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Erandol Taluka Gramodyog, Utpadak Sahakari Society, Erandol v. M/S. Sunil Waste Corporation .

Bombay High Court
Feb 4, 1970
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent sued the Appellant (a registered co-operative society) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, and obtained an ex parte money decree for Rs. 1,400 plus Rs. 277.99 for costs. The decree was thereafter transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Erandol, and an execution application (Regular Darkhast No. 14 of 1964) was filed. The Appellant objected in the execution proceedings on the ground that the suit had been instituted without the notice required by Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and was therefore not maintainable and the decree a nullity.

The learned Civil Judge rejected the Appellant's objection. The Appellant then appealed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the District Court, Jalgaon, where the appeal was dismissed by the learned Assistant Judge who held that the executing court could not go behind the decree, but added the (later-rejected) qualification that the decree should be executed "subject to the objection about the jurisdiction." The Appellant brought the present second appeal challenging the executing court's refusal to treat the decree as a nullity on account of non-compliance with Section 164.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (requiring prior notice to the Registrar), renders a decree a nullity such that the executing court may refuse execution on that ground.
  2. Whether the executing court is entitled to go behind a decree and examine objections going to maintainability (as distinct from inherent jurisdiction) of the original suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Appellant contended that it is a registered co‑operative society and that the Respondent instituted the suit without delivering the notice required by Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co‑operative Societies Act, 1960.
  • On that basis the Appellant argued that the suit was not maintainable, that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or pass a decree, and therefore the decree sought to be executed was a nullity and incapable of execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rana Harkishandas Lallubhai v. Rana Gulabdas Kalyandas, AIR 1956 Bom 513 The distinction between pleas showing a decree is a nullity (which an executing Court may entertain) and pleas that merely challenge the validity/propriety of the decree as contrary to law (which an executing Court should not ordinarily entertain). The Court relied on this distinction to evaluate whether non-compliance with Section 164 rendered the decree a nullity or merely made it contrary to law/voidable; it concluded the latter (a matter of maintainability) and therefore not a ground for the executing Court to refuse execution.
Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, (1962) 2 SCR 747; AIR 1962 SC 199 Validity of a decree in execution proceedings can be challenged only on grounds demonstrating that the Court which passed the decree lacked inherent jurisdiction (e.g., subject-matter wholly foreign, defendant dead at institution, etc.). Applied to hold that non-compliance with Section 164 did not show the trial Court lacked inherent jurisdiction; therefore the decree could not be impeached as a nullity in execution proceedings on that basis.
Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907 Section 3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory; failure of a Court to notice limitation is an error of law. Such an error does not convert the Court's action into one without jurisdiction; the remedy is by appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. Used as analogy to show that peremptory/mandatory provisions (like limitation or notice provisions) may render a suit not maintainable but do not necessarily deprive the Court of inherent jurisdiction; non-compliance is therefore an error to be corrected by appeal rather than a nullity for execution purposes.
Kuldip Thakur v. Sheo mangal Prasad Thakur, AIR 1957 Pat 4 The prohibition on institution (e.g., Section 69(2) Indian Partnership Act regarding suits by unregistered firms) concerns the right to institute a suit and not the Court's power to pass a decree; therefore non‑maintainability under such provision is not ordinarily a ground for resisting execution. Relied upon to demonstrate that language identical or analogous to Section 164 has previously been treated as affecting maintainability rather than inherent jurisdiction, and that such objections should be taken in the original suit and not at execution stage.
Dharwar Urban Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Ramchandra Govindrao Alnavar, (1937) 39 Bom LR 249; AIR 1937 Bom 231 Held that the corresponding notice provision in the old Act was mandatory and failure to give notice had the consequence that the action was as if never brought (in the context in which the point was raised). The Court held this authority inapplicable to the present context because in that case the objection was raised in the suit itself (and the decision was given on appeal from the original decree), so it did not support the proposition that an executing court can go behind a decree on this ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by restating the terms of Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co‑operative Societies Act, 1960, which requires a written two months' notice to the Registrar before instituting suits "in respect of any act touching the business of the society" and requires the plaint to state that such notice was delivered or left.

The Court observed that Section 164 has a limited operation (it applies only to suits touching the business of the society). Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the present suit did touch the society's business, the pivotal question was whether the executing Court is entitled to go behind the decree and treat it as a nullity because the notice was not given.

The Court relied on precedent distinguishing (a) pleas which demonstrate that a decree is a nullity (e.g., where the Court had no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the parties) and (b) pleas which assert that a decree is merely contrary to law or improper because certain mandatory provisions were not complied with. Authorities (Rana Harkishandas; Seth Hiralal Patni) were cited to support the principle that only the former category may be entertained in execution proceedings.

The Court analysed the effect of non-compliance with Section 164. Although the provision is mandatory and makes suits without prior notice not maintainable, the Court concluded that non-compliance does not necessarily mean the trial Court was wholly lacking in inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. Rather, such non-compliance renders the suit not maintainable (an error of law) and does not convert the decree into a nullity that can be impeached in execution proceedings.

By analogy to the Limitation Act (cited in Ittyavira Mathai) and the Indian Partnership Act (illustrated in Kuldip Thakur), the Court held that mandatory provisions which affect the right to institute a suit normally impose a procedural bar to institution but do not strip the Court of inherent jurisdiction to decide the matter. Where the trial Court has inherent jurisdiction, a decree passed in contravention of such a mandatory provision is an erroneous decree which should be challenged by the appropriate appellate remedy rather than by resisting execution on the ground of nullity.

The Court distinguished the Dharwar decision on the ground that in that case the notice objection was raised in the suit itself and the decision was rendered in appeal from the original decree; it was not authority for the proposition that an executing Court may treat a decree as a nullity for want of the requisite co‑operative notice.

The Court further held that the Assistant Judge's observation that the executing Court "must execute the decree as it stands, of course, subject to the objection about the jurisdiction" was incorrect because the specific objection (non-compliance with Section 164) is not a ground that an executing Court may properly entertain as affecting inherent jurisdiction. Consequently, the decree must be executed without that reservation.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect: The second appeal was dismissed and the decree obtained by the Respondent must be executed. The Court held that non-compliance with Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co‑operative Societies Act, 1960, while rendering a suit not maintainable, does not necessarily deprive the trial Court of inherent jurisdiction; therefore such non-compliance is not ordinarily a valid ground for the executing Court to refuse execution on the basis that the decree is a nullity.

The Court emphasized that objections based on non‑compliance with mandatory procedural provisions of the kind in Section 164 are matters of maintainability and should be raised and decided in the original suit (or by appeal) rather than in execution proceedings. The Assistant Judge's reservation that execution be subject to the objection was held to be legally unjustified; the decree must be executed without such reservation.

Costs: Because the Respondent did not appear, the Court made no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Show all summary ...

1. This second appeal arises out of execution proceedings adopted by the Respondent against the Appellant. The Respondent filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, against the Appellant and obtained a money decree in the sum of Rupees 1400 in respect of the amount claimed in the suit and a sum of Rs. 277.99 P. for costs. The decree was passed ex parte. After obtaining the decree the Respondent got it transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Erandol, and filed an execution application, being Regular Darkhast No. 14 of 1964, in the transferee Court. The Appellant filed objections thereto. The principal contention of the Appellant was that the Appellant is a registered co-operative society and the suit was instituted without giving to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies the requisite notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and that for this reason, the suit was not maintainable and the decree passed by the subordinate Judge was a nullity. This contention was negatived by the learned Civil Judge. Against this order the Appellant filed an appeal under section 47 of the cpc, 1908, to the District Court, Jalgaon. The appeal was disposed of by the learned Assistant Judge at Jalgaon. He held that this was not a question which affected the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree and it could not be gone into by the executing Court. The learned Assistant Judge, however, further observed:—

“this question cannot be gone into by the executing Court, and it must execute the decree as it stands, of course, subject to the objection about the jurisdiction.”

2. He accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs. Against this order the Appellant has filed the present second appeal. The only ground urged in this appeal is that as the Respondent instituted the suit without giving a notice as required by Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to pass a decree therein and accordingly the decree sought to be executed was a nullity and incapable of execution.

3. Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act provides as follows:—

“Notice necessary in suits.

4. No suit shall be instituted against a society, or any of its officers, in respect of any act touching the business of the society, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name? description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.”

5. The section has limited operation and does not apply to all suits filed against a registered co-operative society but only to suits in respect of any act touching the business of the society. Assuming for the purposes of the present appeal, that the suit filed by the Respondent was a suit touching the business of the society, the question still remains whether the executing Court was entitled to go behind the decree. In Rana Harkishandas Lallubhai v. Rana Gulabdas Kalyandas, AIR 1956 Bom 513, it was held that in determining the jurisdiction of the executing Court to entertain pleas under section 38 of the cpc, 1908, it is always necessary to make a distinction between pleas that tend to show that the decree in question is a nullity and pleas that merely challenge the validity or the propriety of the decree on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of law. If the plea is that the decree is a nullity and so cannot be executed, it would be open to the executing Court to entertain the plea. On the other hand, if the plea is that the decree is contrary to law in the sense that in passing the said decree certain provisions of the law have been ignored or contravened, that would not necessarily make the decree a nullity and allegations about the impropriety or the illegality of the decree cannot be entertained in execution proceedings. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, (1962) 2 SCR 747 (750, 751) : (AIR 1962 SC 199 at p. 200) the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seized of the case because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or over the parties to it.

6. Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act is mandatory in its terms just like Section 3 of the Limitation Act or Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. What Section 164 does is to require that the requisite notice should be given prior to the institution of the suit. If a suit is filed without giving such a notice, the suit is not maintainable. From this, however, it does not follow that non-compliance with the provisions of Sec. 164 is a defect which takes away the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit or pass the decree. In such a case the decree would be contrary to the provisions of law but would not be a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction. This is a defect which affects the maintainability of the suit and not the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. A suit may not be maintainable for diverse reasons as for example, because it is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation or because it is a suit by an unregistered partnership firm to enforce a right arising out of a contract or because notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act has not been given prior to the institution of the suit. None of these questions affect the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, in Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907, it was held that Section 3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and it is the duty of the Court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings, but even so, it cannot be said that where the Court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely commits an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. II the party aggrieved does not take appropriate step by way of preferring an appeal to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of its being a nullity.

7. In Kuldip Thakur v. Sheo mangal Prasad Thakur, AIR 1957 Pat 4, a suit was instituted by an unregistered firm and a decree was passed in its favour. When the decree was sought to be executed, the judgment-debtor objected on the ground that under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act a suit by an unregistered firm was not maintainable and, therefore, the decree passed in favour of such unregistered firm was a nullity. The Patna High Court held that:—

“the disability created by sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Act is with regard to the right to institute a suit, and not with regard to the power of the Court to pass a decree. The prohibition contained in Section 69(2) is only to the institution of the suit.

The plea of non-maintainability of a suit, on behalf of an unregistered firm under Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, is, as such, not available to a judgment-debtor at the execution stage. Such an objection should be taken in the suit Itself before the passing of the decree.

If such an objection is taken in the suit, and overruled, or, such an objection is not taken at all in the suit, and a decree is passed, in contravention of Section 69(2) of the Act, the decree is not a nullity, if the Court otherwise has inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree, The executing Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to go behind such a decree 8 The bar to maintainability of the suit enacted in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act is in language identical with that of Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. The material provisions of S. 69(2) are:—

“No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against a third party unless the firm is registered

……………”

8. The principles enunciated in the above decisions directly govern the present case. It is not the case here that the Subordinate Judge at Delhi had otherwise no inherent jurisdiction to try the suit or pass the decree. This was, therefore, a suit instituted in the Court which admittedly had jurisdiction to entertain and decide it. If the suit was entertained and a decree passed, though no notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act was given prior to its institution, it was a decree passed contrary to the provision of law, namely, Section 164. It was open to the Appellant to challenge the decree on this ground in appeal. The appellant having failed to do so, the decree is binding between the parties, and this point cannot be agitated in execution proceedings.

9. Mr. Vaze, learned advocate for the Appellant, has strongly relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in Dharwar Urban Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Ramchandra Govindrao Alnavar, (1937) 39 Bom LR 249 : (AIR 1937 Bom 231). In that case it was held that Section 70 of the old Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which is in terms similar to Section 164 of the Present Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was mandatory and the consequence of the plaintiff's failure to give notice under it was as if his action had never been brought. This authority is not relevant. In that case this contention was raised in the suit itself.

10. The decision relied upon was given in the appeal from the original decree. This case is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition that this is a ground which entitles the executing Court to go behind the decree or that for the purpose of execution a decree passed in a suit instituted without giving the requisite notice under the Co-operative Societies Act is a nullity.

11. Before parting with the appeal I may point out the observation of the learned Assistant Judge that the executing Court “must execute the decree as it stands, of course, subject to the objection about the jurisdiction” is incorrect and unjustified in law. As this is not an objection which it is open to the executing Court to entertain, the decree must be executed without reservation.

12. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

13. As the Respondent has not appeared, there will be no order as to costs of the appeal.

14. Appeal dismissed.