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Dareppa Alagouda Basagoudnavar v. Mallappa
Case Summary — Opinion by Lokur, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff's father, Shidramappa, mortgaged two lands (survey Nos. 383/1 and 383/1A) to the defendant Dareppa for Rs. 400 on 24 June 1929. Of these, survey No. 383/1A was rayatawa and survey No. 383/1 was vatan inam (a vatan inam interest that could not be alienated beyond Shidramappa's lifetime). The defendant sued (suit No. 359 of 1925) to recover the mortgage debt; during that suit Shidramappa died and the present plaintiff was brought on record on 26 October 1926 as his legal representative under Order XXII, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code. The mortgage suit resulted in a decree for Rs. 706 with costs and future interest payable by instalments and provided that on default the mortgaged lands or a sufficient portion should be sold.
On default in payments, the defendant executed the decree, and both lands were put up for auction and purchased by the defendant. In execution the plaintiff contended that the vatan land could not be mortgaged beyond the mortgagor's life and that, after Shidramappa's death, the mortgage was void as to that land. The executing Court refused to go behind the decree and referred the plaintiff to a separate suit.
The plaintiff filed a separate suit seeking declarations that the decree in suit No. 359 of 1935 was void and not binding insofar as it affected the vatan land, that the sale of the vatan land was illegal and did not confer title on the defendant, and for an injunction restraining the defendant from taking possession. The defendant contended he was a vatandar of the same vatan, that the mortgage beyond the mortgagor's lifetime was valid for him, that the plaintiff (as legal representative) was a party to the mortgage suit so the decree was binding and the matter res judicata, and that the suit was barred under section 47, Civil Procedure Code.
The trial Court found the mortgage of the vatan land void after Shidramappa's death, held the plaintiff could raise that contention in a separate suit (i.e., it was not barred by res judicata or s. 47) and declared the decree and sale null and void as regards the vatan land, granting injunctive relief. On appeal the First Class Subordinate Judge (with appellate powers) agreed the decree was not binding on the plaintiff but did not hold the decree itself to be null and void; he declared that the auction sale did not affect the plaintiff's independent interest in the vatan land and confirmed other trial findings. The defendant appealed to this Court (second appeal).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff, impleaded only as the legal representative of the deceased mortgagor under Order XXII, rule 4, CPC, could in that capacity contest in the mortgage suit (or in execution) that the vatan land could not be mortgaged beyond the mortgagor's lifetime.
- Whether the plaintiff's present suit seeking to challenge the decree and sale as regards the vatan land was barred by res judicata or by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether, in the absence of required Provincial Government permission under section 5 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, the mortgage of the vatan land enured after the mortgagor's death and whether any decree based on such a mortgage is binding on the heirs or is void as regards the vatan land.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff (as legal representative) contended that his father could not mortgage the vatan land beyond his lifetime and that, upon his father's death, the mortgage became void insofar as the vatan land was concerned.
- The plaintiff asserted the sale of the vatan land in execution of the decree was illegal and conferred no title on the defendant, and sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking possession.
Defendant/Appellant's Arguments
- The defendant contended he was a vatandar of the same vatan to which the land belonged, and therefore the mortgage beyond the mortgagor's lifetime was valid in his favour.
- He argued the plaintiff was a party to the mortgage suit (as legal representative) and thus the decree was binding on him; the plaintiff's present contention was barred by res judicata.
- The defendant also argued that the present suit was barred by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gulli v. Sawan | Legal representatives are appointed merely to enable the suit to proceed; they take the suit where it was left and cannot assert their own individual or hostile title not open to the deceased. | Used to conclude that the plaintiff, as legal representative, could only make defences appropriate to his character as legal representative and could not raise new personal defences (e.g., a personal challenge to the mortgagor's capacity to mortgage beyond his life). |
| Thavazhi v. San Kunni | If a legal representative wants to raise a new point the deceased could not have raised, he must be impleaded in his personal capacity or challenge the decree in a separate suit. | Applied to show that the plaintiff could not, in the capacity in which he was impleaded in the mortgage suit, raise a new personal title argument; he needed separate impleadment or a separate suit. |
| Bam Ugrah v. Ganesh Singh (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court) | Affirms the rule that legal representatives cannot raise personal rights not available to the deceased in the original suit. | Reinforced the Court's view that the plaintiff could not have raised his independent challenge in the original mortgage suit without being impleaded personally. |
| Jayram v. Narayan | A mortgagor cannot question his own right to mortgage the property mortgaged by him (estoppel against mortgagor challenging his own mortgage). | Relied upon to explain that because the mortgagor (the plaintiff's father) purportedly mortgaged the whole land and did not reserve only a life-interest, he was estopped from challenging that act; consequently the legal representative could not assert a defence the deceased could not have made. |
| Lloyds Bank Ltd., Lahore v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi | An executing Court cannot entertain a challenge to the validity of a decree (even if based on the legal representative's independent title) under s. 47 CPC; such challenges must be raised by separate suit. | Applied to hold that the executing Court was correct in refusing to go behind the decree and that a challenge to the decree's validity must be by separate suit (supporting that s. 47 does not permit deciding the matter in execution). |
| Taiyagouda v. Mohodin | An executing Court cannot inquire into the legality of a decree; otherwise it would act as an appellate court and there would be no end to litigation. | Used to support the conclusion that the executing Court could not rule on the legality of the mortgage decree and so the plaintiff's remedy was a separate suit. |
| Ganesh v. Bhausaheb (Fawcett, J.) | A decree based on a mortgage that does not enure after the mortgagor's death (because of statutory or other incapacity) is void as against the mortgagor's heirs; "Such a decree cannot be put on any higher footing than the transaction of mortgage on which it is based." | Applied to hold that because no Provincial Government permission (s. 5, Bombay Hereditary Offices Act) had been obtained and the mortgage did not enure after death, the decree and sale were void as regards the vatan land and thus not binding on the plaintiff. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first examining the legal status of the plaintiff as a party in the mortgage suit. Under Order XXII, rule 4(2), CPC, a person made a party as a legal representative may make only such defences as are appropriate to his character as legal representative. Relying on Gulli v. Sawan and related authorities (including Thavazhi v. San Kunni and a Full Bench decision in Bam Ugrah v. Ganesh Singh), the Court held that legal representatives cannot assert personal or hostile titles which the deceased could not have asserted; to raise such a new point they must be impleaded in their personal capacity or bring a separate suit.
Applying this principle, the Court found that the deceased mortgagor could not have contended in the mortgage suit that he had no right to mortgage the vatan land (because, as the Court explains, a mortgagor cannot question his own mortgage — Jayram v. Narayan). The mortgage-deed did not reserve only a life-interest; it purported to mortgage the whole land. Therefore, the plaintiff, being merely the legal representative in the mortgage suit, could not have raised a personal challenge to his father's capacity to mortgage the vatan land in that proceeding. Consequently, the issue of the mortgagor's incapacity was not constructively in issue in the mortgage suit, and the present suit could not properly be said to be barred by res judicata.
The Court then addressed whether the present suit was barred under section 47, CPC, because the executing Court had refused to go behind the decree. The Court endorsed the principle in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi and Taiyagouda v. Mohodin that an executing Court cannot inquire into the legality of a decree (otherwise it would be acting as an appellate court). Therefore, the fact that the executing Court referred the plaintiff to a separate suit did not constitute a bar under s. 47; the present suit seeking to challenge the decree's binding effect on the vatan land was maintainable.
On the substantive point, it was admitted that no permission of the Provincial Government had been obtained under section 5 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act for mortgaging the vatan land. The Court applied the principle laid down by Fawcett, J., in Ganesh v. Bhausaheb that any decree based on such a mortgage cannot be put on any higher footing than the underlying transaction, and if the mortgage does not enure after the mortgagor's death, the decree is void as against the heirs. Consequently, the mortgage did not enure after Shidramappa's death and the decree ordering sale of the vatan land was not binding on his heirs; the sale executed under that decree was therefore void and conferred no title on the defendant as against the plaintiff.
The Court distinguished two related but different conclusions reached by the lower courts: while the trial Court held the decree itself to be null and void, the appellate (First Class Subordinate Judge) held the decree need not be treated as jurisdictionally void but nevertheless was not binding on the plaintiff so far as it affected the vatan land. Lokur, J. agreed with the latter characterization: the court which tried the mortgage suit was not said to have lacked jurisdiction to try the suit, but that portion of the decree ordering sale of the vatan land was not binding on the mortgagor's heirs.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
Direct consequences and relief granted:
- The plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs granted by the lower appellate Court: a declaration that the auction sale in execution of the mortgage decree did not affect the plaintiff's independent interest in the vatan land and did not convey that interest to the defendant; and injunctive relief restraining the defendant from executing the decree against the vatan land or taking possession from the plaintiff.
- The Court held the mortgage did not enure after the mortgagor's death (no Provincial Government permission under s. 5, Bombay Hereditary Offices Act), and therefore the decree and sale are void so far as the vatan land is concerned and are not binding on the plaintiff.
- The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles about the limited role of legal representatives in pending suits, the limits of executing Courts under section 47 CPC, and the effect of statutory limitations on alienation of vatan inam land. The Court did not indicate that it was announcing any new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case; the decision determines the parties' rights rather than creating a new precedent.
Source: Text of the opinion delivered by Lokur, J., as provided for summarization. This summary is confined strictly to the material present in that opinion.
Lokur, J.:—
The facts out of which this appeal arises are not in dispute. The plaintiff's father Shidramappa mortgaged his two lands, survey Nos. 383/1 and 383/1A, to the defendant Dareppa for Rs. 400 on June 24, 1929. Out of these two lands, survey No. 383/1A was rayatawa and survey No. 383.A1 was vatan inam which could not be alienated beyond the life-time of Shidramappa. The defendant filed suit No. 359 of 1925 against the mortgagor Shidramappa to recover the amount due on the mortgage by sale of the two mortgaged ands. During the pendency of the suit, Shidramappa died and the plaintiff was brought on record as his legal representative on October 26, 1926. The suit ended in a decree for Rs. 706 with costs and future interest payable by instalments and it directed that in case of default the mortgaged lands or a sufficient portion thereof should be sold and the amount realised. On a default in the payment of the instalments, the defendant executed the decre and both the lands were sold by auction and purchased by the defendant himself. In the execution proceedings the plaintiff contended that his father could not mortgage the vatan land beyond his life-time and that after his death the mortgage became void to that extent. But it was held that the executing Court could not go behind the decree and as the decree ordered the sale of both the vatan and non-vatan lands, the plaintiff's objection was not tenable. He was referred to a separate suit and he therefore, filed this suit for a declaration that the decree in suit No. 359 of 1935 was void and not binding against him so far as it affected the vatan land and for a declaration that the sale of the vatan land was illegal and did not confer any title on the defendant who had purchased it at the auction. The plaintiff also asked for an injunction restraining the defendant from taking possession of the suit land. The defendant contended that he was a vatandar of the same vatan to which the land in dispute belonged, that, therefore, the mortgage by the plaintiff's father in his favour beyond his life-time was valid, that the plaintiff was a party to the suit in which the decree was passed and therefore the decree was binding on him, that the plaintiff's contention was barred as res judicata and that the suit in the present form was barred under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Both the Courts below held that the defendant was not a vatandar of the same vatan and that being a finding of fact, the question does not arise in this second appeal. The trial Court further held that the mortgage of the vatan land was void after the death of the plaintiff's father, that the plaintiff as his father's legal representative could not raise that contention in suit No. 359 of 1935, that therefore his present contention was not barred as res judicata, and that the present suit was not barred under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It, therefore, gave the plaintiff a decree declaring that the decree in suit No. 359 of 1935 was null and void as regards the vatan land and that the sale of that land in execution of that decree was also null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. The defendant was restrained from executing the said decree against the said vatan land or from taking possession thereof from plaintiff. In granting the declaration the trial Court held that the Court which tried the mortgage suit had no jurisdiction to pass a mortgage decree against the vatan land and therefore it declared the decree itself to be null and void. But the learned First Class Subordinate Judge (with appellate powers) did not think the decree to be null and void, but held that it was not binding on the plaintiff. All the other findings recorded by the trial Court were confirmed and instead of the declaration granted by the trial Court, he granted a declaration that the auction sale in execution of the mortgage decree did not affect the plaintiff's own independent interest in the vatan land in suit and did not convey to the defendant that interest from the plaintiff. In other respects the decree of the trial Court was confirmed. The defendant has now come in second appeal.
The principal contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that he as the legal representative of his father in suit No. 359 of 1935 should have raised the contention that on his father's death the mortgage of the vatan land became ineffective and therefore no decree for its sale could be passed against him. It is, however, obvious that the plaintiff was not a party to that suit in his individual or personal capacity, but he was impleaded only as a legal representative of his father to proceed with the suit under O. XXII, r. 4, of the Civil Procedure Code. Sub-s. (2) of that rule says:—
“Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.”
This obviously means that he can make a defence only in his capacity as a legal representative of the deceased defendant. As observed in Gulli v. Sawan, when a party to a suit dies, his legal representatives are appointed merely in order that the suit might proceed, and a decision be arrived at. It is the rights and disabilities of the original parties that have to be considered and not those of the legal representatives themselves. All that the legal representatives can, therefore, do is to take up the suit at the stage at which it was left when the original party died and to continue it. It is not open to them to assert their own individual or hostile title to the suit. It follows, therefore, that if any defence to the suit was not open to the deceased defendant, his legal representative would not be at liberty to plead that defence. If, for instance the deceased defendant was estopped from putting forward any defence, his legal representatives, though not themselves similarly estopped, would not be at liberty to put forward that defence. That would be allowing the legal representatives to set up or agitate a new ox individual right, and not open to them to put forward any personal defence. As held in Thavazhi v. San Kunni, if a legal representative wants to raise any new point which the deceased party could not have raised, he must get himself impleaded in his personal capacity or he must challenge the decree in a separate suit. The same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bam Ugrah v. Ganesh Singh.
Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it is obvious that the plaintiff's father could not have contended in the mortgagee's suit that he had no fight to mortgage the vatan land as he had not obtained the permission of the Provincial Government as required by s. 5 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act. It is well settled that a mortgagor cannot question his own right to mortgage the property mortgaged by him [Jayram v. Narayan. The plaintiff's father did not state in his mortgage-deed Exhibit 7, passed in favour of the defendant that he was mortgaging only his own life interest in the vatan land, but he purported to mortgage the entire land as if it was his non-vatan property. If he was estopped from challenging his own right mortgage the vatan land beyond his life-time, the defence which the plaintiff as his legal representative could put forward was also subject to the same disability and he could not plead that his father could not mortgage the vatan land beyond his life-time. If he wanted to dispute his father's capacity to mortgage the vatan land, he should have got himself impleaded independently as a co-defendant. But he was not made a party to the suit in his personal capacity and as he could not then raise the question that after his father's death the mortgage of the vatan land came to an end, the question cannot be said to have been constructively in issue in that suit. The present suit to have that queston decided is, therefore, not barred as res judicata.
It follows from this that there can be no bar of s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code to the present suit. In fact in the execution proceedings the plaintiff did raise the same question which he has raised in the present suit and it was rightly held that the executing Court could not go behind the decree and if the plaintiff wanted to challenge the validity of the decree he must do so by a separate suit. Once a decree was passed ordering the sale of the mortgaged property for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt, any claim by the judgment-debtor or his legal representative that the property or any part of it was not liable for sale in execution of the decree would be a claim challenging the validity of the decree, and as held in Lloyds Bank Ltd., Lahore v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi such a claim even though based on the legal representative's own independent title could not be entertained by the executing Court under s. 47, but must be put forward by means of a separate suit. A similar view was taken in Taiyagouda v. Mohodin, where it was held that when once a decree was made against certain property the judgment-debtor could not contend in execution that the property decreed against could not be so treated and executed against “An executing Court cannot inquire into the legality of a decree; otherwise there will be no end to litigation, and it would be acting as an appellate Court.” I, therefore, agree with the view taken by the lower Courts that the present suit is not barred under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The result is that the plaintiff can now contend that the decree in suit No. 359 of 1935 is not binding on him in so far as it directs the sale of the vatan land. It is admitted that no permission of the Provincial Government was taken by the plaintiff's father for mortgaging the vatan land, and therefore, the mortgage of the land did not enure after his death for the mortgagee's benefit. As held by Fawcett, J. in Ganesh v. Bhausaheb, at p. 1039, any decree based on such a mortgage is, after the mortgagor's death, void as against the mortgagor's heirs:
“Such a decree cannot be put on any higher footing than the transaction of mortgage on which it is based.”
And as the mortgage became void after the mortgagor's death, the decree also must be treated as void so far as the mortgaged vatan land is concerned. Hence the sale of the vatan land in execution of such a decree is also void and not binding on the plaintiff. I agree with the view taken by the lower appellate Court that the Court which decided suit No. 359 of 1935 cannot be said to have no jurisdiction to try the suit, but that part of the decree which ordered the sale of the vatan land after the death of the vatandar mortgagor is not binding on the mortgagor's heirs, and hence the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs granted to him by the lower appellate Court.
I dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
P.A.D
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