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Mathew Charian Christian v. Rajkumar Ramavatar Chourasia .

Bombay High Court
Aug 19, 1982
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal — Rent Control)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal filed by the tenant (appellant) against the first appellate court at Akola which confirmed a decree of the trial court for arrears of rent, mesne profits and ejectment (with a slight modification to mesne profits). At admission, the appeal was restricted to two principal legal questions concerning the validity of a notice terminating tenancy issued after permission by the Rent Controller but while an appeal against that permission was pending.

Key dates and procedural steps referred to in the opinion:

  • Order by Rent Controller dated 25-4-1978 (Ex. 32).
  • Notice of termination of tenancy served on 14-7-1978 (Ex. 33), purporting to terminate tenancy at the end of July 1978.
  • Appeal against Ex. 32 filed before the Resident Deputy Collector at Akola on 14-7-1978.
  • Suit for ejectment filed on 18-9-1978 and decreed on 17-9-1980 by the trial Court.
  • First appellate judgment dated 31-8-1981 (which confirmed the decree with slight modification to mesne profits).
  • Appeal under the Rent Control Order dismissed on 12-10-1981; related Writ Petition No. 2469 of 1981 dismissed in motion hearing on 13-4-1982.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the "written permission of the Controller" under clause 13(1) of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (the "Rent Control Order")—which forms the basis for a notice of termination of tenancy under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act—must be a permission that has become final under clause 21(3) of the Rent Control Order (i.e., final in the sense contemplated by clause 21(3)).
  2. Whether a decree for mesne profits can be passed against a tenant for the period between termination of tenancy and filing of the suit when the permission granted by the Rent Controller had not become final on the date of termination of tenancy.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Shri G.B. Lohia)

  • The "written permission of the Controller" required by clause 13(1) must be construed to mean permission that has become final under clause 21(3) of the Rent Control Order.
  • Because an appeal against the Rent Controller's order was filed on 14-7-1978, the permission granted on 25-4-1978 had not become final; therefore the quit notice dated 14-7-1978 (Ex. 33) was invalid.
  • If clauses 13 and 21 are read together, the permission must be a final one (i.e., immune from further appeal/revision under clause 21(3)) before it can form the basis of a termination notice under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Shri Mohta)

  • There is no provision in clause 13 or clause 21 of the Rent Control Order that explicitly bars a landlord from issuing a quit notice based on a permission of the Controller that has not become final; consequently a landlord may act upon the permission even while an appeal is pending.
  • The operation of a Rent Controller's order is not automatically suspended merely by filing an appeal (absence of automatic stay unless appellate authority orders otherwise), and therefore a landlord can issue a notice and even file a suit relying on the Controller's permission, subject to the risk that such permission may be reversed on appeal.
  • Reliance on earlier judgments by Dharmadhikari J. and other decisions was advanced to show that it is permissible for a landlord to act on permissions that have not yet been finally confirmed on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indra Singh v. Shiavax Cawasji Cambatta, AIR 1948 Bom. 347 (Division Bench) The Division Bench held that under the Bombay Rent Act's section 14(3) the finality of a Controller's order disappears as soon as an appeal is preferred to the Collector; the matter becomes sub judice and it is then the Collector's decision which is final and operative. The court regarded this Division Bench decision as authoritative and controlling on the question of whether a non-final Rent Controller order can constitute a basis for termination. It concluded that earlier decisions to the contrary by a single judge could not be followed in view of Indra Singh.
S.P.A. Annamalay Chetty v. B.A. Thornhill, AIR 1931 PC 263 (Privy Council) Stated that where an appeal lies, the finality of the decree is qualified by the appeal; the decree is not final in the sense of forming res judicata while the appeal is pending. Referred to by Indra Singh and relied upon by the Division Bench to support the proposition that finality disappears upon the institution of an appeal. The court in the present opinion recognized this precedent as forming the basis for Indra Singh's approach.
Ruprao Pandurang v. Raghoba Bhagwanji Chaurase (Judgment by Dharmadhikari J.) Held that filing an appeal did not automatically suspend the operation of the Rent Controller's order where no stay was obtained; landlord could act on the permission and issue a quit notice though at a risk. The court observed that these decisions by Dharmadhikari J. support the respondent's position, but the court held that they could not be followed in view of the Division Bench decision in Indra Singh.
Hariprasad v. Nathmal, 1974 Mah. LJ 637 (Decision by Dharmadhikari J.) Observed that it is open to a landlord to act upon permission granted by the Rent Controller and that the landlord need not wait until Rent Control proceedings are finally decided. Noted by the court as a decision supporting respondent's position, but the court declined to follow it because of the Indra Singh precedent.
P.K. Deshmukh v. Sudhabai Amrutrao Gambhirrao, 1966 Mah. LJ 690; Mahadeo v. Akaji, 1965 Mah. LJ 823; Ishwariprasad Ganpatrao v. Shankar Dayal Shukla, 1964 Mah. LJ 528 These earlier decisions were cited in support of the proposition (in Dharmadhikari J.'s line of decisions) that a landlord could act on a Controller's permission while appeal was pending. The court noted these authorities as part of the line of decisions favourable to the respondent, but stated that they were not followed because Indra Singh (Division Bench) laid down a contrary legal proposition.
Phanibhushan Deb v. Gulabchand, 1951 NLJ 10 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) Held that a quit notice could be given on the basis of permission granted by the Rent Controller even if appeal was pending; Mangalmurti J. rejected the wider application of the Privy Council observation as suggested by Indra Singh and invoked Order 41, rule 5 CPC by analogy. The court examined this decision and rejected the reasoning that relied on Order 41, rule 5 CPC (finding the CPC provision inapplicable to Rent Control proceedings) and did not accept the attempt to distinguish Indra Singh on that basis.
Mohanlal Motilal Kothare v. Raghunath Laxman, 1977 Mh. LJ 174 (Dharmadhikari J.) Held that the Rent Controller deals with permission to serve quit notices while further proceedings for ejectment and possession are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code; argued that filing an appeal does not by itself take away landlord's right to issue a quit notice. The court noted this authority as part of the respondent's line of support but treated the eventual legal question as governed by the principle in Indra Singh rather than these single-judge decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds primarily by interpreting clause 13(1) of the Rent Control Order (which requires "previous written permission of the Controller" to give a notice terminating a lease) in the light of clause 21(3) (which provides that the decision of the Collector, and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and no further appeal or revision shall lie).

The court compared the Rent Control Order provisions with the corresponding provisions of the earlier Bombay Rent Act (section 14(3)) and relied on the Division Bench decision in Indra Singh v. Shiavax Cawasji Cambatta, which interpreted an analogous provision to mean that the finality of the Controller's order disappears as soon as an appeal is preferred to the Collector; thereafter the Collector's decision alone is finally operative. The Division Bench traced this rule to a Privy Council authority (S.P.A. Annamalay Chetty).

Having noted a line of single-judge decisions (including judgments by Dharmadhikari J. and the decision in Phanibhushan Deb) which held that a landlord could act upon the Rent Controller's permission even while an appeal was pending (subject to the risk of reversal), the court nevertheless concluded that those single-judge authorities could not be followed in face of the Division Bench's authoritative ruling in Indra Singh. The court rejected the argument that Order 41, rule 5 CPC (which permits execution of decrees notwithstanding appeal except where stayed) justified permitting landlords to act on non-final Rent Controller orders, because Order 41, rule 5 CPC was inapplicable to Rent Control proceedings and thus could not be imported to qualify the statutory regime under the Rent Control Order.

The court emphasised that the decisive question is whether the notice of termination served on 14-7-1978 (which purported to terminate tenancy at the end of July 1978) was valid at the time it was given. Because an appeal against the Rent Controller's order had been filed before the Collector (on 14-7-1978) and because the court followed the Division Bench principle that finality disappears upon institution of such an appeal, the permission granted by the Controller on 25-4-1978 had not become final on 14-7-1978 and therefore could not validly form the basis of a termination notice on that date.

The court further clarified that subsequent confirmation of the Rent Controller's order on appeal or in writ proceedings was irrelevant to the single legal question now before it — the validity of the notice at the time it was served.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct effects and consequences explicit in the opinion:

  • The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below, so far as they relate to ejectment, possession and damages (mesne profits), are quashed and set aside.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The court observed that the permission granted by the Rent Controller (and ultimately confirmed on appeal/writ) could, however, be used by the respondent as the basis for issuing another quit notice in appropriate form — i.e., the respondent is not permanently precluded from seeking termination again if procedures are complied with.

The opinion does not announce any novel broad precedent beyond applying and following the Division Bench decision in Indra Singh. Its direct legal consequence is to invalidate the specific quit notice issued on 14-7-1978 because the Rent Controller's permission had not become final at that date.

Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

1. This is a second appeal filed by tenant against the judgment of first Appellate Court at Akola confirming decree for arrears of rent, mesne profits and ejectment passed by the trial Court with some slight modification in the amount of mesne profits. Appellant raised number of grounds in the memo of appeal but at the time of admission, appeal was restricted to the question as to whether permission granted by Rent Controller under clause 13 of the C.P and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (referred to hereinafter for short as ‘Rent Control Order’) which forms the basis of a notice of termination of tenancy under section 105 of Transfer of Property Act, must be a permission which has become final in terms of clause 21(3) of Rent Control Order. The other question which was formulated as a substantial question of law was as to whether a decree for mesne profits could be passed against a tenant for the period between termination of tenancy and filing of suit in a case in which permission granted by Rent Controller had not become final on the date of termination of tenancy.

2. Relevant facts for the purpose of decision of this appeal may now be referred before the question of law raised by Shri G.B Lohia for appellant is concerned. Order by Rent Controller was passed on 25-4-1978 which is at Ex. 32. Notice of termination of tenancy on the basis of the said order was issued on 14-7-1978 and it is at Ex. 33. Appeal against Ex. 32 was filed before Resident Deputy Collector at Akola on 14-7-1978. Suit for ejectment was filed on 18-9-1978 and it was decreed on 17-9-1980. The first appellate Judgment is dated 31-8-1981. It is after the decision of the first appellate judgment that the appeal filed under the provisions of Rent Control Order came to be dismissed on 12-10-1981. This was challenged in Writ Petition No. 2469 of 1981 which was dismissed in motion hearing on 13-4-1982. clause 13(1) of Rent Control Order provides that,—

“No landlord shall, except with the previous written permission of the Controller,—

(a) give notice to a tenant determining the lease or determining the lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option; or

(b) where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby, require the tenant to vacate the house by process of law or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions.”

3. Subsequent sub-clauses of clause 13 provide for the procedure for making application to seek permission and the grounds on which permission to terminate tenancy can be granted. Clause 21(1) provides for filing of an appeal against the decision of the Rent Controller. Sub-clause (3) thereof is material for our purpose. It reads as under.

“21(3) The decision of the Collector and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and no further appeal or revision or application for review shall lie from such decision to any authority whatsoever.”

4. On behalf of appellant, Shri G.B Lohia submitted that notice of termination of lease, which is at Ex. 33, seeking to terminate the lease in question at the end of July, 1978, was an invalid notice because the permission of Rent Controller contemplated by clause 13(1) of Rent Control Order must be construed to mean to be a permission which has become final under clause 21(3) thereof and in the present case permission granted by Rent Controller on 25-4-1978 had not become final on account of filing of appeal on 14-7-1978 before Resident Deputy Collector, Akola. According to him, if clause 13 and clause 21 of Rent Control Order are read together, “written permission of the Controller” contemplated by clause 13(1) must be construed to mean written permission of Controller which has become final under sub-clause (3) of clause 21 of Rent Control Order. This contention was met by Shri Mohta appearing for respondent by pointing out that even if sub-clause (3) of clause 21 of Rent Control Order provides that the order of Controller shall be final subject only to appellate decision of Collector, there is no provision either in clause 13 or clause 21 of Rent Control Order barring a landlord from giving quit notice on the basis of permission of Controller which has not become final.

5. Section 9 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, as it stood before its repeal by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, provided that no landlord shall eject a tenant and obtain possession of tenanted premises so long as tenant paid and was ready and willing to pay rent to the full extent allowable by Part II of the said Act and perform other conditions of tenancy. Proviso to section 9, however, permitted a landlord to terminate tenancy where he obtained a certificate from Controller certifying that the tenant had committed any act contrary to the provisions of clause (u) or clause (p) of section 108 of Transfer of Property Act or was guilty of conduct which was a nuisance or annoyance to any adjoining or neighbouring occupiers or that rent charged to a sub-tenant was in excess of a standard rent or that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord either for his own occupation or for occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises were held or for any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Controller Section 14 provided for appeal against order passed by Controller. Sub-Section (3) of section 14 was in the following words.

“14(3)—The decision of the Collector and subject only to such decision, the order of the Controller shall, for the purpose of this part, be final and no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle or decide or deal with any question which is, by or under this part, required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Controller and Collector.”

6. The question that fell for decision before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indra Singh v. Shiavax Cawasji Cambatta . AIR 1948 Bom. 347., was as to whether landlord was entitled, on the strength of a certificate which he had obtained from the Controller, to terminate tenancy when appeal against the order of Controller was pending. Chhagla, acting C.J speaking for the Court, referred to Sub-Section (3) of section 14 of the Bombay Act and observed.

“Therefore, the order of the Controller is made final, but subject to this important proviso that it is subject to the decision of the Collector. In our opinion that means that the finality of the order made by the Controller disappears as soon as an appeal is preferred to the Collector, and it is only the decision of the Collector that becomes final and operative. So long as there is no appeal, the order of the Controller is final, as soon as an appeal is preferred, the matter again becomes sub-judice, and it is then the decision of the Collector which has the finality which is required under section 14(3) of the Act.”

7. The learned Judge also referred to a Privy Council decision in support of this proposition. That was a case between S.P.A Annamalay Chetty v. B.A Thornhill . AIR 1931 PC 263., and the law laid down by the Privy Council, as referred to in the Bombay Judgment, is as under.

“Where an appeal lies the finality of the decree on such appeal being taken, is qualified by the appeal and the decree is not final in the sense that it will form res judicata as between the same parties………”

8. It was urged on behalf of appellant that the wording of sub-clause (3) of clause 21 of Rent Control Order and sub-clause (3) of section 14 of Bombay Rent Act is pari-materia and proviso to section 9 of Bombay Rent Act is also referred “certificate from the Controller” without there being any provision to indicate as to whether certificate referred to in proviso to section 9, was meant to be a certificate which had become final within the meaning of section 14(3) of the Bombay Rent Act or not and, therefore, “written permission of the Controller” referred to in clause 13 of Rent Control order, though it does not contain a provision, indicating as to whether written permission of the Controller which had become final in terms of the law, it must be construed to mean written permission of Rent Controller which had become final under clause 21(3) of Rent Control order, as laid down in the case of Indra Singh (supra) by a Division Bench of this Court.

9. On behalf of respondent, Shri Mohta invited my attention to a Judgment delivered by Dharmadhikari J. in the case of Ruprao Pandurang v. Raghoba Bhagwanji Chaurase.3 While dealing with a similar question, the learned Judge observed as under:

“It is no doubt true that an appeal was filed by the tenant against the order of the Rent Controller, but it cannot be said that only because an appeal was filed the order of the Rent Controller became inoperative. No stay was obtained or granted by the Resident Deputy Collector staying the operation of the order passed by the Rent Controller. It is not known as to when actually the said appeal itself was filed. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my opinion, it cannot be said that only because an appeal was filed by the tenant against the order of the Rent Controller the operation of the order passed by the Rent Controller stood automatically suspended. On the contrary, as observed by this Court in Hariprasad v. Nathmal . 1974 Mah. LJ 637., it is open to the landlord to act upon the permission granted by the Rent Controller and it is not necessary for him to wait till the Rent Control proceedings are finally decided. On the basis of said permission he can issue a notice to the tenant terminating his tenancy and can also file a suit though in doing so he runs the risk of such permission being revoked by the appellate or final authority. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no substance in the first contention raised by Shri Sagdeo.”

10. Decision in the case of Hariprasad (supra) was a decision by the same learned Judge and while dealing with the contention advanced on behalf of applicants that landlord could not issue a notice terminating the tenancy of the tenant unless the order passed by Rent Controller became final as contemplated in clause 21(3) of Rent Control Order, it was observed in this case, referring to three earlier decisions in P.K Deshmukh v. Sudhabai Amrutrao Gambhirrao* . 1966 Mah. LJ 690., Mahadeo v. Akaji . 1965 Mah. LJ 823. and Ishwariprasad Ganpatrao…Applicant; v. Shankar Dayal Shukla…Opponent. . 1964 Mah. LJ 528., that,—

“It is open to the landlord to act upon the permission granted by the Controller and to issue notice terminating the tenancy of the tenant.”

11. Shri Mohta referred to the said three decisions in support of his contention but I do not think it necessary to make reference in detail to the said three decisions since there cannot be any doubt that the decisions of my learned brother Dharmadhikari J. in the two cases referred to above support the contention advanced on behalf of respondent by Shri Mohta. However, I feel that these decisions by Dharmadhikari J. cannot be followed in view of law laid down by the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Indra Singh (supra).

12. Another decision which supports the contention of respondent is of the then M.P High Court in the case of Phanibhushan DEB v. Gulabchand . 1951 NLJ 10.. Mangalmurti J. held in this case that quit notice can be given on the basis of permission granted by Rent Controller even if appeal against the said permission was pending. This was a case under C.P & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1947. But the relevant provision in sub-clause (3) of clause 21 of the said Rent Control Order was similar to the provision in the Rent Control Order of 1949. According to the learned Judge, the question before him was as to whether finality of the order made by Rent Controller disappeared as soon as an appeal was preferred to the Deputy Commissioner or it continued till the order was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal. It was observed that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indrasingh (supra) was based on observations of Privy Council in S.P.A Annamalay Chetty v. B.A Thornhill, and according to Mangalmurti J. Privy Council was considering the question of res judicata and it was while considering such a question that it observed that “where an appeal lies, the finality of the decree on such appeal being taken, is qualified by the appeal and the decree is not final in the sense that it will form res judicata as between the same parties……” The observation of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indrasingh (Supra) that the principle as enunciated by the Privy Council in the case of S.P.A Annamalay (supra) had a wider application than merely to the questions of res judicata, was not acceptable to Mangalmurti J. because,

“The extent of this wider application has not been discussed or laid down and the learned Judges have made no reference to Order 41, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure which lays down that an appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from, except so far as the appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree, but the appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree. So for purposes of execution, the decree or order remains final even after an appeal is filed till its disposal.”

13. With respect to the learned Judge, it is not possible to accept this reasoning because provisions of Order 41, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure are clearly inapplicable to proceedings under Rent Control Order. According to Mangalmurti J., a quit notice can be given even during the pendency of appeal against the order of Rent Controller because giving of quit notice was “more akin to the question of execution of a decree or order than to the question of res judicata”. It was on this basis that the learned Judge differed from the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indrasingh (supra). As indicated earlier, in the absence of applicability of Civil Procedure Code to the proceedings under Rent Control Order, it is difficult to accept that decision of Rent Controller, though not final, could form a valid basis of a quit notice on the reasoning that a decree under appeal could always be executed and filing of appeal does not operate as stay.

14. My attention was also invited to two other unreported decisions from Second Appeal No. 137 of 1966 decided on 6-10-1979 by Waikar J. and Civil Revision Application No. 455 of 1980 decided on 18-9-1980 by Gadgil J. In the former decision, the observation is,

“The legality of the quit notice was not seriously disputed by Shri Kherdekar. In fact all that was contended before the lower appellate Court was that the said notice was premature. Now the permission was granted by the Rent Controller on 28-3-1961 and the appeal preferred against that order to the Deputy Collector was dismissed on 4-9-1962. The quit notice, however, was served on 1-9-1962. It was rightly observed by both the Courts below that the quit notice, though it was issued before the appeal was decided by the Deputy Collector, remained a perfectly valid and legal notice, so long it was not reversed by any competent authority. I thus find that the quit notice was rightly held by the two Courts below as legal and valid.”

15. In the latter decision, Gadgil J. observed that,

“The permission granted by the Rent Controller being the basis of a quit notice, it must be desirable that civil Court should stay the suit when the fact of pendency of appeal against Rent Control Order was pointed out to it.”

16. As they stand, these two decisions hardly advance the case of respondent and do not lay down the proposition that is propounded by Shri Mohta.

17. Referring to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indrasingh (supra), Shri Mohta contended that as observed at the end of paragraph 4 of the Judgment, the proper thing in such circumstances is to stay the suit and that in the present case, an application for stay was made and though it was rejected, appellant did not challenge that order. It may be that the said order was not challenged by the appellant but that does not prevent him from raising the question of law which has now been raised in this second appeal. It was also contended that the order of Rent Controller has ultimately been confirmed right upto the stage of writ petition and the impugned decree of trial Court had already provided that it shall not be executable till the decision of Rent Controller was confirmed in appeal. According to me, all these questions are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the question of law, viz., as to whether notice of termination given on 14-7-1978 terminating the tenancy at the end of July 1978 was a valid notice or not because at that time the permission granted by the Rent Controller was not final and could not constitute a valid basis for the said notice. The question as to whether the permission has subsequently become final or not is not relevant for the purpose of this decision.

18. Reliance was also placed on a decision of Dharmadhikari J. in the case of Mohanlal Motilal Kothare v. Raghunath Laxman . 1977 Mh. LJ 174.. The learned Judge held in this case that Rent Controller dealt with grant of permission to serve quit notice and further proceedings for ejectment and possession are governed by provisions of Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code, Shri Mohta submitted that in view of this proposition of law, filing of an appeal by itself could not take away a right of a landlord to issue a quit notice under the provisions of section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Filing of an appeal against an order of Rent Controller has certainly got the effect of putting the order of Rent Controller in jeopardy and the result is that the very basis of quit notice, that is the order of the Rent Controller, becomes ineffective being sub-judice. Giving of quit notice is no doubt governed by section 106 of Transfer of Property Act but the Rent Control Order of 1946 is an order which restricts this right and if written permission of Controller, as contemplated by clause 13 is to be understood as a final permission to issue notice, the right to issue notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act must stand restricted the moment an appeal is filed.

19. Lastly it was contended that the question of law raised in this second appeal was not raised before the first appellate Court and, therefore, appellant should not be allowed to convass the said question. As the law stands, it is clear that a pure question of law could always be allowed to be raised at the stage of second appeal, provided of course no prejudice is caused to the other side. This appeal was admitted after notice before admission and it was so admitted specifically on the questions of law raised in this Second Appeal. It cannot, therefore, be said that respondent is prejudiced in any way by permitting the appellant to raise this question of law at the stage of second appeal. It is true that such a question was not in terms raised before the first appellate Court though Ground No. 2 in the memo of appeal before the first appellate Court no doubt states that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that appellant's tenancy was validly terminated. Before passing the final order, it is necessary to make it clear that the permission granted by the learned Rent Controller and ultimately confirmed right upto the stage of writ-petition could certainly be used by the respondent as a basis for giving another quit notice.

20. Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below, so far as they relate to ejectment and possession and damages, are quashed and set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.