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Nagardas Vachraj v. Anandrao Bhai

Bombay High Court
Apr 2, 1907
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (an attorney's clerk) filed a suit seeking, among other relief, a declaration that on two insolvencies of the first defendant's father (Bhai Ganpat) certain properties vested in the Official Assignee and were validly transferred to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges he purchased the insolvent's rights from the Official Assignee for Rs. 2,000; the properties claimed are said to be worth about Rs. 190,000.

On 17 January 1907 the plaintiff petitioned the Prothonotary alleging that the first defendant was a minor under 18 and sought appointment of his mother (or another fit person) as guardian ad litem. The petition was heard in Chambers on 23 and 26 March. During the proceedings two central factual-procedural points emerged: (1) there existed an earlier order dated 10 March 1905 by Mr. Justice Tyabji appointing the first defendant's mother as guardian of person and property, and (2) the respondents contend that on 28 January 1907 the judge (Davar, J.) set that earlier order aside in Chambers so that it should be treated as if it had never been made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Judge sitting in Chambers had jurisdiction to set aside or rescind the earlier order of 10 March 1905 appointing a guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act.
  2. Whether, despite any subsequent rescission of the guardianship order, the period of minority of the first defendant was extended to 21 years under section 3 of the Indian Majority Act (Act IX of 1875).
  3. Whether the first defendant was a minor such that a guardian ad litem should be appointed under section 443 of the Civil Procedure Code for purposes of the present suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments (Mr. Setalvad)

  • Although counsel admitted the first defendant was over 18 years of age, he argued that the order of 10 March 1905 appointing the mother as guardian extended the period of minority to 21 years under section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, and thus the defendant would not attain majority until 21.
  • He contended that the Judge had no power to cancel, vacate or set aside the order made by Mr. Justice Tyabji and that doing so amounted to acting without jurisdiction.
  • Relied on several precedents (Khwahish Ali v. Surju Prasad Singh; Rudra Prokash Misser v. Bhola Nath Mukherjee; Gordhandas v. Harivalubhdas; Shivram v. Krishnabai; Gopalchunder Bose v. Gunesh Chunder) to support the proposition that once a guardian is appointed the minority continues until 21 under section 3.

First Defendant's Arguments (Mr. Inverarity)

  • Contended that the earlier guardianship order of 10 March 1905 was an order which ought never to have been made and that, on an application to the judge in Chambers on 28 January 1907 by the first defendant and his mother, the order had been set aside by the judge so that the first defendant now stood as if the original order had never been made.
  • Invoked section 21 of the General Clauses Act to argue that the judge sitting in the place of the judge who made the order could rescind it (though the presiding judge stated it was unnecessary to rely on that provision).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daniell's Chancery Practice (7th ed., p. 1803) States propositions that irregularly obtained orders, or orders obtained by suppression/misrepresentation of material facts, may be discharged; a party affected can procure discharge at the costs of the person who obtained it. The Court relied on this English practice by analogy to support the view that a Judge sitting in Chambers has power to vary, alter, modify or set aside his own orders in miscellaneous matters when justice requires it.
St. Victor v. Devereux An ex parte order was discharged where material facts were not disclosed in the petition; emphasises duty to state material circumstances. Cited as authority for the principle that orders made on incomplete or misleading petitions are irregular and may be discharged; used to criticize the 1905 petition as disingenuous and lacking material facts.
Holcombe v. Antrobus Reinforces the rule that a party obtaining an order of course must state every material fact truly. Applied to show petition for guardianship suggested false reasons and omitted facts which made the 1905 order unjustified.
De Feucheres v. Dawes Ex parte order set aside where a disputed prior reference (to arbitration) was omitted when obtaining an order for taxation. Used to illustrate that failure to disclose material prior matters can render an order irregular and dischargeable.
In re Newman (judgment of Mr. Justice Wright) Receiving order against a trustee in bankruptcy was rescinded ab initio where it ought never to have been made, restoring the trustee to original position. Relied on as analogy for the proposition that an order wrongly made can be treated as if it never had been made.
Khwahish Ali v. Surju Prasad Singh Held that removal of a guardian before the minor attains 21 cannot take the case out of the operation of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act. Examined by the Court but distinguished on facts because there was no challenge to the propriety of the original guardianship order in that case.
Rudra Prokash Misser v. Bhola Nath Mukherjee Where a guardian was once appointed, the minor remains under minority until 21 whether the original guardian continues or not. Distinguished by the Court as not touching the present point because the propriety of the original appointment was not in question in that case.
Gordhandas v. Harivalubhdas Contains a comment about cancelling certificates of guardianship and effect on section 3; facts involved appointment, removal and orders about receivers. The Court found the facts highly peculiar and concluded the case was distinguishable; the sentence suggesting an exception to section 3 was interpreted in context and not seen as controlling here.
Shivram v. Krishnabai Judgment of Mr. Justice Aston; raised in relation to section 3 issues. The Court considered it had little bearing on the present question and did not rely on it.
Gopalchunder Bose v. Gunesh Chunder (Gopalchunder v. Ganeshchunder) Deals with security to be furnished by a guardian and effect of non-compliance. The Court observed it related to security questions and did not find it useful for resolving the present issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed two principal lines of inquiry: (A) jurisdiction to set aside the earlier guardianship order and (B) the legal effect of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act if an appointment had once been made.

(A) Jurisdiction to set aside the 10 March 1905 order

  • The Court examined section 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act (the phrase "an order made under this Act shall be final") and read it in context with the appeals provisions and the saving in section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Judge concluded that section 48 was aimed at giving finality to contested orders and preventing collateral attack by substantive suit, but did not immunize an order that was improperly obtained from being rescinded by the Judge in Chambers.
  • The Court found it unnecessary to decide the applicability of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, though it was raised by defence counsel, because the Court considered it could justify its action without resort to that provision.
  • The Judge concluded on the facts that the 1905 order was improperly obtained and erroneously made: there was nothing to show the order was for the welfare of the minor as required by section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act; requirements of section 10 clause (k) were not complied with; and the petition contained misleading or omitted material facts (the petition suggested false reasons, omitted that the petitioner's suit was being filed and that a receiver had been applied for, and therefore the appointment was unnecessary).
  • Relying on the analogy of English practice (Daniell's Chancery Practice and the cited English authorities), the Court held that a Judge sitting in Chambers has the power to rescind, recall or set aside an order made under the Guardians and Wards Act when satisfied that the order ought not to have been made.
  • The Court also invoked practical considerations and prior practice in the Court's records where orders have been varied or set aside by judges (including instances where Mr. Justice Tyabji himself had set aside an order he had made), reinforcing the view that a Chambers judge may correct an improperly obtained order.

(B) Effect of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act

  • Plaintiff's counsel argued that once a guardian had been appointed, section 3 extended minority to 21 years irrespective of subsequent variation or discharge of the guardianship order.
  • The Court examined the Indian and English decisions cited by plaintiff (including Khwahish Ali, Rudra Prokash Misser, Gordhandas, Shivram, and Gopalchunder) and analysed their facts. The Court repeatedly emphasised that in none of these cases was there any contention that the original appointment was improperly obtained or ought never to have been made.
  • Accordingly, the Court distinguished those authorities on their facts and found they did not address the present situation where the original order was shown to be improperly obtained and was rescinded as if it never had been made.
  • The Court concluded that the cited authorities did not establish that section 3 operated to extend minority to 21 in circumstances where the original guardianship order was improperly obtained and was rescinded ab initio; the Court accepted the analogy from In re Newman that where an order is rescinded ab initio it should be treated as never made.

Conclusion of analysis applied to statutory threshold for appointing guardian ad litem

  • Under section 443 of the Civil Procedure Code the Judge must be satisfied that a person is a minor before appointing a guardian ad litem. The Court was satisfied that the first defendant was not a minor (given the rescission of the guardianship order and the analysis above) and therefore refused the appointment.
  • On costs and motive the Court analysed the circumstances and found the plaintiff's application to have been motivated by ulterior and improper purposes (to obstruct the first defendant from obtaining possession and to coerce a settlement), not bona fide protection of rights. The Court viewed the purported apprehension of the plaintiff (that the defendant might later plead minority) as a pretext.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's dispositive rulings were as follows:

  • Application dismissed; guardian ad litem refused.
  • The notice was discharged and the plaintiff was ordered to pay all costs of the application and notice to the first defendant. The Court certified that this was a fit case for the employment of counsel.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The first defendant was held not to be a minor for the purposes of the current proceedings; no guardian ad litem was appointed; the plaintiff must pay costs. The plaintiff's attempt to have the defendant declared a minor was rejected as having ulterior motives.
  • Legal principle stated by the Court: The Judge sitting in Chambers has power, in miscellaneous matters, to rescind, recall or set aside an order made under the Guardians and Wards Act when satisfied the order was improperly obtained or ought not to have been made; orders obtained by suppression or misrepresentation of material facts are irregular and dischargeable (the Court relied on English authorities and practice by analogy). The Court distinguished Indian authorities on section 3 of the Indian Majority Act as not governing cases where the original guardianship order was improperly obtained and rescinded ab initio.
  • No assertion is made in this summary that a binding new precedent beyond the decision in this matter was created; the Court articulated and applied its reasoning to the facts and made the above orders and findings as the disposition of this application.

Additional Procedural/Administrative Details

Attorneys for the plaintiff: Messrs. Khanderao, Laud, and Mehta.
Attorneys for the defendant: Messrs. Bicknell, Merwanji and Romer.

Citation note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion text of Davar, J., and contains no information beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Davar, J.:— The plaintiff, who is an attorney's clerk, has filed this suit for a declaration amongst other things that on the two insolvencies of the first defendant's father, Bhai Ganpat, the properties mentioned in the plaint vested in the Official Assignee and that the same are now validly transferred to him. For a sum f Rs. 2,000 paid by him to the Official Assignee ho has purchased from him all the right, title and interest of the insolvent Bhai Ganpat in the properties mentioned in the schedule to the conveyance, dated the 23rd of December 1905, and all other estate that may have been left by Ganpat Maneckji Patel, the father of the insolvent Bhai Ganpat. The properties claimed by the plaintiff are of the value of about a lakh and ninety thousand rupees. On the 17th of January 1907 the plaintiff presented a petition to the Prothonotary, alleging that the first defendant was a minor under the age of 18 years and praying that his mother or some other fit and proper person may be appointed his guardian ad litem for the purposes of the suit. The notice was argued before me in Chambers on Saturday the 23rd and Tuesday the 26th of March last.

At the hearing before me Mr. Setalvad for the plaintiff admitted that the first defendant was over eighteen years of age, but he contended that, by reason of an order made by the late Mr. Justice Tyabji on the 10th of March 1905 whereby the first defendant's mother was appointed the guardian of the person and property of the first defendant who was then a minor, the first defendant would not attain majority till he was 21 years of age.

Mr. Inverarity for the first defendant contended that the order of the 10th of March 1905 was an order which ought never to have been made and the same was on the 28th of January 1907 on an application made to me in Chambers by the first defendant and his mother, set aside by me and that the first defendant now was in the same position as if the original order had never been made.

Mr. Setalvad strenuously argued that I had no power to cancel vacate and set aside the order made by Mr. Justice Tyabji, and that in doing so I acted without jurisdiction. He further argued that once the order was made the period of minority under the provisions of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act being Act IX of 1875 was extended to 21 years and that the subsequent annulment, cancellation or setting aside of the order did not affect the question.

The circumstance under which the original order was made and the reasons which induced me to set aside the order are given in my judgment which I delivered on Monday the 28th of January 1907. (See Chamber Note Book, p. 59.) The questions raised by Mr. Setalvad were present before my mind when I gave my judgment, and it will be seen that my mind was not free from doubts on these questions. I am glad therefore that the same questions have now been fully and elaborately argued before me.

The first question for my consideration is—Had I jurisdiction to set aside the order of the 10th of March 19 05? Mr. Setalvad points to section 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act and relies on the words “an order made under this Act shall be final.” A glance at the section makes it quite clear that that section immediately following as it does the section which provides for appeals is intended to give finality to contested orders and to enact that once an order is made, except as provided in section 47 and saving the provisions of section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, the order shall be final and shall not be contested by a substantive suit or by any other form of litigation.

Mr. Inverarity brings into requisition section 21 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and argues that under that section I sitting in the place of the Judge who made the order have power to rescind the same. I do not think it is necessary for me to consider the applicability of that section or to resort to the same to justify my action in setting aside the order of the 10th of March 1905.

I have found that the order was improperly obtained and erroneously made. Not only was there nothing to satisfy the Court that it was for the welfare of the minor that the order should be made as required by section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act but it was an absolutely unnecessary order. The requirements of section 10, clause (k), were not complied with and no cause which led to the making of the order was even suggested in the petition. In the course of his long argument before me I repeatedly asked Mr. Setalvad to tell me how that order was for the welfare of the minor and to give me one single reason why it was necessary or desirable that such an order should have been made. I asked him to suggest to me one single cause which could have led to the making of the application.

Mr. Setalvad's only answer was that in making these enquiries I was really sitting in appeal on Mr. Justice Tyabji's order. This does not deter me in the least. As I have observed before, if my learned predecessor in office had been sitting in my place, and if the facts that are brought to my notice had been brought before him, he would, I feel most confident, have set aside his own order with far less hesitation than I have done. Even at this stage not one single satisfactory reason is put forward in justification of the application for the appointment of a guardian of the minor. When the minor attained the age of 18 years he appealed to the tribunal that made the order to free him from the trammels of that order which, far from being for his welfare, was working positive hardship on him. Although he was declared absolutely entitled to the whole of the family, property, subject to certain provisions, he found that the whole of the estate was involved in litigation and that his properties were in the hands of a Receiver though for certain reasons, not difficult to understand, he was called a Special Commissioner, He desired to be put in possession of his properties and to take the conduct of his affairs in his own hands. For that purpose he appealed to the Chamber Judge to restore him to the position he would have occupied, but for this order which, he contended and rightly, was most detrimental to his interest and for the making of which there was no necessity and not the smallest justification. Is the Judge powerless to give relief when he feels convinced that the order was improperly obtained and erroneously made? As put by Mr. Inverarity, suppose that the minor was 19 years of age when the order for the appointment of his guardian was made. Could it be contended that he was not entitled to come to the Judge who made the order when he came to know of this order and ask him to rescind the order, and would the Judge hesitate for one moment to rescind the order so improperly obtained? I am fortified in this view of the matter from the fact that on searching the records of this Court many precedents will be found where an order made is often varied or altered and in some instances wholly set aside and a new order made. I came across recently an instance in which Mr. Justice Tyabji, after having made an order, set it aside and made another order in the matter of the same minor.

The Guardians and Wards Act makes no provision for setting aside an order made under the Act, but judging from the analogy of English practice I have no doubt that in these miscellaneous matters the Judge sitting in Chambers and making orders on petitions and applications has the power to vary, alter, modify or set aside his own orders when he finds that the order is one that requires in the interests of justice to be dealt with in that way. In Daniell's Chancery Practice, 7th edition, at page 1803, on the authority of several cases collected there the following propositions are laid down:—

“If there is any irregularity in the order, or it has been obtained upon any false suggestion, or by the suppression of any material fact, it will be discharged …. although on the merits it would have been proper to make the order.” And again:— “If an order has been irregularly obtained …. any party affected by it may procure its discharge at the costs of the person who obtained it.”

In the case of St. Victor v. Devereux an order made ex parte was discharged on the ground that material facts were not stated in the petition on which the order was made. The Master of the Rolls Lord Langdale there says:— “There are few things more important than that parties who apply for orders of course should fairly state all the circumstances which really ought to be considered. It is upon the allegations made upon petitions for orders of course that such orders are made, and if those allegations omit anything material, and which ought to be taken into consideration, the order so obtained is an irregular order.” In this case the order was an order allowing the plaintiff to sue in forma pauperis. The Court held that there were material circumstances which ought to have been disclosed in the petition and the order was discharged because these circumstances were not disclosed. This principle was emphasised in a later case, Holcombe v. Antrobus, where the Master of the Rolls says “Upon occasions of this kind there are three rules of which I have taken notice. First, a party obtaining an order of course is bound to state truly, every fact which is material to the question, whether the order ought to be granted as of course or not.”

In De Feucheres v. Dawes an ex parte order was set aside on the ground that an alleged previous reference to arbitration although the fact was disputed was not mentioned when the order for taxation was obtained.

In all these cases there have been distinctions between orders of course and special orders and they depend on technical rules of procedure in the English Courts. I have however referred to these cases on account of the principle they lay down in unmistakeable terms. The appointment of a guardian to a minor when the same is necessary for the protection and safety of his person or property is a matter of course. Under our Rules all applications under the Guardians and Wards Act are made in Chambers. It is possible that when a parent makes the application ostensibly in the interests of her own child as in this case the Judge hearing the application does not scrutinise the allegations of the petition very minutely. This petition which the first defendant's mother was made to present to the learned Judge in Chambers violates the principles laid down in the cases I have referred to above in that it suggests a false reason for the application although such reason is not actively asserted. The scheme of the whole petition seems to be to create on the mind of the Judge an impression that it was necessary to appoint Mathurabai a guardian of the property of her minor son in order to rescue his property from the grasp of other people who had wrongfully taken possession of that property. Paragraph 11 is most disingenuous. It says Your petitioner as next friend and natural guardian is taking the necessary steps against the said Bhagirthibai to recover possession of the said properties by filing a suit against her in this Honourable Court.” On reading this paragraph the first impression that would be produced on the mind of the Judge would bo that the appointment of the petitioner as guardian of the minor's property was the first step towards the filing of that suit and that it was a necessary step before a suit could be filed. It appears however from the affidavit of Mathurabai, affirmed on the 23rd of January 1907, that on the same day that she affirmed the petition she affirmed her plaint in Suit No. 153 of 1905 and that on a subsequent date a Receiver of the property was appointed by the Court on her application. I think it was the duty of the petitioner to have stated in the petition that her plaint had just then been, or was ready to be, affirmed and that she was applying for a Receiver, and that simultaneously with the petition she was filing a suit as the next friend of her minor son. If these facts were clearly stated the Court would have seen the utter futility of appointing a guardian of a boy who would have attained his majority in about seventeen or eighteen months after the date of the petition. As the circumstances then existed there was not the smallest necessity for the appointment of a guardian. The order requires the guardian to give security to the extent of Rs, 1,90,838, The petitioner was a widow without any property of her own. The whole property of her husband's family was involved in impending litigation. She could only find hired security by paying large sum of moneys as commission out of the property which she claimed to belong to her minor son. Could such an order be said to be for the welfare of the minor and that too when there was absolutely “no cause which led to the making of this application”? The order was made behind the back of the minor. He was not represented and not heard. He could only be heard after he attained majority according to his contentions. The only course open to him was to come before the Judge in Chambers and represent how unjustly he had been dealt with, and it would be a positive scandal if the only answer the Judge could give, according to Mr. Setalvad's contention, was:—

“No doubt the order ought not to have been made, but once it is made I am powerless to give you any relief and there is no provision of law whereby the wrong done to you behind your back can be redressed.”

It must be remembered that it has not been argued before me that the order of the 10th of March 1905 was a necessary or proper order, that it was for the welfare of the minor that the order should be made, or that there was any cause whatever for the making of the order. All that Mr. Setalvad has argued is that rightly or wrongly the order was or has been made, that I had no right to sit in appeal on the order made by another Judge, and that I had no jurisdiction to set it aside. On a very careful consideration of all the arguments addressed to me, the impressions formed by me in the first instance that the order was improperly obtained and ought never to have been made are considerably emphasised. The doubts expressed by me in my previous judgment as to my power to set aside the order have on maturer consideration been removed from my mind and I am of opinion that the Judge in Chambers has the power to rescind, recall, or set aside, an order made under the Guardians and Wards Act if he is satisfied that the order is one that ought not to have been made.

The second head of Mr. Setalvad's arguments, I confess, is one that requires much consideration and the question raised by him is not free from difficulties. He argues that once the order has been made—no matter what is subsequently done, whether the order is varied, suspended, or wholly discharged—under the provisions of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act the period of minority is extended to 21 years. In support of his arguments he has relied on the following cases: Khwahish Ali v. Surju Prasad Singh, Rudra, Prohash Misser v. Bhola Nath Mukherjee, Gordhandas v. Harivalubhdas, Shivram v. Krishnabai and Gopalchunder Bose v. Gunesh Chunder.

In the first of these cases—Khwahish Ali v. Surju Prasad Singh—the facts are peculiar. It appears that a guardian was appointed for the plaintiff in the first instance but the certificate of guardianship was subsequently cancelled on the minor attaining the age of 18 years on the ground that the minor had attained his majority at that age. Mr. Justice Oldfield observes that this was done in violation of the provisions of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act and the Court held that “the removal of the guardian before the minor attains the age of 21 years cannot take his case out of the operation of section 3” of the Indian Majority Act. In this case there was no question whatever of the propriety of the order in the first instance and the subsequent cancellation of the certificate of guardianship was manifestly erroneous.

In the case of Rudra Prokash Misser v. Bhola Nath Mukherjee it appears that the District Court appointed the Collector of the District as the manager of the minor's estate. The Collector subsequently withdrew from the guardianship and in the words of the judgment “resigned his trust.” On the minor attaining the age of 18 years it was contended on his behalf that he was entitled to a certificate as a person “sui juris.” The Court held that “a guardian having been once appointed he must continue to be a minor until he reaches the age of 21 whether the original guardian continues to be his guardian or not,” Here again there was no question of the propriety or otherwise of the original order appointing the Collector guardian of the minor's property; and I do not think these cases touch the point in this case.

The case of Gordhandas v. Harivalubhdas was a reference from the Presidency Small Cause Court. The facts as they appear from the case submitted by the Judge of the Small Cause Court are in this case also very peculiar. It appears that in 1884 by a decree of the High Court one Parbhudas was appointed guardian of the person and property of the minor. By an order made in 1890 Parbhudas was removed from his office and one Ramdas was appointed guardian of the minor's person and Parbhudas was ordered to hand over the minor's property to Mr. Watkins who had been appointed a Receiver in the original High Court suit. In 1891 Ramdas was discharged from his office as guardian of the minor's person and no other guardian was thereafter appointed. The minor was at this time 18 years and 10 months old. In 1892 when the minor was 19 years of age he applied to the Court that Mr. Watkins should be ordered to hand over all his property to him on the ground that he was 19 years of age and was competent to manage his estate. The High Court made the order. The minor was sued in the Small Cause Court on a promissory note executed by him when he was 19 years and 4 days old. He there pleaded minority and although he failed in the Small Cause Court he was successful in the High Court. The facts of this case are, as I said above, very peculiar and the order of the High Court directing the Receiver to hand over the minor's property when he was only 19 years of age is difficult to understand having regard to the fact that by its own decree the Court had appointed a guardian of his property. One thing conspicuously clear in this case also is the fact that there was no suggestion at any time that the original order of appointment of a guardian of the person and property of the minor was not a right or proper order. In considering the question before me now in this case I should have felt that this case presented no difficulty except for one sentence in Mr. Justice Strachey's judgment which makes one pause and consider its true import and meaning. Almost at the end of his judgment his lordship says: “And we should not be justified in reading into the section an exception that this provision,” referring to section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, “shall not apply where the certificate of guardianship was subsequently cancelled.” On a careful study of the facts of this case and of the language of the judgments of both the learned Judges it appears to me that when Mr. Justice Strachey uses the word cancelled, he refers to the various proceedings whereby one guardian was removed and another guardian of the person was substituted and the Receiver in the suit took the place of the guardian of the minor's property. The learned Judge must have had in his mind the order of the Court giving the minor possession of his property when he was only 19, the practical effect of which was that the original order became inoperative and was of no effect after the order handing over the minor's property to himself. It is noteworthy that the original order of appointment of the guardian of the property and person of the minor was never challenged—its propriety never appears to be questioned and it had not at any time been cancelled or set aside and I think it is a fair inference to say that Mr. Justice Strachey, when he speaks of cancellation, refers to the subsequent orders which merely varied the operation of the original order of the appointment of a guardian. I have—not without anxious consideration—come to the conclusion that the facts in this case are very distinguishable from the facts in the present case and that this case does not touch the question which arises in these proceedings and is now under my consideration.

Mr. Justice Aston's judgment in the case of Shivram v. Krishnabai I do not think has much bearing on the question before me, and Mr. Justice Stephen's judgment in the case of Gopalchunder v. Ganeshchunder refers to the question of security to be furnished by a guardian, and the effect of non-compliance with that portion of the order which requires a guardian to give security. I do not think any useful purpose will be served by a lengthened discussion of the last two cases.

In not one of the cases relied on by Mr. Setalvad has there been the faintest suggestion that the original order appointing a guardian was improperly obtained or erroneously made. In none of the cases the propriety of the original order has been questioned and in none of these cases has it been contended that the original order was one that ought never to have been made.

I have failed to find any Indian case on the point now under consideration and Mr. Inverarity has not cited any Indian authority on this point but he placed reliance on the judgment of Mr. Justice Wright in In re Newman. In that case it seems that a receiving order was made against a trustee in bankruptcy but the same was very soon afterwards rescinded on the ground that it ought never to have been made. The learned Judge held that “the receiving order was rescinded ab initio and ought to be treated as though it never had been made.” He held that the trustee was restored to his original position.

As the result of all these considerations I have come to the conclusion that the first defendant Anandrao Bhai is not a minor. Under section 443 of the Civil Procedure Code I have to be satisfied that the first defendant is a minor before I could appoint a guardian ad litem. I am satisfied that he is not a minor and I refuse the application.

In considering the question of costs it is important to consider whether this was a bona fide application made by the plaintiff for the protection of his own interests. Mr. Setalvad, when asked why his client was so anxious to have the first defendant declared a minor, said his client wanted to guard against the first defendant pleading minority and vitiating all the proceedings in the suit after his client gets his decree. This is much too far-fetched. The real reasons for the violent efforts made to have the first defendant declared a minor are not far to seek. The estate to which the first defendant is declared absolutely entitled consists of several immoveable properties. The Special Commissioner is in possession of the whole of the estate. He is invested with power to sell the properties. He has purported to sell some of these properties under the power of sale conferred upon him. The Special Commissioner, in certain proceedings which took place before me not very long ago, was charged with selling the first defendant's property at an undervalue and dividing the profits with Dadabhai Narayen Dhume, a solicitor's clerk. This is the same man who is referred to by the first defendant's mother in the 5th paragraph of her affidavit affirmed on the 23rd January 1907 as being the man who told her that it was necessary for her to get herself appointed a guardian of the property and person of her son. The sales made by the Special Commissioner are all challenged by the first defendant. The first defendant appears to be anxious to have the Special Commissioner removed and to be put in possession of his own property. If the first defendant is declared a minor he would not be able to take possession of the properties, and his mother, as guardian under the order of the 10th of March 1905, could not touch these properties till she furnishes security to the extent of one lakh ninety thousand odd rupees—a thing which she is unable to do. The effect of an order appointing a guardian ad litem of the first defendant, as I am asked to do now, would be to render the first defendant impotent against certain people who are working against him and to coerce him into some sort of unfair settlement. The plaintiff or those behind him are anxious that litigation in Suit No. 153 of 1905 should not come to a termination. A perusal of paragraph 17 of the plaint and the affidavit of the plaintiff affirmed on the 21st of January 1907 and made in support of an intended application for an injunction leaves no doubt in my mind as to the real object of the plaintiff. Whatever may have been the legal aspect of the points raised by this application, I have no doubt in my mind as to real nature of the application. It has no merits. The apprehension expressed by the plaintiff as to the first defendant hereafter pleading minority is a mere pretence. The application is made from ulterior and improper motives. I dismiss the application, discharge the notice, and refuse to appoint a guardian ad litem to the first defendant. I order the plaintiff to pay first defendant all costs of this application and notice and I certify that this was a fit case for the employment of counsel.

Attorneys for the plaintiff:— Messrs. Khanderao, Laud, and Mehta.

Attorneys for the defendant:— Messrs. Bicknell, Merwanji and Romer.

B.N.L