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Ranbir Singh Kharab v. Santosh

Delhi High Court
Jul 21, 2006
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Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (complainant) filed a complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The complaint alleged that the respondent had given a loan of Rs. 18,60,000/- to the petitioner at 24% p.a. interest and that the petitioner issued cheque No. 004050 dated 25.12.2003 for Rs. 18,60,000/- drawn on Corporation Bank, Palam, New Delhi, in repayment. When presented, the cheque was returned unpaid with a return memo dated 16.4.2004 stating "Stop payment." The respondent served a legal notice and thereafter filed the criminal complaint; summons were issued to the petitioner in the complaint.

The petitioner challenged the order of summoning by filing the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The petitioner denied the loan transaction, contended that he sometimes leaves signed cheque leaves with his wife and suggested a possibility that a relative (Ranbir, brother of his wife) might have stolen a blank cheque and filled it. He stated he reported the loss of the cheque book to the police and instructed the bank to stop payment after discovering the cheque book (nos. 111031–111040) was lost. The petitioner also challenged the magistrate's compliance with the provisions of Section 200 Cr.P.C., contending that pre-summoning evidence was not properly recorded and that mere filing of an affidavit was not sufficient compliance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Magistrate complied with the requirements of Section 200 Cr.P.C. for recording pre-summoning evidence before issuing summons in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  2. Whether the filing of an affidavit by the complainant (and its acceptance by the Magistrate) constitutes valid pre-summoning evidence under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  3. Whether disputed factual questions raised by the petitioner (e.g., theft or misuse of cheque leaves, non-existence of the loan) can be decided in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or must be left for trial before the trial court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was no loan transaction between the parties and the cheque was not legitimately issued by the petitioner.
  • The petitioner sometimes leaves signed cheque leaves with his wife; a brother-in-law (Ranbir) may have stolen a blank cheque and filled in particulars, implying possible mischief or forgery.
  • The petitioner reported the loss of the cheque book to the police and instructed the bank to stop payment after discovering the cheque book (nos. 111031–111040) was lost.
  • Disputed questions of fact (the genuineness of the loan and issuance of the cheque) cannot be decided in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and must be left for trial.
  • The learned Metropolitan Magistrate failed to comply with Section 200 Cr.P.C. because no pre-summoning evidence was recorded in court; mere filing of an affidavit was not sufficient and the complainant should have tendered the affidavit in open court.

Complainant/Respondent's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The respondent stated that a loan of Rs. 18,60,000/- was given and that the petitioner issued the cheque in discharge of liabilities.
  • The cheque was presented and dishonoured due to "Funds insufficient" (as recorded in the magistrate's summoning order excerpt) and a legal notice was sent within the period of limitation.
  • The respondent filed an affidavit in support of the complaint and was present in court when the affidavit/evidence was taken before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vasudevan v. State of Kerala, 2005 (5) CRJ 740 Consideration of Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and whether proceedings under Section 200 Cr.P.C. qualify as "inquiry" so that affidavits under Section 145 may be received. The court relied on Vasudevan to hold that proceedings under Section 200 Cr.P.C. are an "inquiry" and that sworn statements/affidavits can be treated as evidence at that stage; thus Section 145 of the NI Act applies and affidavits can be received at the Section 200 stage.
Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya, AIR 1960 S.C. 1113 Indication that procedure prior to an order of dismissal under Section 203 (or cognizance under Section 204) is an enquiry. Quoted in Vasudevan and relied upon to support the proposition that the stage under Section 200 Cr.P.C. involves inquiry and consideration of available materials to decide whether to issue process or dismiss the complaint.
Harihara Iyer's case Enquiry envisaged under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is for ascertaining truth or falsehood of the complaint and whether there is evidence to justify issue of process. The court extracted and relied on the passage to affirm that the magistrate's proceedings under Section 200 are properly characterized as an inquiry to test the sufficiency of evidence to issue process.
Rakesh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2001 SC 2521 Sworn statement in chief even when not tested by cross-examination remains evidence for certain statutory purposes (example: Section 319 Cr.P.C.). Relied upon to support the view that sworn statements recorded at the Section 200 stage qualify as evidence even if not subjected to cross-examination, and so can be acted upon.
Santhosh De & Anr. v. Archana Guha & Ors., 1995 AIR SCW 1725 The term "evidence" need not be confined to statements made on oath before the Court that are tested by cross-examination. Used to buttress the proposition that evidence at preliminary stages should not be restricted to statements cross-examined in open court; hence affidavits/sworn statements can qualify as evidence.
Gopalakrishan v. State of Kerala, 2001 (2) KLT 767 Under certain provisions (example in the opinion: Section 244 Cr.P.C.), the accused does not have an absolute right to cross-examine a witness despite statutory language using "evidence." Referred to in support of the broader principle that procedural provisions about examination/cross-examination do not negate the character of sworn statements as evidence at preliminary stages.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the relevant extracts of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate's summoning order, which recorded:

  • Presence of the complainant with counsel; an "evidence by way of affidavit" was filed; "pre-summoning evidence closed."
  • Arguments on the point of summoning were heard and the record perused.
  • The magistrate found that the cheque (Ex CW1/A) was deposed to have been issued by the accused in discharge of liabilities, that the cheque was dishonoured (return memo Ex CW1/D), that legal notice (Ex CW1/C) was sent within limitation, and that the complainant did not receive payment after notice; accordingly the magistrate concluded there was sufficient material to summon the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Based on this record, the court concluded that it could not be said that pre-summoning evidence was not recorded: the magistrate had before him an affidavit and the complainant was present, the pre-summoning evidence had been closed, and submissions were heard. Consequently, the court rejected the contention that pre-summoning evidence was absent.

Addressing the petitioner's further argument that the complainant did not "tender" her affidavit in open court, the court acknowledged that the magistrate's order did not make clear whether the complainant's statement was separately recorded, but then turned to established authorities. Relying on Vasudevan v. State of Kerala and other precedents, the court analyzed the applicable legal principles:

  • Proceedings under Section 200 Cr.P.C. are properly characterized as an "inquiry" (Section 2(g) definition), during which the magistrate considers the materials before him to decide whether to issue process under Section 204 or dismiss under Section 203.
  • Statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters under inquiry fall within the definition of "evidence" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act; the formalities of Chapter X of the Evidence Act (examining and cross-examining witnesses in a particular order) cannot be used to exclude sworn statements recorded at the Section 200 stage from qualifying as evidence.
  • Previous Supreme Court authority (Rakesh v. State of Haryana) supports the proposition that a sworn statement in chief, even if not tested by cross-examination, remains evidence for statutory purposes; similar reasoning is found in Santhosh De and Gopalakrishan decisions cited in the opinion.
  • Therefore, affidavits filed under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act may be received and acted upon at the Section 200 Cr.P.C. stage, and personal appearance of the complainant is not ordinarily necessary to tender the sworn statement at that stage.

Applying these principles to the present record, the court concluded that the magistrate was entitled to accept the affidavit as pre-summoning evidence and to consider it in deciding whether summons should be issued under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court further observed that disputed factual issues raised by the petitioner are matters for trial and cannot be resolved by invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging the summoning order was dismissed.

Implications:

  • The summoning order stands and the petitioner will face trial on the complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The court held that the magistrate properly treated the filed affidavit as pre-summoning evidence under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, consistent with the authorities cited; personal tendering in open court is not ordinarily required at the pre-summoning stage.
  • The court expressly noted that its observations will not prejudice the petitioner's case before the trial court, and no novel precedent was announced beyond application of existing authorities to the facts of the case.

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Show all summary ...

:

The respondent herein filed a complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. It is alleged therein that the respondent had given laon of Rs. 18,60,000/- to the petitioner on interest @ 24% p.a. For repayment of this amount, the petitioner herein issued a cheque bearing No. 004050 dated 25.12.2003 for Rs. 18,60,000/- drawn on Corporation Bank, Palam, New Delhi. When the cheque was presented, it was returned unpaid for the reason `Stop payment' vide returning memo dated 16.4.2004. The respondent served legal notice and thereafter filed the aforesaid complaint. Summons have been issued to the petitioner in the said complaint. Challenging the summoning order, the present petition is filed.

2. It is, inter alia, pleaded that there was no such loan transaction between the parties, the petitioner, on account of his being hard pressed for time, normally gives his cheque book to his wife at times with several signed cheque leaves; the fact was known to one Ranbir, S/o. Jundan Lal, who happens to be elder brother of his wife and it is possible that he has committed mischief by stealing the blank cheque and filling the particulars therein. It is further stated that the petitioner had reported the matter to the Police and gave instructions to the bank to stop the payment, after he came to know that the cheque book containing cheque Nos. 111031-111040 was lost, which contained the cheque in question as well. The aforesaid defence raised is a matter for trial as these disputed questions of fact cannot be decided in these proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In fact, this is the defence of the petitioner which has to be decided by the trial court after recording evidence of both the parties.

3. The other submission made is that before issuing the summons, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate did not comply with the provisions of Section 200 Cr.P.C. inasmuch as no pre-summoning evidence was recorded. It is further submitted that though the respondent had filed the affidavit, mere filing of the same was not sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 200 Cr.P.C. as it was necessary for her to tender the said evidence in the court. The summoning order reads as under :

"PRESENT : Complaint (sic) with counsel.

An evidence by way of affidavit filed today. Pre-summoning evidence closed. Fresh complaint received today an assignment. It be checked and registered.

Argument on the point of summoning heard and record perused.

The cheque Ex CW1/A is deposed to have been issued by the accused in discharge of his liabilities towards the complainant, and the cheque on presentation was dishonoured due to reason of "Funds insufficient on 16.04.04 vide return memo Ex CW1/D legal notice Ex CW1/C dated 13.05.04 was sent to the accused within the period of limitation through registered AD postal receipts. Exhibit CW1/D. It is deposed that even after receipt of notice the cheque amount have not been paid by the accused to the complainant. The present case has been filed within the prescribed period of limitation on 10.06.04. I am also satisfied regarding jurisdiction of this court. There is sufficient material to summon the Accused u/s. 138 Negotiable Instrument Act.

Accordingly issue summons to accused u/s 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act upon filing of PF/RC/AD and as well as through approved courier. Copies of complaint and documents, list of witnesses for 30.07.04."

4. It is clear from the aforesaid order that the respondent/complainant was present in the Court and evidence by way of affidavit was filed. On taking the evidence by way of affidavit in the presence of the complainant, the learned MM closed the pre-summoning evidence and thereafter arguments on the point of summoning were heard, record perused and order of summoning of the petitioner was passed. Therefore, it cannot be said that pre-summoning evidence was not recorded.

5. Another argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the complainant did not tender her affidavit. However, the aforesaid order does not make it clear as to whether her statement was recorded whereby she tendered the affidavit. In any case, the Kerala High Court in Vasudevan v. State of Kerala, 2005 (5) CRJ 740, has considered Section 145 of the Act (as amended) and observed as under :

"11. I find no merit in this assumption also. As early as in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya, AIR 1960 S.C. 1113 it is indicated that procedure prior to an order of dismissal under Section 203 (or cognizance under Section 204) is enquiry. Going by the first principles also, at the stage of Section 200 Cr.P.C., the Court is only considering on the basis of the materials available before it, whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. Materials are available before the Court. The complaint is available. Sworn statement of the complainant and witnesses are available. Mind of the Court is applied to these materials judicially to decide whether the matter deserves to be proceeded with further by issue of process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. or whether proceedings deserve to be terminated by dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. In any view of the matter, the proceedings before the Criminal Court at that stage would certainly qualify to be "inquiry" as defined under Section 2(g). Under Section 2(g), inquiry means every inquiry, other than trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. In this view of the matter, the proceedings before the Magistrate under Section 200 Cr.P.C. whereunder the Magistrate considers the materials available before him to decide whether a judicial order of dismissal under Section 203 Cr.P.C. or a judicial order of issue of process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. should be passed, would certainly be inquiry under Section 2(g). The objection raised that Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot apply for the reason that the proceedings is not inquiry, cannot hence be accepted.

12. The only other question is whether the sworn statement of the complainant can be reckoned as evidence. The learned Magistrate appears to be under the impression that the sworn statement of the complainant cannot be reckoned as evidence for the purpose of Section 145 and consequently the affidavit contemplated cannot be accepted as evidence.

13. On this aspect also we have the observations in Harihara Iyer's case which clearly show that at the stage of Section 200 Cr.P.C., the Criminal Court is conducting an enquiry and is considering the evidence available before it. I extract the relevant passage below :

"We, therefore, hold that the enquiry envisaged under Section 200 is for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint and also for ascertaining whether there is any evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process"
.

(emphasis supplied)

14. Even otherwise, from principle also, I find no merit in the contention that the sworn statement of the complainant and witnesses under Section 200 Cr.P.C. will not qualify to be evidence, Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines evidence in the following words :

"Evidence" -- Evidence means and includes (I) all statements which the Court permit or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry such statements are called oral evidence;

(emphasis supplied)

15. All statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to facts under inquiry would be evidence. The provisions regarding the manner in which examination of witnesses is to take place and the order of examination in chapter X of the Evidence Act cannot be pressed into service to decide whether the sworn statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., will be evidence or not. Any statement which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, whether such statement be tested by a cross-examination or not, will certainly be evidence for the purpose of Section 3. In these circumstances, the contention that sworn statement would become evidence, only if and after opportunity for cross-examinations is granted, cannot also be accepted. On this aspect also, there can be no dispute and the question is clearly covered in Rakesh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2001 SC 2521. Considering the ambit of the expression. Evidence appearing in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court had held that the sworn statement in chief examination, even when not tested by a cross-examination, would continue to the evidence for the purpose of Section 319. In a still earlier decision in Santhosh De & Anr. v. Archana Guha & Ors., 1995 AIR SCW 1725 the Supreme Court, while considering Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was in force in West Bengal, had held that the expression "evidence" therein need not be restricted only to statements made on oath before Court which are tested by cross-examination. Still later, in Gopalakrishan v. State of Kerala, 2001 (2) KLT 767 a learned Judge of this Court has held that under Section 244 Cr.P.C. the accused has no absolute right for cross-examination of a witness, notwithstanding the fact that the statutory provision in Section 244(1) employs expression "evidence."

16. Thus, it follows from the above discussions that the proceedings before the Criminal Court at a stage prior to Section 203/204 Cr.P.C. will be inquiry. The statement of a complainant to be recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. will be evidence. In these circumstances, Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act squarely applies and it will be permissible for the Court to receive the affidavit filed under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act at the stage of Section 200 Cr.P.C. and to act upon the same. It is unnecessary ordinarily to insist on personal appearance of the complainant to tender the sworn statement at that stage."

6. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is dismissed. Needless to mention, the observations made by this Court will not prejudice the case of the petitioner before the trial court.

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