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Nirad Amilal Mehta v. Genelec Limited

Bombay High Court
Apr 24, 2008
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a shareholder of defendant No. 1 company, filed a suit seeking an injunction restraining defendant No. 5, purchaser of the company's property, from selling, alienating, creating third party rights, developing, constructing, or parting with possession of the suit property until the suit's disposal. Defendant No. 1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, managed by defendant Nos. 2, 3, and 4 as its directors. Defendant No. 5 purchased the suit property under a deed dated 13th December 2007. Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 are directors of defendant No. 5. Defendant No. 1 is a Sick Industrial undertaking, with the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction recommending winding up, though no formal winding up order has been issued. The company purportedly passed a resolution on 23rd March 2007 to sell the suit property, which was sold to defendant No. 5 for Rs. 6.95 crores. The plaintiff challenges the conveyance as a derivative action, alleging irregularities in the sale process.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale of the suit property by defendant No. 1 company was valid given the alleged absence of a valid general meeting resolution under section 293 of the Companies Act.
  2. Whether the plaintiff, as a shareholder, is entitled to maintain a derivative action challenging the sale.
  3. Whether the defence of bona fide purchaser without notice is available to defendant No. 5 in light of alleged statutory breaches.
  4. Whether the deed of conveyance executed in accordance with section 46 of the Companies Act binds the company despite alleged non-compliance with section 293.
  5. The applicability and effect of the doctrine of indoor management (Royal British Bank v. Turquand) in the context of statutory requirements under the Companies Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • No valid general meeting was held on 23rd March 2007 authorizing the sale of the suit property.
  • No notice, let alone 21 days’ notice, was given to shareholders including the plaintiff, violating section 173 of the Companies Act.
  • The sale is void as it contravenes section 293 of the Companies Act, which requires company consent in a general meeting for sale of the whole or substantially whole undertaking.
  • The suit property constitutes the whole or substantially the whole of the company’s undertaking at Mumbai.
  • The directors who executed the sale deed are wrongdoers controlling the company and unlikely to sue themselves, entitling the plaintiff to maintain a derivative action.
  • Injunction is necessary to protect the suit property pending final decision on the validity of the sale.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Section 293 does not apply as the company had two undertakings (Mumbai and Aurangabad), and the Mumbai property was not the whole or substantially the whole undertaking.
  • The plaintiff, as a shareholder, has no locus standi to maintain a derivative action since the company is the aggrieved party.
  • The sale deed was executed in accordance with section 46 of the Companies Act, making the contract binding on the company.
  • Defendant No. 5 is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of irregularity and entitled to assume internal company procedures were followed.
  • If the sale is found invalid, defendants 5 to 7 may seek refund of the sale consideration from defendants 1 to 4, but such a direction cannot be granted in the plaintiff’s injunction motion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 Rule that only the company can sue for wrongs done to it, not individual shareholders, except in certain exceptions. Upheld the general rule but recognized an exception where wrongdoers control the company and prevent it from suing, allowing the plaintiff shareholder's derivative action.
B.B.N (UK) Limited v. Janardan Mohandas Rajan Pillai, 1993 (3) Bom. C.R 228 Exception to Foss v. Harbottle rule allowing shareholder to sue when wrongdoers control the company. Affirmed that the plaintiff shareholder could maintain the suit as directors alleged to be wrongdoers controlled the company.
Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327 Doctrine of indoor management allowing outsiders to assume internal company procedures were followed. Distinguished between internal procedural irregularities and statutory breaches; held that statutory breaches cannot be protected by this doctrine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the validity of the sale in light of section 293 of the Companies Act, which prohibits the Board of Directors from selling the whole or substantially whole undertaking without company consent obtained in a general meeting. The plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations indicated no valid general meeting was held on 23rd March 2007, no proper notice was given, and no explanatory statement was attached as required by section 173. The court found no evidence rebutting these allegations, concluding prima facie that no lawful meeting was held and thus no valid resolution authorizing the sale existed.

The defendants’ argument that the Mumbai property was not the whole undertaking was rejected because even if multiple undertakings existed, section 293 requires consent for sale of any undertaking. The court noted the market value of the suit property was Rs. 18.28 crores, substantially higher than the consideration, underscoring the significance of the undertaking sold.

The court rejected the contention that compliance with section 46 (form of contract) alone validates the sale, emphasizing that statutory conditions under section 293 are mandatory and must be satisfied independently.

Regarding the doctrine of indoor management, the court distinguished internal procedural irregularities from statutory non-compliance, holding that statutory breaches cannot be shielded by the doctrine.

On the plaintiff’s locus standi, the court recognized the general rule from Foss v. Harbottle that only the company can sue for wrongs done to it but accepted the exception where wrongdoers control the company and prevent it from suing. Since the directors who executed the sale were alleged wrongdoers and in control, the plaintiff was prima facie entitled to maintain the derivative action.

The defence of bona fide purchaser without notice was held not available at this interlocutory stage because it raised factual issues to be determined at trial and because statutory breaches may negate such defence.

The request to direct defendants 1 to 4 to deposit the sale consideration was denied in the injunction motion, leaving the defendants 5 to 7 free to pursue such relief separately.

Consequently, the court granted an interim injunction restraining defendants from alienating or dealing with the suit property pending final disposal of the suit.

Holding and Implications

The court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating, developing, or parting with possession of the suit property until the suit is disposed of.

The direct effect is to preserve the status quo and protect the suit property pending adjudication on the validity of the sale. No broader precedent beyond the application of established principles such as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, statutory compliance under section 293, and limitations of the indoor management doctrine was set. The decision clarifies that statutory requirements for company resolutions are mandatory and that shareholder derivative actions are maintainable where wrongdoers control the company and prevent it from suing.

Show all summary ...

Karnik, D.G, J.:— Heard. By consent, the motion is heard finally at the stage of admission itself.

2. By this motion the plaintiff who is a shareholder of the defendant No. 1 company, seeks relief of injunction restraining the defendant No. 5, who is the purchaser of the company's property under a deed of conveyance dated 13th December, 2007 from selling, alienating, creating third party rights, developing or carrying out any construction or parting with the possession the property purchased by it (hereinafter referred as ‘suit property’) till the disposal of the suit. Though a relief for appointment of Receiver is also claimed in the motion, the same is not pressed. The facts giving rise to the dispute are that defendant No. 1 is a company incorporated registered under the Companies Act, Page: 5001956. The defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are its directors. The defendant No. 5 is the purchaser of the suit property which formerly belonged to the defendant No. 1 company. The defendant Nos. 6 and 7 are the directors of defendant No. 5. The defendant No. 1 company is said to be a Sick Industrial undertaking. In view of the accumulated losses, the defendant No. 1 approached the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short “the BIFR”, under Sick Industrial Companies Act. The BIFR came to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 was not viable and has recommended its winding up. However, no formal order of winding up has yet been passed by the Court and the defendant No. 1 still continues to be managed by its Board of Directors which consists of 3 directors viz. the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The defendant No. 1 company has its undertaking at the suit property. On 23rd March 2007, a resolution was purportingly passed by the defendant No. 1 company in its general meeting to sell the suit property. In pursuance of the said resolution, the defendant No. 1 company sold and transferred the suit property to the defendant No. 5 for a consideration of Rs. 6 crores 95 lakhs. The defendant Nos. 2, 3, and 4 as the directors of the defendant No. 1 company signed the conveyance as vendors in favour of the defendant No. 5. The plaintiff who is a shareholder of the defendant No. 1 company has field this suit, as a derivative action, challenging the said conveyance.

3. The plaintiff has inter alia alleged that no resolution passed by the defendant No. 1 company, in a general meeting, on 23rd March, 2007 or on any other day authorising sale of the suit property. No general meeting of the defendant No. 1 company was ever held on 23rd March 2007. He has further alleged that no notice of the general meeting, much less notice of 21 days was ever given to him or to any other shareholder. Even the explanatory statement required to be forwarded under section 173 of the Companies Act was not and could not have been forwarded to or attached to the alleged notice of the meeting. Though an affidavit in reply has been filed by defendant Nos. 3 and 2, these facts which have been averred by the plaintiff in paragraph No. 15 of the plaint have not been specifically denied. In fact, in paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 of the affidavit in reply, defendant No. 2 has tacitly if not expressly, admitted the facts as narrated in paragraph No. 15 of the plaint.

4. Strongly, placing reliance on the admission in the affidavit of the defendant No. 2 that no general meeting of the defendant No. 1 company was held on 23rd March, 2007 in accordance with law, learned Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the sale of the undertaking and the property of the defendant No. 1 company was void. Reliance was placed on section 293 of the Companies Act which says that the Board of Directors of a public company or a private company which is a subsidiary of the public company shall not except with the consent of the company obtain in a general meeting sale, lease or otherwise dispose of the whole or substantially whole of the undertaking of the company or where the company owns more than one undertakings the whole or substantially whole of any such undertaking. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the suit properly was practically the whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking of the defendant No. 1 company at Mumbai and the defendant No. 1 company had no other undertaking in Mumbai. The defendant No. 1 company of which the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are the Directors of the company could not have sold the suit properly which was the whole of the undertaking of the company at Mumbai without proper resolution of the company passed in a general meeting. Counsel therefore submitted that it was necessary to protect the suit property pending final decision of the suit wherein the declaration has been sought that the sale is void.

5. Mr. Kamdar, learned Counsel for defendant Nos. 5 to 7 submitted that section 293 of the Companies Act is not applicable in as much as the company had undertakings not only in Mumbai but also at Page: 501Aurangabad. The value of the undertaking and property and Aurangabad was nearly Rs. 10 crores which was much more than value of the Mumbai property which was Rs. 6.95 crores. The sale effected by defendant No. 1 through its directors viz. the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 was not of the whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking of the company. He further submitted that the plaintiff as a shareholder of defendant No. 1 company was not entitled to maintain an action on behalf of the company for the alleged wrong done to the defendant No. 1 company. If at all the suit property was sold without the necessary resolution under section 293 of the Companies Act, the only person aggrieved would be the company and not any shareholder and no shareholder was entitled to maintain an action against the purchaser. He further submitted the sale was a contract and since it was made in accordance with section 46 of the Companies Act it was binding on the defendant No. 1 company. Neither the defendant No. 1 company by itself nor any of its shareholders through a derivative action was entitled to challenge the said contract. Lastly, Mr. Kamdar submitted that defendant No. 5 was the bona fide purchaser for value without notice of alleged irregularity. The sale deed itself mentions that the company was authorised to sell the property by a resolution passed in the general meeting held on 23rd March, 2007. Whether a resolution was passed or not in the general meeting on 23rd March, 2007 was an internal matter to which the defendant No. 5 had no access and it was entitled to assume that all internal formalities had been complied with by the defendant No. 1 before executing the sale deed. In the alternative he submitted that if at all the Court came to the prima facie conclusion that the sale was not binding on the defendant No. 1 or on the plaintiff, the Court should order and direct the defendants 1 to 4 the refund of the amount of Rs. 6.95 crores received by them as consideration for the sale.

Regarding derivative action by a shareholder.

6. The sale of the suit property was effected in the name of defendant No. 1 company by defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the capacity as its directors. It is alleged that the sale being contrary to the provisions to section 293 of the Companies Act is void. If the sale is void, the person aggrieved is the company. The suit should therefore normally be filed by the company for setting aside the alienation. The plaintiff who is only a shareholder of the company would not normally have a right to file a suit on behalf of the company as the person aggrieved is the company and not a shareholder. More than one and a half century ago, in (Foss v. Harbottle), (1843) 2 Hare 461, the Court laid down the rule that normally an individual shareholder would not be entitled to bring an action for a wrong allegedly done to the company. It is the company who alone can bring an action for a wrong done to it. The rule however has been subjected to metre than one exceptions. In (B.B.N (UK) Limited v. Janardan Mohandas Rajan Pillai), 1993 (3) Bom. C.R 228, this Court while upholding the rule that it is the company who is entitled to maintain an action for wrong allegedly done to it and a shareholder has no locus standi to maintain the suit, affirmed one of the exceptions to the aforesaid rule that where a shareholder can show that the wrong doers are in control of the defendant company and hence the company would be unable to maintain the action, he can maintain an action.

7. In the present case, the sale has been effected though in the name of the company by defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 who have signed and executed the sale deed. The defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are the only directors of the company. Though action for winding up is pending, no order for appointment of a provisional liquidator has been made and the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 continue to be in charge of affairs of the defendant No. 1 company. The defendant Nos. 2, 3, and 4 who are the only directors of the defendant No. 1 company and in charge of the defendant No. 1 company, being the signatories to Page: 502the sale deed executed in the name of the company are unlikely to maintain an action in the name of the defendant No. 1 company for setting aside the sale. The plaintiff has alleged that defendant Nos. 2, 3, and 4 themselves are the wrong doers as they have wrongfully alienated and transferred the property of the company in breach of their fiduciary duty as directors of the company. Since defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 themselves are alleged to be wrong doers and are in charge of the defendant No. 1 company, an action by the plaintiff would be maintainable, as an exception to the rule in Foss v. Horbottle. Since it was not argued that if at all the plaintiff were to take a derivative action it should have been done in the name of the company as a plaintiff and not merely joining it as defendant No. 1, I deem it unnecessary to consider this aspect at the interlocutory stage. Suffice it to say that the plaintiff, prima facie, is entitled to maintain the action for the wrong done to the defendant No. 1 company.

Regarding violation of section 293

8. section 293 of the Companies Act puts restrictions on the powers of the Board of Directors. It provides that the Board of Directors of a public company or private company which is a subsidiaiy of the public company shall not, except with the consent of such public company or subsidiary in a general meeting, sale, lease or otherwise disposed of the whole of substantially the whole of the undertaking of the company or where the company owns more than one undertakings of the whole of substantially the whole of any such undertaking. Though the sale deed recites that sanction for the sale of the suit property was obtained by a resolution passed in its meeting held on 23rd March 2007 it is the case of the plaintiff that no general meeting of the company was held on 23rd March 2007 and no notice of any meeting to be held on 23rd March 2007 was given to the plaintiff. It is true that accidental omission to give notice to one or some of the members of the Company does not vitiate the notice of the meeting. However, it is not the case of the defendants that the omission to give to the plaintiff was on account of accidental omission. It appears to be a case where no notice was given to any member at all. This is clear from the averments made in paragraph 15 of the plaint which are not rebutted in the affidavit in reply. Furthermore, the notice of the meeting and agenda is stated to be of the same date as that of the meeting. Section 171 of the Companies Act requires notice of atleast 21 days to be given prior to a general meeting. No material has been produced on record to show that 21 days notice was ever issued before the alleged general meeting on 23rd March 2007. Furthermore, under section 173 of the Companies Act, an explanatory statement is required to be annexed to the notice of the meeting. No explanatory statement under section 173 of the Companies Act was attached to the alleged notice dated 23rd March 2007. In fact, the explanatory statement is dated 13th December 2007 which is long after the date of the alleged general meeting dated 23rd March, 2007. In sub-paragraph No. (iv) of paragraph No. 15, the plaintiff has stated that the place of meeting as stated in the alleged notice was an open ground. He has further stated that no arrangements for the meeting had ever been made at that open space and any such meeting was held and could not be held on the open space. Neither a register of members present at the meeting nor any other material was produced to show that any meeting was held on 23rd March 2007. No minutes appear to have been prepared and aimed by the Chairman as required under section 193 of the Companies Act. In any event no record was produced that the Chairman signed the minutes of the alleged meeting held on 23rd March 2007. The allegations made in paragraph No. 15 of the plaint are unrebutted in affidavit in reply. It must therefore be held, atleast at this prima facie stage, that no meeting was ever held on 23rd March 2007 much less a meeting in accordance with law.

9. Re: Transfer not of the whole of the undertaking.

10. Mr. Kamdar learned Counsel for the defendant submitted that the sale was not of the whole of the undertaking of the Company and therefore it was not necessary to have a resolution under section 293 of the Companies Act for sale of the suit property. He submitted that company had two undertakings, one at Mumbai and another at Aurangabad. The value of the undertaking at Mumbai was only Rs. 6.95 crores and value of the undertaking at Aurangabad was Rs. 10 crores or more. Therefore the undertaking at Mumbai was a smaller undertaking and not a substantial part of the undertaking of the Company. Therefore approval of the generable meeting was not necessary. Firstly, the submission that the value of the undertaking at Mumbai was Rs. 6.95 crores is factually incorrect. Though the deed of conveyance is for a sum of Rs. 6.95 crores, the market value of the suit property on the date of sale was more than Rs. 18.28 crores. Article 25 of the Bombay Stamp Act requires the Stamp duty to be paid on the true market value of the property even if the consideration is less than the true market value. The market value of the property is determined by the Stamp Authorities in accordance with the Rules framed under the Bombay Stamp Act was Rs. 18.28 crores. Stamp duty on that amount was paid by the parties without demur or without challenging the valuation. Though the consideration of sale was Rs. 6.85 crores, the true market value was much higher at Rs. 18.28 crores as for the Government valuation. Secondly, section 293 of the Companies Act provides that where a company has more than one undertakings, the Board of Directors of a company shall not sell any of such undertakings without consent of the company in a general meeting. Therefore even if it is assumed that the defendant No. 1 company had two undertakings, one at Mumbai and another at Aurangabad, neither of the said undertakings could be sold without consent of the company obtained in the general body meeting. I have already held that there was no valid general meeting held on 23rd March 2007 and consequently there was no consent of the company obtained in a general meeting for the sale of the whole of the undertaking at Mumbai. The deed of conveyance dated 13th December 2007 is, prima facie, void and being contrary to section 293 of the Companies Act.

Alleged protection under section 46 of the Companies Act.

11. section 46 of the Companies Act lays down the form of contract to be made by the company and provides that any contract made by the Company in accordance with section 46 shall bind the Company. Mr. Kamdar submitted that the deed of conveyance was a kind of contract, though a completed or an executed contract. The suit property stood conveyed and transferred by the said contract. As the contract was made in accordance with the form prescribed by section 46 the contract was binding on the company. I am unable to agree. Section 46 only prescribes the form of the contract to be made by the Company. Every contract made by a company must fulfill other conditions, if any, imposed by the other provisions of the Companies Act. section 293 of the Companies Act imposes a condition for transfer of the whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking of a company. If the whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking is to be transferred, then consent for such transfer has to be obtained in a general meeting. It is a condition precedent for the transfer. This condition is obviously in addition to the form of contract provided under section 46. Any other interpretation could make section 293 nugatory. In the circumstances, the contention of Mr. Kamdar that since the conveyance is a kind of contract and was made in accordance in the form provided under section 46 of the Companies Act, the contract is binding on the Company, notwithstanding breach of section 293, has to be rejected.

Regarding the defence of internal management.

12. Mr. Kamdar submitted that whether a resolution of the general body under section 293 of the Companies Act was passed or not Page: 504was an internal matter of the company and the purchaser having no means of knowing whether such a resolution was passed was entitled to assume that the internal procedure was followed. The deed of conveyance dated 13th December 2007 recites that resolution of the general body was passed in the meeting held on 23rd March 2007 and the purchaser was entitled to assume the said statement to be true. It is true that in (Royal British Bank v. Turquand) (1856) 6E and B 327 it has been held that a person dealing with a company is not affected by internal irregularities. He is entitles to assume that the internal procedure required by Articles of Association of the Company has been complied with. The differentiation however has to be made between the procedure prescribed by Articles of Association of a Company and the statutory restrictions imposed by the Companies Act. Where there is a clear breach of a provision of a statute, the doctrine of indoor management laid down in Royal British Bank v. Turquand (supra) cannot apply. In the event of a breach of a statutory provision, the consequences of the breach would follow and it would be no defence to hold that the person dealing with the company, including purchaser in the present case, was entitled to assume that all statutory requirements were complied with. If a statute prescribes a mandatory procedure the same must be complied with at the pevil of the action being declared void for its non compliance. There is therefore, no merit in this contention also.

Defence of Bona fide purchasers.

13. In my view, at this inter locutory stage, the defendant No. 5 is not entitled to any protection on the alleged ground that it is a bona fide purchasers for value without notice, for reasons more than one. Firstly, whether the defendant No. 5 at all is a bona fide purchaser is a question of fact which would be required to be determined on appreciation the evidence to be adduced at the trial. At this stage, it cannot be held that the defendant No. 5 had no knowledge of the illegality. Whether the defendant No. 5 had made appropriate enquiries before purchase of the property is also a question of fact which can be determined only at the stage of trial. Secondly, in my prima facie view the defence of bona fide purchaser would not be available in case of breach of a statutory bar on the Board of Directors from selling the undertaking of a company without permission of the company obtained in a general meeting. Hence, at this stage, in my view, the defendant No. 5 cannot claim any benefit on the ground that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

14. Regarding direction to defendants 1 to 4 to deposit money. As regards the request by defendant No. 5 that the defendant No. 1 company and its directors defendant Nos. 2 to 4 be directed to deposit in the Court consideration of Rs. 6.95 crores received by them, the defendants 5 to 7 are free to take such action against the defendants 1 to 4 as they think fit. In the plaintiff's motion for injunction such a relief cannot be granted to them. In the circumstances, this request also cannot be granted.

15. For these reasons, plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating, developing or parting with the possession of the suit property. Accordingly, there shall be interim relief in terms of prayer Clause a (ii), till the disposal of the suit.

16. Interim relief granted.