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Nitin Industrial Associates, Khamgaon v. State Of Maharashtra And Others
Summary of the Opinion (N.K. Parekh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Director of Health Services issued a notice dated 21 July 1983 inviting tenders for the sale of two categories of material — used X-ray plates (used X-ray films) and "wasteful hypo solution" — to be sold to small-scale units (items from which silver is extracted). Six parties submitted tenders. On 3 August 1984 the Government passed a resolution purporting to distribute these two items among three parties: the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4; the resolution also indicated the areas where each party would operate and set sale prices of Rs. 40.50 per kilogram for used X-ray films and Rs. 11.00 per litre for wasteful hypo solution.
The petitioners filed this writ petition seeking quashing of the Government resolution dated 3 August 1984 and consequential reliefs. The petitioners alleged that the tenders had not been rejected or otherwise dealt with and that, since the petitioners had quoted the highest rates, their tenders should have been accepted; they further alleged absence of any methodology for the Government's allocation of quantities and areas and complained that parties who had quoted lower prices were nonetheless allotted portions and called upon to pay the prices quoted by the petitioners.
The respondents resisted the petition (respondents Nos. 1 and 2 being the Government authorities defending the resolution; respondents Nos. 3 and 4 advancing their own positions). A jurisdictional objection was raised by respondent No. 4: that the Nagpur Bench of the High Court had no jurisdiction because the tender notice and the impugned resolution had originated in Bombay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court Bench at Nagpur had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to receive, try and hear the writ petition challenging the Government resolution dated 3 August 1984.
- Whether the Government, having invited tenders, could ignore those tenders without rejecting or terminating them and, by a subsequent resolution, allocate the items among selected parties (i.e., whether the impugned resolution was legally sustainable given the existing tenders).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The tenders submitted in response to the 21 July 1983 notice had neither been rejected nor otherwise terminated; the Government could not lawfully proceed to pass the impugned resolution allocating the items while those tenders remained alive.
- Among the tenders submitted by the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the petitioners had quoted the highest prices for both items and therefore their tender ought to have been accepted and the items given to them exclusively.
- There was no disclosed methodology for the Government's decision to allot items in the proportions and areas specified, nor explanation for how respondents 3 and 4, who had quoted lower prices, were allotted portions and called upon to pay the petitioners' quoted price.
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (Government) — Arguments
- The items were being sold to small-scale industries to assist them, and the distribution among the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was made in light of that policy objective.
- Although respondents 3 and 4 had quoted lower prices than the petitioners, the Government demanded the same price from respondents 3 and 4 as quoted by the petitioners, so there was no loss to the Government; hence there was no basis for quashing the resolution.
Respondent No. 3 — Arguments
- Although respondent No. 3 was allotted a quota less than what they might have expected, they accepted the distribution and thus contended the petition did not warrant quashing the resolution.
Respondent No. 4 — Arguments
- Jurisdictional objection: The tender notice and the impugned resolution had been issued at Bombay; the cause of action had arisen at Bombay; therefore the Nagpur Bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Reliance was placed on the decision in Siku Industries v. C.D. Souza (Bombay, 1971 Mh LJ 172) and on section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (read with Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules).
- On the merits, respondent No. 4 argued that the Government's intention was to assist small-scale industries and that the impugned resolution fulfilled that purpose, so the petitioners should not obtain relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Siku Industries v. Smt. C.D. Souza, Inspector, Office of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, State of Maharashtra (Bombay, 1971 Mh LJ 172) | Suggested principle (as relied on by respondent) that the place where the cause of action arises attracts jurisdiction (case involved Article 227 issues). | The Court explained that the cited decision dealt with Article 227 (not Article 226) and therefore did not support respondent No. 4's contention that cause of action determines Article 226 jurisdiction; the Court held the decision was not of assistance to respondent No. 4. |
| Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao (AIR 1953 SC 210) | Principle that the rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is statutory and cannot be applied to writs under Article 226; Article 226 requires the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. | The Court relied on this observation to support the view that Article 226 jurisdiction is not determined by the place where the cause of action arose and that the Nagpur Bench could exercise writ jurisdiction within its territorial limits. |
| In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (reported as AIR 1958 SC 956) | Rule that Article 226 confers extensive jurisdiction on High Courts throughout the territories in relation to which they exercise jurisdiction; no enactment of a State legislature can take away or abridge the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226. | The Court invoked the principle to reject the contention that section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 or the Appellate Side Rules could abridge the writ jurisdiction conferred by Article 226. |
| Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India ((1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628) | Principle concerning tender law: where tenders are invited and not terminated or rejected, the authority cannot proceed as if tenders were abandoned and award on a different basis; acceptance of a tender in that context must be consistent with the tender process. | The Court relied on this authority to support the petitioners' contention that respondents 1 and 2 could not lawfully ignore the invited tenders and, without rejecting or terminating them, allocate items by the impugned resolution; the Court held the Government's action to be bad in law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeded in two main parts: (A) jurisdiction under Article 226; and (B) substantive tender-law merits.
A. Jurisdiction under Article 226
- The Court analyzed Article 226(1) and (2). It noted that clause (1) vests every High Court with power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority within those territories. Clause (2) permits exercise of the power where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction, even if the seat of the authority or residence of the person is outside those territories.
- Applying these provisions to the facts, the Court observed that both the tender notice and the impugned Government resolution were issued within the territorial jurisdiction of the Nagpur Bench; therefore, by reason of Article 226(1) that Bench clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
- The Court rejected the contention that the place where the cause of action arose (Bombay) deprived the Nagpur Bench of jurisdiction. It relied on the principle in India v. Saka Venkata Rao that the cause-of-action rule applicable to suits does not apply to writs under Article 226; what matters is the territorial ambit of the High Court's jurisdiction.
- The Court also rejected the submission that statutory provisions (section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960) or the Appellate Side Rules could abridge the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226, referring to In re The Kerala Education Bill for the proposition that no enactment can take away or abridge Article 226 jurisdiction.
- That said, the Court recognized that section 41 and Chapter XXXI of the Appellate Side Rules were intended for administrative convenience and to guide the filing and allocation of petitions to appropriate Benches; they do not oust Article 226 jurisdiction. The Bench explained that it does not entertain lightly matters that should ordinarily be heard at Bombay, but in the peculiar facts (the matter had been admitted on 25-9-1984 and was already pending) it would hear and decide the matter at Nagpur.
B. Merits — Tender Law and Validity of the Resolution
- On the merits, the Court addressed the petitioners' submission that where tenders were invited the tender offering the highest price (among competing acceptable tenders) should have been accepted. The petitioners pointed out that they had quoted the highest rates among the competing parties and therefore their tender ought to have been accepted.
- The petitioners relied on Ramana Dayaram Shetty to show that an authority that invites tenders cannot, without rejecting or terminating the tender process, act in a manner inconsistent with the tender process (for example, by allocating the contract to others while the tender process remains alive).
- The Court examined the Government's conduct: respondents 1 and 2 ignored the live tenders and, without rejecting or terminating them, passed the resolution allocating the two items among the three parties. The Court found this procedure to be contrary to law.
- Consequently, the Court concluded that the act of ignoring the tenders and allocating the items by the impugned resolution was legally impermissible and that the petitioners were entitled to the reliefs sought.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The writ petition was allowed — the rule was made absolute and the Government resolution dated 3 August 1984 was quashed.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioners obtained the primary relief sought: quashing of the impugned Government resolution dated 3-8-1984.
- The Court ordered no costs ("There will however be no order as to costs").
Broader implications:
- The Court reaffirmed that Article 226 confers substantive territorial writ jurisdiction on High Courts which cannot be abridged by state legislation or administrative rules; administrative provisions (such as section 41 and the Appellate Side Rules) are for convenience and do not oust Article 226 jurisdiction.
- The decision applies established tender-law principles (as expounded in Ramana Dayaram Shetty) that public authorities that invite tenders cannot ignore the tender process and allocate resources in a manner inconsistent with an ongoing tender process without formally terminating or rejecting that process.
- The opinion does not purport to establish a new principle of law beyond applying these pre-existing authorities to the facts; its immediate effect is the quashing of the specific Government resolution challenged in this petition.
Disposition: Order accordingly. (The rule was made absolute in terms of the prayers (i) and (ii) of the petition; no order as to costs.)
N.K Parekh, J.:— The facts that give rise to this petition are that the Director of Health Services issued a notice dated 21st July, 1983 inviting tenders in respect of used X-ray plates and “wasteful hypo solution” to be sold to Small Scale Units (these being items from which silver is extracted). Six parties submitted tenders in respect thereof. However the Government thereafter passed a Resolution dated 3rd August, 1984 purporting to distribute these two items amongst three parties, namely, the petitioners (herein) and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and also, indicating the areas in which each of these parties would operate. The said resolution also Stipulated that the used X-ray films would lie sold at Rs. 40.50 per kilogram whilst “wasteful hypo solution” would be sold at Rs. 11.00 per litre. Being aggrieved by the said Resolution, the petitioners have filed this petition for quashing the said resolution and consequential reliefs. The petitioners have contended: (a) that the tenders have not been rejected and/or have otherwise not been dealt with and the Government could not purport to pass the resolution (now impugned) distributing the items in the manner they have done, (b) that looking to the tenders filed by the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the rates quoted by the petitioners in respect of both the items were the highest, and the petitioners' tender ought to have been accepted and the items ought to have been given to the petitioners exclusively and (c) that there was no methodology by which the Government allotted these items in the proportions specified in the said resolution, or allocated the areas specified in the said resolution, or as to how the respondents No. 3 and 4 who had quoted a lesser price, were allotted a part of the said items, and as to how they were called upon to pay the price at which the petitioners had offered to buy the items.
2. The petition is of course resisted by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who have contended that these items were to be sold to small-scale industries with a view to help such industries. That it is in the light of this policy that the items were allotted amongst the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4. That although the price quoted by respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in their tenders were lower than the price quoted by the petitioners, nonetheless respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had demanded the same price from respondents Nos. 3 and 4 as quoted by the petitioners and hence there was no loss to the Government. That in the circumstances the question of quashing the said resolution did not arise. Respondent No. 3 has contended that although under the impugned Government resolution respondent No. 3 was allotted a quota less than what they would be entitled to, the question of quashing the said resolution did not arise. Respondent No. 4 has contended that the High Court Bench sitting at Nagpur has no jurisdiction to receive, try and hear this petition. On merits, respondent No. 4 has contended that since the intention of the Government in selling these items was to assist small-scale industries, the Government resolution (now impugned) fulfils the very purpose, and the petitioners would be entitled to no relief. Now as regards the question whether this Court has jurisdiction to receive, try and hear this petition is concerned, it has been submitted by counsel for respondent No. 4 that admittedly the tender notice was issued in Bombay and the resolution (now impugned) was also passed at Bombay. That the whole cause of action had arisen in Bombay. That it was the cause of action that attracted jurisdiction, and this being so, the High Court Bench at Nagpur had no jurisdiction to receive, try and hear this petition. In support of this contention, counsel for respondent No. 4 placed reliance on the decision in the case of Siku Industries v. Smt. C.D Souza, Inspector, Office of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, State of Maharashtra, Bombay (1971 Mh LJ 172). Counsel for respondent No. 4 further contended that section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) reads as follows:
“41. Without prejudice to the provisions of section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, such Judges of the High Court at Bombay, being not less than three in number as the Chief Justice may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Nagpur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Buldana, Akola, Amravati, Yeotmal, Wardha, Nagpur, Bhandara, Chanda and Rajura:
Provided that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any case arising in any such district shall be heard at Bombay.”
3. That Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, inter alia, reads as follows:
“1. All appeals, applications, references and petitions including petitions for exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution arising in the Judicial Districts of Akola, Amaravati, Bhandara, Buldana, Chandrapur, Nagpur, Wardha, Yavatmal and Gadchiroli which lie to the High Court of Bombay shall be presented to the Additional Registrar of that High Court at Nagpur and shall be disposed of by the Judges sitting at Nagpur:
Provided that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion order that any case arising in any such district shall be heard at Bombay.”
4. That the reading of these two provisions must further demonstrate that it is the place where the cause of action arose that will attract jurisdiction and in the present case the cause of action having arisen in Bombay, the petition if at all ought to be presented before the High Court Bench in Bombay but the High Court Bench at Nagpur would be precluded from entertaining the writ petition. In other words, this “Court” has no jurisdiction to receive, try and hear this petition.
5. We are unable to accept these contentions. Turning to the first limb of the argument. Article 226, clauses (1) and (2) of the Constitution read as follows:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including (writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.)
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. Hence clause (1) provides that within the State, the Court's jurisdiction is co-terminus with the territories of the State, whilst clause (2) envisages the issue of writs beyond the Court's territorial jurisdiction provided that the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court concerned. In the present case, the tender notice and the impugned resolution were both issued within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and by reason of Article 226 clause (1) the Bench at Nagpur would clearly have jurisdiction. The provisions of section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) read with Rule 127 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules cannot abridge the writ jurisdiction. We are fortified in this view by the observations in the case of Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao (AIR 1953 SC 210) wherein the Court was pleased to observe as follows:
“The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Art. 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority “within the territories” in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction.”
7. Then again in dealing with the writ jurisdiction in In re The Kerala Eduction Bill, 1957 (AIR 1958 SC 956) the Court was pleased to observe as follows:
“Article 226 of the Constitution confers extensive jurisdiction and power on the High courts in the States. This jurisdiction and power extend throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. It can issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. The contention therefore that it is the cause of action that attracts jurisdiction must hence be negatived.
9. As regards the citation namely Siku Industries v. Smt. C.D'Souza (cited supra) is concerned, the facts in that case were that the petitioners therein were carrying on business at Nagpur and they failed to pay certain amounts under the Provident Fund. That a prosecution in respect thereof was launched at Bombay. The petitioners therein hence filed a petition for quashing the said proceedings on the basis that the Presidency Magistrate's Court at Bombay had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The contention canvassed on behalf of the respondents was that since the complaint was filed at Bombay, the writ challenging the complaint ought to have been filed in Bombay. Dealing with the subject matter of the said petition, the Court went on to hold that a material part of the cause of action had arisen at Nagpur and in the circumstances the Bench at Nagpur had jurisdiction to receive, try and hear the petition. Whilst the citation has been pressed into service for the purposes of reinforcing the argument that it is the place where the cause of action arises that must determine jurisdiction, it may be stated that in the said matter what was being considered were the provisions of Article 227 and not the provisions of Article 226. On the other hand, in the very judgment, there is a clear observation which reads as follows:
“So far as the exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned, the matter stands on a different fixating. It empowers the High Court to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose”
10. Hence the said decision cannot be of any assistance to respondent No. 4 in the present case.
11. Turning to the next limb of the argument namely that since the cause of action had arisen in Bombay the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Bench at Nagpur stands abridged by reason of the provisions of section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) read with the provisions of Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, we do not see how any enactment passed by the Parliament and/or by the State Legislature can possibly trench upon the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Article 226. In In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (AIR 1958 SC 956), it has been observed as follows:
“No enactment of a State legislature can, as long as that Article (i.e 226) stands, take away or abridge the jurisdiction and power conferred on the High Court by that Article.”
12. In view of this, the contention must be negatived. But be that as it may, although the said two provisions cannot abridge the jurisdiction, the said two provisions need to be looked at in their proper perspective. The said two provisions, namely, section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) and the provisions of Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rule, 1960 are designed to meet administrative requirements and administrative convenience. Hence it is not that every petition under Article 226 which is presented to this Bench at Nagpur that needs to be entertained and regard must be had to these two provisions in the filing of writ petitions so that the petitions can be dealt with by an appropriate Bench. However, in so far as this matter is concerned, in view of the above discussion, it cannot be said that the Bench at Nagpur has no jurisdiction to try and hear the petition. Ordinarily we are extremely slow in entertaining such matters which are required to be entertained and tried at Bombay, but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, when the matter has already been admitted as back as on 25-9-1984 and if we may say so we have decided to hear and decide this matter while sitting at Nagpur.
13. Coming to the merits, Mr. Bobde, the learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that since tenders were invited, the tender of the party who offered the highest price should have been accepted. That admittedly amongst the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4, it was the petitioners who offered the highest price and the petitioners' tender ought to have been accepted. If the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 wanted to do away with the tenders, they should have treated the tenders as terminated and in that case they could have adopted any other procedure open to them for the disposal of the two items, but respondents Nos. 1 to 2 could not have, in view of the tenders, acted in the manner they had done, namely by issuing a resolution purporting to allocate the items as aforementioned or allocate the areas in which the parties should operate. That the whole procedure followed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was contrary to law.
14. In support of the aforesaid contention, Mr. Bobde relied upon the decision in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India ((1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628). In that case, the tender notice issued stated that “sealed tenders in the prescribed form are hereby invited from Registered IInd Class Hoteliers having at least 5 years' experience for putting up and running a IInd Class Restaurant and two Snack Bars at this Airport for a period of 3 years.” Several parties submitted tenders and the Airport authorities proceeded to give the contract to one of the parties who was the fourth respondent in the said proceedings. The petitioner, therefore, contested this method of assigning the contract to the 4th respondent. It was argued on behalf of the 1st and the 4th respondents that there was nothing wrong in the 1st respondent giving the contract to the 4th respondent since it was competent to the 1st respondent to reject all the tenders received by it and to negotiate directly with the 4th respondent for giving them the contract and it made no difference that instead of following this procedure, which perhaps might have resulted in the 4th respondent offering a smaller licence fee and the 1st respondent suffering a loss in the process, the 1st respondent accepted the tender of the 4th respondent. In dealing with this argument, the Court held that there was no force in this argument and further observed as follows:
“But here the 1st respondent did not reject the tenders out-right and enter into direct negotiations with the 4th respondents for awarding the contract. The process of awarding a contract by inviting tenders was not terminated or abandoned by the 1st respondent by rejecting all the tenders but in furtherance of the process, the tender of the 4th respondent was accepted by the 1st respondent. The contract was not given to the 4th respondent as a result of direct negotiations. Tenders were invited and out of the tenders received, the one submitted by the 4th respondent was accepted and the contract was given to them. It is, therefore, not possible to justify the action of the 1st respondent on the ground that the 1st respondent could have achieved the same result by rejecting all the tenders and entering into direct negotiations with the 4th respondent.”
15. Mr. Garud, the learned assistant Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, contended that the whole object of selling these items to small-scale industries was to assist small-scale industries in one manner or the other. That in distributing these two items amongst the three parties namely the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had acted fairly as the rates claimed from each of them were the same and there was no loss to the Government. That there was hence no question of quashing the said resolution. The learned counsel on behalf of respondent No. 3 contended that ordinarily respondent No. 3 ought to have got a lion's share of the items but since respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had by their resolution distributed the items amongst the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the question of quashing the resolution did not arise. Counsel for respondent No. 4 also adopted the same line of argument as that of counsel for respondent No. 3 namely that since the two items were distributed amongst the three parties, there was no cause for quashing the resolution.
16. The arguments of counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and counsel for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 do not answer the crucial question, namely, whether it was proper on the part of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 having invited tenders to ignore the tenders and pass the resolution (now impugned). The act of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in ignoring the tenders and then again without rejecting or terminating the same, proceeding to allocate the two items amongst the three parties by the said resolution dated 3rd August, 1984 must clearly be held to be bad in law. In view of this, the petitioners would be entitled to the relief prayed, namely, that the resolution dated 3-8-1984 be quashed. The rule is, therefore, made absolute in terms of prayers (i) and (ii). There will however be no order as to costs.
Order accordingly.
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