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Akash @ Vijay Kumar Khandekar v. State Of Maharashtra Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed an application for parole on the ground of his father's illness, specifically citing a heart ailment. This parole application was rejected by an order dated 25th May 2011. Aggrieved by this rejection, the petitioner filed the present petition challenging the denial of parole. The petitioner also relied on a medical certificate dated 17th July 2011 to support the claim of his father's illness. The petitioner had previously been released on furlough on 1st August 2007 but overstayed by 1011 days, necessitating police intervention to return him to prison. The parole application was rejected partly on this ground and also because the petitioner’s brother was available to care for the father.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to parole on the ground of his father's illness.
- Whether the prior overstay by the petitioner on furlough and subsequent police action justifies denial of parole.
- Whether refusal of parole after cutting remission for overstay amounts to double punishment violating Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.
- The distinction between furlough and parole and the relevant criteria for granting parole.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner claimed that the illness of his father was genuine and serious, warranting parole.
- He relied on the Gujarat High Court decision in Bhikhabhai Devshi vs. State of Gujarat and others to assert the purposes of parole, emphasizing family continuity and constructive hope.
- The petitioner contended that denying parole despite genuine grounds amounted to unfair treatment.
- He argued that the apprehension that parole might endanger complainants or witnesses is not a valid ground to reject parole if the prisoner is not of bad conduct.
- The petitioner claimed that denial of parole after punishment for overstay amounts to double punishment or double jeopardy, violating Article 20(2) of the Constitution.
Respondent's Arguments
- The police enquiry found the reason for parole (father's illness) genuine but noted the petitioner had previously overstayed furlough by 1011 days, which justified denial of parole.
- The petitioner’s brother was available to care for the father, reducing the necessity of parole.
- The medical certificate did not indicate a serious or critical condition of the father.
- The petitioner’s prior overstay and need for police arrest demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness, justifying denial of parole.
- Denial of parole on these grounds does not amount to double jeopardy as no prosecution and punishment before a court has occurred for the same offence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhikhabhai Devshi Vs. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 Gujarat 136 | Distinction between furlough and parole; parole granted only for sufficient cause such as severe illness or death of family member; parole is discretionary and not a right. | The court relied on this to clarify that parole is discretionary and must be granted only on sufficient cause, distinguishing it from furlough. |
| Prahlad D. Gajbhiye Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Mah.L.J. 1584 : 1994 Cri.L.J. 2555 | Parole is not a right and is granted only under certain circumstances with favorable police report. | The court affirmed that parole is discretionary and requires satisfaction of necessary criteria including police report. |
| Murlidhar Ishwar Suryawanshi and another Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 ALL MR (Cri) 2159 | Prisoner who overstays furlough or parole and needs to be arrested does not deserve sympathy. | The court applied this principle to justify denial of parole to the petitioner who overstayed furlough for 1011 days. |
| Maqbool Hussain Vs. State of Bombay, 2010 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 294 : 1953 Cr. L.J. 1432 | Explanation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution regarding double jeopardy requiring prosecution and punishment before a court for the same offence. | The court relied on this precedent to hold that denial of parole after remission cut does not amount to double jeopardy as no judicial prosecution or punishment occurred. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first noted that parole is a discretionary privilege granted only on sufficient cause such as serious illness or death of a prisoner’s family member, distinguishing it from furlough which has different purposes. The petitioner’s reliance on the Gujarat High Court decision was accepted in principle but clarified that parole is not a right and can be denied on valid grounds.
The court considered the petitioner’s prior overstay of 1011 days during furlough, which required police intervention to return him to prison, as a significant factor undermining his eligibility for parole. Additionally, the availability of the petitioner’s brother to care for the father reduced the necessity of parole. The medical certificate submitted did not indicate a serious or critical condition, thus failing to strengthen the petitioner’s claim.
Regarding the petitioner’s argument that denial of parole after punishment for overstay amounts to double jeopardy, the court held that Article 20(2) requires prosecution and punishment before a court or tribunal for the same offence, which was not present here. The cutting of remission under prison rules was held not to be punishment in the legal sense. Therefore, the principle of double jeopardy did not apply.
The court also rejected the petitioner’s reliance on an unidentified Punjab and Haryana High Court decision, noting it was not placed on record and was factually distinguishable.
In conclusion, the court found no merit in the petition, emphasizing the discretionary nature of parole, the petitioner’s previous misconduct, and the absence of legal double jeopardy.
Holding and Implications
The petition is dismissed and the Rule is discharged.
The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner’s parole application remains rejected. The court’s ruling reinforces that parole is a discretionary relief granted only on sufficient cause and that prior misconduct such as overstaying furlough can justify denial. The judgment clarifies that denial of parole following administrative punishment does not constitute double jeopardy under Article 20(2). No new legal precedent was set beyond affirming established principles.
Cases referred :
1. Bhikhabhai Devshi Vs. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 Gujarat 136 [ 5 ]
2. Prahlad D. Gajbhiye Vs. State of Maharashtra , 1994 Mah.L.J. 1584: 1994 Cri.L.J. 2555 [ 6 ]
3. Murlidhar Ishwar Suryawanshi and another Vs. State of Maharashtra , 2011 ALL MR ( Cri ) 2159 [9]
4. Maqbool Hussain Vs. State of Bombay , 2010 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 294 : 1953 Cr. L.J., 1432 [ 12 ]
Advocates appeared :
Mr. R.T. Hiwale, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr. T.A. Mirza, APP for Respondents.
MRS. V. K. TAHILRAMANI, J.: - Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP for respondent.
2. Rule.
3. With the consent of the parties heard forthwith.
4. The petitioner had preferred an application for parole on the ground of illness of his father. According to the petitioner, his father suffers from heart ailment. The said application for parole came to be rejected by order dated 25th May, 2011. Being aggrieved by the said fact, the petitioner has preferred this petition.
5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that when the police conducted enquiry, they found the reason given by the petitioner i.e. illness of his father, to be genuine. Despite this fact, the petitioner has not been granted parole. The learned advocate for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Bhikhabhai Devshi vs. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 Gujarat 136 to contend that the object of granting parole are that the prisoner gets an opportunity to maintain continuity with his family life, to deal with the family matters, to maintain constructive hope and active interest in the life and to save a convict from the ill effects of continuously being in prison. The aims and objects which the learned advocate for the petitioner has pointed out, are actually stated in the judgment only in relation to furlough and not in relation to parole. In the said decision, it is further observed. Furlough and parole have two different purposes. Parole is to be granted only on a sufficient cause such as cases of severe illness or death of any member of the prisoners family or of his nearest relative or for other sufficient cause. Therefore, parole is not a matter of right and only when there is a sufficient and serious cause, the prisoner may be released on parole. Parole may be denied to a prisoner even when he makes out sufficient cause for release on parole if the competent authority is satisfied on valid grounds that release of a prisoner on parole would be against the interest of the society or the prison administration. For example, a prisoner who has once escaped or attempted to escape or who is likely to escape or has such means and resources, may be denied parole because under the Rules, the competent authority has discretion to grant or not to grant parole even when cause is shown. Therefore, comparison of release on parole and furlough is absolutely uncalled for.
6. It is well settled that grant of parole to the prisoner is not a right. It has been so observed by the Division Bench of this Court in para 5 of the decision in Prahlad D. Gajbhiye vs. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Mah.L.J. 1584 : 1994 Cri. L.J. 2555. Moreover, it is only in certain circumstances that a prisoner can be released on parole and even if the reason stated by the prisoner for grant of parole is found to be genuine, his case has to fall within the necessary criteria for grant of parole including favourable police report.
7. Mr. T.A.Mirza, the learned APP pointed out that on 1.8.2007 the petitioner was released on furlough for 14 days. In the said case, he ought to have surrendered on 15.8.2007, however, the petitioner did not report back to prison on 15.8.2007. The police had to eventually trace the petitioner, arrest him and bring back him to prison. There was a overstay of 1011 days on the part of the petitioner. When enquiry was conducted pursuant to the petitioners application for parole, the fact that on earlier occasion the petitioner had over stayed for 1011 days was noticed. In addition, it was noticed that the petitioner has a brother i.e. Vishal Khandekar, who can take care of the father of the petitioner. Hence, on this ground, the application of the petitioner for parole came to be rejected.
8. The petitioner by way of amendment has relied on the Annexure III Medical Certificate dated 17.7.2011 to support the fact that the father of the petitioner is very sick. On going through the said medical certificate, it shows that the father of the petitioner suffers from constipation, chest pain and weakness. The medical certificate does not show that the illness of the father of the petitioner is serious or that he is in a critical condition. Thus, this certificate is of no help to the petitioner.
9. The learned advocate for the petitioner thereafter submitted that if a prisoner, who is not of bad conduct and is qualified for parole, the apprehension that his release on parole may endanger the lives of complainant or eye witnesses, is no ground for rejecting parole application of the prisoner. To support this submission, he has relied on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The citation of the said decision according to the learned advocate is (1987) 1 All Cri. L.R. 787 (787) (P & H). First of all we would like to state that the copy of the said decision was not placed before us, nor could the learned advocate give the name of the parties in the said decision. Such a book is not available in our library. However, in any event this decision cannot be said to be applicable to the present case because the present application for parole is mainly rejected on the ground that earlier when the petitioner was released on furlough he overstayed for 1011 days and he had to be traced by police, arrested and brought to the prison by the police. The second ground for rejection is that the brother of the petitioner is available to take care of the father of the petitioner. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Murlidhar Ishwar Suryawanshi and another vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 ALL MR ( Cri ) 2159 observed that if a prisoner does not report back in time after he is released on furlough or parole and the prisoner had to be arrested and brought back to prison, the prisoner does not deserve any sympathy.
10. Thereafter, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is being punished twice. He claimed that it is a case of double jeopardy. He submitted that on account of overstay of 1011 days punishment has been imposed on the petitioner of cutting remission and in addition thereto now the petitioner is not being released on parole. Hence, according to him it is clearly a case of double punishment i.e. double jeopardy.
11. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that it is a case of double punishment in the sense that apart from punishment being imposed for the overstay, he is not being released on parole and thus, the petitioner has been doubly punished with is violative of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.
12. We are of the opinion that it is not a case of double jeopardy. The only condition precedent for application of the principle of double jeopardy is that the person concerned has been prosecuted and punished for the same offence. The Apex Court in Maqbool Hussain vs. State of Bombay, reported in 1953 Cr. L.J. 1432 : [2010 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 294], held that the words "before a Court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in Article 20(2), yet in order to invoke the protection of Article 20(2), there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a Court of Law or Tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer. The Article contemplates proceedings of criminal nature before a Court of law in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure. It was also held that Article 20(2) incorporates within its scope the plea of " autrefois convict" as known to British Jurisprudence or the plea of "double jeopardy" as known to the American Constitution but circumscribes it by providing that there should not only be a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. The petitioner in this case cannot get any benefit, because he has not been prosecuted earlier. Article 20(2) would become operative in a case where the second prosecution and punishment is for the same offence for which the person concerned has already been prosecuted and punished. Moreover, the principle is that no man should be vexed with more than one trial for offences arising out of identical acts committed by him. The rule against double jeopardy is stated in the maxim Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. It is only when the offence has been the subject of judicial adjudication and it ended in acquittal or conviction, the criminal justice system would not allow repetition of the adjudication in a separate trial on the very same facts. In the present case, the petitioner has not been prosecuted before any Court of law or Tribunal. There were no proceedings of criminal nature "before a Court of law" in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates offences and regulates procedure for punishment, therefore, it is clearly not a case of double jeopardy.
13. It would also be relevant to point out that proviso to Rule 26 of Chapter XXVII of the Maharashtra Prison Manual Rules clearly lays down that any measure taken for security and safe custody of a refractory or dangerous prisoner, or for preventing him from committing mischief, and exclusion from a privilege which is other wise admissible only to a well behaved prisoner shall not be deemed to be a punishment for the purposes of the Prison Rules. Thus, even if remission was cut on account of overstay, it cannot be deemed to be a punishment.
14. In the result, we find no merit in this petition. Rule discharged.
Petition dismissed.
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