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Ojha Bros. v. Volkart Bhos
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Chatterji, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises under clause 10 of the Letters Patent from a suit originally instituted under Order 21, rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In February 1940 Volkart Brothers (defendant no. 1) obtained a decree in the Small Cause Court at Calcutta against Ojha Das and Co. That decree was transferred for execution to the First Munsif's court at Patna. In January 1941 Volkart Brothers caused attachment of certain motor accessories and movables said to belong to the judgment-debtors Ojha Das and Co.
On 16 January 1941 Ojha Brothers (the plaintiffs in the present suit) preferred a claim under Order 21, Rule 58, asserting that the attached goods belonged to them. The plaintiffs were ordered to furnish security; they produced a registered security bond on 20 March 1941 executed by Raghubir Tewari. The claim was dismissed on 5 September 1941 and the execution proceeded. The present suit under Order 21, rule 63 was instituted on 20 January 1942 for a declaration that the attached properties belonged to the plaintiffs and not to Ojha Das and Co.
The attached goods were sold in August 1942; Rs. 70-10-0 of the sale proceeds were paid to Volkart Brothers. The surety Raghubir Tewari made three payments (two of Rs. 60 and one of Rs. 50), and when he failed to make more payments his property given in security was sold in June 1943. The plaintiffs deposited Rs. 357-8-6 under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside that sale, and the sale was set aside. Volkart Brothers also realised Rs. 85 from the plaintiffs as costs of the claim case.
By leave the plaintiffs amended the plaint on 14 December 1943 to add prayers for recovery of six sums (including the three above). At trial the Additional Subordinate Judge found for the judgment-debtors (holding attached properties belonged to Ojha Das and Co.) and dismissed the suit. On appeal the Additional District Judge reversed that finding, held the attached goods belonged to the plaintiffs (Ojha Brothers), and decreed a declaration and refund of money realised. On second appeal Shearer, J. reversed the appellate court: he held the Rs. 70-10-0 claim barred by limitation, disallowed recovery of the three payments made by the surety, held the Rs. 357-8-6 deposit was voluntary under Order 21, Rule 89 and not recoverable, and disallowed recovery of Rs. 85; he accordingly dismissed the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the goods attached and sold in execution of Volkart Brothers' decree belonged to the plaintiffs (Ojha Brothers) or to the judgment-debtors (Ojha Das and Co.).
- Whether the plaintiffs can recover (a) Rs. 70-10-0 (sum paid to decree-holder from sale proceeds), (b) Rs. 357-8-6 (sum deposited under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside a sale), and (c) Rs. 85 (costs paid in the claim case).
- Whether payments made under Order 21, Rule 89 by a person claiming ownership are voluntary (and therefore irrecoverable) or can be characterized as payments made under compulsion/coercion (and therefore recoverable under Section 72, Indian Contract Act).
- What is the correct article of the Limitation Act governing the claim to recover the Rs. 70-10-0: Article 29 (one year for wrongful seizure under legal process) or Article 49 (three years for suits for other specific movable property or compensation for wrongfully taking/detaining the same)?
- Whether a surety (Raghubir Tewari), who stood as security as ordered in the claim case, can be treated as liable to execution under Section 145 of the Code, thereby affecting plaintiffs' right to recover sums paid to protect the surety's property.
- Whether recovery of an amount allowed as costs in a claim case can be sought in the present suit under Order 21, Rule 63, or must be pursued under Section 144 or other proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — represented by Mr. G.P. Das
- Presses appeal only as to three items: (1) Rs. 70-10-0 (realised from sale proceeds), (2) Rs. 357-8-6 (deposit under Order 21, Rule 89), and (3) Rs. 85 (costs paid in claim case).
- Contends the Rs. 357-8-6 payment was made under compulsion of legal process (to save security's property) and therefore was not voluntary; relies on Privy Council decisions (Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh and Seth Kanhaya Lal v. The National Bank of India) treating payments made to prevent sale or to remove unlawful interference as involuntary/coerced and recoverable under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.
- Contends Rs. 70-10-0 is governed by Article 49 of the Limitation Act (three years) because the cause of action arose when the attached goods were sold and proceeds paid to decree-holders in August 1942; plaint was amended in December 1943 and thus within limitation.
- Asserts that because the appellate court found the goods belonged to plaintiffs, the sale/attachment was invalid and Raghubir (who stood surety for plaintiffs as ordered) could not be held liable to satisfy the decree; hence plaintiffs may recover amounts paid to save the surety's property.
- Argues the plaintiffs are entitled to refund of Rs. 85 as that order in the claim case was effectively set aside by the appellate court.
Respondents' (Decree-holder/Defendant no. 1) Arguments — represented by Mr. R.S. Chatterji
- Contended that the court of appeal below did not reach a definite finding that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiffs (an objection the court found without force).
- Relied on the decision in Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pandey and related Patna/Bombay precedents to argue that deposits under Order 21, Rule 89 are voluntary and, therefore, not recoverable; asserted the plaintiffs' deposit of Rs. 357-8-6 was voluntary.
- Argued that because Raghubir stood surety, the decretal amount could be validly executed against him under Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, defeating plaintiffs' claim to recover money paid under Order 21, Rule 89 which satisfied the decree.
- Maintained that the Rs. 70-10-0 claim was barred by limitation (Shearer, J.'s finding relying on Article 29 in part), and that the Rs. 85 allowed as costs in the claim case could not be recovered while the order remained in force; further contended that the remedy for recovery of Rs. 85 should be by application under Section 144 (an argument the court rejected as inapplicable to the present suit where the refund claim was made within the same suit under Order 21, Rule 63).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh (Privy Council) | Payment made to prevent sale under execution was not voluntary; payment made under compulsion of execution proceedings is recoverable. | The court relied on its passage to support the proposition that payments to avoid sale or to remove unlawful interference can be regarded as made under compulsion and thus recoverable. |
| Seth Kanhaya Lal v. The National Bank of India, Limited (Privy Council; 40 Indian Appeals, 56) | Payment made under coercion (force of execution proceedings) is recoverable under Section 72, Indian Contract Act; wrongful interference allows the injured party to choose remedies without making payment voluntary. | Cited by appellants and relied on by the court to hold that payments made to save property from execution (here, by plaintiffs to save surety's property) were made under the force of execution and not voluntary. |
| Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pandey (Patna High Court) | Held that a payment made under Order 21, Rule 89 (to set aside a sale) is an unconditional, voluntary payment for the decree-holder and cannot be recovered by suit. | Shearer, J. followed this decision to hold the deposit under Rule 89 was voluntary; Chatterji, J. distinguished it on facts (here payment protected security property and was made under court compulsion) and refused to follow it for the plaintiffs' Rs. 357-8-6. |
| Narayan Vasudevacharya Katti … v. Amgauda Malagauda Patil … (Bombay) | Considered Privy Council decisions and held payment under Order 21, Rule 89 by one claiming to be true owner is voluntary; deposit made to set aside sale of right/title of judgment-debtor is voluntary. | Discussed by the court as part of the line of authority opposing recoverability; distinguished on facts because plaintiffs' payment here was to save the surety's property given under court order and not to protect a "non-existent right" of the judgment-debtor. |
| Shankarrao Keshavrao Deshmukh v. Vadhilal Mulchand Gujarathi (Bombay) | Followed view that payment under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside a sale where payer claims ownership is voluntary and not recoverable, though acknowledged the Privy Council's contrary ratio where payment was to remove trespass/coercion. | Cited for the general proposition that deposits under Rule 89 by one claiming to be the owner are voluntary; the court examined and distinguished this line of authority on the facts of the present case. |
| L.A. Krishna Ayyar v. Arunachalam Chettiar (Full Bench) | Held that a deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 cannot be accepted subject to conditions or protest. | The respondents relied on this decision; the court observed the facts were distinguishable and did not apply the Full Bench view to deny recovery here. |
| Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra (Privy Council reference) | Held that a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 (section 283 of old Code) is substantially a suit to set aside the summary decision in the claim case. | Used by the court to explain that because this suit under Rule 63 challenges the claim-case decision, the sale/attachment and consequent execution affecting the surety could not validly bind the plaintiffs if the appellate finding is that the goods belonged to plaintiffs. |
| Madras Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Shalimar Works Ltd. (Madras) | Discussed limitation: wrongful arrest/seizure suits (where malice is not proved) are governed by Article 29 of the Limitation Act (one year for wrongful seizure under legal process). | The court considered this decision in deciding whether Article 29 or Article 49 governed the present claim; distinguished it and concluded Article 49 (three years) applied to recovery of sale proceeds. |
| Maharaj Bahadur Singh of Baluchar v. Sm. Achala Bala Devi | Held that suits for value of specific movables wrongfully taken are governed by Articles 48/49 (three years), not Article 29/36. | Cited by appellants and adopted by the court to hold the suit for Rs. 70-10-0 is governed by Article 49 and is within limitation. |
| Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdhery | Held that money realised under a decree or judgment cannot be recovered in a new suit while the decree remains in force; the decree must be reversed before recovery in a new suit. | Respondents relied on this principle but the court found it inapplicable because the claim-case order was effectively set aside by the appellate court; thus recovery of Rs. 85 was permitted in the present suit. |
| Dwarka Nath Kundu v. Mohendra Nath Roy | Like the above, supports the principle that monies realised under an existing decree/judgment cannot be recovered while that decree is in force. | Cited by respondents for same purpose; court held that because the claim-case order was effectively set aside, these authorities did not bar recovery here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining (a) factual findings of the lower appellate court, (b) the legal character of the various payments, and (c) limitation and procedural remedies.
1. Factual finding on ownership: The court disposed of the respondents' objection that the court of appeal did not make a definite finding. It observed that the appellate court expressly found that the movables were not liable to attachment in the execution case and that Ojha Das & Co. and Ojha Brothers were two distinct firms; the court treated that as a binding finding of fact on second appeal.
2. Payments made by the surety (two payments of Rs. 60 and one of Rs. 50): The appellants did not press the appeal as to these items and abandoned them.
3. Deposit of Rs. 357-8-6 under Order 21, Rule 89: The central analytical question was whether such a deposit is voluntary (so irrecoverable) or is made under compulsion/coercion (thus recoverable under Section 72, Indian Contract Act). The court reviewed the Privy Council decisions and the Patna/Bombay authorities that took opposing views. It distinguished those Patna/Bombay cases (which treated Rule 89 deposits by a claimant-owner as voluntary because the owner could ignore a sale of a non-existent right of the judgment-debtor) on the facts here:
- Raghubir Tewari had stood surety as ordered by the court in the claim case; his property was sold; the plaintiffs paid Rs. 357-8-6 to save that property. The payment was made in obedience to a court order requiring security and under the force of execution proceedings.
- Accordingly, the court treated this payment as not voluntary but compelled by the execution process and recoverable; the Patna/Bombay line of authority did not apply to payments made to save a surety's property that was in jeopardy by reason of an attachment and sale.
4. Raghubir's liability and Section 145 argument: The respondents argued that because Raghubir stood surety, the decree could validly be executed against him under Section 145, defeating plaintiffs' claim. The court analysed the circumstances and accepted that Raghubir had stood surety for the plaintiffs (as ordered by the court in the claim case), not for the judgment-debtors; the claim-case order disallowing the plaintiffs' claim was subject to the result of the present suit. Since the appellate court found the goods belonged to the plaintiffs, there could be no valid attachment of the plaintiffs' goods and consequently Raghubir could not be held liable for the decree; therefore the Section 145 argument failed on these facts.
5. Limitation for Rs. 70-10-0: The court examined whether Article 29 (one year for wrongful seizure under legal process) or Article 49 (three years for suits for other specific moveable property or compensation for wrongfully taking/detaining the same) applied. Citing Maharaj Bahadur Singh and distinguishing Madras Steam Navigation, the court held Article 49 applied because the suit sought recovery of money realised from sale (a claim for value of specific movables) and the cause of action arose when the goods were sold and proceeds paid in August 1942. The plaint as amended on 14 December 1943 fell within the three-year period; thus Rs. 70-10-0 was not barred by limitation.
6. Rs. 85 (costs): The respondents relied on authorities that money realised under a decree cannot be recovered while the decree remains in force. The court noted that a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 is substantially a suit to set aside the claim-case decision; because the appellate court's decision effectively set aside the claim-case order, the decree-holders had no right to retain Rs. 85 realised on the strength of that claim-case order. The court rejected the contention that Section 144 was the exclusive remedy and held recovery could be sought within the present suit.
7. Conclusion of analysis: On the facts and legal authorities reviewed, the court concluded that (a) the appellate finding that the goods belonged to the plaintiffs was binding, (b) the Rs. 357-8-6 deposit to save the surety's property was not voluntary and was recoverable, (c) Rs. 70-10-0 was within limitation under Article 49 and recoverable, and (d) Rs. 85 was recoverable because the appellate order had set aside the claim-case finding which had validated retention.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed in part. The court set aside the decision of Shearer, J. on the points contested by the appellants and decreed the suit for recovery of the following sums: (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 357-8-6, and (3) Rs. 85. The plaintiffs are also entitled to the declaration sought that the attached properties belonged to them. Both parties are entitled to their respective costs in proportion to their success, with the plaintiffs' costs to be recovered from defendant no. 1 Volkart Brothers. (Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J., concurred.)
Implications for the Parties
- The plaintiffs obtain a declaratory judgment that the attached goods belonged to them and recover the three specified monetary sums.
- The decree-holder (Volkart Brothers) is required to refund those sums and to bear the plaintiffs' costs to be recovered from defendant no. 1 as ordered.
- The finding that the appellate court had correctly found the goods belonged to the plaintiffs meant Raghubir (the surety) could not validly be held liable in execution on the basis of the earlier claim-case order.
Broader Legal Implications
The court applied established lines of authority concerning the character of payments made in execution proceedings and the interplay of Order 21, Rule 89 with Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. Rather than announcing a new general rule, the court distinguished precedents (Patna/Bombay decisions) on specific factual grounds (payment to save a surety's property given under a court order) and followed the Privy Council's reasoning where applicable. The decision is principally fact-driven: its reasoning clarifies that a deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 may be recoverable if made under the compulsion of execution proceedings to save property that was legitimately at risk (here, property of a court-ordered surety), and that the governing article of limitation depends on the nature of the claim (the court held Article 49 applicable to recovery of sale proceeds). The opinion did not purport to overrule the cited precedents but distinguished them on the facts.
Disposition: Appeal allowed in part; decree for recovery of Rs. 70-10-0, Rs. 357-8-6 and Rs. 85; declaratory relief granted; costs apportioned as above.
Chatterji, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the plaintiffs in a suit which was originally instituted under Order 21, rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant no. 1, Volkart Brothers, a firm carrying on business in motor parts and accessories in Calcutta, obtained, in February 1940, a decree for Rs. 585-3-0 in the Small Cause Court at Calcutta against Ojha Das and Co., a firm carrying on business in motor accessories at Patna, of which the defendant no. 2, Sripat Ojha, is the proprietor. The decree was transferred for execution to the First Munsif's court at Patna, and in execution. Volkart Brothers took out attachment, on 14th January 1941, against certain motor accessories and other movables said to belong to their judgment debtors, Oiha Das and Co. On 16th January, 1941, the plaintiffs, Ojha Brothers, a firm also carrying on business in motor accessories at Patna, of which the proprietors are the two younger brothers of defendant no. 2. Sripat Ojha, preferred a claim under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserting that the goods sought to be attached belonged to them and not to the judgment-debtors, Ojha Das and Co. They prayed for stay of the execution proceeding whereupon they were ordered to furnish security. In obedience to this order, they filed, on 20th March 1941 a registered security bond executed by one Raghubir Tewari. The claim was eventually dismissed on the 5th of September 1941. The execution then proceeded.
On 20th January 1942 the plaintiffs brought the present suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code for a declaration that the properties sought to be attached belonged to them and not to the judgment debtors Ojha Das and Co.
In August, 1942 the attached goods were sold and out of the sale-proceeds, Rs. 70-10-0 was paid to defendant no. 1 Volkart Brothers, by way of rateable distribution. The surety. Raghubir Tewari made three payments, two of Rs. 60 each and the other of Rs. 50 to Volkart Brothers and these payments were duly certified in court. As he did not make any further payment, the property given by him in security was proceeded against and sold in June 1943. To set aside that sale, the plaintiffs made an application under Order 21. Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure on depositing Rs. 357-8-6. Thereupon the sale was set aside. Volkart Brothers also realised from the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 85 as the costs of the claim case.
On the 14th December 1943 the plaintiffs, by leave of the Court, amended the plaint by adding a further prayer for recovery of the said sums of money, that is, (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 60, (3) Rs. 60, (4) Rs. 50, (5) Rs. 357-8-6 and (6) Rs. 85.
The suit was contested by defendant no. 1, Volkart Brothers, and their defence in substance was that the firms Ojha Das and Co., and Ojha Brothers were one and the same concern, belonging to the three brothers, and that the attached goods really belonged to the judgment-debtors, Ojha Das and Co.
The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit, held that the attached properties belonged to the judgment-debtors Ojha Das and Co., and not to the plaintiffs. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiffs, Ojha Brothers and not to Ojha Das and Co., and were, therefore, not liable to attachment or sale in execution of the decree obtained by Volkart Brothers against Ojha Das and Co. He accordingly allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in these terms:—
“Declaration sought for in the suit is allowed. Plaintiff shall be further entitled to refund of the money actually realised from him by the decree-holder (defendant no. 1) in Execution Case no. 1587/40”.
On second appeal, Shearer, J. held (1) that the claim for recovery of Rs. 70-10-0 was barred by limitation, (2) that the three payments, two of. Rs. 60 each and the other of Rs. 50 being made by the surety Raghubir Tewari, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover these sums, (3) that the payment of Rs. 357-8-6 made by the plaintiffs under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code was voluntary and no suit could lie for recovery of that amount and (4) that the sum of Rs. 85 which the plaintiffs had to pay as costs, was also not recoverable. He accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
Before coming to the points raised on behalf of the appellants it is necessary to dispose of the objection taken by Mr. R.S Chatterji on behalf of the respondents that the court of appeal below did not come to any definite finding that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiffs. This objection is without any force. The court definitely found
“In the above circumstances we cannot but hold that those moveables of Ojha Brothers were not liable to attachment and sale in that execution case”.
Shearer, J. proceeded on the footing that the court of appeal below was satisfied that
“Messrs Ojha Das and Co. and Messrs Ojha Brothers were two separate and distinct firms and that the property which had been attached by Messrs Volkart Brothers in execution of their decree belonged to the latter and not to the former firm”.
He appears to have accepted this as a finding of fact binding in second appeal.
Mr. G.P Das on behalf of the appellants does not press the appeal with regard to the three items, two of Rs. 60 each and the other of Rs. 50, which were paid by the surety Raghubir Tewari. He presses the appeal with regard to the other three items, (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 357-8-6 and (3) Rs. 85.
With regard to the item of Rs. 357-8-6, Mr. Das's contention is that the plaintiffs had to pay the amount under compulsion of legal process and, therefore, the payment could on no account be said to be voluntary. He relies on the decisions of the Privy Council in Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh and Seth Kanhaya Lal v. The National Bank of India, Limited(2). In the first case, the plaintiff, who had paid to the defendant a sum of money to prevent the sale of a certain mouza which had been attached and put up for sale in execution of a decree obtained by the defendant against a third person, sued to recover back the money. It was contended that the payment was voluntary. This contention was rejected by their Lordships in the following words:
“But the objections taken to the action were that the payment was voluntary, and that the remedy, if any, was in the execution proceedings, their Lordships think that there is no presence for saying that the payment was voluntary. It was made to prevent the sale which would otherwise inevitably have taken place of the mouza which the respondents had purchased, and was made therefore under compulsion of law; that is, under force of these execution proceedings”.
In the second case (40 Indian Appeals, 56) the defendant Bank obtained a decree against a certain limited company and, in execution of that decree, attached and took possession of certain mills of which the plaintiff claimed to be the sole proprietor. The plaintiff paid the decretal amount under protest and subsequently instituted a suit to recover back that amount. It was held that the money was paid under “coercion” within the meaning of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act and was, therefore, recoverable. The following passage from their Lordships' judgment is instructive; “A wrongful interference with the plaintiff's lawful enjoyment of his own property is alleged. The plaintiff was clearly entitled to rid himself of that unlawful interference by any lawful means without thereby affecting his right to hold the defendants liable for that which they have thus caused him to do. It is true that paying under protest the sum demanded was not the only course open to him. He might have taken legal proceedings, by which, sooner or later, he might have rid himself of the interference. But to do so would have involved his submitting to the wrong for all the period necessary for those proceedings to be effective, and that might have been a serious aggravation of the wrong. To this he was no wise bound to submit. He was free to choose a course which did not involve any such prolongation of the trespass. Accordingly he paid under, protest the sum demanded, and under English law he was unquestionably entitled to demand a repayment of that sum because it was an involuntary payment produced by coercion, namely, the wrongful interference of the defendants with his full and free enjoyment of his own property. By English law it is not open to the wrongdoer to prescribe by which of two lawful alternatives; the injured man puts a stop to the wrong under which he is suffering. His choice of any one alternative does not make it as between him and the wrongdoer a voluntary act or stop him from claiming that it was done under coercion”. Though the money was paid “under protest their”, Lordships do not appear to have attached any importance to that fact. In their view, the payment was made under the force of the execution proceedings and must, therefore, be regarded as being made under compulsion.
Here, in execution of the decree against Ojha Das and Company, attachment was taken out against the goods belonging, not to them but to the plaintiffs. In the claim case preferred by the plaintiffs, they had to furnish security, as ordered by the court. The surety's property was sold, and in order to save the property, the plaintiffs had to pay the sum of Rs. 357-8-6. The plaintiffs were not liable under the decree, and the payment made by them to save the property cannot but be regarded as being made under the force of the execution proceedings.
Shearer, J., in his judgment referred to the aforesaid Privy Council decisions, but apparently he felt bound by the decision of this Court in Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pandey. In that case it was held that where a property has been sold in execution of a money decree and a payment is made under Order 21, Rule 89, Code of Civil Procedure, the person making such payment must accept the validity of the sale and cannot, therefore, maintain a suit for refund of the money deposited by him. Kulwant Sahay, J., who delivered the judgment to which James J., agreed, observed:
“A payment under rule 89 must be an unconditional payment with the object of the money being paid to the decree-holder. Once a payment is made under Order 21, Rule 89 it is clear that the person, making the payment cannot be heard to say that the sale was not a valid sale and that the money deposited should not be paid to the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor or the person interested is under no compulsion to make the deposit under Order 21, Rule 89. Such a deposit is a voluntary deposit and the person making the deposit cannot in my opinion maintain a suit for a refund of the money deposited by him.”
The reason why the deposit was held to be a voluntary deposit will appear more clearly from the following passage:
“If the property sought to be sold does not really belong to the judgment-debtor, then the sale of the property in execution of a money decree will not affect the rightful owner of the property and he can ignore the sale and resist the auction purchaser in his attempt to take possession of the property after the sale. A person who is the owner of the property is not affected by a sale of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor to whom the property does not belong.
In other words, if a person, who is the true owner of the property and is, therefore, not affected by the sale, makes payment under Order 21, Rule 89, he does so as a mere volunteer.
In this Patna case there is no reference to the aforesaid Privy Council decisions. But Kulwant, Sahay, J., followed the decision in Narayan Vasudevacharya Katti…Defendant v. Amgauda Malagauda Patil…Plaintiff . in which those Privy Council decisions were considered. In that Bombay case, the defendant, who had obtained a decree against a third person, got certain property sold and purchased it himself, and the plaintiff, who claimed to be the owner in possession of the property, got the sale set aside under Order 21, Rule 89 by paying into court the decretal amount and five, per cent of the purchase money, and on the amount being paid to the decreeholder, the plaintiff sued to recover it back. It was held that under Order 21, Rule 89 the amount must be taken to have been deposited for payment to the decree-holder voluntarily and unconditionally and, therefore, no suit could lie to recover it back. Macleod, C.J, who delivered the leading judgment observed:
“If the true owner allows the attachment to continue, and the property to be sold as belonging to the judgment-debtor, he can treat the sale as a nullity and resist the auction-purchaser. There is no necessity for him to get rid of the sale of what in his opinion does not exist. The attachment of the property itself is a different matter, that may seriously inconvenience him, but if he is the true owner the sale of a non-existent interest in it does not affect him. If he pays in money to get that sale set aside it can only be treated as a voluntary payment”.
The said two Privy Council decisions were distinguished on the ground that “a payment made under protest to get rid of an attachment or to prevent a sale in execution stands on a different footing and that the ratio decidendi of these cases cannot be applied to a payment made under rule 89 in support of an application to set aside a sale of the right, title and interest of a third party held in execution of the decree”. But it is to be observed, in the first of these Privy Council cases, there was no question of payment “under protest”.
In a later case, Shankarrao Keshavrao Deshmukh v. Vadhilal Mulchand Gujarathi, the Bombay High Court took the same view, though not without some hesitation. In that case, the plaintiffs sued to recover back the amount which they had paid under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree under which the plaintiffs' property was not liable. The mortgage decree was satisfied by the sale of that portion only of the mortgaged property which belonged to the plaintiffs. The mortgagee as well as the mortgagors were made defendants in the suit. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the land belonging to them was not liable to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree, but they were not entitled to recover the amount claimed, from the mortgagee, because the amount must be taken to have been deposited for payment to him voluntarily and unconditionally. Patkar, J., who delivered the leading judgment, after referring to the said two Privy Council decisions, stated:
“If the owner, in order to save the property from sale, pays the amount to the decree-holder, he can recover back the money so paid under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act on the ground that the payment was involuntary or obtained by coercion.
In the present case, the plaintiffs paid the money after the sale under Order 21, Rule 89, to set aside the sale on payment to the decree-holder of the amount of the decree and five per cent of the sale price to the auction purchaser. If the matter were res integra, it might have been possible to hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover back the amount under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. The action of the plaintiffs would not be a voluntary payment of the debts of the other defendants nos. 2 to 6 who were liable, but it was a payment made to save their property and get it back from the mortgagee-decree-holder who had wrongly allowed it to be sold in execution of the mortgage-decree.”
His Lordship then quoted the passage, cited above, from 40 Indian Appeals, 56 and proceeded as follows:—
“The sale of survey no. 159 was a wrongful interference with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their own property and the plaintiffs were entitled to rid themselves of the unlawful interference by any lawful means without thereby affecting their right to hold defendant no. 1 liable for what he had caused them to do. After the sale the only lawful means by which the plaintiffs could get rid of the unlawful interference of defendant no. 1 was by payment under Order 21, Rule 89, and it was not competent to defendant no. 1 to prescribe some other way to put a stop to the wrong to which they were subjected”.
In conclusion, however, his Lordship followed the decision in the earlier case in I.L.R 45 Bombay, 1094 which was also followed by this court in I.L.R 7 Patna, 30. Barlee, J., who agreed with him, but delivered a separate judgment, stated with reference to the Privy Council decision in 40 Indian Appeals, 56:
“Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that he was entitled to succeed inasmuch as he had paid under legal coercion and was entitled to rid himself of the unlawful interference of the Bank by any lawful means. Thus a payment into Court made to remove a trespass can be recovered by suit”.
His Lordship then proceeded as follows:
“But according to the view adopted by a Bench of this Court in Narayan v. Adgauda a payment made under Order 21, Rule 89, to have a sale set aside is not a payment to remove a trespass……………… Kanyaya Lal's case was cited but distinguished and the main ground of distinction was that what had been sold was not the property which A claimed but the right, title and interest of S, in it. There had been no actual trespass and on the assumption that the property belonged to A and not to the judgment-debtor S there was no threat of trespass, their Lordships considered, against the property of A for A by paying the debt of S, was protecting not his own property which was not in danger, but the non-existent right, title and interest of S, in the property.”.
Thus, according to the said Patna and Bombay, decisions, if the payment under Order 21, Rule 89 is made by a third person who claims to be the real owner of the property sold, the payment is voluntary, because he is thereby protecting not his own property which is not in danger, but the non-existent right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in that property.
In the present case, the property given in security by Raghubir Tewari was sold and the plaintiffs made the payment under Order 21, Rule 89 to save that property from sale. It cannot be said that they made the payment to protect any non-existent right, title and interest. It was in obedience to the order of the court that the plaintiffs had to furnish security which was actually given by Raghubir Tewari. According to the finding of the lower appellate court, the goods which were attached by Volkart Brothers belonged not to their judgment-debtors, but to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had to pay the money under the force of execution proceedings. The principle laid down in the said Patna and Bombay decisions, therefore, has no application here. In my opinion, the payment made by the plaintiffs can on no account be said to be voluntary.
Mr. R.S Chatterji further relies on the Full Bench decision in L.A Krishna Ayyar v. Arunachalam Chettiar in which the real question for decision was whether a deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 could be accepted subject to any condition or protest. It was held that no condition could be attached to such deposit. The facts of that case are quite distinguishable from those of the present.
Mr. Chatterji next contends that Raghubir having stood surety, the decree could be valid executed against him under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, the plaintiffs cannot recover the money paid under Order 21. Rule 89 which went to satisfy the decree. But Raghubir stood surety not for the judgment-debtors, but for the plaintiffs, as ordered by the court in the claim case and he undertook the responsibility for payment of the decree in case the claim was rejected. The claim, no doubt, was disallowed by order, dated the 5th September, 1941, but that order was subject to the result of the present suit which was in the meantime brought under Order 21, rule 63. Raghubir's property was sold long after the institution of this suit. As Pointed out by the Privy Council in Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra, a suit under Order 21, rule 63 (section 283 of the old Code) is substantially a suit to set aside the summary decision in the claim case. On the finding of the lower appellate court, there could be no valid attachment of the plaintiff's goods, and consequently Raghubir as surety could not be held liable for payment of the decree.
In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the further question raised by Mr. Chatterji, namely, whether there was a good consideration for Raghubir, standing as surety.
Next, as regards the item of Rs. 70-10-0, Mr. G.P Das contends that the suit is governed not by Article 29 but by Article 49 of the. Limitation Act. Article 29 refers to a suit
“For compensation for wrongful seizure of moveable property under legal process”.
for which the period of limitation is one year from
“the date of the seizure”.
Mr. Chatterji relies on the decision in Madras Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Shalimar Works, Ltd. in which the plaintiff company sued the defendant company for wrongful arrest of a ship belonging to the former. The suit as framed was based on malice or its equivalent, but at the hearing the plaintiff company proceeded on the footing of the suit being one for mere trespass. It was held that in the absence of proof of malice or its, equivalent, a suit for simple trespass would not be for the arrest of a ship. On the question of limitation raised, it was held that assuming that an action would lie in the absence of proof of malice or its equivalent, the action would be for wrongful seizure under legal process and would be barred by Article 29 of the Limitation Act. But the present suit is not for compensation for wrongful seizure of the plaintiffs' goods, but for recovery of the money which was realised by the decree-holders by sale of those goods. Mr. G.P Das contends that the suit will be governed by Article 49 which refers to suits
“For other specific moveable property or for compensation for wrongfully talking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same”.
The period of limitation for such suit is three years from
“when the property is wrongfully taken or injured or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful”.
Mr. Das relies on the case of Maharaj Bahadur Singh of Baluchar, District Murshidabad v. Sm. Achala Bala Devi in which it was held that a suit for value of crops wrongfully attached, cut and removed by the defendant would be governed by Article 48 or Article 49 and not by Article 29 or Article 36 of the Limitation Act. Upon the facts of the present case, I think the proper article applicable will be Article 49. The cause of action for the suit arose when the attached goods were sold and the proceeds were paid to the decree-holders. The attached goods were sold and Rs. 70-10-0 out of the proceeds was paid to the decree-holder in August 1942, and the suit, so far as it related to the recovery of money, must be deemed to have been instituted on the 14th December 1943 when the plaint was amended. The suit was, therefore, well within three years. Consequently the claim for recovery of Rs. 70-10-0 cannot be said to be barred by limitation.
As regards the last item of Rs. 85, the objection taken by Mr. Chatterji is that this amount having been allowed as costs in the claim case, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover it. He relies on the decisions in Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdhery and Dwarka Nath Kundu v. Mohendra Nath Roy. It was held in these cases that money realised under a decree or judgment cannot be recovered back in a new suit or action, while such decree or judgment under which it was recovered remains in force, as the original decree or judgment, must be taken to be subsisting and valid until it has been reversed or superseded by ulterior proceeding. As already pointed out, a suit under Order 21, rule 63 is substantially a suit to set aside the summary decision in the claim case. Here, the order in the claim case was in effect set aside by the court of appeal below. Consequently, the said decisions do not stand in the plaintiffs' way of obtaining a refund of Rs. 85. The order in the claim case having in effect been set aside, the decree-holders are not entitled to retain this sum which they realized on then strength of that order.
It is further contended by Mr. Chatterji that in any case the remedy of the plaintiffs with regard to this Rs. 85 is not by a separate suit, but by an application under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But section 144 by its terms has no application to the present case. Here, the claim for refund of the sum of Rs. 85 is made in the very suit under Order 21, rule 63. If by the decree passed in this suit the order in the claim case is set aside, there is no reason why in this very suit the plaintiffs will not be entitled to a refund of the amount.
In the result I would allow the appeal in part, set aside the decision of Shearer, J., and decree the suit for recovery of the three sums of (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 357-8-6 and (3) Rs. 85. The plaintiffs will also be entitled to a declaration as sought for. Both parties will be entitled to their respective costs throughout in proportion to their success, the plaintiffs' costs to be recovered from defendant no. 1.
Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J:— I agree.
Appeal allowed.
G.N.P
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