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Venku Reddi v. Pichi Reddi
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises from a suit filed by the appellants for recovery of possession of a scheduled property and for rent amounting to Rs. 72 for three years, along with interest and an account of future rents or profits until delivery of possession. The suit was based on a sale deed dated 1st June 1945, executed by Bhima Sankarareddy in favour of the plaintiff, which recited that the vendor acquired title through another document (Exhibit A-2) dated 29th May 1945, referencing a purchase from Mr. Balaramireddy. The defendants contested the suit on the ground that the alienor under Exhibit A-2, Raghavareddy, had no title to the property, asserting the property belonged to them and was purchased in the name of Lakshmi Devamma in 1941 due to their relationship. The trial court dismissed the suit as the plaintiff failed to prove Raghavareddy's title, though it did not find the defendants' benami claim established. The lower appellate court confirmed this dismissal, leading to the present second appeal by the plaintiff challenging that judgment and seeking to admit additional documents as evidence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the second appellate court has the power to admit additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code in a second appeal.
- Whether the documents sought to be admitted by the appellant fall within the scope of Clause (c) of Rule 27 as necessary to enable the court to pronounce judgment.
- Whether the appellant has exercised due diligence in presenting the evidence and whether the delay in producing documents justifies their admission at this stage.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant sought admission of additional documents in the second appeal to prove title and avoid deprivation of a valuable right.
- Reliance was placed on the Madras High Court judgment in Gaddan Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna (1919 M.W.N. 455), which allowed admission of additional evidence in second appeals to prevent conflicting decrees.
- It was contended that the documents should be admitted under Clause (c) of Rule 27 as necessary for the court to pronounce judgment.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondents relied on the judgment in Subbaraja v. Narayana Raja (AIR 1954 Mad. 1074) by Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu, which held that second appellate courts could not admit additional evidence or decide questions of fact.
- It was argued that provisions of Section 103 and Order 42, Rule 1 exclude the applicability of Order 41, Rule 27 to second appeals.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gaddan Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna (1919 M.W.N. 455) | Admissibility of additional evidence in second appeal to avoid conflicting decrees. | The court agreed with the ratio, holding that Order 41, Rule 27 is applicable in second appeals in appropriate cases. |
| Subbaraja v. Narayana Raja (AIR 1954 Mad. 1074) | Second appellate courts cannot admit additional evidence or decide questions of fact; exclusion of Order 41, Rule 27 in second appeals by virtue of Section 103 and Order 42. | The court acknowledged this view but respectfully disagreed with its broad proposition, finding it not binding on the applicability of Order 41, Rule 27. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the scope of its powers under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code regarding the admission of additional evidence in second appeals. It noted that Clause (c) of Rule 27 applies only when documents are necessary to enable the court to pronounce judgment, which was not the case here. The appellant's delay in presenting the documents, despite knowledge of the vendor's title issue, militated against their admission. The court acknowledged conflicting precedents but aligned with the view allowing additional evidence in second appeals under special circumstances. However, the court found no special circumstances here and declined to admit the documents, especially since their admission would require remanding the case for rehearing. The court emphasized that the appellant must succeed on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of the defense.
Holding and Implications
The court dismissed the petition for admission of additional evidence and consequently dismissed the second appeal with costs. The direct effect is that the judgments of the lower courts stand affirmed, and the appellant's attempt to introduce new evidence at this stage is rejected. No new legal precedent was established beyond clarifying the limited circumstances under which additional evidence may be admitted in second appeals.
(1) This second appeal is directed against the judgment of the subordinate judge of nellore confirming that of the district munsif, nellore, dismissing o. S. No. 80 of 1949. The appellants filed a suit for recovery of possession of the plaint a scheduled property and to directt he defendants to pay him rs. 72 by way of rent for three years together with interest thereon and also for a direction to render an account of future rents or profits till the date of delivery of possession. The suit was based on a sale deed executed by one bhima sankarareddy in favour of the plaintiff on 1st june, 1945, for a consideration of rs. 400. It is recited in this sale deed that the vendor acquired title thereto under exhibit a - 2 dated 29th may, 1945. In exhibit a - 2, there is a reference to the property having been purchased from one mr. Balaramireddy.
(2) The suit was contested mainly on the plea that raghavareddy, the alienor under exhibit a - 2 had no title to the suit property and that it really belonged to the defendants thought it was purchased in the name of one lakshmi devamma in the year 1941. According to the defendants, the property was put in the name of the said lakshmi devamma having regard to the relationship that existed between them. As the plaintiff could not prove the title of raghavareddy to the suit property the trial court dismissed the suit. Though in its opinion the defendants have not make out their case that the property was originally purchased for their benefit in the name of lakshmidevamma.
(3) The lower appellate court agreed with this conclusion, on appeal by the aggrieved plaintiff, with the result that the dismissal of the suit was confirmed by the appellate court. This second appeal is brought by the plaintiff who is dissatisfied with this judgment. To show that the plaintiff has title to this property he seeks to have some documents admitted in this second appeal. It is not disputed that on the evidence on record the judgment of the courts below are correct. Though the defendants have not established their case of benami the plaintiff will not be entitled to succeed as it is well - established that the plaintiff could succeed only on the strength of his own title and could not depend upon the weakness in the defence.
(4) What is urged by mr. Kuppuswamy in support of the application to admit some documents by way of additional evidence is that if these documents are excluded the appellant will be deprived of a valuable right. The chief point for consideration is whether there are any grounds for admission of these documents as additional evidence in the appeal. The powers of an appellate court in this regard are controlled by the provisions of order 41, rule 27, civil procedure code. The question for consideration is whether the instant case can fall under any of the categories listed in that rule. Mr. Kuppuswamy suggested that i might admit these documents under clause (c) of rule 27. It is difficult to bring the present application within the operation of clause (c) because it cannot be postulated that these documents are necessary to enable me to pronounce a judgment. It may be that the judgment without these documents will be against the appellant but that is not the same thing as saying that they are essential to enable a court to reach a decision. In my opinion, clause (c) governs cases where the court thinks that certain documents are necessary to enable it to make up its mind.
(5) Mr. Kuppuswamy drew my attention to a judgment of a bench of the madras high court in gaddan paramasivudu v. Mulakala subbanna, (1919) m. W. N. 455. Which decided that the high court can admit additional evidence in a second appeal in order to avoid conflicting decrees being passed between the same parties and argues that additional evidence in this case could be admitted. On the other side a judgment of mr. Krishnaswamy naidu in subbaraja v. Narayana raja, a. I. R. 1954 mad. 1074. Which lays down that the second appellate court could not admit additional evidence and give its decision on a question of fact is relied on. It is stated by mr. Justice krishnaswamy naidu thus :
"apart from the decision cited, the provisions of section 103 are sufficiently clear to exclude the operation of order 41, rule 27 and their applicability to appeals filed under order 42, civil procedure code. It is not every provision in order 41 that could be said to automatically apply to a proceeding in second appeal by virtue of order 42, rule 1 but only such provisions as may reasonably be applied having in view the provisions of sections 100 and 103, and the limited scope of the jurisdiction of the second appellate court in matters affecting questionsof facts. The proper view to be taken therefore is that it is not competent to admit additional evidence in second appeal."
(6) It seems to me that mr. Justice krishnaswmy naidu has stated the proposition very broadly and is opposed to the ruling of the bench decision mentioned supra. The bench judgment is not even noticed in the judgment of mr. Justice krishnaswamy naidu. I am in respectful agreement with the ratio of paramasivudu v. Mulakala subbanna. I do not think there is anything either in section 103 or in order 41, rule 27, civil procedure code, which excludes the applicability of the latter provision to second appeals. The terms of rule 27 are general in application and my view is that in appropriate case it is open to this court in second appeal to admit additional evidence. It may be that this court will be reluctant to adopt the course indicated in that rule unless there are special circumstances. But it is different to say that it is not competent for a second appellate court to let in additional evidence under any circumstances.
(7) However, that does not, in this case, help the appellant. I have already stated that clause (c) of that rule cannot apply to this case, nor can the appellant seek to bring it under clause (b). It is not even suggested that, despite the exercise of due diligence, these documents were not within his knowledge and therefore he could not produce them. The written statement raises the plea that the vendor of the plaintiff had no title to the suit property. So he knew that he had to prove the title of his vendor, but yet he had not chosen to do so. He did not adopt this course even in the lower appellate court. Having slept over this matter for several years, the appellant now thinks of moving this court for the admission of additional evidence. This court will not ordinarily admit documents which will necessitate the remand of the case to the trial court for a rehearing and reopening of the suit. I do not think there would be any justification for me to grant the request in this behalf.
(8) In these circumstances the position for admission of additional evidence is dismissed. No order as to costs in this petition. The consequence is that the appeal also has to be dismissed with costs. Appeal and petition dismissed.
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