judge says that “the use of the word ‘dismissed’ conveys no more than that the petition was disposed of by the decree made in the suit”, which seems a strange interpretation to place upon the word. However, the reasoning of the learned Judge undoubtedly is that an interlocutory application for attachment before judgment is a proceeding, that an order made on that proceeding in the compromise decree has the effect of making the land attached the subject-matter of the suit, and so saves the decree from the necessity of registration. It seems to me, with great respect to the learned Judge, that there are several answers to that reasoning. In the first place, although no doubt, the expression “proceedings” does, in some contexts, include interlocutory proceedings, still, when you get a reference to a decree or order to be made in a suit or proceeding, the natural meaning of “proceeding” is an independent originating proceeding, which may be contrasted with a suit, a proceeding that is under some special Act. In my opinion in cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17 the word “proceeding” is used in that sense, and the fact that land is attached before judgment does not make it the subject matter of the suit. A further difficulty appears to me to be that it is not correct to say that land is the subject-matter of an order for attachment before judgment. An order for attachment is merely Page: 38an injunction restraining the defendant from disposing of certain land, which operates in personam and not in rem, and which does not create any right or interest in the land. If I may say so with great respect to the learned Judge, it seems to me fantastic to say that in any circumstances immoveable property can be regarded as the subject-matter of a suit merely for a money decree. In my opinion, the case of Govindaswami v. Rasu (1934) 58 Mad. 781 was wrongly decided, and the question then arises whether weought to follow it upon the principal of stare decisis. I realise that authorities which may affect title to immoveable property ought not lightly to be disturbed; but this decision seems to me to be contrary to the plain words of an Act of Parliament. It was decided less than five years ago, and, so far as we have been able to ascertain, it has not been cited or referred to in any decision of any other High Court except in a decision of this High Court in Krishna v. Madhav (1938) 40 Bom. L.R 929. That was a decision of a single Judge, and the learned Judge merely applied the reasoning of the case of Govindaswami v. Rasu (1934) 58 Mad. 781 to the facts in his case without considering whether the decision was right or wrong. As I have said, I think the Madras decision was wrong, and under the plain words of the Indian Registration Act this compromise decree, which involved, land not the subject-matter of the suit, required registration.

In the Court below the learned Judge assumed that the decree required registration, and apparently the two cases, I have mentioned, were not brought to his notice. But he held that, although the decree could not be enforced as a mortgage decree, the property in question could be attached in execution of the decree, regarded as a money decree. Mr. Rao for the appellant contends that cannot be done because of the provisions in cl. 4 of the decree that defendant No. 2 is not personally liable for the said debt. If I were to construe cl. 4 as a whole without reference to the Indian Registration Act, I should say that the meaning of it is that, although defendant No. 2 is expressly ordered to pay the debt by the instalments mentioned, still, on default the monies are only to be recovered by sale of the mortgaged property, and not by any other process, against the defendant or her property. But, dealing with the clause as a whole in that sense, it is perfectly plain that this property is not exempted from execution. If, on the other hand, one is to read the clause omitting all reference to the mortgage upon this property, as one is required to do by s. 49 of the Indian Registration Act, one gets this: an order on defendant No. 2 to pay a sum of money coupled with a provision that she is not personally liable for the debt. The two things are really inconsistent, and, construing the clause without reference to the mortgage, I think that it means that defendant No. 2 must pay, but there is to be no personal liability, in the sense Page: 39of liability to attachment of her person. That is the meaning I should be disposed to give to the clause, if I have to omit all reference to the mortgaged property. But whichever way one reads the clause, it seems to me clear that it does not exempt this particular property from attachment. In my view, therefore, the judgment of the lower Court was right, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Wassoodew, J.:—I agree.

Decree confirmed.
J.G.R